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© FIojlHTHSAaT, 1981
English translation (C Progress Publishers 1984 Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
0505030202--149
32--84
014(01)-84 0505030202
[2]CONTENTS
Page ~
PoaaiiOB ~
The Secret Weapon of the Fascists........ 5
The Failure of the "Watch on the Rhine" Operation . . 23
Ribbentrop's Memorandum and the Crimean Conference 44
The Nazi "Special Missions Ambassador"...... 65
``The SS in Action"............. 91
Nazi Diplomacy in Its Death Throes........ 113
Admiral Doenitz'Twenty-Three Days of Diplomacy . . . 142
Conclusion................ 185
[3] ~ [4] __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE SECRET WEAPON OF THE FACSISTSThe largest collection of documents on the history of the Third Reich is stored in a grey three-story building on a quiet Munich street, away from the city's centre with its famous Frauenkirche's twin bell towers, and away from the busy side-streets of the student Schwabing. Here, in the West German Institute of Modern History, a card catalogue contains an index of all the significant events of the Third Reich---the acts of aggression prepared for and committed by the Nazis against the peoples of Europe and the brainwashing campaign conducted against the German people. There is a day- byday account of the activities of the Nazi leaders, including their discussions on political and military matters. Nevertheless, these extensive archives contain no document concerning the meeting which took place at Hitler's residence in Obersalzberg on July 6, 1944, despite its crucial significance for understanding the foreign policy strategy and tactics of the Reich's ruling circles at the close of its bloody twelve-year history.
Not even Hitler's official stenographers, who were charged with recording their leader's speeches and even his table conversations "for history and posterity'', were allowed into the meeting. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the high command of the German Army's General Headquaters---Field-Marshal Keitel, Colonel-General Jodl and the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel-General 5 Zeitsler---were not invited to attend. Bormann and Himmler were present, but most Nazi leaders were not, including Goering and Ribbentrop who, when tried for war crimes at Nuremberg, exposed many of the atrocities committed by the fascist Reich. Even the Nuremberg records do not mention the July 6, 1944 meeting.
In order to understand why this secret meeting was held, it is important to understand the position the Nazi leaders found themselves in by the summer of 1944. That the Nazis would be defeated became evident after the German Army was routed at Stalingrad and Kursk. Moreover the developments on the German-Soviet Front in the summer of 1944 made it clear that this defeat would come in a matter of months. German forces in Byelorussia suffered severe losses after the Soviet Army began to attack their positions on June 23. A 400-km breach, which led directly to Berlin, was forced at the centre of the front; and the Nazis could not possibly repair it quickly enough. The fighting was rapidly advancing towards the country which had unleashed it, fascist Germany and the countries of Southeastern Europe were being successfully liberated. On June 6, 1944, the Allies finally landed in France. Germany was feeling the heat of the war for the first time and was battling on both eastern and western fronts. The country was becoming increasingly isolated; the aggressive coalition the Nazis had put together in Europe was falling apart. Italy had dropped out of the fascist bloc in 1943, and Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary were negotiating with the USSR, Great Britain and the USA in the summer of 1944 about severing ties with fascist Germany.
The Soviet Army's decisive victories strengthened 6 the resolve of freedom-seeking peoples and states. By the summer of 1944, there were approximately 50 countries at war with Germany. The leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain issued a Declaration of the Three Powers stating that the "common understanding which we have reached here guarantees that victory will be ours. No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless and = increasing."^^1^^
Under the circumstances, Germany found itself in a deep political crisis, which was centred on the growing discord between different factions of the ruling camp about how to avoid the coming catastrophe.
Directors of military-industrial concerns, influential bankers and reactionary generals, who had pledged the Nazi Party and Hitler their unlimited support, now had to rethink their position. They discussed whether keeping Hitler as F\"uhrer would lead to the complete defeat of German forces by the Soviet Army and whether anti-fascists within the country would take advantage of the situation to destroy the Nazi leadership and those who supported it. Influential monopoly and military circles were counting on making a deal with the US and Great Britain in order to avoid an unconditional surrender and thereby preserve the wealth they had stolen from occupied territories, escape responsibility for the accessory role they had played in the bloody deeds committed by the Nazis and main- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Foreign Relations of the United Stales. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961, pp. 640--41.
7 tain Germany's reactionary system under a new name. It was clear, however, that as long as the man the world considered to be a murderer was in power, neither the Americans nor the British would allow their governments to enter into any kind of negotiations with Germany, especially behind the back of their ally, the Soviet Union.Both the monopolies and the military were counting on Hitler's removal from office to throw the countries into confusion, to create the illusion of ``democratisation'' and thereby provide the leaders of the United States and Great Britain with the opportunity to deal with the German imperialists.
The same people who had brought Hitler to power were now anxious to get rid of their unsuccessful F\"uhrer. The ``conspirators'' included Kurt von Schroder, a Cologne banker at whose villa on January 5, 1933, it was decided that the Nazis would rule Germany, and Robert Pferdmenges, another banker from Cologne and the future ``godfather'' of West Germany. It was at Pferdmenges' apartment in October 1949, that the first FRG government was formed under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer. When Pferdmenges was suspected of taking part in the conspiracy against Hitler, the influential Chief of the SS Security Service, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, made sure that nothing came of it. Pferdmenges and his accomplices intended to replace the fascist distatorship with a militaryclerical dictatorship of Christian-Democrats.^^1^^
General Ludwig Beck, the leading representative of the Prussian military, was supposed to head the new government. The man chosen to replace Hitler _-_-_
~^^1^^ Hans Adamo, Die CDU/CSU. Wesen und Politik, Verlag Marxistische Blatter, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, pp. 27--30.
8 as chancellor, Carl Goerdeler, was a close friend of Robert Bosch. Bosch owned a large electrotechnical firm and his brother was the president of the I. G. Farbenindustrie Board of Directors. Goerdeler was also friendly with the Krupp family and was to have been appointed a member of the Board of the family firm. Ewald Loser, general director of a large business concern, was selected as the future government's finance minister, while Adam Trott zu Solz, a close friend of Friedrich Flick, was chosen to head another ministry. The foreign policy of the "post-Hitler government" was worked out under the close direction of Ulrich Hassel, owner of the Gutehoffnungshutte metallurgy foundry and the man designated to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.At the same time that plans were being made to remove Hitler from office, the future leaders of the German government were desperately trying to make a pact with the West against the Soviet Union. Naturally, the proposals made by the representatives of German monopolies varied depending on the military and political situation at the time, but they were always aggressive. Goerdeler privately admitted to the close circle of conspirators that he envisaged a Germany which would "first seize the economic and then political leadership of Europe".^^1^^
German monopolies and their proxies, the "July 20th = conspirators'',^^2^^ formulated their foreign policy _-_-_
~^^1^^ Europastrategien des deutschen Kapilals 1900--1945, Herausgegeben von Reinhard Opitz, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Koln, 1977, p. 805.
^^2^^ The German political and military figures who unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944.
9 goals and planned the post-war world order in a number of documents. Swedish banker Jacob Wallenberg carried these documents to England while Allen Dulles, who had been stationed in Switzerland since 1942 as the head of the European Bureau of the US Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), took them to the American government.Dulles and the American reactionaries who supported him believed that the success of this highlevel conspiracy in Berlin would keep other European countries from taking full advantage of the victory which was near at hand and would obstruct the Soviet Army's liberation efforts.
George Schuster was sent as a secret emissary of American monopolies to one of the conspirators, Konrad Adenauer, with the suggestion that he " consider the possibility" of becoming chancellor of post-war Germany.
Most of the documents the ``conspirators'' sent to London and Washington were written by " Chancellor" Goerdeler and "Minister of Foreign Affairs" von Hassel. Von Hassel's memorandum, written in 1943, chiefly proposed that the West not insist on Germany's unconditional surrender and that ``post-Hitler'' Germany conclude anti-Soviet pacts with the Western Allies. For their concessions to the West---withdrawing German forces from occupied European countries and ``refusing'' to acquire colonies---the monopolists demanded as ``compensation'' a free hand in the East--- recognition of Germany's seizure and forced annexation of Austria, the western parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda.
In the first half of 1944 Goerdeler devised the aggressive aspirations of the German imperialists into two plans and sent them to Dulles through the 10 German vice-consul in Zurich, Hans Gisevius. In the first plan, demands were made that German monopolies be allowed to maintain their presence in the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and that Germany's colonies be ``returned'' or that the country be given colonial regions of equal value. The second plan pressed for even more aggressive claims---Germany demanded the annexation of the Southern Tirol region of Italy.
Since the Nazis had failed to reshape the world to benefit German imperialism, the "July 20th conspirators" were planning a ``peaceful'' economic conquest of Europe and overseas territories. They therefore wished to preserve the economic power of imperialist Germany after the war and to provoke disputes between Western powers.
The "July 20th conspirators" thought to strengthen the rule of German monopolies in post-war Europe by creating an "Economic Structure of Europe" where Germany would "lead the European bloc" and play the same role in it "as Prussia in Germany".
This Europe was to have one ministry of economics, a single body to manage the colonies, one police and military force and a united Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the summer of 1944 Paul Heinrichs, the executive director of the Carl Zeiss concern, wrote to the head of the German-American industrial union, H. E. Miinck: "You are also convinced that a healthy Europe is impossible without an economically powerful = Germany."^^1^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ Reinard Kiihnl, Der deutsche Faschismus in Quellen and Dokumenten, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Koln, 1975, p. 339.
11German monopolies did not rule out the support of big capital from the US for their ``peaceful'' post-war enslavement of Europe. Their plans were based on the anti-Soviet sentiments of reactionary Western leaders, their fear of the "communist threat".
The strategy of the leading German monopolies and the "July 20th conspirators" associated with them called for inducing the governments of those Western countries with anti-Soviet and anti- communist monopoly circles and reactionary politicians to break-up the anti-Hitler coalition and enter into anti-Soviet pacts with German imperialists who had given up the Hitler "fa9ade" for a more pleasing appearance to the West.
``Conspiracy'' documents which have now been made public prove that the German monopolies planned to accomplish their coup d'etat as quickly as possible (in less than 36 hours) and proclaim a ``new'' German government. It would then be possible for the Germans to pursue their aggression in the East, since they would have already made separate deals with the US and Great Britain.
In the second plan, German troops in the West would be transferred to the East in order to hold the line at the Soviet-German Front at any cost. Moreover, the conspirators deliriously imagined German and English troops joining forces to push the Soviet Army as far east as possible. This would have satisfied both the German imperialists and reactionaries in the West. Goerdeler wrote, "We must transfer the armies in the West to the East in order to force the Russians back to the Chudskoye Lake-Dniester line and thereby free ourselves and Great Britain from a grave threat... 12 The development of relations with Great Britain along these lines is politically possible."^^1^^
Even the crushing defeats the Nazis suffered at the German-Soviet Front did not bring the German monopolists and "July 20th conspirators" to their senses. The new Reich under its cherished name--- the Economic Structure of Europe---intended to mark its eastern boundary in the Smolensk region, if not further east.
Just like the Nazis, the "July 20th conspirators" had written off the Soviet Union, but, at the same time, they were not above blackmailing the West with the possibility of conducting talks with the Soviet Union. Von Hassel mentions in his diary that the possibility of approaching the Soviet Union was discussed among the conspirators. Hassel admits that the Germans would make this approach only to pressure the West with the possibility of an " agreement with the Russians''. Peter Hoffmann, a Canadian scholar, researched the documents of the "July 20th conspiracy" and concluded that "there is not a single statement made by the leaders of the conspiracy as to the readiness to cease military action on the Western or Eastern = Front".^^2^^
The conspirators were becoming more interested in opening the Western Front in order to counter the victorious advance of the Soviet Army. As early as March, 1944, a memorandum was sent to the US government through Dulles stating the willingness of the conspirators to surrender to British and American forces if the West would not demand an unconditional surrender on all _-_-_
~^^1^^ Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die Deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1954, p. 536.
~^^2^^ Die Zeit, December 29, 1978.
13 fronts, i. e., if they could continue their war with the Soviet Union.It was not just the disastrous turn of the war on the German-Soviet Front which pushed the German monopolies and the conspirators to make a deal with the West as quickly as possible in 1944. When British and American troops landed in Western Europe, the conspirators saw a real opportunity to rely on reactionary forces in the West to stop the advance of the Soviet Army. With the Allies in Normandy, the Germans could at last open the way for them.
Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel's papers, which have only recently been made public, have been able to shed some light on what the conspirators were planning in this respect. After opening a second front with the Allies, Hitler placed Rommel in command of army group ``B''. These were the troops stationed in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. According to Rommel's papers, the conspirators were trying to persuade him, Field-Marshal Giinther Kluge, Commander-in-Chief of German troops in the West, and their top officers to join them. These men were needed to carry out the conspirators' plans for an immediate cease-fire in the West and to open a path to the east which would allow the Americans and British to advance to confront the Soviet Army.
Even high-ranking officers on the Soviet- German Front, who would have to "fight to the finish" in order to give the conspirators the opportunity to make a deal with the West, were not informed of these plans. On July 15, 1944, Rommel wrote Kluge concerning the developments on the German-Soviet Front: "The unequal struggle is drawing to a close. It is my opinion that a political 14 solution be found to the present situation. As commander of an army group, I feel it is my duty to state this clearly.'' The following day, Rommel informed his advisor Admiral Ruge: "The destruction will occur in four weeks. Therefore, a political solution must be found as soon as possible. We must take advantage of the contention among the Allies. It would be best if the F\"uhrer himself took care of the = matter."^^1^^ Rommel was prepared to travel to Hitler's headquaters to get his approval for an immediate meeting with the commander of the 21st group of Allied Forces, British Field-Marshal Montgomery. Rommel told one of his trusted officers: "I want to persuade him to find some way we could work together against the = Russians."^^2^^
The conspirators did not wait for Hitler to act. They devised a plan which Dulles carried to London and Washington. The plan, in effect, was for the conspirators to allow American and British troops to occupy Germany and help the Germans to hold the front against the Soviet troops. Three British-American airborne divisions were to land in the Berlin region in order to prevent the city's capture by the Soviet Army and large-scale amphibious operations were to be conducted in the Hamburg and Bremen regions. The German generals themselves were to be responsible for ``isolating'' Hitler. Gisevius later wrote that they were counting on the British and Americans to reach the Konigsberg---Prague---Vienna---Budapest line first. This would make it possible for certain circles in the US and Great Britain to preserve the reac- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Der Spiegel, No. 38, September 18, 1978, p. 196.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 192.
15 tionary political regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Germany, despite the agreements between the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.The well-known English historian David Irving writes that "in return" for withdrawing German troops from France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the two Field-Marshals---Rommel and Kluge--- wanted Washington and London to give them a free hand in the East. In planning their foreign policy, the conspirators made a serious error; imperialist Germany would never have a "free hand''. Only the most diehard adventurers from the reactionary circles of the West still hoped that it would be possible to return to the same anti-Soviet policy of the Munich deal type, even though this was clearly not what the people of the US, Great Britain and other allied countries wanted.
Irving writes: "That a shrewd general like Speidel should seriously expect the British and Americans to abandon their war aims, let alone the doctrine of unconditional surrender, while leaving Hitler's conquests in the east intact, shows the land of illusions in which the conspirators were living."^^1^^
The conspirators devised a foreign policy which would ``remove'' the USSR, the leading force in the anti-Nazi coalition and the country which was winning decisive victories over the German Nazis, from deciding vitally important international matters. They also planned to put together a united anti-Soviet front. This clearly shows that although _-_-_
~^^1^^ David Irving, The Trail of the Fox. The Life of FieldMarshal Erwin Rommel, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1977, p. 375.
16 the foreign policy of the conspirators was but a refrain of the same anti-Soviet policy of German imperialism---to turn all of Europe into a German estate while purporting to defend the countries from communism---German imperialists were still unable to figure out the real balance of power in the world. Only the most fanatic adventurers with visions of European and world domination could believe that the people whose countries were fighting against Hitler would agree to peace terms that would allow imperialist Germany to retain many of its conquests and its dominant position in Europe. They were counting on a separate peace with the West without taking into consideration the will of the people whose blood had been shed in the struggle against fascist enslavement and the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the war. The conspirators were building castles in the air.The F\"uhrer and his accomplices were also trying to think of a way to save the Third Reich. It is widely reported in bourgeois literature that the German leadership was sticking to a policy of extremes in the final months of the war: all or nothing--- military victory or total destruction. To prove the point, the public speeches of Nazi leaders, which were usually mere propaganda and intended for the German populace, are referred to. West German scholar Hermann Jung correctly observes that " Hitler was by no means categorically opposed to a political solution to the war''. And this was also true of other fascist leaders.
The fact is that immediately after German troops were defeated at Kursk in September 1943, Hitler had an interesting conversation with Joseph Goebbels who, along with Bormann, had become one of the F\"uhrer's most trusted officers. Goeb- 17 bels warned Hitler that "it would be difficult for Germany to wage war on both sides".
In April 1944, Hitler directed Goebbels to draft a memorandum. Goebbels wrote that Germany had finally exhausted its strength and that "it would be in the interests of Western civilisation to come to peace with the Americans and British''. He also proposed that Ribbentrop, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, be removed from office since the West considered him to be anti-British. Goebbels stated that he was willing to perform this difficult duty himself.
A number of Nazi documents detail the possible conditions and terms for a political settlement with the West. All their plans were based on the illusion that it was impossible for the Allies to remain united much longer. Hitler and his advisors had based their unrealistic hopes of escaping military defeat and responsibility for their heinous crimes on exaggerated disagreements among the Allies. The F\"uhrer told his subordinate officers: "Soon the disagreements among the Allies will become so great that nothing will be able to prevent them from breaking apart. We need only wait for this to happen.'' The Nazis pinned especially high hopes on pro-fascist circles in the US, which had attacked President Roosevelt's policies, and supporters of the Munich Deal in Great Britain. Hitler and his aides were counting on growing discord among the Allies to allow these Western circles to effectively influence American and British foreign policy.
Despite their claims to the contrary, the Nazis did not intend to passively observe the development of events. The way to stir up dissent among the Allies was to use the "Soviet threat" to frighten 18 the West. After Nazi troops were defeated at Stalingrad and Kursk, Goebbels' propaganda centred on the need for the West to unite in order to stop the "Red invasion''. It was at this time that Hitler thought up the notorious lie of an "iron curtain" which would supposedly seal Europe off from the rest of the world in the event of a Soviet victory. During the years of the cold war, Churchill and other anti-Sovietists revived this lie.
It is clear that both the Nazis and those who wished to replace them in office---the "July 20th conspirators"---took advantage of anti-communist sentiment. The conspirators' plans to reshape the world after the war differed little from those of the Nazi leadership. Both groups were controlled by the real leaders of Nazi Germany---the millitary-industrial monopolies. As early as 1943, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a plan to Hitler that called for creating a "European Confederation" after the war. The members of this confederation would "unite in the struggle against Bolshevism'', "defend the economic interests of Europe and its African territories."^^1^^
Despite the similarities between the plans of the Nazis and the conspirators, there were some differences. While the monopolies and the conspirators associated with them were prepared to sacrifice the trappings of fascism and Hitler himself in order to preserve Germany's imperialist base and to hold on to what they had stolen, Hitler and his closest advisors were adamant in maintaining their fascist form of government. Whereas the conspirators had _-_-_
~^^1^^ Ulrike Horster-Philipps, Wer war Kilter wirklich? Grosskapital and Faschismus 1918--1945. Dokumente, Pahl- Rugenstain Verlag, Koln, 1978, pp. 348--49.
19 been forced to agree to Germany's possible occupation by Allied forces, this was completely unacceptable to the Nazi leadership as it would cost them their political careers and even their lives. Therefore, it was absolutely imperative that the Nazis stabilise the military situation at the fronts. They believed that this would allow them to conduct talks with the West, if not from a position of strength, at least as an equal power. In the summer of 1944 Hitler told his closest associates: "We can only proceed from a position of military strength''. Since the Germans could never in their wildest fantasies hope to achieve victory on the GermanSoviet Front, they were waiting for a lull in the fighting in the East to strike the British and American troops stationed in France. At this precise moment and not before, the Nazis were to use their "secret weapon"---an anti-Soviet deal worked out through diplomatic negotiations. The Nazi strategy in the summer of 1944 was to blackmail reactionary circles in the West with the "Soviet threat" and the "danger of communism for Europe''. By frightening the US and Great Britain with the ``power'' of Nazi Germany, the Nazis thought to get the governments of these two countries to renounce their obligations to fight together with the Soviet Union for Germany's unconditional surrender. Such a political agreement with the Nazis would preserve German imperialism in the form of a Nazi dictatorship.The financial and industrial leaders of Germany knew that the Nazis' plans required time, and there was no time. In July, 1944, the German Front in the East was torn apart. Reserve troops, which could have been used for the "diplomatic demarche" against the British and Americans, were sent to 20 the Eastern Front. The question of who would lead Germany out of the war with the least losses and who would negotiate with the West---Nazi leaders or the "July 20th conspirators"---was decided in financial and industrial circles in favour of the conspirators.
Suspecting that those who had brought him to power and had supported him throughout his rule were now turning against him, Hitler took the extraordinary measure of inviting the heads of the most influential banking businesses and industrial monopolies to a secret meeting at Obersalzberg on July 6, 1944. At Hilter's request the Director of War Production, Albert Speer (who was also Hitler's longtime friend and a leading representative of the monopolies in the fascist government), made the arrangements for inviting these distinguished guests. Some of those invited, including Gustav Krupp and Friedrich Flick sent word that they were too ill to attend.
Hitler spoke for ninety munutes, but it was not his usual pompous speech. After describing the difficult military situation, he did not merely ask, but begged his audience to give him time to "straighten out the situation''. He reminded his listeners of how he had helped German industry and asked that they continue to trust him. It was at this meeting that Hitler revealed the plans of the Nazi leadership: to strike American and British forces stationed in France at the first opportunity and then offer to negotiate with the US and British governments.
At the same time, Hitler tried to frighten the bankers and industialists by saying that they could not remain rich and powerful without him: "You think that without me you will be spared. But some 21 of you will be shot and the others sent to Siberia.''
However, Hitler's guests obviously did not believe that he could stop the attack of Soviet troops and change the military situation. And they wanted to avoid any connection with a leader on the brink of disaster.
Therefore, the meeting did not produce the results Hitler intended. After listening to the F\"uhrer's speech, the industrialists and bankers were even more determined to act as quickly as possible to remove Hitler and to start negotiating with the West without delay.
It was decided to go ahead with the longplanned assassination. On July 20, 1944, Hitler had returned from Obersalzberg to his Wolfschanze headquaters in Prussia, and it was there that the assassination attempt took place. Klaus Schenk von Stauffenberg, one of the highest-ranking officers in the German army and the Chief-of-Staff of the Reserve Army, exploded a bomb in the room where Hitler was conducting a military briefing. The assassination attempt failed: Hitler escaped with only superficial cuts and bruises.
For the German bankers and monopolists who had inspired the "July 20th conspiracy'', this failure meant that they would now have to try and make an anti-Soviet deal with the reactionary circles of the West through Hitler rather than the conspirators.
Hitler had hardly recovered from the assassination attempt when he began to conduct measures which, if successful, would lead the way to a separate agreement with the West.
In August 1944 Goebbels' propaganda department began an intensive campaign about a new "secret weapon" which would soon turn the tide of 22 the war in Germany's favour. Nazi documents, however, clearly point to the fact that German leaders were counting heavily on negotiating an antiSoviet pact with the Allies.
__ALPHA_LVL1__ THE FAILURE OF THE ``WATCH ON THE RHINE'' OPERATIONAfter the July 20th assassination attempt, Nazi leaders devoted all their efforts---military, domestic and, of course, diplomatic---to creating favourable conditions for a separate deal with the West.
Working on the diplomatic angle, Himmler was assigned by the F\"uhrer to gain access to communication channels passing through Sweden and Switzerland between the conspirators and British and American government agencies. This would significantly facilitate matters from a technical standpoint. The Nazi secret service had already begun to investigate Goerdeler's and Hassel's overseas contacts and interrogation of the arrested conspirators revealed new details concerning their connections. Hitler was so interested in finding out about these connections and gaining access to them that he would spend the whole night poring over the notes taken at the interrogation of a conspirator and listening to the tapes. Ribbentropp, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Himmler were assigned by Hitler to maintain contacts with government agencies in the West.
German diplomacy was also unfolding in another direction. We should mention here earlier diplomatic action taken by the Nazis.
On May 10, 1941, a short time before the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, the world was stunned with the news that Rudolf Hess, deputy leader 23 of the Nazi party, Hitler's official successor and his trusted friend, had flown to England, a country at war with Germany. The Nazis hastened to proclaim Hess mentally unstable, while the English announced that the high-ranking official had fallen into a trap set by British intelligence. But secret files, which have now been made public, tell an altogether different story. Hess had been assigned by the F\"uhrer himself to a top-level diplomatic mission: would London agree to Hitler's peace terms, namely, the rule of fascist Germany on the European continent, recognition of Germany's ``interests'' in the mid-East and a free hand against the Soviet Union? In return for all this, Germany would recognise English dominance in the British empire. Hess' mission was not successful. The Churchill government recognised that the acceptance of these terms would be England's deathblow. Nevertheless, the Nazis never forgot that London had been prepared to discuss German "peace proposals" on the highest level.
In July 1944, for the first time since the failure of Hess' mission, the Nazis officially formulated their "peace proposals" to the West. Following Hitler's orders, Himmler told an audience in Bistsher that Germany was prepared to "be satisfied" with expanding the Reich to include the Danes, Dutch and Norwegians in the West. In the East, the German "line of defense" would have to be moved eastward "at least 500 kilometres from the 1939 boundary''. In other words, as the grounds for a separate deal, the Germans were proposing that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and a large part of Belgium be included in the Reich on the West and that the Nazis be given a free hand in the East.
24Himmler's speech was not only addressed to the West, but also to monopoly and military circles in Germany itself. The Nazis were anxious to point out that they were as dedicated as ever to defending industry, banking and military interests.
On August 3, to emphasise its importance, Himmler repeated the foreign policy part of the speech practically word for word in Poznan.
It was at this time that Hitler informed General Westphal and General Krebbs of his intention "not to miss the opportunity to end the war with a political settlement''. The Chief of Staff of Germany's High Command, Field-Marshall Keitel, told an interrogating group of Soviet officers on June 17, 1945, that "since the summer of 1944 Germany had been waging war to win time, expecting those events which were supposed to occur but never did... expecting political events and partly expecting an improvement in the military = situation".^^1^^
In the area of domestic policy, the Nazis, while preparing the ground for the anti-Soviet deal, were trying to show both London and Washington and the German monopolies that they would not permit mass protests against the fascist dictatorship and would resort to terror to stop them. The execution of the "July 20th conspirators" marked the beginning of harsh reprisals against everyone suspected of anti-fascist activities. In the autumn of 1944 a so-called storm action was taken: thousands of people were arrested; the number of prisoners in concentration camps came to exceed 550,000; in a few weeks time, fascist tribunals sentenced 45,000 people to death (only 700 of which were connected _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Military-Historical Journal, No. 9, 1961, pp. 80--81 (in Russian).
25 with the conspiracy); thousands of anti-fascists were executed without trial. Anton Zaefkov, Franz Jacob and Bernhard Bastlein---leaders of Germany's underground Communist Party---were captured and tortured by the Nazis. On August 18, 1944, the leader of the German working class, Ernst Thalmann, was cruelly executed after eleven years of imprisonment and torture. Nazi terror struck the anti-fascist movement in Germany a severe blow.At the same time, Hitler's government started to take extraordinary measures to strengthen the military-economic base of the country and to prevent at all costs any further reduction in the number of army troops. On July 25, 1944, it was announced that Germany would be "totally mobilised" in order to "serve the war effort through all spheres of social life''. The working week was increased to 60 hours but, in reality, there was no fixed working day. Women were obligated to work, universities and colleges were closed and the students drafted into the army. Theatres and cinemas were shut down and no fiction was published. Passenger trains no longer commuted. The draft age was lowered to 16 years. Within three months (August---October) there were 500,000 new recruits in the German Army. But even these extraordinary measures could not maintain the desired number of German troops under the crushing blows delivered by the Soviet Army. As a result of heavy casualties suffered at the SovietGerman Front, the German Army lost almost 800,000 men in 1944. The number of troops fell from 10 million 169 thousand to 9 million 400 thousand.
By unmercifully exploitating German workers, forcing foreigners to work in military factories 26 and robbing occupied territories, the Germans managed to increase military production in the autumn of 1944. The amount of arms and military equipment produced that year was almost three times greater than that of 1941 and the highest level of production was achieved throughout the entire war.
Under the circumstances, the Nazi leadership thought the time for action had come. As has already been stated, the Nazis were planning to strike the Allies' positions in the West in order to demonstrate Germany's strength and to force the US and Great Britain to negotiate an honorable separate peace with Germany.
Hitler explained his plans to General Manteuffel by saying that it would be naive to hope to negotiate successfully while suffering military defeats; negotiations could only be conducted from a favourable military position, and that the Western powers would be more willing to accept a peaceful settlement if they were to lose a battle to the Germans.
As the Nazis began to prepare for operations on the Western Front, which were more political than military, they again underestimated the might of the Soviet Union, its powerful armed forces. In late September 1944, Keitel and Jodl came to the following conclusion: "The situation at the Eastern Front has stabilised after the Soviet summer offensive. We can count on a quiet period until the beginning of the winter offensive.'' Hitler agreed with this conclusion, but time would show that the Germans had no grounds for these calculations and that their plans were merely adventurous. Standing as they were on the brink of disaster, the fascists were gambling everything.
27As before, the German monopolies supported these unrealistic plans. On October 12, 1944, Hitler informed Speer: "We must put all other matters aside for this attack, no matter what the consequences.'' The F\"uhrer asked that he be given the opportunity to make a "last effort''. Speer writes in his memoires, "I was convinced that it was necessary to help Hitler in every way possible to 'play his last card'.'' After this conversation took place, the military-industrial concerns stepped up production in order to supply the coming offensive with military equipment.
German monopolists were counting on the success of Hitler's planned offensive and its favourable political consequences. At the end of the summer and during the autumn of 1944, these men were conducting one meeting after another to work out measures for developing the economic and political expansion of imperialist Germany after the separate deal with the West.
On August 10, 1944, a meeting was held at the Rotes Haus Hotel in Strasburg. The Krupp concern was represented by Dr. Kasper, Rochling by Dr. Tolle, Messerschmitt by Dr. Sinceren and Volkswagenwerke by Dr. Ellenmayer. There were also three representatives from Rheinmetall. It was decided at this meeting that each industrialist would immediately reestablish or increase his contacts with foreign firms. It was also recommended that funds be transferred to banks in neutral countries so that it would be possible "to obtain necessary capital from abroad after the war''. The Krupp concern was held up as a good example. This firm shared a patent on the production of stainless steel with the American Chemical Foundation Inc. and had mutual cooperation agreements with United 28 States Steel Corp., Carnegie Illinois and American Steel and Wire.^^1^^
Several weeks later representatives from Rochling, Hese and Krupp were present at another meeting. The representative of the Ministry for Munitions and Armaments, Dr. Bosse, stated that all previous bans on the transfer of German capital to other countries were being revoked and, moreover, the industrialists were being asked to support the German government by transferring as much capital as possible to other = countries.^^2^^
Secret Nazi documents have revealed that beginning on July 31, 1944, preparations for military operations in the West were in full force. On August 19, Hitler gave direct orders to prepare for a November offensive. In the next two months, 25 divisions were to be grouped and supplied with sufficient ammunition and fuel.
By the middle of September, the area of attack had been decided on. On September 16, 1944, after the usual briefing about the situation at the front, Hitler invited Keitel, Jodl, Guderian (the reappointed Army Chief of Staff) and Air Force General Kreipe into his private rooms. Jodl reported that in the last three months alone, German casualties had exceeded 1.2 million and that Finland was following Romania and Bulgaria in breaking ties with Germany. Jodl announced that if the tide of events did not turn, it was inevitable that the Allies would invade Germany. Hitler interrupted and poked the map with his finger: "We will cross the _-_-_
^^1^^ Gerhard Forster, Olaf Grohler, Der zweite Weltkrieg, Militarverlag, Berlin, 1972, pp. 283--85.
~^^2^^ Ulrike Horster-Philipps, Wer war Hitler wirklichl Op. cit., p. 352.
29 Maas and then on to Antwerp!" He immediately stressed that the offensive was to be more political than military. The Nazis were clearly dreaming of another Dunkerque for the British Army, but with a different political ending. The Germans planned to attack the area where American forces, which were stationed towards the South, met the British, and to penetrate to the North Sea and seize Antwerp. In this way, reasoned the Nazi government, 25--30 British divisions could be surrounded and destroyed. The Nazis were counting on this offensive to stir up British supporters of a deal with Germany, to drive a wedge between London and Washington and, finally, to force the Western powers to negotiate.At a September 25th briefing the primary goal of the coming offensive was discussed: the Allies had 62 divisions at the front. If the Nazis could destroy 30 of these, Germany would be in a better position and the situation would be "generally stabilised''. It seems that the Germans thought that after the offensive in the West "it would be possible to transfer troops to the East in order to repulse the anticipated Soviet winter offensive''. The Nazis considered it necessary to stabilise the Eastern Front in order to hold successful negotiations with the Allies. Therefore, this stabilisation was the most important goal of the Ardennes offensive.
Preparations for the military-political offensive were now in full force. In the Bonn region, seventeen-year-old recruits were being formed into the 6th panzer army of the SS. Hitler placed his favourite SS officer, General Josef Dietrich (praised in the official German propaganda as a "great Nazi general''), in command. General Kreipe was ordered to have a thousand fighters ready by November to provide aircover for attacking forces.
30On October 12, 1944, Hitler approved the plan submitted by Jodl. The plan called for a surprise attack and unfavourable flying conditions which would hinder aviation for the Allies. The Germans would penetrate the British-American front at the Ardennes between Monschau and Echternach, where there were only four divisions for a 100- kilometre sector and advance the 5th and 6th panzer armies of the SS, which, after crossing the Maas between Liege and Namur, would quickly take Antwerp. This would split the front and Montgomery's 21st Army Group would be cut off from its rear and forced to the sea. The operation was planned for the last ten days of November, giving from six to eight weeks for preparation. Hitler did not approve of Jodl's code-name for the operation, "Christmas Rose" ``(It should be over by Christmas,'' he said), and named it "Watch on the Rhine''. At the same time, the F\"uhrer rejected a plan proposed by Field-Marshal Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of German forces in the West, and Field-Marshal Model, the officer Hitler placed in command of the Ardennes operation ``(Autumn Fog''), to wage limited offensive operations against the British and Americans. Taking into consideration the available number of German troops and evaluating the military situation, which was clearly unfavourable to the Reich, both generals had suggested that the offensive be more localised and not pursue such far-reaching goals. Hitler told the two generals that perhaps their suggestions were reasonable from a military standpoint, but the coming operation was more political than military.
Jodl also stressed the political nature of the planned offensive in a speech he gave to the 31 commanders of the formations at the Western Front. He stated that the Allies would be thrown into a state of confusion for a long period and the enemy (the Allies) would be forced to reevaluate its policy. The Nazi leadership took extraordinary measures to convince the commanding officers at the Western Front of the importance of the coming operation and the necessity to "fight to the finish''. On December 11--12---several days before the planned offensive---two groups of division commanders were called into Rundstedt's headquaters. The officers' weapons and briefcases were taken and the men were driven to a large concrete bunker. This was Adlerhorst, Hitler's headquaters on the Western Front near the city of Bad Nauheim. The officers were led to the F\"uhrer through a standing guard of SS men. They were met by a hunched figure seated in an armchair; the face was deathly pale, the fingers trembled and the left hand constantly jerked. Stalingrad and Kursk had not only broken the back of fascist Germany, but the spirit of its F\"uhrer. An armed guard stood behind each officer. General Bayerlein, one of the panzer division commanders, later stated that the officers were so intimidated by the SS guards that "no one even dared reach for his handkerchief''. Hitler spoke to the officers for two hours, explaining what the divisions were to accomplish and the significance of the coming offensive---a German victory at the Ardennes would stabilise the Western Front and make it possible to transfer German troops to the East. The Nazi leadership was counting on a successful operation to raise the morale of the German people and also influence public opinion in the Allied countries. This was the last opportunity to gamble everything.
32Again it was emphasised that the offensive was to demonstrate Germany's strength to the Allies and open the way for negotiations.
The German Command was counting heavily on sabotage operations at the rear of British and American troops to make the offensive a success.
On October 12, immediately after approving the final plan for the Ardennes offensive, Hitler sent for SS officer Otto Skorzeny, who was " Gruppenleiter IVS" in the Imperial Security Agency. Skorzeny was known to have carried out secret missions for the F\"uhrer. In September 1943, he abducted Mussolini from prison and sent him to occupied German territory. Later, following Hitler's orders, he killed Admiral Horthy's son because he was trying to establish contacts with the US and Great Britain. This time the F\"uhrer put Skorzeny in charge of operation ``GREIF'' which was to ensure the rapid advance of Nazi troops after the Allied front was penetrated. Those Germans that spoke fluent English were organised into a special unit--- the 150th panzer brigade. Dressed in American uniforms, carrying weapons and riding in jeeps captured from the enemy, this unit was to seize the bridge across the Maas between Liege and Namur by surprise and cause panic and confusion among the Allied troops. To achieve this objective, Skorzeny was told to destroy the Allies' military headquaters and to kill high-ranking officers.
Paratroopers would be dropped in another sabotage operation (code-named Stosser) in order to block the road between Eipen and Malmedy, thereby impeding the Allies' transfer of reinforcements to the area of penetration.
The Ardennes offensive was extremely important for the Nazis and extraordinary measures were taken 33 to keep its preparations secret. Army and division commanders who were informed of the plans were ordered to keep them a guarded secret on pain of death. Hitler himself told Rundstedt, Chiefof-Staff that he would be immediately executed if word of the offensive were leaked to the enemy. The 5th panzer army was transferred from the Netherlands to the Ardennes at the last possible moment. Until then there had been rumours that it would be transferred to the East. To ensure the secrecy of the coming operation, German troops at the Western Front were issued orders on October 12, which stated that a counter-offensive was impossible at the present time because all military reserves were being sent to "strengthen the vitally important defence of the Fatherland in the East".
The Ardennes offensive was launched on December 16, 1944. Two incidents should be discussed here, for both played an important role in the development of military and diplomatic events. First, the Nazis were unable to organise the striking force they considered necessary for the success of their operation. Any withdrawal of forces from the Soviet-German Front, where the Germans had 185 divisions, 56,000 artillery pieces, 8,100 tanks and 4,100 combat aircraft, was completely out of question.^^1^^ Soviet troops were conducting a largescale offensive at the southern flank of the Eastern Front, carrying out active combat operations in the Baltic area and had entered Eastern Prussia. On December 4, 1944, a few days before the planned Ardennes offensive, Hitler distressfully informed Ferenc Szalasi, the head of the fascist Hungarian _-_-_
^^1^^ See: The History of the Second World War. 1939--1945, Vol. 10, Moscow, 1979, p. 37 (in Russian).
34 government, that it would soon be necessary to send the reserves that had been transferred to the Western Front back to the East because the Russians were planning a general offensive against Eastern Prussia and Upper Silesia in the near future. The Soviet-German Front continued to hold the main forces of the German Army, and the Nazis did not dare transfer a single division to the Ardennes. Therefore, it was impossible for them to put together powerful enough forces. The Germans had to rely on battle-weary troops and hastily assembled reserves. As a result, there were 21 divisions instead of the planned 25; 800 fighters instead of 1,000; the tanks had enough fuel for only half of the planned operations and some of the motor vehicles stood idle for lack of drivers.Nevertheless, German troops at first achieved a certain amount of success. Opposing American forces were unable to put up an organised resistance, and, after suffering a large number of casualties, began to retreat. The Allied Front had been penetrated. German panzer and motorised infantry divisions rushed through the 100-km breach. Ahead of these divisions, Skorzeny and his daring men dressed in American uniforms were wreaking havoc at the headquaters and rear units of the enemy. An American journalist, Ralph Ingersoll, witnessed the event and later wrote that enemy forces "were pouring through! it [the gap] like water through a blown dam. And on every road ahead of them to the west there were Americans fleeing for their = lives".^^1^^
On the fourth day of the offensive, German _-_-_
^^1^^ Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1946, p. 248
35 advance units were approaching Liege while the main forces of the 5th panzer army were moving towards a crossing of the Maas. It was a tense and complicated situation for the Allies. At the beginning stage of the operation, the element of surprise had offset the Nazis' inadequate number of troops and supplies.There have been many books published in the West about "Operation Ultra''. It turns out that even in 1940, the British succeeded in breaking the German military code, thus enabling them to have a fairly good idea of the military operations planned by the Nazis. In July 1945, General Eisenhower, Commander of the US Occupation Forces in Germany, sent a special telegramme thanking the head of "Operation Ultra'', General Menzies of Britain, for the valuable information. There is no need even to ponder why this "valuable information" was not shared with the Soviet Union---an ally bearing the brunt of the struggle against Nazi Germany. Churchill gave personal orders to suppress it.
This brings us to another matter. Why was the launching of the German offensive at the Ardennes a complete surprise for American and British troops? John Toland, a well-known historian who has researched the Battle at the Ardennes, writes: "All along the Ghost Front, from Echternach to Monschau, the 75,000 American troops made little note of midnight December 15. Those few who did felt only that they were one day closer to a Christmas far from = home."^^1^^ The commander of the 9th Army, General Hodges, was planning of- _-_-_
^^1^^ John Toland, Battle, The Story of the Bulge, Transworld Publishers, London, 1961, p. 21.
36 fensive operations. General Bradley, who commanded the US 12th Army Group was planning to leave the following morning for Allied headquarters near Paris to congratulate General Eisenhower on his promotion to the highest rank in the US Army---General of Army. An even more complacent mood prevailed at the headquaters of the 21st Army Group, which was positioned at the spearhead of the Nazi offensive. On the evening of December 15, the commanding officer, British Field-Marshal Montgomery, told his staff officers that the Germans "cannot stage major offensive operations''. He considered the situation at the Western Front to be so routine that he had asked General Eisenhower to grant him leave to spend Christmas at home in England. When the German offensive was launched, Field-Marshal Montgomery was in the Dutch city of Eindhoven where he had gone to play a few rounds of golf with one of the staff officers. The commanding officers of the Allied forces were surprised by the Nazi offensive because of political reasons, not by lack of information. London and Washington were aware that the Nazis had gained access to the channels of communication opened by the "July 20th conspirators" and so expected only diplomatic action from Berlin.Nazi leaders rejoiced at the initial success of the Ardennes offensive. Hitler immediately called Army Group ``C'' headquaters stationed in Italy: "Everything has changed in the West! Success--- complete success---is now in our grasp!"
German radio stations interrupted their broadcasts with an urgent bulletin: "Our troops are again on the offensive''. In his New Year's day radio address, Hitler announced that "Germany will rise like 37 a phoenix from its ruined cities''. Army Chief- ofStaff Heinz Guderian's orders for the New Year contained an assuring message: "The beacon of victory shines through the flames of battle.'' The Nazis' delight at the initial success of the Ardennes offensive was heightened by the thought that the enemy (the Western powers) would henceforth understand the futility of prolonging military action. There was only one thing to do: clear the way for a "political solution".
In order to strengthen their position at the bargaining table, which they considered to be close at hand, the Germans were taking measures to exploit their initial military success. On December 22, 1944, the Nazi leadership decided to expand the scale of operations while they still had the initiative and launch a number of new attacks against the British and = Americans.^^1^^
On December 27, Hitler explained the strategy of the Nazi leadership to his generals: "Only the offensive will enable us once more to give a successful turn to the war in the West."
On December 28, 1944, the Nazi Supreme Command approved the plan for operation "North Wind''. The plan called for forcing Eisenhower to withdraw some American forces from the Ardennes, thereby giving the German shock troops an opportunity to advance. On New Year's eve, eight divisions in Alsace under the command of FieldMarshal Blaskowitz, launched an offensive. The objective was to pin down as many enemy forces as possible. Next the commanding officers of the German army intended to renew the offensive _-_-_
^^1^^ John Toland, Battle, Op. cit., p. 236.
38 across the Maas to Antwerp. Model had already been given orders to begin preparing for the offensive. German shock troops were being mobilised for a new break-through in the West which the Nazis believed would result in appreciable political success. The Americans were expecting the Germans attack in other = areas.^^1^^However, on January 8, 1945 Hitler placed an urgent phone call to Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of the Western Front, and ordered him to immediately begin drawing troops back to their previous positions. The German armoured forces turned round 180 degrees and began to retreat as quickly as possible back to the East.
What happened the first week of January 1945 that forced the Nazis to hastily give up the idea of a renewed offensive? Here is where the Soviet factor played its role. Eisenhower in his cables to Washington had expressed his impatience for a beginning of a Soviet offensive in the East which would help to weaken the German attacks at the Ardennes. In a report to the War Department he stated that the tense situation would have been greatly relieved by the launching of a large-scale Russian = offensive.^^2^^
On December 24, 1944, both Roosevelt and Churchill cabled Stalin telegrams. Churchill wrote: "...Quite evidently Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are... We certainly have great need to know the main outlines and dates of your movements. Our confidence in the offensives to be of the Russian _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower. The War Years, Vol. IV, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1970, p. 2407.
^^2^^ See: The History of the Second World War. 1939--1945, Vol. 10, p. 238. (in Russian)
39 army is such that we have never asked you a question before and we are convinced now that the answer will be = reassuring."^^1^^ Roosevelt told Stalin that he wanted to direct Eisenhower to "send a fully qualified officer of his staff to Moscow to discuss with you Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern = Front".^^2^^ With Stalin's consent, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Arthur Tedder was sent to Moscow.On January 6, 1945, Eisenhower discussed with Churchill the urgent need for the Soviet help to ease the situation at the Western Front. Alarmed by the development of events, Churchill made a personal trip to Eisenhower's headquaters. Because Tedder's plane was unable to leave Cairo due to bad flying conditions, there was no news from Moscow. Eisenhower insisted that Churchill make an immediate appeal to Stalin for help. That evening Churchill sent Stalin the following telegram: "The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions... I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, _-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941--1945, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1957, p. 288.
~^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 177. 40
40 or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention. I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field-Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as = urgent."^^1^^Churchill's telegramme was received in Moscow on the evening of January 7. Stalin answered: "It is extremely important to take advantage of our superiority over the Germans in guns and aircraft. What we need for the purpose is clear flying weather and the absence of low mists that prevent aimed artillery fire. We are mounting an offensive, but at the moment the weather is unfavourable. Still, in view of our Allies' position on the Western Front, GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of the weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January. Rest assured we shall do all in our power to support the valient forces of our = Allies."^^2^^
Churchill replied on January 9: "I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I have sent it over to General Eisenhower for his eyes only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble = venture."^^3^^
When Eisenhower was informed of Stalin's message, he sent Churchill the following telegramme on January 10: "Your news is most = encouraging."^^4^^
The USSR came to the aid of American and British forces like a true ally. By January 1945 _-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence ..., Vol. 1, p. 294.
~^^2^^ Correspondence ..., Vol. 1, pp. 294--95.
~^^3^^ Correspondence ..., Vol. 1, p. 295.
~^^4^^ The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 2412.
41 the Soviet Supreme Command had concentrated a powerful attacking force to deal crushing blows against Nazi Germany. At the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukranian fronts alone there were more than 2.2 million men, more than 33,000 artillery pieces and mortars, over 7,000 tanks and more than 5,000 aircraft.Soviet forces were faced with important political objectives: Poland's liberation, providing favourable conditions for the final strike against Berlin, diverting some of the Nazi forces from the Western Front and helping the Allies out of a difficult situation.
Out of consideration for the Allies, the Supreme Command of the Soviet forces moved the date of the Russian offensive up from January 20 to January 12, 1945. One of the heaviest battles of the Second World War was fought that day. The Wisla-Oder operation covered a broad front--- from the Baltics to the Carpathians. The offensive resulted in the destruction of 60 Nazi divisions, the liberation of Poland and the laying of grounds for the final blow against Nazi Germany. On January 27, Churchill wrote Stalin: "We are spellbound by your glorious victories over the common foe and by the mighty forces you have brought into line against them. Accept our warmest thanks and congratulations on historic deeds."
In August 1945 after the war had ended, General Eisenhower told Marshal Zhukov that the Americans and British had long waited for the Soviet offensive and were relieved to learn of its success. He also told Zhukov that after the Soviet offensive the Allies were convinced that the Germans would not be able to reinforce the Western = Front.^^1^^
_-_-_^^1^^ G. K. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Thoughts, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1978, p. 372 (in Russian).
42But let us return to those first few days ol 1945. After January 6--7, the Allied Command in the West could operate knowing that the Soviet armies would soon be launching a powerful winter offensive which would decisively affect the German operations in the Ardennes.
The German Command was, of course, aware of the Soviet Union's accelerated preparations for a large-scale offensive. Documents in West Germany's military archives reveal that as early as November 10 Guderian was informed by German intelligence that Soviet troops were preparing for a winter offensive on the central sector of the Soviet-German Front, that is in the direction of Berlin. But the Nazis were counting on having the situation at the Ardennes under control before the Soviet offensive, so no action was taken. In November Guderian began pointing out at military briefings the immediate threat of the Soviet troop concentration.
On December 31, 1944, there came an even more alarming signal. Guderian received a memorandum which stated that the Soviet Army's preparations for a winter offensive were close to completion, and that, in all probability, the offensive would be launched on the central sector of the front. On January 5, 1945, Guderian made the following proposals to Hitler: first, that all support units stationed in the West be transferred immediately to the East; second, that these forces be concentrated in the Poznah region to counter-attack the Soviet shock forces; third, that an offensive be organised on the SovietGerman Front in order to weaken the planned Soviet offensive.
Naturally, these actions could be taken only if the German operations in the Ardennes were abruptly halted. But even the Nazi leaders, who
43 habitually underestimated the military might of the Soviet Union, were incredulous when Himmler announced at that January 5 meeting that the Russians were not in a position to launch an offensive.On January 8, the order was given for the 5th and 6th panzer armies, already spearheaded for a new offensive against British and American troops, to make an immediate withdrawal from the combat zone. The SS divisions were officially assigned to fend off an Allied attack. In fact, however, this was the first stage of transferring troops from the Ardennes to the Eastern Front.
On the first day of the Soviet offensive--- January 12---German divisions began to be rapidly transferred to the East. Eight divisions having 800 tanks and self-propelled guns were transferred before January 31.^^1^^ According to General Westphal, almost a third of the German combat forces at the Western Front were transferred to the East.
Thus ended the "Watch on the Rhine" operation. The Nazis' hopes for military and political success from the Ardennes offensive were shattered.
__ALPHA_LVL1__ RIBBENTROP'S MEMORANDUM AND THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCEThe Soviet Army's winter offensive had brought Germany face to face with inevitable military defeat. It was now only a matter of weeks before the Reich would fall.
The Wehrmacht had lost more than a half million in casualties. The war was now being fought on _-_-_
~^^1^^ See: The History of the Second World War. 1939--1945, Vol. 10, p. 239.
44 German territory, and the Nazis had left behind more than 100 munitions factories. Most important, they had lost Silesia---a heavy industry region, second only to the Ruhr. Their military-economic system of extortion, based on robbing and exploiting Nazi-occupied countries and peoples, was destroyed. The war of aggression had ceased to be profitable for German monopolies and no longer brought honour and glory to the Nazi leadership. The coming fall of the Reich would bring into question the very existence of the ruling elite.Under the circumstances, the powerful monopolies, which were closely associated with the military-industrial complex, and the leading generals demanded that Hitler, as the official head of the Reich's military-political government, immediately begin negotiating with the West. Their objective was a cease-fire in the West which would permit the transfer of Nazi troops to the East. The Soviet Army's inland offensive had to be stopped at all costs in order to preserve the German power structure.
Three trusted monopoly and government figures were charged with the task of informing Hitler of the ultimatum---the Minister of the War Economy Speer, Minister of Finance Schwerin von Krosigk and Army Chief-of-Staff Guderian.
Hitler was notified of the ultimatum immediately upon his return to Berlin from the Western Front on January 16, 1945. It was on the same day that Hitler and the Chief-of-Staff of Germany's High Command, Keitel, had decided to cancel the Ardennes operations. It was impossible to return to Wolfschanze, from where fascist politicians and military leaders had conducted the war on the Soviet-German and other fronts almost contin- 45 uously since the summer of 1941. Several days later Soviet troops took control over the region where Hitler's headquarters had been located. Soviet forces also approached the F\"uhrer's headquarters in Silesia near the city of BadCharlottenburg. The Nazis were sure they would not have to retreat further (28,000 workers had constructed a huge underground complex here. More concrete was used in its construction than was used to build bomb shelters for the entire civilian population). Nevertheless, in January 1945 the Germans were forced to abandon Silesia.
The fascist leaders' forced retreat to Berlin was by no means triumphant. The city's residents could not help but recall Hitler's arrogant arrival in the summer of 1940, after the fascist victory over France. It was at that time that Hitler moved into the imperial government offices---a huge, newlycompleted structure that occupied an entire block in the city's centre. The numerous square columns and high portals faced with marble from Sweden were designed to symbolise the greatness, power and stability of the "thousand-year Reich''. Here, in the large reception rooms, Nazi generals were presented with Field-Marshal batons and Goering, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was given the unique rank, Reichs Marshal.
Hitler's return to Berlin was different this time. Soviet troops were rapidly approaching the city, railway stations were overflowing with evacuees and entire city blocks had been levelled by American and British bombers. Even the imperial government offices had been hit. Many columns were no longer standing and paper and cardboard had replaced the glass in the buildings. Hitler had taken up residence in an eight-metre-thick concrete bunker beneath 46 the government offices.
Guderian informed Hitler at a regular military briefing that the war was lost from a military standpoint. He insisted that combat operations in the West be suspended without delay and' that all available forces, including those trapped in Kurland, be concentrated on the Oder. Those present at the briefing were startled .by Guderian's manner. Hitler's faithful lackey, who had always carried out his F\"uhrer's orders unquestioningly, was now behaving like a teacher trying to convince a dim-witted pupil of the necessity of taking definite action. But there was no cause for surprise: Guderian knew full well on whose behalf he was making demands.
That evening Hitler was handed a memorandum from Speer, who had a different opinion about what needed to be done. Since the war economy of the Reich was shattered, Speer wanted all military equipment and supplies to be transferred to the Eastern Front. He also stressed the need to reinforce General Schorner's forces in Silesia and proposed that, in addition, up to 50 per cent of the Reich's January military industrial production be directed to Silesia and that all the aircraft presently at the Western Front be transferred to the East.
Speer met personally with Hitler on January 21 and made a frank appeal for the withdrawal of forces from the West and their desposition on the Eastern Front.
But Hitler played for time. He had reason to believe that a separate deal with the West could decide his fate. Speer then tried a more effective tactic. On January 27 he handed Hitler a memorandum that had been signed by three hundred of the most influential German industrialists and bankers and their representatives in the war economy. The 47 memorandum told of the collapse of the economic sphere and called for urgent measures to be taken to preserve the country's industrial capacity for producing metal and electrical energy, and for retaining a base for providing industry with raw materails. The powerful industrialists from the Ruhr had already forgotten about the lost war and were now thinking about preserving their own economic base and how to shape the world in their interests. There was clearly only one thing for Hitler to do---immediately begin negotiating a cease-fire with the Americans and British. As always the commands of the real rulers of Germany were binding on the Nazi leaders. On February 5 Hitler asked Speer for the opportunity to draw the necessary conclusions from the present situation.
Minister of Finance Schwerin von Krosigk made the next move. He sent a letter to Hitler through Goebbels which stated that the "military situation at the present time is such that it is impossible to speak of political developments" and also recommended that such "old friends" of von Krosigk's as Carl Burckhardt and the Portuguese dictator Salazar be used as mediators to establish contacts with the Western powers.
Speer writes in his memoirs that "in February and March 1945 Hitler implied that he had already made various contacts with the enemy [Western powers]''. Speer added that he was not aware of the details of the negotiations. On the basis of available documents it is possible to reveal Germany's persistent and active diplomacy during the winter and spring of 1945, the objective of which was to conclude an anti-Soviet pact with the West.
Bourgeois historians are generally of the opinion that such well-known diplomatic endeavours as 48 ``Wolff's mission'', the "Himmler-Bernadotte nigotiations'', "Ribbentrop's memorandum" and so on, were sporadic and disorganised, that they were conducted without the F\"uhrer's knowledge or against his orders. They write that the Western powers unanimously rejected these manoeuvres and that even if negotiations were conducted at that time, the Allies would still have lived up to their obligations. Reimer Hansen, a West-German historian writes that "under the Nazis, no official negotiations about capitulation were = undertaken".^^1^^
What really took place? Secret documents of the Nazi government offer a detailed foreign policy plan for the last months of the Reich and specific activities coordinated by Berlin for the plan's implementation. Various members of the government took part in these activities---Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Himmler, head of the Security Service, and the military commanders of the Western and Italian fronts.
A kaleidoscope of events followed the demarche of the military-industrial circles and the generals. On January 17 Hitler told Ribbentrop the basic provisions of his "peace proposals" to the West. The top-ranking officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were called in to add the final touches. On January 19 the document, which was called " Ribbentrop's memorandum'', was given final approval by Hitler. It was basically a summary of all the ``peaceful'' demarches made by the Nazi government during its last months of existence. Moreover, in looking ahead, upon the Soviet capture of Berlin on May 2, 1945, Ribbentrop gave the memorandum _-_-_
~^^1^^ Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, Book 12, December 1967, p. 717.
49 to Hitler's ``successor'' Admiral Karl Doenitz to be used -as a framework for negotiations with the West. "Ribbentrop's memorandum" was first learned about from the memoirs of Nazi diplomat Fritz Hesse. Hesse was reputed to be a specialist on Britain in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before the war, as the German embassy's press-attache in London, Hesse performed sensitive missions for Ribbentrop. The day before Great Britain declared war on Germany---September 2, 1939---Hesse, acting on Ribbentrop's orders, met secretly with Horace Wilson, a trusted adviser of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. The meeting was an attempt to "iron things out''. As a counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the war, Hesse was attached to the F\"uhrer's headquarters and was among those who drafted the memorandum. But he gives a false account of his role in this affair in his memoirs. Hesse apparently wanted to whitewash Nazi diplomacy and its representatives who were condemned by the Nuremberg tribunal as accomplices and organisers of Nazi Germany's aggression. According to Hesse, in order to negotiate with the West, the Nazis were prepared to empty the concentration camps, cease persecuting opponents of Nazism, allow freedom of religion, release religious leaders from prison and permit the remaining Jews to emigrate to the West. Moreover, Hesse tried to imply that if the negotiations with the West were successful, the Nazi leadership intended to resign and "wipe the slate clean" for a "provisional government".^^1^^ _-_-_~^^1^^ Fritz Hesse, Das Spiel um Deutschland, Paul List Verlag, Miinchen, 1953, p. 397.
50 Swedish journalist Arvid Fredborg wrote an article about "Ribbentrop's memorandum" which was published in the Svenska Dagbladet newspaper. The article was based on information from Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and refuted Hesse's claims. Nevertheless, even today bourgeois historians of the Second World War refer to this memorandum. And they often refer to the fact that the original copy of the memorandum is missing. In West German archives, however, this writer managed to uncover a photocopy of the memorandum. The original is in the US along with a number of other German documents that were captured after the war.The memorandum begins with the myth of a "Soviet threat to the West'', which the Nazis often employed. If today's proponents of the cold war read Ribbentrop's memorandum, they would see that they did not originate the lie of the "Soviet threat''. In trying to intimidate the West with the "Soviet threat'', the Nazis even mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union possessed practically all necessary raw materials and that the "formerly illiterate Russians now possessed modern technology''. The Nazis warned that "Russian imperialism's next objective was to conquer Europe''. If England did not make an immediate ``arrangement'' with Germany, Central and Eastern Europe would fall to the Soviet Union after the war creating a Soviet "bloc of 300 million people''. The Germans threatened that "subversive activity would be carried out in Western Europe to pave the way for the further advance of the Soviet Army" and that England itself would soon fall since "all the European coast would eventually be under Rus- 51 sian control''. Moreover, British rule in the Mid-East would collapse, thus making the West dependent on the "mercy of the Russians for their supply of oil".
The memorandum stated that only Germany could counter the "Soviet threat''. And since the situation in Germany was such that only the National Socialists had a significant power base in the country, only a National Socialist Germany could counter the Soviet Union. Only the National Socialist Party could prevent the further advance of communism and Bolshevism to the West. It would be too much to expect that the German people would support a coalition government of bourgeois parties. The memorandum also brings up the cooperation of Great Britain and fascist Italy between the two world wars. Though Hesse had suggested that the Nazi leadership was prepared to ``resign'', the memorandum's only objective was to make a settlement with the West that would allow the criminal Nazi regime to remain in power. The German diplomats who delivered the memorandum to the West especially emphasised this point.
The memorandum stated that under the present circumstances, "if Germany were weakened any further'', the Americans and British would not survive. The traditional British diplomacy of a "balance of power" in Europe, which played off the most powerful governments on the continent against each other, was outdated according to the memorandum. The Nazis proposed a new diplomatic "balance of power": Germany--- Europe---England against the powerful Soviet Union.
After alarming the US and Great Britain with 52 the impending "Soviet threat'', the memorandum went on to make some concrete proposals. The first was for an immediate cease-fire on the Western Front, since the continuation of the war was detrimental to Germany and, strategically, even more so to Great Britain. But the ceasefire was to leave unaffected Germany's "political and military power''. It is especially interesting to note that the Nazis---the worst enemies of freedom and national independence---even when faced with inevitable defeat, intended to hold on to the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, Luxembourg, Austria, the Western regions of Czechoslovakia and significant areas of Poland. In refurn the Germans were prepared to form a military-political bloc with the West against the Soviet Union and to persuade their ally in the Far East---Japan---to join also. These were the basic proposals set forth in Ribbentrop's memorandum.
One more important aspect of this document should be mentioned for it later was to determine certain elements of the Nazis' foreign policy. Although the memorandum was intended to court the West as a whole, it was specifically addressed to reactionary and anti-Soviet circles in Great Britain. The Nazis believed that if the Soviet Army won a great victory, English supporters of the "Munich Deal" would again gain influence in the country. What Nazi emissary Rudolph Hess was unable to achieve in May 1941, Berlin was hoping that Hitler-Rubbentrop diplomacy could. Therefore, London was warned not to depend on the US, where ``isolationists'' could again come to power, but to rely on Germany with respect to the "Soviet threat''. In this 53 way, by tossing out the diplomatic ball in the form of Ribbentrop's memorandum, the Nazis were not only trying to drive a wedge between the USSR and its allies, but also to cause dissention between the Western powers.
Germany's diplomatic machine had been in full operation since January 20, 1945. The fact that the Nazis were working at such a feverish pitch was not merely due to the catastrophic military situation. A German spy at the Embassy of Great Britain in Ankara had reported that a meeting would soon take place between the "Big Three"---the leaders of the Soviet Union, the US and Great = Britain.^^1^^ The Nazis thought that their recent peace proposals would have a direct influence on the meeting's outcome. West German historian Reimer Hansen writes that "it was the Germans' intention to make concrete proposals for peace in order to pit the Western powers against the USSR and split the enemy = alliance".^^2^^
Although Hitler was pulling all the strings for "peaceful diplomacy'', Ribbentrop was formally in control. Moreover, it was made known that the Foreign Minister was "personally responsible" for whatever concrete actions Hitler took in the matter. Just as with Hess, Hitler preferred, at least at the initial stages of the operation, to stand in the shadows. If the ``peace'' mission were successful, the F\"uhrer would reap the glory; if it were not, Ribbentrop would be to blame.
By the beginning of 1945, Ribbentrop's position in the fascist hierarchy reflected rather well the _-_-_
~^^1^^ The meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill took place in the Crimea, February 4-11, 1945.
~^^2^^ Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 1967, p. 719.
54 deplorable state of the Nazi diplomatic service. It had been a long time since preparing and carrying out acts of aggression had furthered the career of the F\"uhrer's adviser on foreign policy and made an unknown champaigne salesman a ``prominent'' Nazi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a member of the Privy Council, a member of Hitler's political staff at the main headquaters and a general of SS troops.The defeats suffered by the Germans at the Eastern Front were immediately reflected in the Nazi foreign service and its leadership. By the beginning of 1945 approximately 50 countries had broken diplomatic relations with Germany and many were at war with the Nazis. There were only a few German diplomatic representatives abroad. If one excludes the German ``ambassadors'' to Nazi puppet governments headed by such men as Szalasi, Quisling and Pavelic---Berlin's henchmen---German embassies in Europe were open only in Bern, Stockholm, Dublin, Lisbon and Madrid. There was also a Nazi representative in the Vatican, which remained an enclave in Italy after the country was liberated by the Allies. The building which housed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Ribbentrop was fond of posing in the chair of the former ministers of Kaiser Germany, was reduced to rubble. Most of the officials and documents had been removed to Southern Bavaria. Ribbentrop's star had begun to fade along with Germany's diplomacy. The Foreign Affairs Minister was no longer invited to attend Hitler's daily briefings. Goebbels' diary contains numerous vituperative remarks made by Nazi leaders and addressed to the once powerful diplomat who liked to compare himself 55 to Bismarck.
The arrogant, ambitious Ribbentrop believed that negotiations with the West would give him another chance to steady his shaky position in the fascist camarilla.
On January 21, 1945, Ribbentrop's memorandum, which had been revised for the last time and approved by Hitler, was distributed to German embassies in Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and Portugal. "Influential neutral mediators" were to forward the document to British representatives there with whom Germany wished to make contact at the first possible opportunity.
A military briefing on January 30, 1945 reveals the extent to which the Nazi leadership counted on the success of Ribbentrop's memorandum. Hitler categorically rejected a proposal to evacuate Nazi troops which were cut off in Kurland and use them to reinforce the troops defending Berlin. Hitler, it seems, thought that these troops could be used along with British and American forces to attack Leningrad!
A week passed. Germany's "peace proposal" went unanswered. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs came up with an idea that was approved by the Nazi leadership: to push matters along by sending special ambassadors to Bern, Stockholm, Madrid and Lisbon. The mission these special ambassadors would be entrusted with was considered so important that the candidates were selected by Ribbentrop and approved by Hitler (the most important consideration was the candidate's political biography). Only veteran Nazi diplomats having a number of contacts with Western representatives were selected for the sensitive mission.
56Hesse, who was well acquainted with members of the ruling elite in Great Britain, was sent to Stockholm. Friedrich Moellhausen, a close aide of Rudolf Rahn, was dispatched to Madrid and Lisbon. Rahn was Berlin's representative to the Mussolini ``government'' in Northern Italy at the time and had had contacts with representatives from the West for quite some time. Ribbentrop blocked the appointment of Rahn as one of the special ambassadors for the simple reason that Hitler knew and liked him. Ribbentrop preferred to keep his potential rival out of the country and could not in conscience give him a mission which could possibly improve the Reich's international position. Werner von Schmieden, an experienced diplomat, was sent to Bern and told to inform official representatives of the US of the memorandum.
The fine points of the memorandum were gone over again and again in Berlin since the emissaries would have to verbally communicate the document's proposals. It was unanimously decided that the demarche should activate "friendly circles in the US and Great Britain" and "try to prevent the other side from rejecting the Nazi proposals''. During one of these discussions, Hesse handed Ribbentrop a report which stated that immediately before the meeting of the Big Three, no "political consensus" existed among the Allies on the question of Germany's future, and "under the circumstances, it was possible to take advantage of existing disagreements''. Hesse suggested that Hitler publicly announce the three basic principles of the "peace proposals" addressed to the West: first, Germany would "return to the future League of Nations'', second, Germany would "renounce unilateral ac- 57 tions" and return to "international cooperation" and, finally, that the country would ceremoniously commit itself to "joining the world order which would be established by the West''. Hitler declined to make the announcements but Hesse and other emissaries were told to relate the principles to official representatives of Western powers.
The emissaries were even instructed to embellish the contents of the memorandum. For example, in speaking with British representatives, the Germans were to stress that their country was not only willing to return to the comity of the West and acknowledge the "European order" which Great Britain would establish, but that Germany would also submit to Pax Britannica, i. e., British rule in the world.
It was recommended that the emissaries stress the official nature of the "peace proposal" to Western representatives. It was, after all, being introduced through diplomatic channels. Finally, if the negotiations ran into difficulty, Berlin instructed its emissaries to bring up once again the "Soviet threat''. The instructions, which were approved by Hitler, stressed that "insisting on the resignation of the members of the National Socialist government could lead to Germany's unilateral crossing over to the Soviets or the country's general collapse into communist hands".
Essentially, the Nazis' "peace proposal" was nothing more than a brandishing of the "Soviet threat''. On February 17, in order to strengthen the hand of his emissaries, Ribbentrop met with Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden in Berlin. Bernadotte was a member of the Swedish royal family and the director of the Swedish Red Cross. Married to an American, Bernadotte was acquainted with many known political and business representatives from the US 58 and Great Britain. The two-hour meeting between the two men turned into a Ribbentrop monologue in which the German minister fabricated and distorted the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop even lied in intimating that the Soviet Union had planned to attack Germany in August 1941, that it had set its sights on the Danish straits of Skagerrack and Kattegat and it was planning to turn all the countries of Europe into "Soviet Republics''. Finally, Ribbentrop went so far as to warn Bernadotte that if Germany lost the war Stockholm would be bombed and the Swedish royal family shot by the Bolsheviks within six = months.^^1^^
Ribbentrop had to use this anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to ``confidentially'' inform Bernadotte of the Nazis "last private attempt" to reach an agreement with the West. He reiterated the German peace offer that British and American forces cease attacking and bombing German targets, i. e., that there be an armistice on the Western Front, and that Germany preserve Hitler's dictatorship.
Bernadotte was unimpressed with Ribbentrop's proposals. He would not agree to act as a mediator between British and American representatives and Hitler's government. And with good reason. By the spring of 1945 the increasing international influence and military power of the USSR had helped to strengthen liberation and democratic movements all over the world. Therefore, Western governments preferred not to negotiate with official governmental representatives of the Reich, much less, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
On February 12, 1945, the leaders of the three Allied Powers---the USSR, USA and Great Bri- _-_-_
~^^1^^ See: F. Bernadotte, Das Ende, Europa Verlag, Ziirich, 1945, pp. 26--27.
59 tain---made public the decisions reached at the Crimean Conference. This completely crushed Nazi hopes for an official separate peace with the West based on anti-Soviet sentiment.The three Allied leaders agreed that Germany's unconditional surrender was compulsory. They outlined the basic principles of a concerted policy towards Germany which called for the demilitarisation of the country and the establishment of democracy. It was decided that Germany would be occupied by Allied troops and controlled by the three Allied Powers. The purpose of the Allied occupation and control was "to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world''. The Allies announced that they would disband the German military, dissolve Nazi General Headquaters, confiscate or destroy all German military equipment, liquidate or institute control over all German industries capable of producing military goods; sentence all war criminals to swift and just punishments, destroy any Nazi or military connections with public institutions, eliminate Nazi influence in the cultural and economic life of the German people and take whatever measures which may prove necessary to ensure the future peace and security of all peoples. The Allied leaders at the Conference stressed that they had no intention of suppressing the German people. But they reaffirmed that "only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations''.^^1^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ Foreign Relations of the United Slates. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1955, pp. 970--71.
60Alluding to the efforts of British and American reactionaries to negotiate with Hitler's government, Stalin asked Churchill and Roosevelt on February 5, 1945: "... if Hitler surrenders unconditionally are we to preserve his government? One thing excludes the = other."^^1^^
Churchill was obliged to answer: "... if Hitler or Himmler should offer to surrender unconditionally the answer was clear---we would not negotiate under any circumstances with any war = criminals."^^2^^
After the Crimean Conference Nazi efforts to enter into official negotiations with the West were stalemated.
The Vatican was the first to reply to the Ribbentrop memorandum. Ernst von Weizsacker, the Nazi representative to the papal throne, had maintained contacts with representatives from the West for quite some time. When Bishop Spellman (the future cardinal) of New York visited the Vatican at the end of 1944, Weizsacker instructed German priests to give him a memorandum to take to President Roosevelt. The memorandum appealed to the US President not to allow "all the Allies to meet in Berlin" but only to permit American and British forces to occupy = Germany.^^3^^ Weizsacker then managed to have several confidential discussions with the former American ambassador to Germany, Hugh Wilson, and the Chief of the US Office of Strategic Services, General Donovan. The Nazi emissary posed the question of "shortening the war" by political means. The remarkable contribution _-_-_
~^^1^^ Foreign Relations of the United States, Op. cit., p. 624.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 613.
~^^3^^ Ernst von Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, Paul List Verlag, Munchen, 1950, p. 372.
61 of the Americans who participated in these discussions was to suggest that Germany be broken up into a number of "independent formations" after the war.After receiving Ribbentrop's memorandum, Weizsacker immediately conveyed its contents to Western representatives at the Vatican. The answer was discouraging: negotiations were impossible without a change of personnel in Hitler's government. When Weizsacker inquired whether this were possible, Ribbentrop answered: "We will not discuss a personnel change in the government ... only the National Socialist Party can save Germany and Europe."
Ribbentrop's memorandum was received no better in Switzerland. Von Schmieden informed Berlin that a necessary prerequisite for negotiations with the West was an SS pledge to cease persecuting clergymen, Jews and opponents of Nazism.
The Franco government in Madrid immediately arranged a meeting between Nazi emissary MoelIhausen and the aides to Ambassador of Great Britain Samuel Hoare. A prominent British diplomat who had once served as Foreign Secretary, Hoare was a leader of the reactionary wing of the Conservative Party in Great Britain before the war. He adamantly supported an anti-Soviet pact with Hitler and Mussolini. After the war began, Hoare no longer enjoyed his previous prominent political position. He was appointed ambassador to Spain, the country ruled by his friend Franco.
Hoare continued his activities in Spain. The more it became apparent that the Soviet Union would not be weakened by the war but would emerge even more powerful and influential, the wider the Am- 62 bassador of Great Britain opened the doors of the Great Britain embassy to Nazi emissaries. In September 1944 Franz von Papen, an important political figure in Germany, arrived in Madrid and met with Hoare's aides. Papen had served consecutively as Vice-Chancellor, Ambassador to Austria and Ambassador to Turkey. For his resourcefulness in carrying out his diplomatic missions, he was nicknamed "Satan in a top hat''. Papen was trying to find out if it would be possible for Germany to conclude a separate peace and still retain its 1939 boundaries, i. e., the annexed territory of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and parts of Soviet Lithuania. The aides of the Ambassador of Great Britain were even willing to negotiate with Moellhausen about Ribbentrop's memorandum.
The German ambassador to Spain sent a cable to Berlin reporting: "There can be no peace negotiations unless the Ftihrer limits himself to functioning only as the head of state and transfers the leadership of the government to = Mister~X."^^1^^ Hoare in effect told Germany's Nazi and monopoly circles that if they pushed Hitler out of the limelight it would be possible to negotiate peace with the West. But Hoare was speaking without authority. It was impossible for London to officially contact the government of the Third Reich. Hoare was recalled from his post even before the Yalta Conference. The British charge d'affaires to Madrid was authorised to inform Moellhausen that the British did not trust him and refused to negotiate anything with him.
After the Crimean Conference the Nazis tried one last time to achieve positive results from Rib- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatische Biihne. 1923- 1945, Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn, 1954, p. 587.
63 bentrop's memorandum. On February 17 Hesse arrived in Stockholm in order to establish contact with the West through Swedish bankers Jakob and Markus Wallenberg. Hesse had met the bankers' father (recently deceased) in Berlin through Herbert Gutmann, a member of the Dresden Bank's Board of Directors.On February 20 in the offices of Stockholm's Enskilda Bank Hesse met with Jakob Wallenberg. Wallenberg disclosed that he had met with President Roosevelt four months prior to Hesse's arrival in Stockholm and had talked to Churchill a few weeks before that. He was, therefore, well informed on the position of the Western powers. Wallenberg told Hesse that although he was concerned about his bank's interests in Germany and hoped that "Germany would be preserved'', he was not prepared to act as a mediator between the Nazi government and the leaders of the West since he was positive that "the Western Powers would remain with Russia and that it would be impossible to separate them''. Hesse informed Berlin that Wallenberg "categorically refused to act as a mediator with the West".
Berlin was distressed at the failure of its diplomacy. Goebbels wrote in his diary that Ribbentrop's peace proposals had been soundly rejected both by the British and the Americans. The West's refusal to negotiate with Hitler's government was a humiliating blow to the fascist Foreign Minister and his F\"uhrer.
As for Hesse, he was in no hurry to leave Stockholm. Nazi leaders were working on new ``peace'' manoeuvres that required an "expert on England".
64 __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE NAZI ``SPECIAL MISSIONS AMBASSADOR''The failure of Ribbentrop's memorandum by no means indicated that Germany would cease making diplomatic manoeuvres. Inasmuch as the Nazis could not save the Reich by military means, they had no choice but to use diplomacy to achieve their goal. An operation known as "Wolf's mission" was planned in utmost secrecy. Archive records and other materials that have been made public reveal previously unknown aspects of this mission.
In order to understand the mission's objectives, it is important to recall the position of Germany's ruling circles. Although all the Nazi leaders agreed that there was no other way to end the war except by political means, there was no agreement on diplomatic objectives.
One group of Nazi leaders, which included Hitler himself, Bormann, Goebbels and others, never considered that negotiations with the West would necessitate Germany's surrender. Hitler told his trusted officers: "We must allow no movement to pass without showing the enemy that, whatever he does, he can never reckon on a capitulation. Never! Ne- ver!"^^1^^
Hitler and his supporters were, first of all, looking for a way to ease the military situation by negotiating with the West. Fighting on two fronts had locked Germany into a vise which was squeezing the country tighter and tighter. The Nazis wanted to use the cover of negotiations to stem the advance of the Allies. Then, taking advantage of either an _-_-_
~^^1^^ T. L. Jarman, The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany, The Cresset Press, London, 1955, p. 330.
5---418
65 official or de facto armistice, they would withdraw their most proficient troops from the Western and Italian Fronts and transfer them to the East. Having almost no reserves, each division that could be thus ``freed'' was of paramount importance to the Germans. There was even serious discussion of forming female battalions.In arranging an armistice with the West, Nazi leaders were not considering the possibility of allowing Allied troops into Germany. On the contrary, they thought it absolutely necessary for political negotiations to hold the front. Goebbels wrote in his diary on March 5, 1945: "If we cannot hold the Western Front we will lose our last political chance since the British and Americans will march into the middle of Germany and will not have the slightest reason to negotiate with us."^^1^^ For this reason, Hitler ordered Field-Marshal Model, the Commander of the Western Front, to hold German positions on the Eastern bank of the Rhine at all costs.
A typical example of Hitler's ``diplomacy'' was put into effect at the beginning of 1945 by the F\"uhrer's trusted lackey, Field-Marshal Keitel. Supposedly the commanders of the arms of the service were behind the action. But, in reality, the F\"uhrer, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was responsible. Keitel requested the Commander of Allied Forces in Western Europe, General Eisenhower and his deputy, British Field-Marshal Montgomery, to agree to a "100-day armistice" on the Western Front. The request was made in the hope that the Nazi command could use this time to con- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Joseph Goebbels, Tagebiicher 1945, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1977, p. 111.
66 centrate their available forces and defeat the Soviet Army between the Wisla and Oder rivers. Montgomery agreed to the request on the conditions that American and British Forces would be allowed to peacefully take control of the territory of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg under German control, and occupy the line of security on Germany's Western border. The Nazi command rejected Montgomery's conditions but continued to bargain for an armistice. It is unclear how long these intrigues would have continued had it not been for the obstruction of the Soviet command. When the Soviet Union became aware of its allies' secret correspondence with Berlin, Eisenhower was forced to stop negotiating with the German High = Command.^^1^^In planning the diplomatic action connected with Wolf's mission, Hitler and his associates had another important goal: to use the negotiations to buy time to stir up anti-Soviet sentiment in the ruling circles of the US and Great Britain and to destroy the anti-Nazi coalition.
Himmler, Goering and a number of other leading Nazi officials had different objectives for negotiations with the West. Of course, they agreed with Hitler that the negotiations should be used to fan the disagreements between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. But they also believed it possible to conclude a separate anti-Soviet pact with the West. In January 1945, for instance, Goering attempted to persuade Hitler that the Western Allies would conclude a separate peace with Germany out of fear of the Russians. The members of this _-_-_
^^1^^ In all, Keitel exchanged seven cables with Eisenhower and Montgomery.
67 group believed that in order to conclude an antiSoviet pact with the West, Germany would have to make some sacrifices---probably the Nazis would have to cede occupied territory in the West and even sacrifice Hitler in return for the participation of US and British forces in Germany's "march to the East".In order to arrange an anti-Soviet pact, it was absolutely imperative to achieve an armistice in the West and simultaneously continue the war on the Soviet-German Front. Walter Goerlitz, a West German reactionary historian, writes that Goering "clung to the idea that he could achieve an armistice with the Western Allies and thereby free [ German) forces for the struggle against = Bolshevism".^^1^^ Goering's most serious rival was Himmler. Both men hated each other and each considered himself the only person qualified to arrange an antiSoviet pact.
A more realistic view of the possibility of reaching an agreement with the West was held by a third group---the leaders of military-industrial concerns and influential bankers. These were the men who controlled Germany's economy. After the failure of the "July 20th conspiracy" and the execution of the conspirators, the monopolists turned to trusted friends who were, at the same time, Hitler's confidantes---Director of War Production Speer and Minister of Finance von Krosigk. These two men, especially Speer, represented the interests of this group in the Nazi government.
Speer, an unknown architect before the Nazis came to power, was an old beer-drinking friend _-_-_
~^^1^^ Walter Goerlitz. Der zweite Weltkrieg. 1939--1945, Vol. 11, Steingriiben-Verlag, Stuttgart, 1952, p. 559.
68 of Hitler and an excellent organiser and courtier. As he moved up in the Nazi hierarchy, Speer continued his efforts to establish and strengthen his ties with industrialists and bankers. Germany's "40 families" needed a clever and capable mediator to inform the Nazi leadership of their views (and see to it that they were acted on!). Supported by Hitler and the monopolies, Speer became Reichsleiter, a member of the Reichstag, Imperial Minister for Munitions and Armaments and the Chairman of the Armaments Council. Speer used his power to grant the monopolies billions of marks in military contracts and the forced labour of millions of foreign workers. No crime was too great for him to commit for the sake of monopoly profits. The West German weekly Zeit magazin recently recalled one of them: under Speer's personal direction ten thousand foreign workers were forced to build in the Harz Mountains a huge underground factory for the production of V-2 = rockets.^^1^^ During the Nuremberg trials the place was described as a "hell on earth''.Speer and the industrialists and bankers who supported him worked out the following provisions for their international programme in the spring of 1945: German imperialists had already lost World War II: the most important task now was to use diplomacy to prevent the destruction of Germany's military-industrial potential and the Soviet Army from occupying large areas of the country. The only way to achieve these objectives was to allow British and American forces to occupy German territory as quickly as possible, and the best way to do this was to have the German Army surrender to the Western Allies. However, Speer and his _-_-_
^^1^^ Zeit-magazin, No. 43, October 20, 1978, p. 35.
69 supporters realised that anti-Nazi sentiment in the US and Great Britain would prevent the governments of these two countries from making a separate pact with Germany. The solution---a ``quiet'' surrender on the Western Front beginning with separate armies, then army groups and finally the entire front. Reactionary anti-Soviet circles in the West could claim these were military tactics which did not have any bearing on the Allies' political agreement to demand Germany's unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet-German Front.Speer and his supporters achieved partial success in their endeavours. After British and American forces surrounded a German army group consisting of 18 divisions---approximately 325,000 men---in the Ruhr on April 1, 1945, the commander of the forces, Field-Marshal Model obeyed Speer's direct order to cease resistance and ``disband'' his forces rather than obey Hitler's command to "fight to the finish''. The oldest and youngest German solders were permitted to return home and the surrounded garrisons to surrender. British and American forces could now march into Germany.
In the archives of the Munich Institute of Modern History an interesting document can be found among Speer's routine dispatches about the production of arms and military equipment: "A complete disbandment on the Western Front gives us a great opportunity to ward off defeat and incredible possibilities for the future.'' What kind of ``future'' did the German monopolies envisage under the aegis of the Western Allies? Germany would acknowledge the ``loss'' of Poland (though a considerable part would remain under German control), the Baltic area, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, 70 Greece and Turkey. A "strong German influence" must be preserved "within the borders of old Austria in the Southeast'', i. e., the German monopolies intended to maintain their influence in Austria, Hungary and a part of Yugoslavia even after Germany's surrender.
As for the Soviet Union, despite the crushing defeats suffered by the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union, German imperialists continued to covet the USSR's great reserves of natural resources. They were planning to make the Soviet Union a supplier of raw material for Germany and other Western countries. "The Bolsheviks would no longer be a threat in a few years,'' the document stated. They would be replaced by a regime " acceptable" to the West.
It is hard to say what is expressed more strongly here---an overestimation of strength, which has long been characteristic of German imperialism, or racist contempt for other governments and peoples.
In the spring of 1945 the German monopolies based their political calculations or rather their speculations on an immediate end to the war in the West. They also accepted the fact that they would have to allow British and American forces to temporarily occupy the country. As has already been noted, some influential members of Germany's ruling circles thought the best way to do this was to gradually surrender German forces to the Western Allies who could then quickly occupy all of Germany. The surrender of German forces on the less strategic Italian Front was seen as a way to test the ``quiet'' surrender.
The changing relationship between the important Nazi officials who surrounded Hitler---Bormann, 71 Goebbels and Ley---and the influential industrialists and bankers who were the real rulers of the Reich, is important for an understanding of the diplomatic manoeuvres which were taking place in Germany in the spring of 1945.
The Nazi leadership was willing to turn Germany into a scorched earth in order to delay their inevitable downfall. On March 19, 1945, Hitler issued the following order: "... even within the territory of the Reich, to exploit every means of weakening the fighting strength of our enemy and impeding his further advance..."^^1^^ Before retreating from military objectives German troops were ordered to destroy factories and all means of communication, transportation and supply. "We will leave the enemy a scorched earth,'' said Hitler. German monopolists were bitterly opposed to Hitler's orders. They supported and encouraged a "total war" as long as it raged outside Germany's borders. But they would not accept the destruction of the material base of their power. The monopolists did everything possible to prevent Hitler's order from being carried out and also hastened to reach an agreement with the West about opening the front and allowing British and American troops to occupy German territory. They also thought that this would solve the "problem of the F\"uhrer'', who was steadfastly holding on to power and was willing to sacrifice everything to save himself.
The action taken by the monopolists in response to Hitler's scorched-earth policy clearly revealed who really ruled Germany and determined the direction of Berlin's diplomacy. The day after _-_-_
~^^1^^ Hitler's War Directives 1939--1945, Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1964, p. 206.
72 Hitler's order was announced, Speer, acting on behalf of the monopolies, sent a special memorandum to Hitler informing him of their opposition. Then, together with the director of the Siemens Company, Luschen, and prominent industrialist Rudolf Stahl, Speer visited the commanders of German troops on the Eastern Front---Weichs, Heinrich and even Himmler, who at that time commanded the Wisla Army Group---and persuaded them not to follow the scorched-earth policy. Afterwards, Speer gave Guderian a memorandum expressing opposition to the destruction order and then headed for the Western Front with an influential Saar industrialist, Hermann Rochling, to persuade Field-Marshal Model in the same manner. After his meeting with Speer, Model not only refused to turn the largest Bayer chemical plants in Leverkusen into a battleground, but even informed the enemy of his decision. After Hitler ordered three Ruhr Gauleiters to "destroy everything before retreating'', twenty of Ruhr's most powerful industrialists met at Thyssen castle in Landsberg and summoned the Gauleiters there to give them counter-orders. Hitler reacted by ``pleading'' with Speer to remain at his post and "hope for victory''. Then, on March 30, Hitler instructed the Nazi party and state and military agencies that Speer's ministry would from that time on decide on the destruction of important targets. As the saying goes, the ``i'' was dotted and the ``t'' crossed.It is now clear who was really in charge of the Nazi's behind-the-scenes diplomacy known as Wolffs mission.
First of all, let us turn to Karl Wolff. The fact that Hitler knew and trusted him is of great importance. Wolff belonged to the F\"uhrer's "old guard". 73 In the 1920's he took part in Munich's fascist pogroms and was then appointed by Hitler as aide to the Bavarian Gauleiter, General von Epp.
At the same time, Wolff was completely trusted by Himmler, who first made him his aide and then chief of his personal staff. SS Obergruppenfiihrer Wolff had been permanently stationed at Nazi headquarters as Himmler's personal representative since September 1939. He was called "Himmler's little wolf" and "Himmler's eyes and ears" in high-level Nazi = circles.^^1^^ Walter Schellenberg writes that Wolff's influence on Himmler was so great that the latter rarely made an important decision without first consulting Wolff.
What was the secret of Wolff's influence on Himmler and, to a certain degree, on Hitler, and why was he so trusted? The answer can be found in documents from West Germany's federal archives in Koblentz. We know that Himmler had close ties with influential German industrialists and bankers, who formed his so-called "circle of friends" and financed the SS and Himmler himself. The circle included Rudolf Bingel of Siemens-Schuckert, Heinrich Biitefisch of I. G. Farbenindustrie, Friedrich Flick of Deutsche Bank, Fritz Reinhart of Commerzbank, Emil Meyer and Karl Rasche of Dresdner Bank and others---in all about 50 representatives of Germany's largest monopolies and banks. In 1932 the members of this ``circle'' began to regularly transfer millions into a special ``R'' account---money which soon found its way into Himmler's and other high SS officials' pockets. It also turns out that Karl Wolff was in charge of collecting and distributing these ``donations''. _-_-_
~^^1^^ Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung, October 1, 1964.
74 He was, in effect, the monopolies' trusted representative to Himmler and Hitler. After it became clear that Nazi aggression had failed, the monopolies also began to use Wolff to establish contact with the Western Allies. For this reason he was put (in late 1943) in charge of the SS and police force in occupied Italy. In May 1944 Wolff was granted an audience by the pope. He told the pope that he regretted the war against the West and the senseless spilling of blood of the European people, who would soon be needed to fight against the East and communism. The Vatican and especially Schuster, the Cardinal of Milan, helped Wolff to contact representatives of the Western Allies. Later, he was able to use the connections established by the "July 20th conspirators" and Admiral Canaris, the chief of Germany's Military Intelligence, Abwehr.Hitler trusted Wolff because his immediate supervisor was Field-Marshall Kesselring, commander of Army Group ``C'' in Italy and a man unquestionably loyal to Hitler. This was supposed to be a guarantee that Himmler would not use Wolff to help achieve his own personal goals.
It was only natural then that Wolff would take part in German diplomacy. However, different groups were demanding different things from him.
On February 6, 1945, Wolff was recalled to Berlin for instructions. Ribbentrop, Himmler and their representatives at Hitler's headquarters--- envoys Walter Hewel and Hermann Fegelein---were present at the meeting in the underground imperial government offices. Hitler expressed his approval of negotiations with the West in off-handed remarks but made no concrete proposals for conducting them. The next day he instructed Wolff to contact 75 the Western Allies on the subject of a temporary cease-fire on the Western and Italian Fronts. But Wolff was granted greater authority by "Himmler's circle of friends''. They were looking for the opportunity to gradually surrender German troops if the Western Allies would agree.
In order to establish contact with London and Washington, Wolff was planning to use a channel that had often served the Nazis before. Allen Dulles---a special representative of the US Office of Strategic Services and the future director of the CIA---had been stationed in Switzerland since 1942. According to information possessed by Berlin, Dulles was a direct representative of the American government and was assigned to study European, especially East European problems. Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles (a cold war supporter), represented those circles of the US ruling elite who believed it was not in America's interest to completely destroy Germany, that imperialist Germany should be preserved as a stronghold against European socialism and democracy. As early as February 1943 Dulles tested the situation by informing a Nazi supporter, Prince Hohenlohe, of the opinions of the Americans whom he represented. These were their basic proposals:
``The German state must be a factor of order and restoration; its division or the separation of Austria from it is out of question.
``The creation of a buffer zone against Bolshevism by expanding Poland to the East and preserving Romania and a strong Hungary should be supported."
Dulles also agreed with a "state and industrial organisation of Europe based on large territories believing that a strong federated Germany (like 76 the US) together with the adjacent Danube Confederation would be the best guarantee of order and the restoration of Central and Eastern Europe... Considering the historical significance of Hitler and his deeds, it would be difficult to imagine that public opinion in the West would ever allow Hitler to be the undisputed ruler of Great Germany.'' Strong ties between the US Office of Strategic Services and Himmler's representatives were established after Dulles' meetings with Hohenlohe.
In November 1944, the General Director of Italy's largest synthetic fabric producing company, Snia Viscosa, Italian industrialist Marinotti, and the head of the established Olivetti firm, acted as mediators and delivered a message to Dulles from some members of the SS. Dulles was asked to start negotiating a cease-fire in Western Europe and a unification of forces against the Soviet Union. By the beginning of 1945 Dulles had already made contact with Walter Schellenberg, the head of the 6th department of the Chief Imperial Security Agency (foreign intelligence), Wilhelm Harster, the agency's representative in Northern Italy and even Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the head of the Agency.
Wolff and the men he represented had reason to believe that Dulles himself would be the most suitable man to arrange negotiations for a separate peace. The mediators between Kaltenbrunner and Dulles were Count Pottocki and SS officer Wilhelm Hottl, a man who had many connections with antiSoviet circles in the Catholic church. The way was now paved for negotiations between Wolff and Dulles.
Based on materials that have now been made available, it is possible to make a rather accurate reconstruction of the negotiation process. We 77 should point out, however, that Dulles' recollections of the negotiations differ remarkably from those that actually took place. He declines to mention any facts that would cast him in an unfavourable light.
American historian John Toland gives a more accurate account of the negotiations. He interviewed Dulles, Gero von Gaevernitz, Dulles' closest associate, and Major Max Waibel, an officer of the Swiss security agency who was a mediator in negotiation arrangements and was present during the negotiation process.^^1^^
Wolff himself supplied detailed information about the negotiations when interviewed by the Swiss newspaper, Neue Ziircher Zeitung.
After returning to Kesselring's headquarters in Northern Italy, Wolff discovered that a British captain by the name of Kimball Tucker had been arrested by "Black Brigade" units (troops of the Mussolini puppet government in Nazi-occupied Italy) in Como. Tucker had been personally instructed by Field-Marshal Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Troops (Mediterranean), to contact Marshal Graziani, the war minister of the Mussolini ``government''. Wolff ordered the Italians to turn Tucker over to him and then sent him back to Alexander to find out what military and political demands the Field-Marshall would make on the German command in Italy.
Meanwhile, Wolff and his closest collegue---SS officer Eugen Dollmann, who through his Italian mother had many close contacts in the Vatican and industrial circles of Northern Italy, and Rudolf _-_-_
^^1^^ See: John Toland, The Last 100 Days, Op. cit., pp. 239--41.
78 Rahn, German ambassador to Mussolini's " government'', tried in every possible way to play on the anti-communist and anti-Soviet feelings of their partners in the negotiations. Wolff informed Alexander that the reason he wanted to negotiate was his alleged concern over the fate of Northern Italy: if the Germans suddenly ceased counteraction, the Italian partisans would immediately form a " communist government''. Then the French Communists in the West and the Italians in the East would tighten a red belt around all of Southern Europe. Wolff proposed that they solve this problem by agreeing to an organised surrender of German forces. The Western Allies could then occupy Northern Italy before the partisans seized control.Interestingly enough, Wolff himself did not place too much faith in the success of his ``mission'' to drive a wedge between the Allies. But Allen Dulles was a willing listener to Wolff's anti-Soviet tirades. Dulles later wrote: "If we had managed to get the Germans to quickly surrender in Italy, we could have seized Trieste---the key to the Adriatics... Otherwise the Soviet Army could have penetrated through Hungary or Tito's supporters could have advanced from Yugoslavia and, together with proCommunist partisans, seized Trieste, possibly even advancing further to the West."
In Zurich on February 25, 1945, Wolff's emissary, Baron Luigi Parrilli, who had represented an American refrigerator manufacturing company (Kelvinator) in Italy before the war, was asked by Dulles to invite Wolff to Switzerland. But Wolff first sent Dollmann to Zurich in order to work out the details of a meeting. Dollmann met with Dulles' representative, Gero von Gaevernitz, who had earlier acted as a mediator between Dulles and the "July 79 20th = conspirators".^^1^^ The meeting was held at the offices of the Rotary Club in Lugano. Gaevernitz informed Dollmann that only the surrender of the German army on the Italian Front would be discussed. On March 6, Wolff received an official invitation from Dulles to come to Switzerland for negotiations. To be sure that he was dealing with men in authority, Dulles asked that two Italian bourgeois businessmen---Ferruccio Parri and Antonio Usmiani---be released from prison. This was immediately done on Wolff's order.
Field-Marshal Kesselring approved Wolff's trip to Switzerland to negotiate with the Americans. It is interesting to note that when the negotiations began, Kesselring was sent to the Western Front. Perhaps it was to provide Hitler with a "military cover" for separate negotiations with the West there too.
Wolff and Dulles held their first meeting in Zurich on March 8, 1945, at the secret residence of the American Consul-General. Wolff laid down the following conditions for an agreement: the Western Allies would not launch their planned offensive on the Italian Front, and German forces would not destroy the industry of Northern Italy; all hostilities would cease on the Italian Front and all the forces of Army Group ``C'' would be allowed to return to Germany unimpeded. "In this way the continued existence of the German order is guaranteed and will in the future be determined by Germans themselves."
Dulles agreed to Wolff's proposals in principle. Wolff later told Kesselring that after talking with Dulles he was convinced that the German forces _-_-_
~^^1^^ See: A. Norden, Um die Nation, Berlin, 1952, p. 338.
80 which surrendered would be able to preserve their structure in case circumstances should arise which would make it necessary to use them in the East.^^1^^ Dulles demanded only one thing: that the negotiations be kept top secret and that other Allies not be contacted.Wolff, in accordance with strategy that had been worked out in Berlin, cautioned Dulles that an agreement could be put into effect only if it was approved by Kesselring. "If the Field-Marshal unconditionally agrees to it, this will be an incentive for the commanders of other fronts to surrender."
Both sides were very pleased with the initial stages of the negotiations. Returning from Berlin on the Saint Gotthard express, the German emissaries were already planning Germany's post-Hitler government. Kesselring was to be the new president, von Neurath---who had held the post before Ribbentrop---the new minister of foreign affairs, Hjalmar Schacht would be the finance minister and Wolff---the minister of the interior.
The Americans were also very pleased with the negotiations. When Dulles informed his superior, General Donovan, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services, about the negotiations with Wolff, he was told to continue them under the codename ``Sunrise''.
After returning from Switzerland, Wolff was called to Berlin. He reported to Himmler that it seemed that the negotiations were heading for a compromise which would make interference by the Russians impossible. The negotiations were significant in that the German forces on the Italian _-_-_
~^^1^^ See: E. F. Mollhausen, Die gebrochene Asche, Alfeld- Leine, 1949, p. 319.
81 Front would not be taken prisoner and could preserve order in Germany. The negotiations between Wolff and Dulles were also approved by Hitler. He instructed Wolff to take his time and to conduct the negotiations as a game of strategy between the Allies.During the negotiations with Wolff, Dulles not only agreed to the Nazi proposals but even imbued them with greater anti-Soviet character. While keeping the separate pact with the Nazis a secret, reactionary circles in the US and Great Britain were planning to advance through Italy to the North and provide protection for the reactionary orders established by the Nazis in Germany and Austria. Churchill wrote in his memoirs, "... we should accept a military surrender in the West or South, which means that our armies will advance against little or no opposition and will reach the Elbe, or even = Berlin...^^1^^."
Washington and London approved of Dulles' actions. On March 10, 1945, Field-Marshall Alan Brooke, British Chief of Staff, wrote in his diary that it had been decided to "send our representatives to a certain place in Switzerland''. FieldMarshall Alexander was instructed to appoint a group of high-ranking officers to discuss the " specific details of an agreement" with the Nazis. The group included Major-General Lyman = Lemnitzer,^^2^^ Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5th American Army and Major-General Terence Airey, Deputy Chief _-_-_
^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy, Bantam Books, New York, 1962, p. 382.
~^^2^^ From 1962--1968 General Lemnitzer was the commander of the aggressive NATO forces. He is today one of the leaders of an extreme right organisation in the US---the Committee on the Present Danger.
82 of Staff of the 8th British Army and Chief of the British secret service in Italy. On March 15, 1945, both representatives dressed in civilian clothes and carrying the identification papers of American soldiers, arrived in Switzerland. After two days of talks with Dulles in Bern, the generals were accompanied by Gaevernitz to Ascona, a town closer to the Italian border. There they waited impatiently for Wolff.Dulles was so anxious to conclude the anti-Soviet pact that he was ready to talk with Dollmann or Rahn while Wolff was in Berlin. But he was told that only Wolff was authorised to negotiate. Dulles would have to wait.
On March 19 the entire delegation met in Ascona at Gaevernitz' villa. Berlin was represented by Wolff and Dollmann; Dulles headed the British-American delegation which also included the two generals--- Lemnitzer and Airey. Gaevernitz acted as interpreter. As has already been mentioned, Major Max Waibel, a Swiss intelligence officer, was a neutral observer. Because of the secret nature of the talks, no one else was present.
Beginning the negotiations, Dulles announced that it was important to immediately discuss the "specific details" of an agreement and approve it: the British-American delegation had been given the necessary authority to do this.
But Wolff had been advised by Hitler not to be hasty in coming to an agreement. After becoming aware of the desire of the official representatives of the US and Great Britain to make an anti-Soviet pact, the German government did not want to sell it cheap. Also, the Nazis had already begun to reap the benefits of their diplomatic action: the US and Great Britain had begun to slow their 83 advance on the Italian Front. There was, in effect, an unofficial armistice there which allowed the Germans to remove three divisions and transfer them to the Soviet-German Front.
In a word, the situation at the Italian Front which resulted from Wolff's negotiations with Dulles, was satisfactory to Hitler and his followers. Wolff received instructions to try and extend the unofficial armistice to the Western Front as well. It was for this reason that he made Kesselring's approval of an official agreement imperative at Ascona. It should be remembered that Kesselring was at the time the Commander-in-Chief of German forces at the Western Front.
With respect to the agreement already reached, which would allow British and American forces to enter Germany from the South, Wolff found various excuses for not signing it. He said he needed more time to persuade General Vietinghoff, new commander of a group of German forces in Italy, to accept the surrender; otherwise, immediately upon his return, he (Wolff) would be arrested by Kaltenbrunner, who was supposedly holding Wolff's wife under house arrest. In the end, Wolff "promised to do everything possible to bring about the surrender''. He asked that he be given five-seven days to do so.
Dulles was clearly displeased with the delay but was forced to accept it. Generals Lemnitzer and Airey were ordered to remain in Switzerland. They and Dulles waited for another meeting with Wolff to conclude the agreement.
Not only London and Washington were unhappy with the delay in signing the anti-Soviet pact. When Wolff returned to his headquaters in Fasano ( Northern Italy), Tirole's gauleiter, Franz Hofer, arrived 84 from Innsbruck. In high-level Nazi circles he was known to be Speer's very close friend. They had known each other even since the time of the Munich putsch. Also, through his wife, who was a member of the Rochling family, Hofer had close ties with these uncrowned rulers of the Saar. Hofer told Wolff frankly, "The war is lost, and if the F\"uhrer comes here in order to organise a final resistance in the fortifications of the Alps, I will order him interned in a sanatorium.'' Hofer also stressed that it was important to open the Italian Front so that the British and Americans could prevent " undesirable centres of power" not only in Northern Italy but also in Austria and South Germany. This was what was worrying the coal and steel magnates of the Saar and Southern Germany whom Hofer was representing.
On March 26 Himmler instructed Wolff to "keep the door to negotiations with the Allies open''. On March 30 the British-American delegation in Ascona received a message from Wolff through Parrilli. He informed his American negotiating partners that Kesselring had approved the surrender of German forces in Italy and that this would pressure General Vietinghoff to do the same. Wolff also promised to return to Switzerland in the near future to conclude the agreement.
However, the further development of events connected with Wolff's mission did not work out according to the plans of London, Washington and various groups in the ruling circles of Nazi Germany.
These negotiations between the official representatives of the US and Great Britain and the Nazis were, of course, in strong violation of the Allies' commitments. We should recall that at a Moscow conference of the ministers of foreign 85 affairs from the USSR, US and Great Britain (October 19--30, 1943) a "Resolution on PeaceFeelers from Enemy Countries" was adopted: "The governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR agree to inform each other immediately of any peace-feelers which they may receive from the government of, or from any groups or individuals in a country with which any of them is at war. The three Governments further agree to consult together with a view to concerting their action in regard to such ap- proaches."^^1^^
The Soviet government was aware of BritishAmerican negotiations with Wolff. For this reason London and Washington decided to lift some of the secrecy. On March 12 Archibald Kerr, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, sent Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, a copy of Field-Marshall Alexander's telegramme to the British government. Alexander had cabled that General Wolff had arrived in Switzerland in order to discuss the surrender of German troops in Northern Italy and that representatives of the Office of Strategic Studies with British-American forces iri the Mediterranean theater were "continuing to negotiate with Wolff''. But the Soviet Union was not informed that official representatives of the US and Great Britain were participating in the discussions.
On March 12, 1945, Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow, also informed Molotov _-_-_
~^^1^^ Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1943, Vol. 1, General, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1963, p. 737.
86 that negotiations were being conducted with Wolff. His letter stated that Field-Marshall Alexander had been instructed to send his officers to Switzerland to meet with Wolff and requested the Soviet viewpoint on the matter.That same day, Molotov informed the American and British ambassadors that his government would not object to the negotiations with Wolff if a representative of the Soviet military command was also allowed to take part. If London and Washington accepted this proposal, it would be an acknowledgement that the negotiations were of a purely military nature and were not directed against the Soviet Union. But reactionary circles in the US and Great Britain had linked Wolffs mission with far-reaching anti-Soviet schemes. Therefore, both the British and American ambassadors to Moscow told Molotov that a representative of the Soviet • k military command would not be permitted to take part in the negotiations.
The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs sent prompt letters of reply to these ambassadors stating that the refusal of the US and British governments to allow a Soviet representative to participate in the negotiations was unexpected and incomprehensible inasmuch as the USSR, the USA and Great Britain were Allies. The Soviet government insisted that the negotiations which had begun in Bern be immediately ended, and that the possibility of any future negotiations being conducted by one or two of the Allied Powers with German representatives, without the participation of the third, be precluded.
To confuse matters, on March 21, 1945, Kerr assured the Soviet government that it was never intended to conduct any kind of negotiations in 87 Bern, that only a preliminary meeting had taken place in order to find out whether the German representatives had the necessary authority to conduct negotiations.
On March 22, 1945, the Soviet government resolutely demanded that the US and Great Britain immediately cease negotiating with the Nazis.
The question of the negotiations with Wolff was discussed in the correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, the President of the US, Franklin Roosevelt, and the Prime-Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill. On March 29, 1945, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt, "... I agree to such talks with the enemy only in cases where they do not lead to an easing of the enemy's position, if the opportunity for the Germans to manoeuvre and to use the talks for switching troops to other sectors, above all to the Soviet Front, is precluded. The task of coordinated operations involving a blow at the Germans from the West, South and East, proclaimed at the Crimean Conference, is to hold the enemy on the spot and prevent him from manoeuvring, from moving his forces to the points where he needs them most. The Soviet Command is doing this. But Field-Marshall Alexander is not."^^1^^ On April 3, 1945, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt, "Clearly this situation cannot preserve and promote trust between our countries."^^2^^
Churchill himself acknowledged the anti-Soviet implications of operation Sunrise in a telegram to Roosevelt on April 5. He agreed to the negotiations with the Nazis believing that it was import- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence ..., Vol. II, pp. 200--01.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 206.
88 ant for the Allies to "join hands with the Russian armies as far to the East as possible''. The strong position taken by the Soviet government forced the US and Great Britain to cut off further contact with Wolff. On April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt wrote to Stalin that the Bern incident was a thing of the past.Ambassador Harriman announced in Moscow that the "disagreement concerning the meeting in Ascona should be viewed as an insignificant incident''. Two days before Allied troops had renewed the offensive on the Italian Front.
The correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt during the last days of the American president's life proves that the British prime minister wanted to continue operation Sunrise. But Roosevelt would not agree to = it.^^1^^
On April 10 Allied Headquarters in Italy informed Dulles that negotiations on the surrender of German troops must be of a purely military nature and conducted only with "fully authorised officers''. Dulles was immediately recalled to Paris. There General Donovan informed him that due to the accusations made by the Soviet Union, neither the Americans nor the British could accept a surrender if it were to be proposed by the Germans.
Unlike Churchill, the ruling circles of the US did not want to worsen relations with the Soviet Union. The American Command was extremely interested in the active participation of Soviet armed forces in military action against Japan. Agreement _-_-_
~^^1^^ Roosevelt and Churchill, Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, Ed. by F. L. Loewenheim, H. D. Langley, M. Jonas, New York, 1975, pp. 685, 704, 708.
89 on this subject had been reached at the Crimean Conference. It is significant that Roosevelt decided to break off the negotiations with Wolff after a number of meetings with General George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and William Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff.^^1^^ Also government circles in the US and Great Britain were beginning to suspect Wolff of double-dealing. While representing the German monopolies who had supported the deal with British and American reactionaries on the basis that German troops would surrender in the West, Wolff nevertheless did not hesitate to use the negotiations to prolong Hitler's rule.The most important factor contributing to the failure of Wolff's mission was the Third Reich's hopeless military situation, which was a result of the Soviet Army's pressure. In the spring of 1945 the Nazis wished to strengthen their bargaining position in order to demonstrate to reactionary circles in the US and Great Britain Germany's value as a partner in the struggle against the " communist threat''. On February 16 the Wisla Army Group, which was concentrated in Pomerania tried to attack the Western flank of the advancing Soviet Army. In a conversation between Guderian and Hitler, it was stressed that this was necessary in order to gain the time required to negotiate an armistice with the Western Powers. In early March the 6th Panzer Army, which had been transferred from the Ardennes to Hungary, was joined by other units in a counter-attack designed to throw the Russians back to the Danube. Hitler stressed the political significance of this attack to Goebbels. _-_-_
~^^1^^ Jim Bishop, FDR's Last Year. April 1944-April 1945, Moscow, New York, 1974, pp. 506--40.
90 But neither operation was successful. Soviet troops routed the main forces of the Wisla Army Group and by the end of March had reached the mouth of the Oder. In Hungary the Soviet Army repulsed vicious Nazi attacks and destroyed more than 500 enemy tanks. Soviet troops then penetrated the German front and launched an offensive on Vienna.As a result of the Soviet Army's great victories, Nazi attempts to enter into official peace negotiations with the US and Great Britain were completely unsuccessful.
Dismayed by the situation at the Soviet-German Front, on March 20, General Guderian asked Himmler to help him persuade Hitler to immediately request an armistice from the Western Allies. To Guderian's surprise, Himmler refused. But there was no reason for surprise: following Hitler's orders, Himmler had for several weeks been directly involved with secret negotiations between the Nazis and the US and Great Britain.
__ALPHA_LVL1__ ``THE SS IN ACTION''This is the title of a book which has been published in the GDR. It is based on irrefutable facts and documents and describes the heinous crimes commited by SS troops. We would like to discuss here a topic which is less known. During the last days of the Reich, the Nazis' terror service acquired yet another function: it was at the centre of diplomatic manoeuvres between the Nazis and Western anti-Sovietists who were trying to prevent the Reich's downfall.
American and British reactionaries had reason to turn to the SS. First, in the event the German 91 army was defeated and the Nazi party toppled, the SS would be the only "real power" left in Germany. Second, negotiations with Himmler and other SS officers could be cloaked under the pretense of concern for the prisoners being held in Nazi concentration camps.
The SS, headed by Himmler, was also increasingly interested in negotiating with the Western Allies. Himmler was by this time extremely powerful. Even before the war, his sadistic cruelty had enabled him to become the head of Germany's terror organisation. When the Nazi war of aggression began, Himmler's SS troops shot, hanged, gassed and burned everyone who opposed the establishment of the bloody Nazi ``order'' in European countries. The SS forced millions of foreigners to slave for German monopolies. As the Nazi plague spread throughout Europe, Himmler rose in the Nazi hierarchy and became even more powerful. In addition to the titles he already held: SS ``Reichsfuhrer'', Chief of Police, Supreme Commissar of the Gestapo and Imperial Commissioner for "strengthening the German race'', Himmler was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1943. After the "events of July 20, 1944'', he became the commander of the " internal army'', i. e., Himmler was in control of German army units within Germany. At the same time, he was placed in charge of Abwehr---military intelligence and counter-intelligence. Himmler was in control of all the branches of German espionage abroad.
As a result of the defeats suffered by the German army at Stalingrad and Kursk, Himmler began to work out a plan envisaging the repartition of the world. If the Western Allies would agree to the inclusion of Soviet territory to the Urals into 92 the Reich, Himmler would ``generously'' give Siberia to Great Britain, and the US and Japan could divide up the Far East. Relying on reactionary circles in the US and Great Britain, Himmler was sure that these countries could be persuaded to march against the Soviet Union.
With respect to Western Europe, France, Belgium and the Netherlands would return to their pre-war state politically but would be closely ``united'' with Germany economically. The same would be true of the countries of Southeast Europe. The French province of Alsace, Austria and the Suddeten region of Czechoslovakia would remain in the Reich.
In order to make an anti-Soviet pact with the West, Himmler was considering preventing Ribbentrop and his agency from conducting the Reich's foreign affairs and handling matters himself through a "political section of the secret service''. Beginning in 1943, Walter Schellenberg, head of the 6th department (foreign intelligence) of the Chief Imperial Security Agency, was admitted into Himmler's close circle of SS officers. Schellenberg later wrote that Himmler "gave me a free hand to use foreign intelligence channels to establish contacts with the West".
Besides Schellenberg, Himmler also employed a number of other high-ranking SS officers in diplomatic actions: General Kaltenbrunner, head of the Chief Imperial Security Agency, the already mentioned Hottl, who had contacts with reactionary catholic circles, and a number of others.
In the summer of 1944 there were even more opportunities for making contacts with the West. Himmler ``inherited'' the connections which had been established by the "July 20th conspirators''. Those conspirators who had direct contacts with 93 the West---Canaris, Goerdeler, Popitz, Haushofer and others---were not immediately executed but kept in a special prison at Himmler's disposal until the spring of 1945. Gerhard Ritter, a well-known West German historian, writes that Himmler asked Goerdeler after he was taken prisoner to use his contacts through Wallenberg, the Swedish banker, to negotiate a quick peace with Churchill that would be ``acceptable'' to both sides.
But let us return to the events we have been describing. Schellenberg was authorised by Himmler to meet with the British Consul in Zurich and make the "peace proposals''. British representatives soon replied that Churchill had given them the necessary authorisation to conduct unofficial negotiations. Schellenberg made sure that the British understood his proposals by repeating them through a high-ranking officer in the Swiss secret service.
Perhaps it was Himmler's ``peaceful'' and farreaching proposals that inspired the British prime minister at precisely that time to approach President Roosevelt and the members of the British cabinet with the notorious memorandum which envisioned a post-war "United States of Europe" directed against the = Russians.^^1^^
Himmler was informed when Dulles arrived in Switzerland. Dulles' anti-communist sentiments were also made known by Wilhelm HottI, Schellenberg's deputy and his authorised representative in Switzerland. In early 1943 Schellenberg established direct contact with Dulles through Prince Hohenlohe. From January 15 to April 3, 1943, three meetings took place between Hohenlohe, Dulles _-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, Cassell and Co., Ltd., London, pp. 503--04.
94 and Dulles' aide ``Roberts''. Schellenberg was assured that Germany would "remain a factor of order and play a responsible role in the future".Kaltenbrunner was also instructed by Himmler to make contact with Dulles. But the Chief of the Imperial Security Agency basically concerned himself with establishing strong ties with reactionary catholic circles in the Vatican, Madrid and Lisbon.
Himmler gave Schellenberg orders to try and establish other means of contact with the West through Sweden. With the assistance of Carl Rasche, the Director of the Dresdner Bank, Schellenberg met Markus Wallenberg, an influential Swedish banker who had been closely associated with Zionist circles in the US for quite some time. Schellenberg then recommended that Himmler's personal physician, Felix Kersten (also Himmler's trusted friend) be sent to Stockholm.
Kersten had been recommended to Himmler by the director of a German potassium manufacturing firm and, like Wolff, represented German monopolies. With Wallenberg's help, Kersten established close contacts with two anti-Soviet-minded rightwing representatives from the US: Professor Bruce Hopper, a specialist in Russian affairs, and a man who, for security reasons, called himself Abraham Hewitt. Hewitt announced that he "also understood the threat from the East" and was willing to act as a mediator between Himmler and Washington.
In November 1943 Schellenberg arrived in Stockholm and himself made contact with the American diplomats. The American side announced that an agreement would be possible if the following proposals were met: that Germany's 1914 borders be restored, i. e., that Germany retain large area of Western Poland and the French provinces of 95 Alsace and Lorraine, that the Wehrmacht not be destroyed but only reduced to three million men, that the SS and Nazi party be dissolved, that "free elections" be held in the country under the control of the US and Great Britain, that these two countries regulate Germany's military industry, and that the war criminals be punished.
The American proposals were, on the whole, acceptable to Berlin. Only the proposal dealing with the punishment of war criminals was initially objected to. But after further consideration it was decided that this would make it possible to get rid of undesirables. Himmler announced that he was ready to ``help'' punish such war criminals as Bormann and Ribbentrop.
Germany's sharply worsening military situation due to Soviet attacks compelled Himmler to try and reach an agreement as soon as possible. As early as 1943 he authorised Kersten to inform the Americans that he agreed to conduct negotiations on the basis of their proposals and was willing to meet personally with Hewitt. The only thing that remained to be done was to determine the time and place. Himmler was sure that the West would want to make an agreement with him since he controlled Germany's powerful terrorist apparatus.
From early 1945 Himmler himself began to make contacts abroad. It was at this time that Himmler, the murderer of millions of people, tried to make his most odious deal with certain circles in the West. Trying to disguise their desire to preserve Nazi Germany and its anti-Soviet goals, these circles professed an interest in the fate of the remaining prisoners in German concentration camps, especially the Jews.
In late 1944 Dr. Jean Marie Musy, the former 96 president of Switzerland, and Sternbuch, member of the Rabbinical Alliance of America, contacted Schellenberg and his aides. Musy informed Schellenberg that he was willing to travel to Germany and meet secretly with Himmler. This meeting took place on December 20, 1944, in Himmler's private train not far from Vienna. Officially these talks, which were conducted under the flag of the Red Cross, were to discuss the freeing of a group of Jews. Musy, acting in the name of Zionist organisations, offered Himmler five million Swiss francs for this act. There was, of course, no discussion of the freeing of all the imprisoned Jews. Musy was interested only in a few hundred who were apparently connected with the Zionist movement. He gave a list of their names to Himmler. Himmler saw an opportunity to negotiate with Musy on a wider political basis. Their second meeting took place in January 1945. Musy proposed that twice a month 200--300 imprisoned Jews be sent through Switzerland to the United States. In return he would act as Germany's lawyer, explaining the alleged "political turnover" that had taken place in the country. Schellenberg noted that Himmler, aware of "Musy's influence in Western politics'', agreed to the proposal. Himmler and Schellenberg worked out a scheme to be presented at the next meeting which was to take place in a few weeks in Berlin: Germany would propose an armistice of several days on land and in the air to the Western Allies. This would demonstrate the country's "good will" and make it possible to transport the prisoners Musy had named without delay. Schellenberg wrote: "We hoped that this 'rescue' would give us the opportunity to discuss compromises with the West."
7---418
97When Musy's negotiations with Himmler were leaked to the press and became known to the public, the former Swiss president was forced to act more cautiously. But he still continued to negotiate with Himmler. On April 7, 1945, Schellenberg asked Musy what concessions the British and Americans would make if the Nazis left the concentration camp prisoners behind when they retreated in the West: could not Eisenhower be immediately informed of this proposal? Three days later Musy replied, "Washington has been informed and the reaction is favourable."
Before entering into a new round of important negotiations with the West, Himmler wanted to make sure of the support of the monopolies. He talked with Speer while Kaltenbrunner paid a visit to Theodor Hupfauer, Speer's deputy minister of armaments. Though Speer is usually generous with minor details in his memoirs, he does not relate what was said in this important conversation with Himmler.
Before discussing any further the negotiations between high-ranking SS officers and the Americans, British and leaders of Zionist organisations (who were to act as mediators), it is important to make one thing clear. As has already been mentioned, after the failure of Ribbentrop's memorandum, Hesse did not return to Berlin but remained in Stockholm. He began to work on another task, this time for Himmler, not Hitler. On his way to Sweden, Hesse had stopped in Copenhagen. There Werner Best, the "Imperial representative" in occupied Denmark, had been instructed by Himmler to turn over to Hesse his contacts with the West through Allen Vought. Vought was not only influential in Sweden, but 98 was the personal friend of a well-known politician in the British Labour Party. The most important task Himmler had assigned to Hesse was to make contact with Gilel Storch in Stockholm. Storch was a representative of the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Congress, an organisation which, it had been learned from Trott zu Solz and other "July 20th Conspirators'', was very influential in US government circles.
At their first meeting, Hesse asked Storch to request the American government to begin political negotiations on a number of issues, among them: an agreement to "humanise the war'', cease the bombing of civilian targets, guarantee the lives and property of civilians in occupied territory, and so on. Undoubtedly, Berlin viewed an agreement on these issues to be a prelude to a negotiated cease-fire on the Western Front. To lure the West into these negotiations, Germany proposed to discuss sending the Jews imprisoned in concentration camps out of the country, and Hesse stated that he had the "necessary authority and guarantees from Ribbentrop and Himmler to do so".
Another American also took part in the negotiations with Hesse---Ivar Olesen. Storch called him "Roosevelt's right hand in Jewish affairs.'' When Hesse questioned whether Olesen had really been instructed by the US government to take part in the negotiations, Storch unhesitatingly answered: "You have the word of the World Zionist Congress on this!" Storch and Olesen "took the bull by the horns" as, the saying goes, and instead of discussing releasing Jews from concentration camps, proposed that "larger and more important problems" be negotiated. "It is evident that Germany has lost the war. Why haven't you tried to discuss a capitul- 7* 99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1984/BSTRD194/20061009/195.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2006.10.09) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ [BEGIN] ation with us?" When Hesse asked how they could circumvent the Allies' agreement to demand Germany's unnconditional surrender, Olesen stated frankly: "Of course, it will be called an unconditional surrender, but I can assure you that the American government will deal with every point of the capitulation. You can be sure that Roosevelt recognises the danger coming from the East. We are conducting this war in order to eliminate tyranny everywhere, not just in Germany".
Hesse replied that he was not authorised to negotiate Germany's surrender, and asked Storch to continue the discussion with Himmler. Bourgeois historians have written that Storch, supposedly having seventeen relatives imprisoned in German concentration camps, was simply afraid to travel to Germany lest he be similarly imprisoned. But as Storch himself later admitted, this was not the case. He wasn't afraid of the Gestapo; he had too much in common with the men who worked there. He was afraid that his plane might be directed from its course and would land in Soviet-occupied territory.^^1^^ And then the ulterior motives of the Zionist reactionaries, who wanted to take advantage of their connections with the US government, would become known to the world.
For this reason, Norbert Masur, a Swedish citizen and the representative of the World Jewish Congress in Stockholm, was sent as the Zionists' emissary to Himmler. On April 19, 1945, he arrived at Berlin's Tempelhof Airport. The following day a special car was sent to take him to Himmler's headquarters in Zinten castle, about 100 kilometres _-_-_
~^^1^^ It should be remembered that the front at that time was only 60 kilometres from Berlin.
100 to the north of Berlin.The conversation between the two men lasted 11 hours and was held under conditions of the utmost secrecy. When the most sensitive points of the agreement were being discussed, even Schellenberg was sent from the room.
From the very beginning it was clear that the question that Masur had purportedly come to Berlin to discuss---improving the lot of the Jews imprisoned in German concentration camps--- did not interest him in the slightest. With " pathetic calm" Masur listened as Himmler cynically stated: "...These men helped the Resistance. They fired on our troops from their ghettos. And, moreover, they carry diseases such as typhus. It was to stop epidemics that we sent them to the ovens... The concentration camps! They should be called education camps... It's true that the prisoners have to work hard there. But all Germans work = hard."^^1^^
Passing on to the most important issue, Himmler then asked Masur to act as a mediator in the negotiations with the West. Himmler assured him: "The National Socialist state Hitler created is the only political organisation capable of stopping Bolshevism. If this bastion falls, American and British soldiers will have to deal with Bolshevism and the Western countries will fall into social chaos.'' Masur agreed to act as mediator.
Himmler and Masur also discussed the conditions of a future agreement between Germany and the Western Allies. Himmler felt that any understanding reached with the US should be strengt- _-_-_
^^1^^ Joseph Kessel, The Man with the Miraculous Hands H. Wolff, New York, 1961, p. 226.
101 hened by an agreement with Great Britain. At the same time that Himmler---Schellenberg--- Hesse were meeting with Storch---Olesen---Masur, SS officers were working on another plan which they thought would pave the way for a deal with London.On February 17, 1945, Count Bernadotte, the vice-president of the Swedish Red Cross and the nephew of the Swedish King, arrived in Berlin under the pretext of wanting to discuss the fate of Danish and Norwegian citizens in concentration camps. His trip had been arranged in preliminary discussions between Kaltenbrunner and Carl Burckhardt, the president of the International Red Cross and a man who had long been closely associated with ruling circles in Great = Britain.^^1^^ Bernadotte was aware of the negotiations between Himmler and Musy. In Berlin, he established personal contact with Himmler's subordinates: Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg and Professor Karl Gebhardt, president of the German Red Cross; and then met with Himmler.
The negotiations between Bernadotte and Himmler were held over a two-month period---from February 17 to April 24, 1945---and were approved by Hitler. Himmler and Bernadotte found that they had much in common even at their first meeting on February 17. Himmler talked in circles about the "danger of Bolshevism''. He assured Bernadotte that while Germany's posi- _-_-_
^^1^^ Between the wars, Carl Burckhardt held, on suggestion of the British government, the post of the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig (Gdansk).
102 tion was serious, it was not hopeless, and that there was no immediate danger of the Russians seizing Berlin. Himmler admitted that the situation of the Nazi forces occupying Norway was serious, and asked that Sweden take a position that would be favourable to Germany in this matter. Though Bernadotte had presumably come to Berlin to defend the interests of the people living in Scandinavian countries, he did not contradict Himmler. He presented him with a book about Swedish runes of the XVII century.On March 12, 1945, Bernadotte again arrived in Germany. He asked Schellenberg to give Himmler a very interesting letter, the contents of which refuted the myth of this Western emissary's "humane mission''. The reason Bernadotte was rushing between Stockholm and Berlin was not to help free concentration camp prisoners, but to save the crumbling Nazi regime. Bernadotte wrote to the murderer of millions of Jews; "Jews are just as unwelcome in Sweden as they are in Germany, so I completely understand you on the Jewish = question."^^1^^ He asked Schellenberg to personally deliver the letter to Himmler so that it "wouldn't fall into the wrong hands".
Through Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg and Kersten, Bernadotte informed the rulers of Nazi Germany of the position of reactionary circles in Great Britain: as a gesture of "good will" and as a prelude to serious negotiations, Germany should, in effect, cease hostilities in Scandinavia and the Atlantic. Kersten told Himmler that in Bernadotte's words, "after the war, the US will return to its isolationism... England will be con- _-_-_
^^1^^ Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, No. 4, 1978, p. 572.
103 cerned with her empire, so the Soviet Union will remain the greatest influence in Europe. Only by stopping the fighting of the Germans in Norway will it be possible to keep the Soviet Union far from the Atlantic Ocean.'' Himmler said that he would order SS units in Denmark and Norway to cease hostilities and prepare for surrender and try to convince Hitler as soon as possible of the necessity for taking such action.On April 2, 1945, Himmler again met with Bernadotte. Their conversation took place at Professor Gebhardt's clinic in Hohen Liichen and lasted four hours. Bernadotte later said, "I fell right into the center of big politics.'' Himmler asked him if he could immediately contact Eisenhower and Churchill and find out if it would be possible for the Germans to surrender on the Western Front. Himmler was ready to send Schellenberg and Kersten to ``accompany'' Bernadotte. Expressing the position of the Americans and British, Bernadotte said that for " understandable reasons'', the initiative in this matter should come from Himmler, not from the West.
Himmler gave Bernadotte an account of the proposals he was considering making to Churchill and Eisenhower. "The SS and the Wehrmacht are ready to continue the war against Russia if the British and Americans will agree to an armistice with us. It is impossible for us to conclude a peace with Bolshevik Russia. Any agreement would be meaningless, since Russia would not keep it. Therefore we must continue to fight in order to save Europe from the horrors which await it if Bolshevism is not repulsed. Do everything possible to convince Eisenhower that the real enemy of mankind is called Soviet Russia and that only 104 we Germans are in a position to fight against her. I agree to accept the victory of the Western Powers, but they must give me time to repulse Russia. If they will supply me with the necessary military equipment, I can still do it."
Thus, instead of agreeing to Bernadotte's proposal that the Germans surrender in Norway and Denmark, the Nazis proposed a broader agreement to the US and Great Britain: a cease-fire on the Western Front and the Allies' support in Germany's war against the Soviet Union.
Bernadotte announced that Himmler's proposed discussion with the political and military leaders of the Western powers must be of a "serious nature''. Therefore, it would be possible only if Himmler would publicly announce that he was Hitler's successor and would in the future carry out his functions. Bernadotte also advised Himmler to break up the National Socialist Party and declare the end of the Third Reich. The message to Himmler was clear: an immediate change in the Reich's fa9ade which would mislead the Western public, was a necessary prerequisite for serious negotiations. Still, Bernadotte passed Himmler's proposals on to the governments of the US and Great Britain through Mr. Boheman, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The negotiations between Himmler and Bernadotte were given impetus after the Soviet offensive, which had begun on April 16, wiped out the entire Nazi Eastern Front a few days later. On April 20, 1945, Soviet artillery fired the first shots into the capital of the Nazi Reich. Under the circumstances, Himmler felt that his time was running out to reach an agreement with the West. He had to act immediately and without waiting 105 for Hitler's approval. That evening, April 20, Bernadotte arrived in Berlin and early the next morning met with Himmler and Schellenberg. They hoped that Bernadotte would "fly to General Eisenhower on his own initiative" in order to pave the way for direct negotiations between Eisenhower and Hitler. Bernadotte replied that in view of the existing situation (resulting from the victory of the Soviet Army) he could do nothing to help either Hitler or Himmler. "The Reichsfiihrer... should have taken the affairs of the Reich into his own hands after my first visit,'' i. e., in February-March 1945.^^1^^
But Himmler still hoped to use Bernadotte. On April 23 Schellenberg continued negotiations with him in Flensburg. Schellenberg told Bernadotte that Himmler had decided to meet personally with General Eisenhower to inform him of his willingness to surrender all German armed forces on the Western Front. Bernadotte again expressed doubt as to whether the Western Powers would officially agree to a surrender of German forces on the Western Front under the circumstances. He then told Schellenberg to make the following two suggestions to Himmler. First: "It would be wiser if Himmler directed his requests to the Swedish government, which could then deliver the message to the Western Powers.'' Second: "It was not necessary for Himmler to meet personally with Eisenhower" in order to surrender.
This was perhaps an indication that, though they could not sign a formal agreement to this _-_-_
~^^1^^ Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, Pan Books Ltd., London, 1962, p. 156.
106 effect, the Western Powers were willing to allow the Nazis to surrender in the West and continue fighting against the Soviet Union.The last meeting between Himmler and Bernadotte took place on the evening of April 23 in the offices of the Swedish embassy, which by that time had been moved from Berlin to Liibeck. The city was without electricity and the three-hour meeting was conducted by candle-light. In the middle of their discussion, an air alarm sounded and the two men moved to the cellar.
Himmler began the meeting by declaring that "Hitler is probably dead now" and that he, Himmler, "was free to end the war''. "In order to keep the greater part of Germany from a Russian invasion, I am prepared to surrender on the Western Front so that the troops of the Western Powers can advance to the east as quickly as possible. But I am not prepared to surrender on the Eastern Front. I have always been a sworn enemy of Bolshevism and will remain one."
Following the advice Bernadotte had given to Schellenberg the day before, Himmler asked the Swedish count to give his proposal to Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that it could be passed on to the West. Bernadotte replied that he would do this on the condition that Germany's surrender on the Western Front be extended to include Denmark and Norway. Himmler, of course, agreed. To be sure that Himmler was serious, Bernadotte asked him to personally address a note to the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Himmler complied with this request, writing: "I declare that the Western Powers have defeated the German army. I am prepared to surrender unconditionally on the Western Front. I am also 107 prepared to discuss the technical details of a German surrender in Denmark and Norway."
It was decided that Bernadotte would return as quickly as possible to Sweden while Schellenberg would remain in Flensburg to wait for a reply from the West.
In order to strengthen Bernadotte's mission, Himmler sent a personal letter to British FieldMarshall Montgomery, that is to say, to Montgomery's superior in London, Churchill. Himmler wrote that he wanted to arrange a meeting with Montgomery in order to stress that' "now that Germany was beaten, Britain was left alone to pace the Asiatic onslaught. It was essential to save the fighting manpower of Germany from falling into Russian hands, since it would be needed to fight with the British against the Russians in the near = future."^^1^^
Himmler was so sure that Bernadotte's mission would be successful that immediately after their conversation he began to discuss with Schellenberg points of protocol in preparation for the coming meeting with Eisenhower: should he greet him with the Nazi salute or shake hands, should he be the first to hold out his hand.
But events did not unfold as Himmler and his accomplices in the West had planned. Bernadotte did in fact return to Stockholm that night and several hours later the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boheman, asked the British Minister to Sweden, Sir Victor Mallet, and his American colleague, Herschel Johnson, to call _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G., The World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, 1958, p. 333.
108 upon him. The Foreign Minister stressed that "Himmler had stipulated that his information was exclusively for the Western = Powers".^^1^^On April 25, 1945, Himmler's proposal was the subject of a special meeting held in Washington between Truman, George Marshall and William Leahy. During the meeting Truman talked by phone with Churchill. According to Leahy, Churchill was considering the possibility of accepting Himmler's = proposal.^^2^^ Churchill himself refers to this in his memoirs. It seems that on the morning of that same day, April 25, there was a meeting of the British War Cabinet. The Cabinet adopted what Churchill thought to be a very clever resolution: to enter into negotiations with Himmler on behalf of the triple Powers, i. e., on behalf of the Soviet Union also, although Moscow had not voiced its opinion, "since no one of us can enter into separate negotiations''. But "this fact in no way abrogates General Eisenhower's or Field-Marshal Alexander's authority to accept local surrenders as they = occur".^^3^^ It was clear that Churchill intended to use the negotiations of the triple Powers with Himmler for an unconditional surrender of German forces on all fronts as a cover for reaching a separate agreement that would allow the Nazis to surrender on the Western and Italian Fronts.
Washington was also very tempted to accept _-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, pp. 457--58.
~^^2^^ W. Leahy, I Was There, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1950, p. 357.
~^^3^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, pp. 458--59.
109 Himmler's proposal. But although the April 15, 1945 meeting between political and military leaders and monopoly representatives decided to try and preserve Germany's reactionary regime under US control, the American government did not dare make an open pact with Germany.There were many supporters of a secret antiSoviet pact with Germany to be found in British and American ruling circles, but at that time they were unable to act either in their own countries or abroad. Field-Marshal Montgomery admitted in his memoirs that, the "British people... would never have been persuaded to fight the Russians in 1945".^^1^^
While Himmler was waiting for an answer from London and Washington, there were rapid developments on the Soviet-German Front. On April 25, 1945, the day that London and Washington decided how to deal with Himmler's proposal, Soviet forces attacking to the north of Berlin met troops from the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Potsdam region; Berlin was encircled by Soviet forces. That same day, units from the 1st Ukrainian Front met the 1st American Army at the Elbe in the region of Torgau, splitting Germany and its armed forces in two. Under these circumstances, neither the American nor the British government would compromise itself by making an official pact with Himmler or any other representative of the defeated Nazi government. Moreover, London and Washington realised that Himmler had lost much of his power and prestige during the last days of the Reich.
_-_-_~^^1^^ The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery af Alamein, p. 340.
110On April 26, 1945, President Harry Truman sent a cable to Stalin informing him of Himmler's proposal. Truman went on to say: "In keeping with our agreement with the British and Soviet governments it is the view of the United States government that the only acceptable terms of surrender are unconditional surrender on all fronts to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States... Germans ... should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders in the field."^^1^^
Stalin wrote in reply: "I think your contemplated reply to Himmler, which calls for unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, is absolutely sound. Please act in the spirit of your proposal, and as for us Russians, we undertake to continue our attacks upon the = Germans."^^2^^
Churchill was also forced to comply with Washington's decision. The British and American ambassadors were instructed to inform Himmler through Sweden that the Allies would only accept an unconditional surrender on all fronts.
On April 27, 1945, Bernadotte again arrived in Germany. In the small town of Flensburg on the border of Denmark, Bernadotte informed Schellenberg of the Western Powers' negative reply to Himmler's proposal. The press learned of negotiations between Himmler and the West and on = [[an]] = April~28 Radio London broadcast the British Reuters News Agency report concerning Himmler's proposal and the Western Powers' refusal to accept it. Within minutes this information was given to Hitler in the underground Imperial Chancellery.
At the same time, Admiral Donitz, the commander _-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence ..., Vol. 2, p. 222.
~^^2^^ Correspondence ..., Vol. 2, pp. 222--23.
111 of Nazi forces in Northern Germany, sent a telegram to the bunker asking if Hitler was aware of Himmler's proposal of surrender to the British and Americans and of the latters' refusal to accept anything but a general surrender on all fronts. Himmler's failure to arrange a ``deal'' with the West through Bernadotte was a severe blow to the Nazi leadership. Hitler, of course, had been informed of the negotiations and, moreover, had approved them. But he had not been prepared for their failure. The knowledge that the US and Great Britain would not accept the surrender of German forces behind the back of their Soviet Ally hung over the F\"uhrer and his cohorts like a dark cloud. Hitler furiously ordered that Himmler be found and arrested together with Gruppenfiihrer Fegelein, Himmler's representative at Nazi headquarters. A jockey by profession, Fegelein (nicknamed Flegelein---ruffian, ignoramus) would more than likely have remained at the lower level of the SS hierarchy if he had not married in 1944 Gretl Braun, the sister of Hitler's mistress, Eva Braun. But his marriage allowed him to enter Hitler's inner circle. In order to have his own man near Hitler Himmler gave Fegelein Gruppenfuhrer rank---SS general---and appointed him his representative at headquarters.Hitler ordered that Fegelein be found "dead or alive''. He was not in the next bunker where his offices were located---he had escaped from the bomb shelter two days before. The SS troops headed by Standartenfiihrer Hegl, the deputy chief of Hitler's personal bodyguard, began to search for the fugitive in the city quarters closest to the Imperial Chancellery. The night of April 29, as artillery fire and mines sounded throughout Berlin, and 112 buildings crumbled to the streets, an SS detachment was carrying out Hitler's order and combing the city street by street. Fegelein, dressed in civilian clothes, was found in a relative's apartment and immediately brought to Hitler.
Why was the F\"uhrer so anxious to have his ``brother-in-law'' brought in? To punish him for escaping from the bunker? No, the reason was that Hitler knew his "faithful Heinrich" (as Himmler was called by top-level Nazi officials) too well. Along with Fegelein, SS troops found a briefcase with top-secret documents. As Hitler expected, among the documents was Himmler's detailed account of all the SS attempts to arrange negotiations with the West. And Himmler had not failed to stress that these attempts had been sanctioned by Hitler.
The implicating documents were immediately burned and Fegelein shot on Hitler's order in the Imperial Chancellery courtyard.
Thus ended the SS terror organisation's diplomatic attempt to save the Third Reich by an antiSoviet = pact.^^1^^
__ALPHA_LVL1__ NAZI DIPLOMACY IN ITS DEATH THROESBy the beginning of April 1945 it had become clear that Himmler's negotiations with the representatives of international Zionist organisations had _-_-_
~^^1^^ It is interesting to note that Himmler's "peace proposals" to General de Gaulle's Provisional government in exile in France were also refused.
Although the ruling circles in France were definitely leaning towards making a deal with the Nazis, they nevertheless refused Himmler's offer.
113 failed just as badly as had Ribbentrop's memorandum and Wolff's mission. The Nazi leaders who had taken up residence in the underground Imperial Chancellery became more and more convinced that it was both militarily and politically impossible to change the situation.A ``new'' military-diplomatic strategy was worked out and approved by the Nazis at the April 6, 1945 meeting of the Nazi leadership: the important thing was to hold out until there was a split in the Russian and British-American coalition. The political experience that the Nazis had gained by this time convinced them that the Soviet Union would remain loyal to its commitments to its Allies and would not make any kind of pact with Nazi Germany. But the Nazi leaders never gave up hope that under certain conditions anti-Soviet sentiment in ruling circles in London and Washington would prevail and the American and British governments would seek to preserve Nazi Germany and even ``use'' the country in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. It was in this direction that Berlin applied its military and diplomatic efforts.
Hitler's mad notion during the final days of the Reich was that as soon as the Soviet Army met up with American and British forces in German territory, or perhaps even before this, there would be a rupture in the anti-Nazi coalition and the Allies would begin to fight among themselves.
The Nazis exaggerated the disagreements and contradictions among the Allied Powers and then believed them to be real. In the beginning of April 1945 Hitler and his officers spent entire evenings in the underground Imperial Chancellery discussing all the possibilities of a "turn around of events''. Jiirgen Thorwald, a West German historian, writes: 114 ``There were conversations where each statement made by an Allied statesman, each article in an Allied newspaper, every slightest indication of tension between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviet Union was discussed and interpreted with feverish delirium, where the hopes of one fired the hopes of others and the illusions of one awakened new illusions in others.'' Hitler hung a portrait of the Prussian king, Frederick II, in his study and Goebbels gave him an English history of the Seven-Year War by Thomas Carlyle. The favourite topic of conversation in the underground chancellery was the "remarkable conclusion" to the SevenYear War: an unexpected death of the Russian Empress Elizabeth broke the coalition between the nations fighting the Prussian king.
The Nazis viewed the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, as a confirmation of the realistic nature of their foreign policy plans. Now that Roosevelt was gone, they were clearly counting on anti-Soviet elements in reactionary circles of the US gaining control and thus making it possible for Germany to enter into diplomatic negotiations with Washington and London. Goebbels "was in ecstasy" when he learned of Roosevelt's death. He contacted Hitler immediately: "My Fuehrer, I congratulate you! Roosevelt is dead. It is written in the stars that the second half of April will be the turning-point for us. This is Friday, April the 13th. It is the = turning-point!"^^1^^
The next three days were joyous ones in the underground government offices. A witness later wrote, "Champagne flowed like water; newspapers were exultant. Hitler was endlessly congratulated from _-_-_
^^1^^ Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, p. 143.
115 all = sides."^^1^^ The theme was the same: Roosevelt's death would lead to a change in the West's position with respect to the Third Reich and Hitler.But the Nazis had again miscalculated. They had overestimated the disagreements among the Allies and did not see what held together and strengthened the anti-Nazi coalition---the steadfast will of freedom-loving peoples, including the peoples of the US and Great Britain, to put an end to German fascism.
It is indeed a fact that after Roosevelt's death and Truman's coming into office, those ruling circles in the US and Great Britain that were prepared to end the Second World War with a separate antiSoviet pact with Germany became more active. The statement made by Harry Truman, then a senator, on June 24, 1941, immediately following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, is indicative. "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances''. Truman hoped that the US would win the war and that both the Soviet Union and Germany would be weakened in the process. But the Soviet Union emerged a victorious and mighty socialist power with even more influence in the world. As a result, America's foreign policy became increasingly anti-Soviet. After taking office, President Truman declared that the Russians would soon be put in their places, and that the United States would then have the lead on running the world in the way that the world ought _-_-_
^^1^^ Ibid.
116 to be = run.^^1^^The Nazis were ecstatic over what was being published in the major American newspapers: "It has long been known that a certain group in the State Department is in favour of coming to terms with Germany... But there was no talk on this subject as long as Roosevelt was in the White House. The day after his funeral [Roosevelt was buried on April 15, 1945], a meeting was held in the office of Assistant Secretary of State Clayton at which representatives of the State and War Departments decided to overturn Roosevelt's policy.'' Also present at this meeting were prominent politicians and businessmen who were in favour of making a separate peace with Germany.
Berlin was quick to pick up these signals from Washington. Trying to find some common ground with American and British reactionary circles, Goebbels stepped up the Nazi propaganda campaign about the "communist threat" which would endanger Europe if the Third Reich fell. In every one of his speeches given at that time, Goebbels warned his listeners about the "iron curtain".
On the evening of April 19, Goebbels delivered a speech over Berlin radio. Although he addressed himself to the German people, it was clear that his words were intended for others. Trying to frighten the West with the threat of communism, Goebbels declared that Hitler alone had saved European culture and civilisation from sinking into an abyss. There was only one conclusion to be drawn: _-_-_
^^1^^ See: William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, The World Publishing Co., Cleveland and New York, 1959, p. 168.
117 if Washington and London did not immediately come to its aid, Germany would be destroyed, and the "Bolshevik threat" would hang over the entire Western world.Inspired by the anti-Soviet sentiment being manifested in American and British foreign policy, Goebbels began to ``theorise'' about what the Western Powers would demand from Germany in return for their military alliance with the Reich against the USSR---"free elections" or the formation of bourgeois parties? Keitel ordered that a list of the "war criminals" in occupied Nazi countries be drawn up so that they could be appropriately punished after Germany's victory. Clearly, Nazi leaders and the German monopolists who supported them were anxious to make a pact with the West so that they might take advantage of the respite to reestablish Germany's military and industrial power and thus have the opportunity to make another bid for world dominance.
Well aware of Truman's anti-Soviet views, the Nazis waited impatiently for the new American President's first official statement. But they were bitterly disappointed. Truman knew that with victory close at hand, the American people would never allow him to lead the country into a confrontation with its military ally, the Soviet Union.
Toland writes, "Even if Truman had wanted to become more resolute with Russia, for example, it would have been extremely difficult. The American people had overwhelmingly supported Roosevelt's friendly policy...'' The fact that the US government was interested in the Soviet Union's cooperation in the war against militarist Japan was also a factor. In weighing all the pros and cons of the situation, Truman undoubtedly also consid- 118 ered recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who soberly evaluated the new balance of power in the world, particularly between the US and the Soviet Union. One such recommendation stated that the successful conclusion of the war against Germany would lead to deep changes in the balance of military power in the world, which could only be compared in the last 1500 years with the fall of Rome. This is fundamentally significant for future international political agreements and the negotiations which lead to them. The recommendation went on to declare that after the defeat of Japan the United States and the Soviet Union would remain as first-class military powers. This could be explained by a combination of factors such as geographical location, size and enormous military potential. It was concluded that although the United States could direct its military power to many distant regions of the world, the relative power and geographical location of the two powers would not allow one to defeat the other even in an alliance with the British Empire.
In his address to Congress on April 16, 1945, Truman was compelled to announce: "Nothing shall shake our determination to punish the war criminals even though we must pursue them to the end of the earth."
No matter how fantastic and unrealistic the plans and desires of the Nazi leadership were, much effort was put into trying to realise them. The Nazis planned to organise a military confrontation between the Allies on German territory. They planned to accomplish this in several ways. Assuming that such a confrontation was inevitable (and this was the only way the Germans could hope to make an anti-Soviet deal with London and Washington), 119 the Nazi leadership decided, first of all, that everything possible must be done to have this confrontation take place as far to the east as possible. Secondly, the remaining forces of the Wehrmacht should be concentrated in one or several " fortresses" where Hitler and other leaders of the Reich could bide their time until the situation improved. Until January 1945, when Soviet troops had advanced to the outlying regions of Berlin, the Nazis had intended to turn the mountainous region to the south of Munich, which included the southern part of Bavaria and the Austrian region of Tirole, into such a fortress. Hitler had given the command of the "Alpine fortress" to Field-Marshal Kesselring. In the spring of 1945, the archives and valuables of various German government agencies along with the families and possessions of Nazi leaders were transported there.
However, as Kesselring himself later acknowledged, all the millitary plans connected with the "Alpine fortress" were nothing more than a fantastic dream. Though the ``fortress'' was covered by the Italian Front in the South, where virtually no fighting was taking place, the Nazis lacked the necessary troops and military equipment to defend it in the East. Documents from Nazi archives state that one of the most important reasons for concentrating German forces in Hungary was for this purpose---to defend the fortress in the East from the advancing Soviet Army. As has already been noted, this attempt ended in utter failure. After crushing the concentrated Nazi formations, Soviet forces launched a rapid offensive along the Danube---in the direction of the "Alpine fortress''. On April 4 Soviet troops liberated Bratislava, the most important city in Slovakia, and the next day 120 began combat operations on the outskirts of Vienna, the Austrian capital. The Eastern Front of the "Alpine fortress" was being ripped apart.
At the April 6th meeting at Hitler's headquarters, the decision was taken for the political and military leadership of the Reich to remain in Berlin.
The Nazi leadership had hoped that the German troops concentrated in the Berlin region could prevent the city from falling to the Soviet Army. Remaining inside their circle of defense, they were waiting for the relations to sour between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and for the anti-Nazi coalition to rupture.
The Nazis managed to concentrate considerable strength in the Berlin region---48 infantry, 6 panzer and 9 motorised divisions. And in the city itself more than 200 Volksturm battalions had been mustered. The total strength of the garrison exceeded 200,000 men. To cover the "Berlin fortress" from air attacks, the Nazi Command had approximately 2,000 planes including 120 of the latest M-262w jets and 600 anti-aircraft artillery pieces. Three lines of fortifications had been built around the city. In Berlin itself numerous antitank and barbed wire obstacles had been constructed, and approximately 400 bunkers equipped with antitank and antiaircraft artillery covered the entrance to the centre of the city where the main government and administrative offices were located. On Hitler's instructions, General Helmuth Reymann issued the order that "Berlin must be defended to the last man and the last bullet".
While the Nazis considered defending Berlin a necessary prerequisite for diplomatic negotiations with the West, it was also necessary that they hold the front against the Soviet Army at the Oder. 121 The Nazi leadership considered the American and British troops' entering the region a "lesser evil" that could even make it easier for the Germans to achieve an anti-Soviet pact.
After the April 6th meeting at Hitler's headquarters, the Nazi leadership handed down special orders which stated: "The war will be decided not in the West but in the East... We must concern ourselves only with the East, regardless of what will happen in the West. Holding the Eastern Front is a prerequisite for altering the course of the = war."^^1^^ At Hitler's insistence, General Heinrici issued the following order to the Wisla Army Group, which was defending Berlin to the East: "Do not retreat a step before the Russians, even if British and American tanks attack us from the rear.'' Coward though he was (he reportedly fell into hysterics on the eve of visits to the dentist) Hitler gathered up enough courage to visit a few military units at the Oder. He asked the soldiers and officers "to die but not surrender'', "under no circumstances to allow the Russians to enter Berlin".
Thus, the Nazi leadership was trying once again to create a military basis for diplomatic negotiations with the West. There was even speculation that the Germans could defeat the Soviet Army outside of Berlin. This would make it even easier to arrange a separate deal. Field-Marshal Keitel testified at Nuremberg that Hitler firmly believed that there was no reason for a hasty surrender, that negotiations with the enemy in the West should begin "after a victory'', at Berlin for = example.^^2^^ The Nazi _-_-_
~^^1^^ The History of the Second World War. 1939--1945, Vol. 10, p. 311.
~^^2^^ New Times, No. 12, 1965, pp. 17--18.
122 Command had grossly underestimated the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces. Goebbels announced: "It is possible to win a victory of global significance at Berlin. This victory must be won here, the place the world is watching... If the Soviets are repulsed from Berlin, it would be a great example for the entire world."^^1^^Documents which are available today reveal the foreign policy plans of the Nazi leadership in the final days before the collapse of the Reich. Bormann's notes, which were published in 1974, express the belief that the Americans would certainly turn to Germany for support in the "inevitable confrontation" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The minutes of the last meetings which were held in the underground Imperial Chancellery have been published in West Germany and are of even greater interest. It is apparent that the Nazis were hoping for a rift in the anti-Nazi coalition up to the last minute.
All the final Nazi foreign policy plans were connected with Berlin. For example, Goebbels announced at a meeting in April 1945: "The political situation is ripe, but there must be an external stimulus to cause a turn of evens in the world war. It is evident that the enemy's coalition is about to fall apart; they admit as much themselves. There is already talk of a third world war... The British and American press is rife with reports about a third world war. Roosevelt's death was one stimulus, but it was insufficient. If a second stimulus is given, if Germany proves here [i.e., in Berlin), that it is capable of action, this could be the second stimulus which would cause the destruction of the enemy coalition."
_-_-_^^1^^ Der Spiegel, No. 3, 1966, p. 34.
123The Nazis thought nothing of sacrificing Berlin's civilian population in order to delay their inevitable defeat and gain time to put their foreign policy plans into effect. But all their efforts were futile.
The Soviet-German Front was steadily approaching Berlin. On April 20, after Soviet forces overwhelmed the Germans at the Oder and continued their advance towards Berlin, the Nazi leadership took desperate action. In order to arrange a confrontation between the advancing Soviet Army and Anglo-American forces, the Nazis wanted to allow American and British troops to move to the East unimpeded.
On the evening of April 22, 1945, Keitel proposed withdrawing all troops facing British and American forces and transferring them to the defence of Berlin. Although acknowledging that such action was dangerous since it would weaken the Germans' position in negotiations with the West, he concluded that there was no other choice. Otherwise, "there won't be any place left to conduct negotiations''. If the British and Americans closely pursued the Germans and ended up in the Berlin region, this would only hasten their confrontation with the Russians. Keitel proposed that they begin the " pivoting" of German forces to the East with General Wenck's Twelfth Army, which was stationed in the Magdeburg region and the closest troops available to cut off the Soviet forces from Berlin.
Hitler was still deciding while Goebbels arrived at the bunker. W. Hewel, Ribbentrop's representative at Hitler's headquarters, told Goebbels that Ribbentrop had informed him that the Western Powers were seriously prepared to enter into lastminute negotiations with the Nazi government. 124 Ribbentrop pleaded that the Germans hold Berlin at least a few more days. Goebbels announced that considering the position of the Western Powers, it was important to use all available military forces in order to "give the British and Americans the opportunity to put into effect their political measures''. After Goebbels had spoken, General Hans Krebs, the Army Chief of Staff, observed that for the past few days the British and Americans had practically ceased all military aviation activity on the Western Front. Jodl was confident that the Americans would not impede the transfer of the German units from the Western Front to Berlin. Summing up the discussion, Hitler gave the go ahead.
Here we should return to events which had occurred a few days earlier and broaden our narrative to include what was taking place in Prime Minister Churchill's office in London.
On April 16---the day Soviet forces began their attack on Berlin---Wolff was hastily recalled from Italy to the Imperial Chancellery. On April 18 he reported to Hitler that he had "succeeded in opening doors, through Mr. Dulles, to the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Field-Marshall Alexander."
Hitler heartily approved of these contacts and said: "You're fantastically lucky. If you had failed, I would have had to drop you exactly as I dropped Hess.'' During their second conversation that day Hitler explained to Wolff what he wanted him to negotiate with Dulles. The Nazi leadership intended to hold Berlin for at least six or eight weeks. During this time, the Germans believed that either the Western Allies or the Soviet Union would cross the line of demarcation of Germany's established zones of occupation. This would aggravate relationships between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union 125 and give Hitler the opportunity to negotiate with London and Washington. "And that will be the poit at which I'll be offered a high price for my participation in the final war,'' boasted Hitler. Wolff was instructed to forthwith return to Italy and maintain contact with the Americans, trying to bargain for "better conditions".
On April 20 Wolff returned to his headquarters in Italy and requested another meeting with Dulles. One would think that having been instructed to cease negotiating with Wolff, Dulles would brush his request. However, that was not the case. In his memoirs Dulles writes that on April 20th he met with Baron Parrilli, who had acted as a mediator between Dulles and Wolff. As Wolff later recalled to American historian John Toland, Dulles completely ignored the instructions which stated that there could be no separate negotiations without knowledge of the Soviet Union and met with Wolff in Luzern. Wolff told Dulles: "We will be ridiculed for centuries if we don't manage this properly."
The Nazi emissaries noticed at once that Dulles was being more cautious. He sent a radiogramme to Field-Marshal Alexander requesting authorisation to negotiate with Wolff. Wolff was made to understand that any negotiations would have to start with the surrender of German troops on the Italian Front.
The Nazi leadership was overjoyed with the ease with which Wolff established direct contact with an official representative of the US government. Hitler and his officers believed the ``key'' to diplomatic negotiations with the West was to "hold out" in Berlin and wait for a confrontation between the Soviet Army and the Western Allies. It is most likely that the April 22 decision to cease resistence 126 on the Western Front and thus allow British and American troops to enter the Berlin region was based on the Nazis learning of the position of reactionary circles in the West, primarily that of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill.
Churchill had intended for the Anglo-American military and political strategy in the spring of 1945 to be based on the following directives: "First, that the Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world. Secondly, that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep. Thirdly, that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible. Fourthly, that Berlin was the prime and true objective of the Anglo-American Armies. Fifthly, that the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry into Prague of American troops was of high consequence. Sixthly, that Vienna, and indeed Austria, must be regulated by the Western Powers. Seventhly, that Marshall Tito's aggressive pretensions against Italy must be curbed. Finally, and above all, that a settlement must be reached on all major issues between the West and the East in Europe before the armies of democracy = melted..."^^1^^
Churchill's violent activities had not gone unnoticed in Berlin. The British Prime Minister and his circle of advisers become particularly upset when plans to halt the advance of the Soviet Army into Central Europe failed. In order to move AngloAmerican forces as far to the east as possible (and this was viewed as a necessary prerequisite for conducting negotiations with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength" and imposing the Anglo- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S.Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, p. 391.
127 American conditions for the post-war reconstruction of Europe on the Soviet Union), Churchill was willing to ignore the military plans which had been worked out with the Soviet Union. He was, of course, aware that the Germans were stubbornly resisting the attacking Soviet Army and at the same time weakening their opposition against the advancing Anglo-American troops.The principal agreement on coordinating the action of the Allies during the final stages of the war in Europe was reached at the Crimean Conference. The lines of demarcation for the meeting of Allied troops in German territory were also set at the conference. At Roosevelt's request General Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, was granted permission to deal directly with the Soviet Army Command. On March 28, 1945, Eisenhower outlined his plan for an offensive on the Western Front in a message to the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces. He stated that after surrounding the German army group in the Ruhr, he intended to launch a major attack in the direction of Erfurt, Leipzig and Dresden, where his troops would meet Soviet forces. As a result, the remaining German forces would be cut in two. The Allied forces would also cut a path through Regensburg to Linz. Here also the Allied forces would meet the advancing Soviet Army. On April 1, 1945, Stalin replied to Eisenhower: "Your plan to cut the German forces in two by joining Soviet troops with your own is completely compatible with the plan of the Soviet High Command."^^1^^ He further informed the Allied com- _-_-_
~^^1^^ The History of the Second World War. 1939--1945, Vol. 10, p. 315.
128 mand that Soviet troops would take Berlin and that he would announce the approximate date for the launch of the offensive.The plan agreed upon to defeat fascist Germany called for the Anglo-American offensive to bypass Berlin, which provoked sharp outcries from antiSoviet circles in the West. Churchill and others believed that if Anglo-American forces were the first to enter the Nazi capital, it would give the Western Powers an enormous political advantage. It would symbolise their strength and be of great significance in determining the fate of the post-war world.
Despite the decisions reached at the Crimean Conference, Churchill persistently tried to persuade Eisenhower to reconsider the plans already agreed upon by the Allies, insisting that the Anglo-American forces make a powerful thrust in the direction of Berlin and occupy the city before the Soviet troops. On March 31, 1945, Churchill sent Eisenhower a cable which read: "... why should we not cross the Elbe and advance as far eastward as possible? This has an important political bearing... Therefore I should greatly prefer persistence in the plan on which we crossed the Rhine, namely, that the Ninth U. S. Army should march with the TwentyFirst Army Group to the Elbe and beyond = Berlin."^^1^^
On April 2, 1945 Churchill again addressed Eisenhower: "I deem it highly important that we should shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as = possible..."^^2^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, p. 397.
~^^2^^ Moscow was aware of Churchill's intentions. On April I, 1945, at a meeting in the Kremlin, General Shtemenko, chief of the Major Operations Department of the Soviet Army's __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 130. __PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__ 9---418 129
Since Eisenhower had reason to believe that Churchill's proposed "march to Berlin"---a sharp wedge offensive without concern for the flanks--- smacked of military adventurism, he did not hurry to abandon the plans which had been agreed upon by the Allies. But he did state that "... if at any moment collapse should suddenly come about everywhere along the front we would rush forward ... and Berlin would be included in our important targets''. Churchill increased the pressure and addressed himself directly to the President of the United States: "If they [the Russians] also take Berlin will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributer to our common victories be unduly imprinted in their minds... I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible, and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it."^^1^^
And these remarks were made at the time when Anglo-American forces were stationed at the Rhine, more than 400 kilometres from Berlin, while Soviet troops were at the Oder, only 60 kilometres from the German capital.
At the same time, Field-Marshal Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group which was _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 129. General Headquarters, read aloud a telegram that had been sent by one of the Soviet foreign missions. It read in part: "The Anglo-American Command is preparing an operation to seize Berlin. The plan is to seize it before the Soviet Army. The main force is being formed under the command of FieldMarshal Montgomery. They are planning to direct the major attack to the north of the Ruhr, along the shortest distance which separates the main British forces from Berlin" (I. S. Konev, The Year 1945, Moscow, 1966, p. 88 (in Russian).
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, p. 399.
130 stationed on the left flank of the Allied forces, acting under Churchill's directive, demanded that Eisenhower launch an offensive against Berlin. Montgomery believed that his British troops should be the ones to enter Berlin. He and Alan Brooks, Chief of the British General Headquaters, supported a "lightening strike into the heart of Germany'', a "strong and decisive blow against Berlin''. Montgomery was told that a decisive Allied offensive against Germany must be well prepared for and be conducted on a wide front with secured flanks. The objective of such an offensive was to defeat Germany and destroy her armed forces. But Montgomery was not to be placated. On March 28, 1945, without informing Eisenhower, he issued his Army Group "orders concerning an eastern offensive''. The orders stated that it was necessary to advance to the Elbe and then "along the highway to Berlin".Eisenhower responded by withdrawing the Ninth US Army, which had formed a part of the 21st Army Group, from Montgomery's command. He sent the British Field-Marshal a telegram which stated: "You will note that in none of this do I mention Berlin. That place has become, as far as I'm concerned, nothing but a geographical location, and I have never been interested in these. My purpose is to destroy the enemy's = forces."^^1^^
Truman later recalled that Churchill tried to convince him that "Berlin was not just a military matter but a matter of state, to be decided by the heads of government''. In other words, Churchill proposed that the "Berlin problem" be resolved _-_-_
~^^1^^ Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle, Collins, London, 1966, pp. 185--86.
131 by a clandestine Anglo-American deal with the Nazis. The US government was not about to demand that Eisenhower abandon the military plans agreed upon by the Allies for concluding the war. The American historian Cornelius Ryan justly noted that at the time Eisenhower did not want to complicate the political relationship existing among the Allies, much less to confront the Soviet = Army.^^1^^Pursuing the mercenary political goals of British imperialists, Churchill was even prepared to enter into an open conflict with the Soviet Union. His anti-Soviet game provided the Nazis with a lastminute opportunity to make diplomatic overtures. One of the last diplomatic actions taken by the Nazis involved the war criminal Hermann Goering. For a number of years Goering had been second only to Hitler in the Nazi hierarchy. SS General, President of the Reichstag, Minister of Internal Affairs, Chief of the Prussian Police, Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, Minister of Aviation, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, member of the Privy Council---these are just some of the positions and titles held by Goering. In June 1941 a secret decree declared him Hitler's official successor.
The F\"uhrer apparently believed that by including such an ``authoritative'' figure in the negotiation _-_-_
^^1^^ There were also reactionary circles in the United States which were not opposed to playing the "Berlin card''. The West German newspaper Die Welt reported that in the spring of 1945 the Pentagon was preparing an operation under the code-name ``Eclipse''. In the event that the Reich unexpectedly collapsed or Hitler proposed an armistice to the Western powers, the operation called for American paratroopers to seize Berlin's Tempelhof, Gatow and Oranienburg airports and thus permit large contingents of Anglo-American forces to enter Berlin and block the way of the Soviet Army.
132 process, the Nazi leadership could prove to London and Washington that it was indeed serious about negotiating. Though bourgeois historians persist in writing that Goering was acting at his own risk, there are documents available today which confirm that "Goering's Mission" was not only approved by Hitler but personally ordered by him. Goering was given his instructions on April 20, 1945, in the bunker of the Imperial Chancellery. The next day Hitler again informed military leaders Keitel and Jodl that Goering and no one else was to succeed him, thus stressing the importance of the actions which Goering might take.Immediately after his meeting with Hitler, Goering left for Berchtesgaden where he waited for further instructions from the Imperial Chancellery. They arrived in the early morning hours of April 23. Jodl informed Goering that Hitler had decided to remain in Berlin despite the real danger of Soviet forces surrounding the city. This meant Goering could take action. That same morning Jodl met with Luftwaffe General Karl Koller, Goering's chief of staff, and informed him of the measures taken by the military command in order to promote Goering's Mission. To convince the British and Americans that from now on Germany was only waging war against the East, General Wenck's 12th Army, which was defending the road to Berlin, was being withdrawn from the Western Front and turned eastward.
Assuming that this action would lead to the quick appearance of Anglo-American forces in the Berlin region and a sudden aggravation of relations between the West and the Soviet Union, Goering hurried to enter into ``high-level'' negotiations with the Western Powers. April 23 was a day 133 of intense preparations for these negotiations at Goering's headquarters. An address to the German people was being,prepared in his name as Hitler's successor. Goering's directive: "The Russians who read our appeal must believe that we will continue to conduct the war in the West and the East as before, but the British and Americans must be able to infer that we are no longer thinking of continuing the war against the West but only against the Soviet Union."^^1^^
Goering gave orders that Ribbentrop be sent to him. But he made it clear that he would personally conduct the negotiations with the British and Americans. Roller wrote in his diary that Goering "will not surrender to the Russians but will immediately surrender to the Western Powers. Therefore he wants to fly to General Eisenhower in the morning. He believes that in a man-to-man discussion they will soon come to an agreement."
But Goering's Mission was ill-fated from the start. On April 24 Hitler sent Goering a stop-order. Afterwards Goering was removed from his posts and placed under house arrest. It is evident that internal squabbles, fear and mutual distrust among the Nazi leadership, played a hand in this action. A document signed by Bormann stated that the "turning-point must be brought about by the F\"uhrer himself, only by him" and that it was necessary to "give the F\"uhrer the domestic political freedom to conduct negotiations''. As for Goering, he was afraid that Bormann, who had remained in the Imperial Chancellery, would usurp his position and announce himself to be Hitler's successor after _-_-_
~^^1^^ Karl Koller, Der letzte Monal, Norbert Wohlgemuth Verlag, Mannheim, 1949, p. 40.
134 the F\"uhrer's death, taking the matter of the negotiations into his own hands. For this reason Goering rushed to proclaim himself the F\"uhrer's successor, which was used by Bormann to discredit him in Hitler's eyes.But there was another more important reason for the complete failure of Goering's Mission. Wolff sent a message from Italy to the Imperial Chancellery informing the Nazi leadership that the British and Americans categorically refused to conduct political negotiations with him and agreed only to the open surrender of Nazi forces in Italy to the governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. General Eisenhower also decisively refused to conduct political negotiations with the Nazi leadership.
On April 24, 1945, when Goering was planning to fly to Eisenhower's headquarters in Reims, the rug was pulled out from under the feet of the Nazis and the Western reactionaries who wanted to play the "Berlin card" against the Soviet Union. This was the day that the troops of the First Byelorussian Front joined those from the First Ukrainian Front in the southeastern sector of Berlin, cutting the city off from German troops stationed at the Oder. The next morning the 2nd Guard Tank Army of the First Ukrainian Front joined units from the First Byelorussian Front in the Ketzen region to the west of Berlin. The German forces and Berlin were surrounded by the Soviet troops. The Nazi leadership, ensconced in the Imperial Chancellery, had tried everything to delay their inevitable downfall. Their last hope was a confrontation between the Western Allies and Soviet forces on German territory.
At a briefing on April 25 Hitler announced that 135 he had learned that at the opening conference of the United Nations in San Francisco the Soviet and British Ministers of Foreign Affairs were " unable to reach a compromise'', and that if the British did not oppose the USSR they would not win but lose the war. Hitler said, "I believe the moment has come when the others, in one way or another, out of a sense of self-preservation will oppose what has become an excessive proletarian-Bolshevik Colossus and Moloch... As long as I hold the capital the British and Americans can hope that under certain circumstances it will be possible to oppose this threat together with Nazi Germany. And I am the only man suitable for this = task."^^1^^
On the morning of April 26 an event occurred at the usual bunker briefing that confirmed as nothing else just how oblivious the Nazis were to reality. Press reviewer Heinz Lorenz announced that according to a Swedish radio broadcast a slight disagreement as to who would take what regions had arisen the night before when Soviet and American units met in Central Germany. Although the broadcast stressed the insignificance of the incident and stated that it would not lead to an armed conflict, Gerhard Boldt, who witnessed the event, later reported that the Nazi leadership became ecstatic. They believed that their antiSoviet plans would soon be fulfilled. ``Gentlemen'', cried Hitler, "this is a clear indication of discord among our enemies. Would not the German people and history consider me a criminal if I concluded peace today and tomorrow our enemies quarreled among themselves?"
A few hours later Lorenz brought another report _-_-_
~^^1^^ Der Spiegel, No. 3, January 10, 1966, p. 34.
136 that dashed the Nazis' hopes. When American and Soviet forces met in Germany, Truman sent a message to the Soviet Government which read in part: "The enemy has been cut in two. This is not the hour of final victory in Europe, but the hour draws near ... the last faint, desperate hope of Hitler and his gangster government has been extinguished... Nothing can divide or weaken the common purpose of our veteran armies to pursue their victorious purpose to its final Allied triumph in Germany."^^1^^The meeting of Soviet and Anglo-American forces resulted in a stirring demonstration of the steadfast will of the American, British and Soviet people to victoriously, hand in hand, finish off Nazi Germany.
The "Berlin card" of Nazi diplomacy had been beaten.
On April 29 General Berzarin, Soviet Commandant of Berlin, held a news conference in the liberated section of the city. On April 30 Hitler committed suicide to escape responsibility for his = heinous crimes.^^2^^ In the early morning of May 1, 1945, Soviet soldiers hoisted the Red Banner above the Reichstag.
Nazi leaders Bormann and Goebbels remained _-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence... Vol. 2, Op. cit., p. 221.
~^^2^^ We should point out that despite the claims of West German revanchists, the chief Nazi war criminal had no intention of dying a hero's death in the ruins of Berlin. Documents show that until the last minute Hitler was planning to flee. On his orders, the underground Junkers factory in Dessau began to build huge six-engine Ju-390 jets with a range of greater than 8,000 km. In the spring of 1945, one of these planes made a non-stop flight over the North Pole and on to Japan. A Ju-390 now stood ready at the Rechlin airport north of Berlin. But the defeated F\"uhrer had nowhere to go.
137 in the underground Chancellery offices. They still believed they could use diplomacy to drive a wedge between the anti-Nazi coalition. Their perfidious plan was to lure the Soviet Union into negotiations and thus avoid the immediate and unconditional surrender of surrounded German forces. The Nazis wanted to use negotiations with the Soviet Government to raise suspicion on the part of the US and Great Britain and worsen relations among the Allies. They also assumed that the negotiations would give them the opportunity to function as Germany's legal government. Moreover, they believed that if the Western Allies were faced with such a situation they would either want to preserve Berlin as the residence of the Bormann-Goebbels government and demand of the Soviet Union not to take the city by force, or would insist on moving the ``government'' to territory controlled by the Western Allies.And so the Nazi leaders who remained thought that they could do what Hitler could not: preserve the basis of fascist rule in Germany by relying on reactionary circles in the West.
But in order to attain these far-reaching goals it was important not to allow the surrender of German forces in Berlin, or at least to delay the capitulation. Therefore, General Helmuth Weidling was summoned to the Imperial Chancellery immediately after Hitler's death on April 30, 1945. Army Chief of Staff Krebs instructed Weidling to draw the Soviet Command into negotiations and under no circumstances to allow any changes in Berlin's military position.
The Nazi leaders were ready to sacrifice thousands more soldiers, officers and civilians living in Berlin in order to carry out the "diplomatic 138 action" of Bormann and Goebbels. General Krebs, an experienced intelligence officer who spoke Russian reasonably well and was known as an "expert on Russia'', was to conduct the diplomacy. In the spring of 1941 Krebs was appointed an aide to the German military attache in Moscow and held that post until the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union. In March 1945 he replaced Guderian as Army Chief of Staff. And now the "expert on Russia" was recognised by Bormann and Goebbels to be the best man to conduct the first stage of their diplomacy---negotiations with the Soviet Union.
At 3:30 a.m. on May 1, 1945, Krebs crossed the front and was taken to the headquarters of the commander of the 8th Guard Army, ColonelGeneral Chuikov. Krebs handed Chuikov and Army General Sokolovsky, Deputy-Commander of the First Byelorussian Front, an appeal to the Soviet Supreme Command for a temporary cease-fire in Berlin which would give Germany and the Soviet Union the opportunity to conduct "peace negotiations".
Krebs stressed that he was speaking only of a temporary cease-fire in Berlin which would allow the rest of the members of the government, who were out of the city, to be contacted and informed of the F\"uhrer's posthumous will. The Nazis also wanted to inform the German people of Hitler's death and about the formation of a new government. Supposedly, the new German Government would be able to acquire power and then the Soviet Union would have a legitimate partner with which to conduct peace negotiations.
Fearing the inevitable punishment they would have to face for their heinous crimes, the remaining 139 Nazi leaders were trying to persuade the Soviet Union to conclude a separate peace with Germany. English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper writes that Goebbels and Bormann were counting on the success of Krebs' Mission to give them the opportunity to leave Berlin. Under the pretext of informing other Nazi officials of the conditions set by the Soviet Union, they intended to travel to Admiral Doenitz' headquaters located to the north of Hamburg.
Krebs also attempted to blackmail the Soviet Command. He stated that Himmler's negotiations with the Western Allies were at an advanced stage and that if the Soviet Union did not agree to the proposals the Nazis were offering a new German Government would be formed in the territory occupied by the Western Powers.
The Soviet Command informed Krebs that it was unauthorised to conduct such negotiations and could only discuss the unconditional surrender of the Berlin garrison. It merely agreed to inform Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, commander of the First Byelorussian Front, of Krebs' proposal; if he thought it necessary he would inform the Soviet Government.
At 10:15 a. m. on May 1, 1945, the Soviet Government's reply to Krebs' proposal was received: The Berlin garrison must surrender immediately and unconditionally.
The Soviet Command agreed to allow representatives of the German Government in Berlin to contact Doenitz so that they could immediately appeal to the three Allied Powers to begin peace negotiations. But the Soviet Command could not guarantee that the governments of the USSR, Great Britain and the United States would enter into 140 negotiations of any kind with the German Government.^^1^^
Thus, the Soviet Union decisively refused to conduct separate negotiations with the Nazis, and by demanding the unconditional surrender of the Berlin garrison, demonstrated its unwavering loyalty to the Allied cause. The USSR's tough and uncompromising position shattered the plans which the Goebbels---Bormann clique had made in connection with Krebs' Mission.
Chuikov later wrote, "The important thing was that the Nazi leadership, just as Hitler had done, was to the very end counting on the aggravation of contradictions between our country and its Allies... Spending nearly half a day with us, General Krebs did not see any wavering of our loyality to the Allied cause. On the contrary, we showed him that we wouldn't retreat a single step from the decisions reached at the Teheran and Yalta = Conferences."^^2^^
The Nazis who had remained in control of the government were themselves soon gone. Goebbels committed suicide. Bormann, who was preparing to flee Berlin with a group of SS officers, was anxious to get to the West in order to form a new fascist ``government'' in the territory controlled by Anglo-American forces. But fate caught up with him and put an end to his = crimes.^^3^^
On the morning of May 2, General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin, accepted the Soviet ultimatum demanding the unconditional surrender of Ger- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Defeat of German Imperialism in the Second World War, Articles and Materials, Moscow, 1960, p. 268 (in Russian).
~^^2^^ V. I. Chuikov, The End of the Third Reich, Moscow, 1973, p. 278 (in Russian).
~^^3^^ In December 1971 skeletal remains were uncovered at a work site in West Berlin and later identified to be Bormann's.
141 man forces in the city. By the end of the day all organised resistance in the city had ceased.The Soviet Army's capture of Berlin radically changed not only the military-strategic but also the international situation in Europe. A strong basis had been laid for strictly abiding by the Allies' decision to demand fascist Germany's unconditional surrender.
__ALPHA_LVL1__ ADMIRAL DOENITZ' TWENTY-THREE DAYS OF DIPLOMACYThe Nazi clique which had ruled Germany for twelve years was finally overthrown. But the real rulers of the Third Reich---the financial and industrial magnates and the top military closely associated with them---remained. As a result of Germany's complete military defeat, these groups were compelled to search for ways to preserve German imperialism in new, radically changed conditions.
There are a number of documents available that reveal the forcing policy objectives worked out by the monopolies and given to the ``post-Hitler'' government. The Allies found an interesting document among the papers of Admiral Doenitz, "Hitler's successor"---an appeal from Doenitz to German Army officers which stated: "... The Political line we must follow is very plain. It is clear that we have to go along with the Western Powers and work with them in the occupied territories in the West....'' The document further states that the final goal of these advances to the Western Powers was to create another "form of National Socialism" in Germany.^^1^^ Influential German bankers and in- _-_-_
^^1^^ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, MacMillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1954, p. 699.
142 dustrialists were, just as before, counting on antiSoviet sentiment in American and British reactionary circles. They believed that by temporarily recognising the leading role of these powers in world politics and by playing on anti-Soviet feelings, German imperialism could reestablish its strength and rearm for another struggle to redivide the world. The monopolies ordered a special memorandum prepared for the guidance of the new ``post-Hitler'' German authorities. It specified principal policies for using the support of American and British reactionaries to turn Germany into a first-rate power factor on the European continent and even to control certain parts of Russian acquisitions.^^1^^But these were plans for the future. In the context of the Reich's downfall the immediate task, as seen by Germany's financial oligarchy, was to hold the front against the advancing Soviet Army at all costs. This would permit Anglo-American forces to occupy as much of Germany as possible. The monopolists thought the best strategy would be to quickly form a government which would be recognised by the Western powers and would become the centre of all militarist and reactionary forces in the country.
After writing off the vanquished Hitler clique, German monopolies and their political agents--- Speer, Schwerin von Krosigk and others---began to make considerable efforts in late spring 1945 towards forming such a government. On April 23, Speer, whose relationship with Hitler had by that time cooled considerably, arrived at the Imperial Chancellery and had a lengthy discussion with the F\"uhrer. In his memoirs he wrote that his ``farewell'' _-_-_
^^1^^ Military-Historical Journal, No. 12, 1960, p. 78.
143 visit was merely a matter of protocol. But in fact, it had a different purpose. On behalf of the monopolies, Speer asked that Hitler designate not Himmler, Bormann, Goering or Goebbels, but the commander of the navy, Admiral Doenitz, as his successor.Doenitz was influential in the armed forces, and it was hoped that his orders would be carried out, But the most important thing was that Doenitz was related to certain members of the financial- industrial elite of German imperialism---his aunt was the wife of Hugo Stinnes, a powerful monopolist. At a time when two Stinnes brothers were prominent representatives of big business in fascist Germany, a third brother was living in the United States and was closely associated with the Morgan banking house. As was mentioned earlier, it was at the Stinnes villa in Ascona where secret negotiations between Dulles and Wolff were conducted. And Stinnes' close relative, Gero von Gaevernitz, who was thereby also closely related to Doenitz, acted as interpreter.
Speer and the monopolies he represented had reason to believe that the Western Powers would accept Doenitz as Hitler's ``successor''. The F\"uhrer agreed to consider the Nazi admiral for the position. Other key positions in the future government were also agreed upon. In addition to assuming the titles of President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Doenitz would be the Minister of War. Another monopoly spokesman, von Krosigk, was to be the Finance Minister. Although Hitler had insisted that the government include his favourite officers--- Goebbels (as chancellor) and Bormann (as Nazi Party Minister), these two men were swept from the scene after Soviet forces captured Berlin on 144 May~2.
It is important that we mention yet another topic of conversation between Hitler and Speer. While doing everything possible to see that Doenitz was named Hitler's successor, Speer was also trying to thwart Goering's Mission to Eisenhower. Speer and the monopolies he represented did not believe that the Reichsmarshal was the right man to conduct negotiations with the West. After leaving Hitler, Speer sent a telegram to Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, General Stumpff, instructing him to prevent Goering's flight (previously agreed on by Hitler) to General Eisenhower. Stumpff was ordered to close all airports in the northern area so that neither Goering nor other Reich officials could depart to negotiate with the Allies.^^1^^
English historian Trevor-Roper notes that though the question of Hitler's successor---a man who would be accepted by the West---was often discussed in the underground Imperial Chancellery during the last days of the Reich, it was not until after Hitler's suicide on April 30 that Doenitz was informed that he had been named. Doenitz was at his headquarters on the outskirts of Plen, a small town near the Danish border, when he received Bormann's telegram stating that he had been named Hitler's successor. The admiral's reply to Hitler, who had already committed suicide, was a hypocritical statement about the measures the F\"uhrer's successor intended to take: "My F\"uhrer, I remain loyal to you. I will therefore take all possible measures to ease your position in Berlin. If fate compels _-_-_
^^1^^ See: Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, Office of the Chief of Military Department of the Army, Washington D. C., 1954, p. 472.
10---418
145 me as your appointed successor to become the ruler of the German Reich, I will end this war in a manner in keeping with the unprecedented heroic struggle of the German people.'' However, Doenitz and the monopoly circles which supported him had no intention of following Hitler's disastrous path.Taking political and military control of the toppling fascist government, Doenitz did not lift a finger to "ease the position" of the remaining members of Hitler's clique. The F\"uhrer's newly appointed successor was more concerned with London and Washington than with Berlin, whose fall to the Soviet Army was now inevitable within a number of hours. Doenitz directed all his activity toward working out a foreign policy designed to achieve an anti-Soviet pact with the Western Powers which would, of course, under the circumstances, place Germany in a dependent and subordinate position to the US and Great Britain. West German historian Marlis Steinert writes: "Doenitz hoped that Hitler's death would be the beginning of a new development which would make it possible to ease the fighting in the West but continue the struggle in the East, perhaps even with the support of the = West".^^1^^
Doenitz intended to give his new government a ``democratic'' look. In order to make it easier for the West to enter into negotiations with Germany, certain Nazi leaders who had already compromised themselves were discarded. Doenitz categorically refused Himmler's request that he be the "number two man" in the government. Ribbentrop was replaced as Foreign Affairs Minister by von Krosigk, _-_-_
~^^1^^ Marlis D. Steinert, Die 23 Tage der Regierung Donitz, Econ-Verlag, Dusseldorf-Wien, 1967. p. 80.
146 former Minister of Finance. On May 5 Doenitz also appointed von Krosigk Chanceller and reinstated him as Finance Minister.Von Krosigk's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs was a clear indication of the foreign policy Doenitz intended to conduct. A member of an old aristocratic family, Krosigk had long been related to the Fugger and other families of the "business nobility''. After graduating from Oxford, he maintained close ties with Great Britain's ruling elite. He became President Hindeburg's close friend after the November Revolution in Germany. In 1937 Hitler presented Krosigk and Hjalmar Schacht, another well-known and trusted confidant of the German monopolies, with gold Nazi party pins for services rendered. Along with Speer, who had been reappointed Minister of Economics, Krosigk became one of Doenitz' closest political advisers. The new government and Doenitz' residence were set up in the city of Flensburg on the Danish border.
Doenitz announced that "the government and party were no longer united'', thus trying to convince the West that his fascist government was a "cabinet of officials" separate from the party.
The government's ``reorganisation'' efforts, which removed the Nazis most closely associated with Hitler were well received in the West. In a May 8th radio address, Churchill called Doenitz "the designated head of the German = State'',^^1^^ a move in the direction of conducting negotiations with him. Arch-reactionaries in the West did not want to admit that the "democratic look" of Doenitz' _-_-_
~^^1^^ "Unconditional Surrender. A World Broadcast, May 8, 1945'', In: Winston S., Churchill, Victory War Speeches, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1946, p. 163.
147 government was but a camouflage for the same aggressive, reactionary plans and schemes which were worked out by Hitler. And this is particularly true with respect to trying to split the anti-Nazi coalition. Steinert writes: "He | Doenitz | had illusions of a rupture of the enemy alliance up to the moment of capitulation."From Flensburg the new government tried to use anti-Sovietism and anti-communism to sow discord among the Allies.
Doenitz' order of the day to the Wehrmacht on May 1, 1945, was not so much addressed to the fascist warlords as it was to London and Washington: "I am assumming supreme command over all Wehrmacht units and am firmly resolved to continue the struggle against = Bolshevism."^^1^^ His radio address to the German people that same day contained an unambiguous appeal to the US and British governments to conduct negotiations without the Soviet Union. "This is the only objective for which we will continue the armed struggle. As long as the British and Americans hinder this objective, we must defend ourselves and continue to fight = them."^^2^^ ``Chancellor'' Krosigk repeated Doenitz' warning in a speech broadcast over the Flensburg radio station: "The world can live in peace only in the event the Bolshevik wave does not sweep over Europe. Germany is Europe's protective rampart. She can defend Europe from Bolshevism if there is a rear."
Following in Goebbels' footsteps, Krosigk again mentioned the "iron curtain'', which was supposedly _-_-_
^^1^^ The International Military Tribunal. Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vol. 35, Nuremberg, 1949, pp. 116--17.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 117.
148 moving further to the West with the advancing Soviet Army, and hysterically spoke of a third world war against the Soviet Union.On May 1 Speer also made a direct appeal to the Western Powers asking them to recognise the danger from the East that threatened all mankind and Europe first of all.
Doenitz summoned Field-Marshal Keitel and General Jodl to Flensburg and gave them the following instructions: "It is clear that the centre of gravity of military action lies in the East. It is necessary to do everything possible militarily to stop the Russian advance at Mecklenburg, or at least to hold them back as long as = possible."^^1^^
Western historians write that the Germans' fierce resistance in the East in May 1945, despite their hopeless situation, was an effort to ``save'' as much of the German population as possible from Soviet occupation. But the facts show that it was Doenitz who was willing to make great sacrifices in order to preserve a territorial base from which to conduct political negotiations with the West. He instructed Keitel and Jodl to hold the German Front in the East at all costs for at least a few days. The Wehrmacht was ordered to "continue fighting in order to gain time politically''. Joachim Schultz, historiographer of the German Supreme Command, explains that what was meant by this "stalling for time" was that Doenitz was expecting a ``rift'' to develop between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. Doenitz further ordered the Wisla Army Group, which was still fighting the Soviet troops to the north and west of _-_-_
^^1^^ Das Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges, Heft 4, Deutscher Militarverlag, Berlin, 1961, p. 61.
149 Berlin, to "hold their positions at all costs''. The German troops in Czechoslovakia were ordered to "close all fronts into a circle, concentrating the main forces on the Eastern Front, and to hold their positions to prevent the Bolsheviks from occupying as much territory as = possible."^^1^^The Soviet Army soon ``amended'' the Nazis' plans. But during the first few days of May 1945 Doenitz continued to act under the illusion that he would have the time and base with which to conduct diplomacy.
There was nothing essentially new in Doenitz' diplomacy. It was a peculiar hybrid of the positions outlined in Ribbentrop's Memorandum and the plans for a pact with the West, which were most clearly expressed in the general plan for 1945 worked out by Speer in April 1945.
Though Ribbentrop, quite understandably, was not included in the new government, on May 2, 1945 he was summoned to Doenitz for " consultations''. Ribbentrop gave Doenitz a memorandum (preserved in West German archives) concerning questions of foreign policy. Subsequent events showed that Doenitz used Ribbentrop's proposals as the basis for the foreign policy of his Flensburg ``government''.
The memorandum clearly states that the primary diplomatic task of Doenitz' government was to take advantage of anti-Soviet sentiment in certain influential circles in the West in order to keep at least a part of Germany from being occupied, and to legalise the new government in accordance with international law. The memorandum also stated _-_-_
~^^1^^ Joachim Schultz, Die letzten 30 Tage, Steingriiben-Verlag, Stuttgart, 1951, p. 55.
150 that at least a part of Schleswig-Holstein should be free of occupation in order to give the Imperial Government a chance to govern. To do this, it was necessary to enter into negotiations with official representatives of the Western countries. If these measures were not taken, German territory would be occupied completely, the members of the Imperial Government arrested and the country run by the Allies. Also, National Socialism would be eradicated and the Wehrmacht crushed.A document of May 7, 1945, describes the "Fourth Reich" imagined by the Nazis in Flensburg. The document included demands for keeping intact ``historical'' German lands, for Germany's liberation from the "foreign yoke'', for the preservation of the German people's ``independent'' life style and political (i.e., fascist---H.R.) organisations, for the creation of a ``community'' of European countries on a federal basis with Germany at the head, etc.
Ribbentrop recommended, first of all, that Doenitz not try to enter into negotiations with the West by making an open appeal to the US and British governments, which were bound by agreements with the USSR to demand Germany's unconditional surrender, but rather seek to establish direct contact with the Allied Command in German territory--- General Eisenhower and his deputy, Field-Marshal Montgomery.
Doenitz and Ribbentrop were especially counting on the reactionary circles in Great Britain which surrounded Churchill, and they hoped that the British Army would realise that one day it might need German troops in a fight against the Red Army.
The Nazis hoped that such political advisers to military leaders as Robert Murphy, a well-known
151 American reactionary, would participate in the negotiations with Eisenhower and Montgomery. These men could be used to work out a political programme which would be acceptable to the Western Powers and as such could be presented to the Soviet Union. This programme would provide for "keeping the Germans within their border in Europe" and eliminating those elements within Germany which interfered with the country's " cooperation" with other nations.Though the wording of the ``programme'' was deliberately vague, it is clear that in exchange for guaranteeing a reactionary order in Germany, the Doenitz government wanted a Germany (under Anglo-American control, of course) that would include "all Germans''. This, in Nazi terminology, meant the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, Austria, the western regions of Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. Even while totally defeated the German imperialists were as greedy as ever.
Of special interest for an understanding of Doenitz' future diplomacy is a section of Ribbentrop's Memorandum which states that the British and Americans must be able to present the Germans' proposals to the Russians in such a way that the Russians would not be able to protest, though they would realise that the Western Powers' agreeing not to occupy Schleswig-Holstein was not in the interests of the Soviet Union and would have farreaching political consequences.
Hence, the memorandum proposed that the British and Americans be approached with making a military settlement concerning Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and perhaps Norway. The settlement would provide for the gradual withdrawal of German 152 troops from Denmark and Norway, in return the Western Allies would agree not to occupy all of Schlezvig-Holstein and thus give the Imperial Government the opportunity to function as an independent government. Ribbentrop advised Doenitz to immediately send peace envoys to Eisenhower and Montgomery to persuade them to make this military settlement---the first serious step in the direction away from demanding Germany's unconditional surrender. Having himself learned from bitter experience, Ribbentrop warned Doenitz to be extremely careful in "building bridges" with the West.
On May 2, 1945, the Doenitz government began to try and put the foreign policy programme worked out by Speer and Ribbentrop into effect. Doenitz knew that the US and Great Britain would not agree to a formal cease-fire in the West while the Germans continued the war against the Soviet Union. The Western powers had to consider their powerful and victorious ally and the anti-fascist sentiment of the American and British peoples. Doenitz, therefore, planned to pass the surrender of German troops off as a military tactic, surrendering first army corps, armies and then army groups to the Anglo-Americans.
Before discussing how the Doenitz government had attempted to revive earlier established connections, it is important to consider yet another matter. Doenitz categorically demanded that Nazi officials and military leaders get his permission and authorisation before conducting any negotiations concerning a surrender. The reason being, of course, that he wanted to appear to the West as a leader possessing genuine power, someone to be reckoned with. He rescinded the surrender of Ger- 153 man troops on the Italian Front which had been signed on April 29, 1945 on behalf of the commander of Army Group ``C''. General Vietinghoff was dismissed, and the new commander, General Schultz, was instructed to resume negotiations for the surrender of his forces on behalf of the Doenitz government. The new surrender was signed on May 2, 1945.
That same day Doenitz began his diplomacy of trying to lure the Western Powers into negotiations with his government under the pretext of discussing the partial surrender of German forces. At an evening briefing, it was decided to "begin negotiating with Montgomery as quickly as possible''. Doenitz believed that the time was right for such negotiations. The fact is that Hamburg Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann, who was one of the most influential Nazi officials in Hitler's circle, was at that time Imperial Commissar of Commercial Shipping. He had close ties with both German and foreign monopolies, especially with British shipowners. Before the war, Kaufmann's close friend Speer often met with the owners of the British insurance firm Lloyd's Register of Shipping at Kaufmann's home and even took up residence there during the final weeks of the Reich's existence. Throughout the war Kaufmann continued to play the role of mediator between German and British shipowners. The Resistance Movement preserved documents which show that Speer advised Kaufmann to go to Berlin on behalf of the Hamburg shipowners. On April 3, 1945 Kaufmann, accompanied by Field-Marshal Ernst Busch, commander of German forces in Northwest Germany, arrived in the capital. There he persistently tried to persuade Hitler to begin negotiating with the West and that 154 the F\"uhrer's first step should be to declare Hamburg an "open city''. After returning from the Imperial Chancellery, Kaufmann began to take action with the support and encouragement of the Hamburg commercial-industrial elite. He assembled other Nazi gauleiters at his home and proposed that they give Germany's north coast over to the Western Allies without a fight and then tried to persuade them to quickly cross the Elbe to Mecklenburg in order to occupy as much territory as possible to the east of the Elbe before the Russians arrived. The gauleiters supported Kaufmann's proposal, and it found the approval of Field-Marshal Busch. Kaufmann was put in charge of making the necessary arrangements and conducting the negotiations.
Kaufmann's ideas were in complete agreement with the plans of Winston Churchill, who, in spite of his agreements with the Allies, wanted to seize as much territory in the Soviet zone of occupation as possible in order to subsequently exert pressure on the Soviet Union. Kaufmann's actions therefore met with British approval. Churchill believed that the surrender of Hamburg and other port cities would allow Montgomery's forces to march into Berlin and even further east. Kaufmann contacted the British through Richard Bertram, director of Lloyd's North Germany and Riensberg, commercial attache to the German embassy in Sweden who maintained constant contact with the British embassy in Stockholm. Albert Schafer, director of the large Phoenix-Werke shipyards, also participated in the negotiations. Wolff was authorised by Speer to instruct military leaders not to destroy anything before surrendering to the British.
Riensberg soon telephoned Bertram and told him 155 that the German proposals had been accepted by London: Hamburg would be turned over to the British without a fight, and the Western Allies would immediately cease bombing German cities. The Nazis had now only to wait for the arrival of British troops. The first city to be surrendered was Bremen. Gauleiter Wagner, who at first tried to mount resistance, was immediately summoned to Doenitz' headquarters. Doenitz was at that time Commander-in-Chief of German forces in the North.
On May 1, 1945, British troops approached Hamburg. Montgomery sent General Wolff, the city's commandant, an ultimatum to surrender, which, of course, was immediately accepted. The surrender was signed on May 3, 1945 in the town hall.
Instead of encountering prolonged street fighting in the city, Montgomery's troops were allowed to advance rapidly eastward. American historian John Toland writes that Nazi General Giinther Blumentritt even had a kind of "gentlemen's battle" with the British: "...one of the liaison officers from the Second British Army came to Blumentritt unofficially and said that since the Russians were closing in on Liibeck, His Magesty's forces wondered if the Germans would allow them to take the Baltic port ahead of the Russians. Blumentritt ... issued immediate orders not to fire on the advancing British."
Churchill expressed the thoughts of British reactionaries, writing: "I think therefore ... we shall head our Soviet friends off at this point too."
As for the Nazis ensconsed in Flensburg, they considered the deal that had been made concerning Hamburg to be a favourable prelude to negotiations with first the British command and then London. In 156 early hours of May 3, 1945, an official delegation headed by Admiral Friedeburg, who had replaced Doenitz as the Commander of Naval Forces, was allowed by the British to cross the frontlines. That same morning the delegation appeared at the headquarters of the 21st Army Group of AngloAmerican forces. On behalf of Doenitz, Friedeburg proposed that Montgomery accept the surrender of not only those German forces facing his troops but also those units retreating to the west under Soviet attack. Not wanting to play all his trumps, Friedeburg did not offer to surrender German forces in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands.
On May 4, 1945, Friedeburg, who remained at Montgomery's headquarters, informed Doenitz of the initial results of the negotiations. Montgomery demanded the surrender of all German forces fighting the Western Powers in Denmark, the Netherlands, Northwest Germany and SchlezvigHolstein. But the British field-marshal did not take a corresponding hard line on the question of the Germans surrendering to the Soviet Army as required by the Allied agreement. He stated that he could not accept the surrender of the three German armies withdrawing in front of the Russians, but "... if any German soldiers came towards my front with their hands up, they would automatically be taken = prisoner."^^1^^ Friedeburg reported that Montgomery had assured him that "German prisoners-of-war would not be handed over to the Russians, the positive aspect of this decision being a partial capitulation and the opportunity to continue the war on the Eastern Front".
_-_-_~^^1^^ The Memoires of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G., p. 300.
157Doenitz quickly authorised Friedeburg to conclude the agreement. A few hours later the document of surrender was signed. At 8:00 a. m. on May 5th hostilities were ceased between German troops and Montgomery's forces. At the same time Doenitz ordered that submarine warfare against the Western Powers be halted and that German troops in Norway avoid any confrontations with Anglo-American forces.
An entry in the journal of the German Army's Supreme Command reads, "The sequence of events and the approach to solving questions on the part of the Germans and Allies indicate the desire of both sides to preclude all obstacles or conflicts."
In the meantime Doenitz was issuing one order after another demanding the German forces to continue fighting against the advancing Soviet Army at whatever the cost. Immediately after the agreement with Montgomery was signed, the German Supreme Command drew up a secret directive which stated that the Germans were surrendering in Northwest Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands because it would be meaningless to keep fighting against the Western powers. However, the fight in the East would continue.
The Doenitz government was trying to achieve the same goal through diplomacy in Western Czechoslovakia,^^1^^ which remained occupied by German troops. The Nazis wanted to keep this region free of occupation by Allied forces in order to use it as a territorial base for Doenitz' "legal government''. If this proved to be impossible, they were ready to allow the American and British forces to _-_-_
~^^1^^ There were more than 900,000 German troops, 1,900 tanks and 1,000 planes in Czechoslovakia.
158 advance eastward through Czechoslovakia, far beyond the line of demarcation which had been agreed upon by the Allies. This, the Germans hoped, would cause a sharp deterioration in the relations between the Western countries and the USSR.But the Nazis had again underestimated the strength of the Soviet Army and mistakenly believed that the military situation in Czechoslovakia would allow them to carry out their plans.
Two plans were proposed. Keitel and Jodl suggested that the Doenitz government be transferred to Prague. This plan was rejected for "political reasons"---the ``government'' would be more " authoritative" if it remained on German territory. Speer, acting on behalf of the German monopolies, proposed another plan: to have certain large landowners and influential businessmen immediately form in Prague a "Czech government" which would be closely connected with the Nazis and recognised by the Western Powers. Speer tried to convince the other members of the Doenitz government that under the circumstances this was the best thing to do. German "economic interests" would be preserved in Czechoslovakia and a government formed that would be acceptable to London and Washington.
According to his memoirs, Speer suggested to Hitler at their last meeting on April 23, 1945 that a group of "loyal Czech industrialists" be flown by a Luftwaffe plane to Paris for negotiations with US and British representatives. Hitler agreed, but "technical problems" arose which prevented the plan's implementation. Now Doenitz would try. On May 4, 1945, a hand-picked group of Czech industrialists flew from Prague to Paris. The group was headed by Hruby, ``minister'' of the puppet Czech government. Hermann Frank, 159 ``protector'' of Bohemia and Moravia, instructed the group to persuade the Americans, who had arrived at the Western border of Czechoslovakia, to occupy all of Bohemia, including Prague.
But further events showed that the Nazis had failed to consider Czechoslovakia's democratic patriotic forces. That same day Frank arrived in Flensburg and reported that "Bohemia is on the threshold of revolution. It is impossible to hold the protectorate for long either militarily or politically."
News that Soviet forces had taken Berlin strengthened the national liberation struggle in Czechoslovakia. On May 4, 1945, as Doenitz was trying to solve the Czechoslovakian problem by making an anti-Soviet pact with the Western Powers, armed workers overcame the Gestapo and seized several factories in the city of Kladno---the country's largest industrial centre. On May 5 a rebellion broke out in Prague. Having captured the Prague radio station, the insurgents announced the end of the fascist protectorate. German troops in the city were given an ultimatum to surrender unconditionally.
Despite the events in Czechoslovakia, Doenitz continued to try to carry out the second half of his political plan: to persuade American forces to enter Prague, i. e., to cross the Czechoslovakian line of demarcation that the Allies had agreed upon. It was for this purpose that Frank was instructed to contact General Omar Bradley, Commander of the Western Allies' 12th Army Group. At the same time, Field-Marshal Schorner, Commander of the German Centre Army Group, received orders from Flensburg to "preserve the unity of the front, to quickly eliminate breaches and to conduct military 160 operations with the objective of gaining time".
The Allies had reached an agreement (which both Doenitz and Churchill now wanted to revoke) about the line of demarcation on Czechoslovakian territory through messages exchanged by General Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army, and General Eisenhower. On April 24, 1945, Soviet Army Headquarters sent a dispatch to the Allied Missions in Moscow, which stated: "... We wish to inform General Eisenhower that in the near future the Soviet Supreme Command plans to take Berlin and clear the enemy from entire eastern bank of the Elbe, from the north and south of Berlin, and also from along the river Vltava, where, according to our information, the Germans have concentrated considerable strength.'' On April 30, 1945, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower informed Moscow of his agreement with the Soviet proposal.
General Shtemenko, who was at the time the Chief of the Soviet Army's Operations Department, wrote: "An agreement about the line of demarcation, which neither American nor Soviet forces were to violate when reached was made between Eisenhower's Headquarters and Soviet General Headquarters. This line extended along the bank of the Mulda River and through the cities of Chemnitz, Carlsbad, Pilsen and = Klatovy."^^1^^ In other words, the Soviet Army was to defeat German troops in the Prague region and liberate the city. And the Soviet Government and the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army worked toward this objective.
_-_-_~^^1^^ S. M. Shtemenko, General Headquarters During the War, Moscow, 1973, pp. 428--29.
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161The plans of Doenitz and his friends in the West to use Czechoslovakia for anti-Soviet purposes were overturned by this agreement between the Allies. On April 30, 1945 Churchill asked President Truman to rescind the agreement and order the advance of American troops into Prague. In making this request Churchill did not conceal his political motives: "...The liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of Western Czechoslovakia by your forces might make the whole difference to the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in near-by countries... I think the highly important political consideration mentioned above should be brought to his [Eisenhower's] attention."
Soon plans to invalidate the agreement were being worked out in London and Washington. On May 4, 1945, Soviet Army General Headquarters sent a message to General Eisenhower: "In accordance with General Eisenhower's request, the Soviet Supreme Command... has already halted its forces' advance to the Wismar---Schwerin--- Domitz line. We hope that General Eisenhower will now comply with our request with respect to halting the advance of his forces into Czechoslovakia."
General Eisenhower thought it necessary to abide by the Allied agreement. But Churchill again urged him to ignore it, writing: "I am hoping that your plan does not inhibit you to advance to Prague... I thought you did not mean to tie yourself down [with the Allied = agreements]."^^1^^
Such were the international intrigues which were taking place as Doenitz worked out his ``diplomacy''. While waiting for American forces _-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, p. 433.
162 to approach Prague, the Nazi government tried to crush the rebellion in Prague both by diplomatic and military means. Doenitz instructed General Rudolf Toussaint, commandant of Prague, to negotiate with the Czech National Council. On the morning of May 7, Toussaint promised the members of the Council, the majority of which were bourgeois politicians, that German troops would pull out of Prague and even surrender on orders from Flensburg. But this was merely a ruse. When Schorner was later taken prisoner and interrogated by Soviet authorities he admitted: "I had no intention of ordering my forces to surrender. I knew the German leadership wanted to concentrate retreating German forces in Austria and hold out there as long as possible. For this reason we worked out a gradual retreat for the Centre Army Group. Thus, the Nazis were trying to gain time, hoping for a deterioration of relations among the Allies.Doenitz tried to strengthen his diplomacy by taking military action. While keeping the insurgents in Prague surrounded by German troops and forcefully resisting the advance of Soviet forces into Prague, he ordered that the front be opened to the West strongly provoking the American Command to violate the Allies' agreement concerning the line of demarcation. On May 8 American military jeeps were spotted at the rear of the German forces and were even seen on the outskirts of Prague.
But Doenitz' plans for Czechoslovakia just as Churchill's hopes were not destined to be fulfilled. While the members of the Czech National Council were conducting negotiations with General Toussaint, Prague patriots who had
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163 participated in the rebellion turned to the Soviet Army for help. They broadcast their request over Prague radio: "Dear Soviet brothers! Prague is burning, the Nazis are annihilating the Czechs. Come to the aid of Prague!"The Armed Forces of the USSR fulfilled their international obligation. They refused to let the Nazis exact reprisals against the Czechoslovakian patriots and destroy the capital city. The tank armies from the First Ukrainian Front which had just taken Berlin were advanced from the Dresden region to the Czechostovakian capital. After defeating German troops in the area, the Soviet Armed Forces scaled the Erzgebirge Mountains and at dawn on May 9, 1945 entered Prague. That same day units from the Second and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts entered the city. Almost all enemy forces in Czechoslovakia were surrounded. The Soviet Army had put an end to Doenitz' diplomatic manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia. Now the Nazi government had nothing to offer the Western countries to persuade them to negotiate--- Czechoslovakia had been liberated by the Soviet Army; Schemer's encircled forces surrendered to the Soviet Army.
Nevertheless, Doenitz persisted in his diplomatic efforts. In order to avoid an unconditional surrender to all the Allies, he continued the tactics of a ``partial'' surrender to the British and Americans. On May 4 Max Edelscheim, representing General Wenck, Commander of the 12th Army began to negotiate a surrender with representatives of the 9th US Army. That same day, in Munich, General Foertsch officially surrendered the Nazis' ``G'' Army Group to American General Deevers. On May 5, the Nazi commander 164 of the 19th Army signed in Innsbruck a declaration surrendering German forces in Tirole and Vorarlberg.
Encouraged by these ``partial'' surrenders, Doenitz had begun to consider surrendering the entire Western Front. On May 5 Admiral Friedeburg, who had just completed negotiations with Montgomery in Liineburg, was sent to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Reims. Here he met with General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. Smith informed Friedeburg that Eisenhower refused to follow Montgomery's example for the entire Western Front and had no intention of continuing to negotiate with Doenitz' envoys if they did not propose to surrender on the Eastern Front as well. In his memoirs. Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower gives a frank account of this decision. He states that while it may have been possible to describe Montgomery's actions as "purely military in nature'', any agreement between himself and Doenitz would have immediately taken on "political meaning".^^1^^
The Supreme Command of the Allied Forces proposed that Doenitz either issue an order for signing an unconditional and simultaneous surrender on all theatres of military operations or send the Chief of Staff of Germany's Armed Forces and the Commanders-in-Chief of the German Army, Navy and Air Force to sign an unconditional surrender. The following conditions were included in the surrender: all forces must remain at their positions; no ships or aircraft _-_-_
~^^1^^ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Da Capo Press, New York, 1977, p. 426.
165 were to be damaged in any way. The High Command of the German Army must guarantee that all commanders at every theatre of military operations will be informed of the orders of the Western Allies' and the Soviet Union's Supreme Command.After explaining the Allies' demands, General Smith wanted to demonstrate to Friedeburg the hopelessness of the Nazis' position. He showed him a map of operations which indicated the points the Allies were prepared to strike. Friedeburg was duly alarmed but explained that he was not authorised to sign a general surrender.
On the morning of May 6 Doenitz received Friedeburg's report from Reims. Realising that Eisenhower was not going to play his ``game'', Doenitz planned to do everything possible to delay signing the unconditional surrender. He was attempting to gain enough time to crush the Prague rebellion and thus have the opportunity to play his "Czechoslovakian card''. At a special meeting of government leaders Eisenhower's demands were deemed unacceptable. Then Doenitz sent General Jodl, Wehrmacht Chief of Operations and the man who was responsible for almost all the Nazi acts of aggression against the people of Europe, to Reims to assist Friedeburg. Jodl was instructed to inform the Allies that Doenitz was ready to capitulate on the Western Front and explain why the Germans couldn't surrender in the East: "We cannot turn over all our armies on the Eastern Front to the Russians.'' Before Jodl's departure Doenitz again admonished him to delay signing a general surrender as long as possible, if necessary to agree to the surrender but to postpone the actual signing and especially the date when the surrender 166 would go into effect.
It is now known that Jodl did not immediately travel to Eisenhower's headquarters. He first went to Liineburg, where the day before Friedeburg had signed an agreement with Montgomery. Jodl was quick to explain Doenitz' position to Montgomery's Chief of Staff, and asked for assistance in his mission to Eisenhower. This ``stopover'' at Montgomery's headquarters proved to be beneficial.
On the evening of May 6 Jodl, wearing his medals and Nazi party pin, was accompanied by Major-General de Guingand and Brigadier Williams, to General Smith's office. Admiral Friedeburg was also present at the negotiations. The Allies' representative was William Strang, an aide to the British Deputy Foreign Minister, a specialist on German affairs and the British representative to the European advisory commission. Following Doenitz' orders, Jodl began to rant that victory for the Soviet Union would cause the "decline and fall of the Western world" and threatened that Germany would be thrown into ``chaos'' if the Nazis surrendered to the Soviet Army. After more than an hour of discussion, General Smith and the British officers concluded that the "Germans were merely dragging out the talks to gain time for their forces in the = East".^^1^^ They relayed this information to Eisenhower, who ordered that Doenitz' envoys be told that if they did not quickly agree to the terms of surrender he would break off all negotiations and seal the Western Front preventing by force any further westward _-_-_
~^^1^^ Forrest G. Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 486--87.
167 movement of German soldiers and civilians. General Smith informed Jodl and Friedeburg that under the terms of surrender the new German government would be held responsible if hostilities = continued.^^1^^Jodl had to ask Doenitz for authorisation to sign an unconditional surrender of German forces. Doenitz proclaimed that the Allies' demands were "pure blackmail'', but he was forced to accept them. Keitel sent a telegram to Jodl which stated: "Grossadmiral Doenitz grants full permission to sign an agreement with the proposed terms."
Now Jodl began to do everything possible to keep the surrender from going into effect quickly. He told Smith, Strang and Robert Murphy, Eisenhower's political adviser, that the Doenitz government needed no less than 48 hours to inform German forces of the surrender. Eisenhower later recalled: "To us it seemed clear that the Germans were playing for time so that they could transfer behind our lines the largest possible number of German soldiers still in the = field."^^2^^ But more importantly, the Nazis wanted two more days for their anti-Soviet plans.
At 2:40 a. m. on May 7, 1945 Jodl signed a document of surrender which stated:
``(1) We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command of all forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this date under Ger- _-_-_
~^^1^^ See: Walter Bedell Smith, Moscow Mission 1946--1949, William Heinemann Ltd., Melbourne, 1950, p. 10.
~^^2^^ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 426.
168 man control.``(2). The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 23.01 hours Central European time on May 8."
The Act of Surrender signed in Reims did not demand that the Nazis immediately cease all hostilities. In effect, this pertained only to the Soviet-German Front where fierce fighting was continuing. The Allied Command was lenient with the Nazis and gave them two days---May 7-8---to try and split the anti-Nazi coalition. It was evident that Jodl's meeting with de Guingand the night before had been successful. It was also clear that Churchill's representative, Williams Strang, had helped to draw up the surrender document. Representatives from the Soviet Union were not allowed to take part in the discussions concerning the surrender.
The Soviet government was quick to condemn what had taken place in Reims. Stalin declared: "The Allies have made a unilateral agreement with the Doenitz government. This kind of agreement looks more like a bad deal... It appears that the surrender does not affect our country, and this when it is we who have suffered the most from the Nazi invasion and have made the greatest contribution to victory, having broken the back of the fascist beast. Only bad consequences can be expected from such a 'surrender'."^^1^^
And, in fact, Doenitz did try to use the loophole in the Reims surrender document to break the _-_-_
~^^1^^ S. M. Shtemenko, General Headquarters During the War, p. 441.
169 anti-Nazi coalition. While Jodl was signing the document Doenitz was issuing orders to the Wisla, Centre and Austria Army Groups still fighting the Soviet Army to "transfer as many troops to the West and as quickly as possible, breaking through Soviet troop positions if necessary''. Doenitz also ordered that all hostilities against British and American forces be immediately ceased even before the surrender signed in Reims went into effect. A special courrier, Colonel Meyer-Detring, flew from Flensburg to the Command of the Centre Army Group with orders for the armies stationed in Czechoslovakia to continue fighting as long as possible. Nazi forces in Denmark surrendered to the Allies, but the commandant of the island of Bornholm was ordered to prevent Soviet forces from landing.At noon on May 7 Schwerin von Krosigk, head of the Flensburg ``government'', informed the German people and army that the Nazi government had surrendered in Reims. But not a word was said about halting military operations on the Soviet-German Front. The reason for this was clear. Doenitz had signed two documents--- one addressed to the officers and men in the Wisla, Centre and Austria Army Groups still fighting on the Soviet-German Front, and the other, an appeal to the German population in the areas occupied by the Western Powers. In the first document, Doenitz urged the German soldiers to continue fighting the Soviet Army and threatened any traitors with severe punishment. In the second he requested that the illegal activities of the Werwolf and other organisations be stopped and that the people cooperate with those in charge of the occupation forces. This appeal was not 170 made known in the areas occupied by Soviet forces.
Doenitz' diplomatic game was becoming clear---to take advantage of the time he had won in Reims to play his last trump---the lives of hundreds of thousands of German officers and men stationed at the Soviet-German Front. He hoped to avoid surrendering to the Soviet Union and "win over" the British and Americans by raising suspicion between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers and preparing the ground for future ``cooperation'' between his government and the West. Though an unconditional surrender had already been signed, Doenitz wanted to prevent it from going into effect. But, as Hitler, Doenitz was unable to break the anti-Hitler coalition. The ``thousand-year'' Reich was drawing to a close. The Flensburg government and the Nazi military Command had no alternative but to surrender unconditionally and thus acknowledge the utter failure of German imperialist plans to rule the world.
On May 7, 1945, after Moscow received the news of the surrender in Reims, Stalin announced: "The Soviet people, not the Allies, have borne the heaviest burden of the war. Therefore, the surrender should be signed in front of the supreme commands of all the countries of the anti-Nazi coalition, not just in front of the supreme commands of the Allied = forces."^^1^^ The Soviet Government wanted the surrender to be signed in Berlin, the centre of Nazi aggression. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies on May 7 resulted in an agreement to _-_-_
^^1^^ G. K. Zhukov, Thoughts and Recollections, Vol. 2, p. 321.
171 consider the Reims' signing only a preliminary act of surrender.On May 8 Doenitz was instructed by the Allies to immediately send the commanders of the three branches of the German armed forces to Berlin with authorisation to sign an act of unconditional surrender. The Flensburg government suppossedly was unable to reach FieldMarshal Schorner, whom Hitler had designated to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, so Keitel was appointed to sign the surrender in his stead. The Commander- inChief of the already defunct Luftwaffe, FieldMarshal Greim, had been wounded and was replaced by his Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Stumpff. Admiral Friedeburg, Commander- inChief of the German Navy, was the third member of the delegation. These three men were accompanied by aides and the head of the "foreign countries" division in German Supreme Command Headquarters.
That afternoon authorised German personnel flew from Flensburg to Berlin's Tempelhof Airport. The Act of Surrender was to be signed shortly after midnight on May 9, 1945. The large hall in the Military Engineering Academy was brightly lit and decorated with the flags of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France. Representatives from the Soviet Union's Supreme Command, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and representatives of the Supreme Command of Allied Expeditionary Force, headed by Air Force Marshal Arthur Tedder, were present as were many correspondents, who had arrived to record the historic moment. There was nervous excitement in the 172 air. The leaders of fascist Germany who had unleashed a war of aggression against the peoples of Europe would officially acknowledge total defeat. A new era was about to begin.
Zhukov opened the meeting: "We, representatives of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces, are authorised by the governments of the anti-Nazi coalition to accept Germany's unconditional surrender from the German military command."
The German delegation was ushered into the room. Keitel produced a document signed by Doenitz authorising the signing of an unconditional surrender.
Zhukov ordered the German delegation to approach the table and sign the act of unconditional surrender.
One after the other, Keitel, Stumpff and Friedeburg signed the document which read: "We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army all forces on land, at sea and in the air who are at this date under German = control."^^1^^
General Carl Spaatz, US Strategic Air Commander, and General de Lattre de Tassigny, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, were present to witness the signing.
The time was 12:43 a. m. on May, 9, 1945. Fascist Germany had surrendered unconditional- _-_-_
~^^1^^ The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 317, July 22, 1945, p. 106.
173 ly, the Second World War had come to an end in Europe. During the next few days the remaining forces of the German Army surrendered to the Soviet Army and the Allies. Soon Goering, Ribbentrop, Streicher, Sauckel, Kaltenbrunner, Raeder and thousands of lower-ranking Nazi officers and officials were behind bars waiting to be punished for their heinous crimes. Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels had committed suicide, and Bormann died while attempting to flee the country. Twelve bloody years of fascist terror had come to an end.But, strange as it may seem, the winds of change did not blow in the direction of Flensburg. Swastikas could still be seen and soldiers of the patrol batallion and SS troops from the Great Germany division, who were instructed by Doenitz to maintain "order,'' continued to march down the streets. The Nazis here greeted each other with the salute, "Heil Doenitz!''. Meanwhile Doenitz himself was riding around the streets of Flensburg in Hitler's armoured Mercedes. Heinrich Hoffmann, who had been one of Hitler's personal photographers, arrived from Munich. He accompanied Doenitz everywhere, immortalising him "for history''. On May 12 Doenitz announced over Flensburg radio that he would remain Germany's leader until the German people elected a "new F\"uhrer''. Nazi Field- Marshal Ernst Busch addressed the people after Doenitz and went so far as to say that it was his duty "to maintain order and discipline".
Doenitz wanted to make it seem that Hitler's clique was responsible for the defeat of the Reich and the unconditional surrender. In this way he could try and rehabilitate the members 174 of the Nazi General Headquarters who had organised Germany's acts of aggression against the peoples of Europe.
Even after Germany had surrendered unconditionally, Doenitz planned to try to preserve the ``government'' in Flensburg as the country's only ``legal'' government. This would permit German reactionaries to maintain a fascist order within the country and enable Doenitz to use diplomacy to try to break the coalition between the Allied countries which had defeated Nazi Germany.
To this end the Doenitz ``government'' was reorganised again and again in order to camouflage its Nazi elements and make it acceptable to the Western public. ``Chancellor'' Schwerin von Krosigk suggested that Keitel be removed from his position as Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command for "political reasons''. Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein was named as Keitel's replacement, but he remained in hiding and could not be located. Jodl was then appointed to replace Keitel temporarily. Addressing the members of his staff, Jodl declared: "The Doenitz Government is important because it represents the unity of the empire in its defeat, and this unity will be preserved in the future... The time has come for us to play the Russians against the AngloAmericans.'' Jodl advised Doenitz to hide Germany's efforts to rebuild its military might behind pleas for the "Germans' right to self- determination and equality with other nations".
The actions of the Doenitz government in Flensburg inspired other Nazi war criminals. On May 9 Goering appeared at the headquarters of American General Stack. His armoured Mercedes was accompanied by 17 large trucks 175 carrying paintings and other valuable works of art which had been stolen from museums throughout Europe. The Nazi war criminal had the audacity to face American journalists and say that he "was ready for the difficult task of rebuilding the = world".^^1^^
The Doenitz government would not have been able to function a single day if it had not been for the support of certain circles in the West. Before surrendering, the Nazis made an agreement with the commanding officers of the Anglo-American 21st Army Group stationed in the Flensburg area. British troops did not occupy the area, and German officers and men here were permitted to carry weapons. The Doenitz government was also given access to the Flensburg radio station. All these concessions made by the British were flagrant violations of the Allied agreements. Evidence now exists that proves that the actions of Field-Marshal Montgomery and other British officers were guided by the British Government which was still headed by Winston = Churchill.^^2^^
Churchill sought to spare Germany from an unconditional surrender. He insisted that the country's "partial surrenders" would serve the same purpose. After Montgomery had made a separate deal with the Nazis on May 4, 1945, Churchill had called Washington several times a day trying to persuade Truman to decide the issue without the Russians.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Horst Barwald und Klaus Polkehn, Bis fiinf nach zwdlf, Verlag des Ministeriums fur Nationale Verteidigung, Berlin, 1960, p. 111.
~^^2^^ The Churchill government was defeated in parliamentary elections in July 1945.
176Churchill and other British reactionaries were most disturbed by the decisive role which the Soviet Union had played in the defeat of Nazi Germany and the increasing influence of the great socialist power. The British Prime Minister later wrote: "Apprehension for the future and many perplexities had filled my mind as I moved about among the cheering crowds of Londoners in their hour of well-won rejoicing after all they had gone through... The Soviet menace, to my eyes, had already replaced the Nazi = foe."^^1^^
On May 12, 1945, Churchill wrote Truman that he was "profoundly concerned about the European situation'', that an "iron curtain" was being drawn down on the continent and that if immediate measures were not taken "it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to advance to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic".
Churchill had been prepared in May 1945 to form an alliance with the Nazis against the Soviet Union. It is easy to understand the relationship which developed between the British military command and the Nazis in Flensburg when one considers Churchill's extreme anti-Soviet position: he was already looking to reactionary circles in Germany when he began to plan anti-Soviet action. Arthur Smith writes that one thing was perfectly clear: regardless of whether the Germans were Nazis or not, the Doenitz government continued to function because Churchill wanted it to. This was indeed the case since after May 9, 1945 Flensburg was a part of the British zone of occupation.
In 1954, in the British House of Commons, _-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, p. 486.
12--418
177 Churchill, who had again been elected Prime Minister (at the height of the cold war), had been asked who had authorised Montgomery to allow Doenitz to form a government and to permit that government to function from May 4 to May 23, 1945 and who had authorised Montgomery to allow Doenitz to broadcast over Flensburg radio an appeal to the German soldiers and civilians to cooperate (with the British ---H.R.) in order to regain control of the area being occupied by the Soviet Union. Was it the British who had permitted all this?
Churchill replied that Field-Marshal Montgomery was not responsible for these measures, thus admitting that he was behind the actions taken by the British military command with respect to the Doenitz government. Moreover, the Prime Minister acknowledged several days later that even before the end of the war, "when the Germans were surrendering by hundreds of thousands'', he had sent Montgomery a telegram directing him to be careful in collecting the German arms and to stack them "so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with if the Soviet advance continued".
The details of Churchill's plan, code-named ``Eclipse'', are now known. Montgomery stated that the plan called for forming a low-level German military organisation in the British zone of occupation which would direct his orders to Field-Marshal Busch, German Supreme Commander in Northwestern Europe. Busch was to locate his headquarters in Schlezwig-Holstein and his Chief of Staff, General Kinzel, was to work with liaison officers at Montgomery's headquarters. The plan further called for dividing the German armed forces into 178 three commands under the leadership of former Nazi generals: Lindemann in Denmark, Bliimentritt in the region between the Baltic Sea and the Weser River, and Blaskowitz in the areas between the Weser and the Dutch border. Francis de Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff estimated the number of German troops under the joint command of the British and Nazis to be 1,419,000 officers and men.
The British Command acted in flagrant violation of the Allied agreements: it refused to immediately disarm and imprison the officers and men of the German Army, allowed former Nazi generals to remain in command of German units and even included German officers in the operations of the Anglo-American 21st Army Group headquarters.
Fearing that Doenitz would become a willing tool of London, Washington began to show cautious support for the new German ``government''. Eisenhower admitted that Doenitz would do everything in his power to pit the Allies against the Russians. And this was probably why reactionary circles in the US were interested in the Flensburg government.
On May 13, 1945 American and British representatives of the Allied Control Commission arrived in Flensburg to discuss the affairs of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command. Instead of abolishing the organisation, the head of the Commission, MajorGeneral Lowell Rooks, informed Doenitz that Eisenhower wished to see a representative of the Flensburg government at his headquarters, and that he, Rooks, was instructed to cooperate with Doenitz.
Both Rooks and British General Ford paid Doenitz "official visits''. Doenitz assured them that his government would be oriented towards the West.
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179 Speer stated that the Control Commission was soon functioning as a link between the Allies and the Doenitz government.
The action taken by the British and Americans led Doenitz to hope that his government could survive with the help of his anti-Soviet protectors in London. He told his aides: "We can hardly consider the Anglo-Americans our enemies. Soon Germany and the Western countries will form a common front against Bolshevism.'' Unimpeded by British military authorities, the Doenitz government spread rumours among the German population that the Anglo-Americans would soon be at war with the Soviet Union and would therefore be willing to rearm the Germans. Flensburg even interpreted an announcement over Hamburg radio calling for all men of draft age to report to certain assembly stations (for internment) to mean that the men were being mobilised to join the West in a war against the Soviet Union. And Doenitz went so far as to send an inquiry to Montgomery asking why so many generals were being sent to prisoner-of-war camps, and proposing to clear up the "usual misunderstandings".
The Doenitz government advised the British and Americans on different ways to preserve reactionary Germany and ensure the country's cooperation with the West against the Soviet Union. It was for this purpose that Herbert Backe and Julius Dorpmiiller were sent to Eisenhower.
In order to carry out serious negotiations with the West, Doenitz wanted to form a ministry of foreign affairs. Officials from Ribbentrop's ministry, who had in March 1945 been placed on indefinite leave or were evacuated to Bavaria, were summoned to Flensburg. Inasmuch as it was impossible for 180 Ribbentrop to remain as minister, Baron Adolf von Steengracht was appointed to replace him. Steengracht was a veteran Nazi diplomat who had been Ribbentrop's State Secretary and chief of his "personal staff''. He appointed Schellenberg and Werner Best, who had long headed the SS in Denmark, Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
But Doenitz' efforts to revive the Nazi diplomatic service were unsuccessful. By May 9, 1945, the day of Germany's unconditional surrender, 55 countries were at war with the Nazis. Even those neutral countries which had maintained diplomatic relations with Germany throughout the war began to break them now. Portugal severed relations with the country on May 6, Sweden on May 7, Switzerland on May 8 and Spain and Ireland on May 9.^^1^^ Doenitz had no one to whom he could address his diplomacy.
The world public began to grow increasingly indignant of the Doenitz government that continued to function in Flensburg after Germany's unconditional surrender. The freedom-loving peoples of the world did not endure the hardships of war so that Hitler's ``successor'' and other Nazi criminals could continue to claim they represented Germany's "legal government".
Even England's bourgeois press published an angry letter from a soldier stationed in Flensburg. Sergeant Evans wrote that the day after the surrender was signed troops stationed in the Flensburg area were ordered to salute German officers. Evans asked why he and thousands like him who had been _-_-_
~^^1^^ Marlis G. Steinert, Die 23 Tage der Regierung Donitz, p. 272.
181 fighting the Nazi beast since 1939 should have to salute German officers. Why was England permitting the Flensburg government, which was being run by Doenitz, von Krosigk and other Nazi criminals, to function.The American press also spoke out against allowing the Nazis to continue spreading their propaganda with the intention of breaking the Allied coalition. It reported that the Allies had learned their lesson the hard way when Franco, Retain, Darlan and Laval tried to blackmail them with threats of ``anarchy''. The Allies could maintain order and govern Germany without the help of Doenitz, von Krosigk and the other defeated generals who had suddenly been transformed from Nazis to " professional politicians".
On May 15, 1945, the US Government formed a commission to investigate Nazi war crimes. On the following day Goering was arrested. Even members of the Flensburg government would not escape punishment. Eisenhower was instructed by the Secretary of War to arrest Doenitz and his staff at the "appropriate time".
The American and British peoples would not tolerate Churchill's plans to use the Doenitz government to "turn the front" against the Soviet Union. They were deeply sympathetic towards the Soviet people who had suffered the most in the war against German fascism and had played a leading role in the final victory. Llewellyn Woodward, official British historian of the Second World War, writes that the Western public would have been outraged by any threat to use force against the Ally which had for so long borne the brunt of Nazi attacks and whose resistance had made it possible for the West to invade German-occupied 182 Europe.^^1^^ Even Churchill was forced to admit this fact: "In their fight against Hitler, the Russian peoples had built up an immense good will in the West, not least of all in the United = States."^^2^^
The Doenitz government lacked public support even in Germany. Many Germans preferred to support those who would build a new Germany without fascism. The German monopolists who had backed Doenitz now thought it would be more advantageous to cooperate directly with monopoly circles in the West.
On May 19, 1945, not far from Flensburg at Gliichsburg castle, a group of American politicians and businessmen met with Doenitz' "Minister of Economy and Supplies'', Albert Speer. Among the Americans present were D. O'Lier, President of the Economic Warfare Organisation, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, and Paul Nitze, future Deputy Secretary of State and leader of the extreme Tightest organisation, Committee on Present Danger.
But it was the Soviet Union which ultimately decided the fate of the Doenitz government.
On May 20, 1945 Pravda published an article which stated: "Flensburg has given rise to illusions among the remaining Nazi leaders. These illusions must be ended... No one is fooled by Doenitz and company's cheap pretence to be anti-Nazi. Doenitz is as much a part of the Nazi gang as the German General Headquarters and the Nazi party are a part of German = imperialism."^^3^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. 3, London, 1971, p. 283.
~^^2^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War and an Epilogue on the Years 1945 to 1957, Cassell, London, 1964, p. 965.
~^^3^^ Pravda, May 20, 1945.
183Von Krosigk later admitted that from the middle of May the members of the Doenitz government felt that their days were numbered due to sharp attacks by the Russians in the press and over radio against Doenitz and against Great Britain for allowing him [ Doenitz] to remain in power for so long.
On May 16, 1945 Stalin called in Molotov, Voroshilov and Zhukov and announced: "While we have disarmed and sent to prisoner-of-war camps all German officers and men, the British are keeping German forces in full combat readiness and cooperating with them. German forces' headquarters headed by their former commanders have complete freedom and on Montgomery's orders collect and prepare their forces' weapons and military equipment... The British are trying to preserve German forces in order to use them later. And this is a direct violation of the agreement between the heads of governments to immediately disband German forces."^^1^^ A Soviet delegation was ordered to immediately depart for Flensburg to join the Control Commission which was supposed to have ordered that the Allies arrest all the members of the Doenitz government and also collaborating German officers.
The next day, May 17, 1945, Soviet representatives on the Control Commission arrived in Flensburg, much to the dismay of the members of the Doenitz ``government''. The Soviet officers demanded that they be given copies of all the documents the Allies had received.
In accordance with the Act of Unconditional Surrender, the Soviet representatives ordered that the fascist government be completely eliminated, including the remnants of the German Army's _-_-_
~^^1^^ G. K. Zhukov, Thoughts and Recollections, Vol. 2, p. 347.
184 Supreme Command. Due to the action taken by the Soviet Union, Churchill's efforts to use the Doenitz government to revive German imperialism and militarism were unsuccessful. And Eisenhower decided that the "appropriate time" had arrived for arresting Doenitz and the other members of his government.On the morning of May 23, 1945, a batallion of British military police seized Flensburg. Doenitz and the members of his government were arrested, and their documents confiscated. Doenitz and members of his government were told to face the wall with their hands up and were searched like ordinary criminals. More than 300 Nazi politicians, generals and officers were arrested in Flensburg that day and sent to Bad-Mondorf to be held in detention. An Allied Command dispatch stated that the members of the Doenitz government had been taken into = custody.^^1^^ There would be no more Nazi attempts at provocative diplomacy.
Several days later in Berlin on June 6, 1945 representatives of the governments of the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain and France signed a document declaring Germany's defeat and the decision of the four Allied governments to assume supreme power over defeated Germany. The criminal fascist Reich and its diplomacy were no longer in existence.
__ALPHA_LVL1__ CONCLUSIONMaxim Gorky once said that it is useful to climb up the hills of the past in order to see further into _-_-_
~^^1^^ Most of the members of the Doenitz government did not escape punishment for their crimes. Some, like Keitel and Jodl, were sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Others, like Speer and Doenitz, were given long prison sentences.
13---418
185 the future. To successfully fight the aggressive schemes of imperialists today we must study the lessons of history.Nearly forty years have passed since the peoples' victory over German fascism. The great achievement of the Soviet people, who courageously defended their country and set the future development of society along the path of socialism, will never be forgotten. Leonid Brezhnev stated: "The defeat of Nazi Germany signified the victory of progress over reaction, humanity over barbarism and the victory of socialism over imperialist obscurantism. This victory opened the road for advancing the revolutionary struggle of the working class, a national liberation movement on an unprecedented scale and the destruction of the shameful colonial system."^^1^^
The grim experience endured by freedom- loving peoples in the struggle against Nazi aggression and the historical lessons of the Second World War have made it possible to better understand the present and foresee the future, to acquire insight into the workings of imperialist circles, into their subversive activities directed against the peace and security of nations.
The victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War was not just the victory of the Soviet Army over the armies of fascist Germany, its satellites and the other Axis Powers, but the victory of Soviet diplomacy. Just like the soldiers of the armed forces, the fighters on the diplomatic front honourably fulfilled their difficult missions.
In war years, questions of foreign policy were _-_-_
~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Politizdat, Moscow, 1973, p. 120, Vol. 1 (in Russian).
186 inextricably linked with the battles being fought on the Soviet-German Front. And it was the determination and courage of the Soviet soldiers, their success in crushing the Nazi military machine that more than anything else determined the solution to these questions. At the same time, it was the good, efficient Soviet diplomacy that, to a large extent, allowed the enemy to be defeated more quickly.Another factor which led to the final victory over German fascism was the development by the Communist Party and the Soviet government of the Leninist principle concerning the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems. This principle was put into practice when the powerful anti-Nazi coalition of states was created.
The anti-Nazi coalition was an important factor leading to the defeat of German fascism. It also proved Lenin's premise that governments with different socio-economic systems could cooperate, that the peoples of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries could live in peace, cooperating in political, economic and other spheres for their mutual benefit.
But there were also certain groups who viewed the anti-Nazi coalition with suspicion and even hostility. Today these reactionary circles of imperialism cannot reckon with the outcome of the Second World War and seek to hinder the development of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation among countries with different social-economic systems.
Certain reactionary political and military figures even developed a ``theory'' which suggested that the anti-Nazi coalition was an unnatural, chance phenomenon. This ``theory'' was developed in the works of American historians Thomas Bailey, Louis Sny- 187 der, Edgar Furniss and the former head of the United States Military Mission to the USSR, John Deane. Deane even titled his book, The Strange Alliance. The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia.
A number of historians in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have shown this ``theory'' to be untenable. Its proponents seek to distort the events of the past and hinder the development of peace today.
There were, however, difficulties in preserving the anti-Nazi coalition. Sharp disagreements sometimes took shape among the coalition members representing different social systems. Conflicts arose over the opening of a second front in Europe for the purpose of hastening the defeat of the common enemy and concerning the democratic principles for the post-war world.
But disagreements among the countries belonging to the anti-Nazi coalition could not always be attributed to the fact that the member nations represented different social systems. Conflicts often arose as a result of the activity of influential antiSoviet circles in the United States and Great Britain which feared a victory by the freedom-loving peoples of the world and nurtured plans for preserving reactionary regimes in Europe. These regimes would not be fascist but would be controlled by the reactionaries' own governments. Harry Hopkins acknowledged: "There are plenty of people in America who would have been perfectly willing to see our armies go right through Germany and fight with Russia after Germany was defeated,'' and to "take advantage of every rift between ourselves and Russia to make trouble between our two countries".
188The unwillingness of reactionaries in the West to face reality undermined the effectiveness of the anti-Nazi coalition and prolonged the war, thus raising the toll of human life.
Nevertheless, the member nations of the coalition were able to overcome their differences. Their cooperation in military, political and economic spheres allowed them to defeat Nazi Germany and lay the grounds for a firm and lasting peace. Overall, during 1941--1945 the US and Great Britain pursued a realistic foreign policy.
This realistic policy can be attributed, firstly, to the fact that the leaders of these countries realised that they could not defeat the military might of Germany and Japan without the help of the Soviet Union. Secondly, the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces over the Nazis destroyed the hopes of reactionary circles in the West that the Soviet Union would be weakened by the war. Soviet diplomacy also contributed to the triumph of realistic American and British foreign policies. Russian diplomats consistently practised the restraint and flexibility necessary for reaching compromises while at the same time staunchly defending the interests of the USSR.
When, after much diplomatic effort, an agreement was signed with the other Allies, the Soviet Union resolutely tried to abide by it. The Soviet Union believed that successful cooperation among the members of the anti-Nazi coalition depended on each country's fulfilling its obligations. Addressing Parliament on February 27, 1945, Churchill admitted: "... The Soviet leaders wish to live in honourable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no Government which stands to its obli- 189 gations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government."
As the Second World War was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomacy was faced with a difficult task. The international political situation was becoming increasingly complicated as anti-Soviet elements in the West stepped up their activity. Frightened by the increased military strength of the Soviet Union and the growth of the democratic liberation struggle of the peoples of the world, reactionary circles in the US and Great Britain began to pressure their governments not to completely destroy fascist Germany and to make a separate pact with the Nazis.
German diplomacy was also working towards this goal. This book has presented facts which show that while the Nazis were suffering crushing defeats on the Soviet-German Front, the German ruling circles, generals, influential bankers and military industrialists continued to try to cause a rift in the anti-Nazi coalition. They hoped to establish contacts with anti-Soviet circles in the West in order to conclude a separate peace and thus preserve Germany's economic and political base so that the country could again attempt to redistribute the world in its favour.
Soviet diplomats were determined in their efforts to prevent these two reactionary groups in the imperialist camp from uniting. At the same time the victories of the Soviet Army were radically changing the military-political situation and the balance of power in the world. This served to strengthen the position of sober-minded people in the West, who were now certain that underestimating the USSR and disregarding its legal interests would ultimately hurt the Western Powers. Public opinion also played a factor here. The American 190 and British people would have strongly opposed any separate deal with Nazi Germany. For these reasons many people in the West believed that international problems could be solved only if the Third Reich were completely destroyed and the member nations of the anti-Nazi coalition continued to cooperate after the war.
The US government's position on this matter was also determined by the fact that it wanted the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. If Washington failed to exact Germany's unconditional surrender, the Soviet Union might not live up to its obligations.
The Soviet Union never ceased in its efforts to bring about Germany's total defeat. Consistent efforts of Soviet diplomacy directed towards strengthening the anti-Nazi coalition increased its international influence and further isolated Nazi Germany. During the war years the USSR established diplomatic relations with 23 countries and reestablished relations with ten countries. On the other hand, by the time of its unconditional surrender on May 9, 1945, Germany had lost all its allies in Europe and 55 countries had declared war against the country. The Nazis' diplomatic isolation hastened their military defeat.
History has proven that in the interest of preserving peace and security for all nations, the leaders of Western countries must not become involved with anti-Soviet intrigues, but rather develop relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries based on mutual respect of interests, equal security and fulfillment of agreements and obligations.
The last few months of the Second World War serve as a reminder that we must remain wary of 191 the reactionary schemes of modern capitalism. Much of the deceit and treachery employed by the Nazis in their diplomacy is now characteristic of reactionaries in the West who wish to deprive the people of the fruits of their victory against fascism. These are the same people who are encouraging militarist circles in West Germany to develop nuclear weapons and urging them to take aggressive action against the socialist government of German workers and peasants---the German Democratic Republic.
The efforts of the bellicose, imperialist Nazis and their allies to turn back the march of history, to stop the peoples' struggle for peace and social progress resulted in the military defeat of German fascism. This was a remarkable manifestation of the constant process that has come to be characteristic of the world today---a change in the balance of power in the world favouring peace, democracy and socialism.
Today the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government continues to work towards these goals. With the support of other socialist countries and the peace-loving peoples of the world, the Soviet Union's policy for peace, detente, disarmament, the realisation of the Peace Programme, put forward by the CPSU, has made significant progress in putting an end to the tragic recurrence of war. Everyone who struggles for peace, detente and the peaceful co-existence of governments with different social systems can be proud of this accomplishment.
Imperialists in the West today try to ignore the strengthening position of socialism, the success of the national liberation movement and the growth of democratic forces. They oppose these processes with a policy which is non-conducive to peace. 192 NATO members, especially the United States, are trying to upset the established balance of military power in the world in their favour and to the detriment of socialist countries, detente and security of nations.
At the 26th Congress of the CPSU it was noted that the aggressive actions of Western reactionaries are an indication of the weakness of the imperialist system. During the 1970s the balance of power between socialism and capitalism swung even further in favour of socialism. Speaking at the 26th Congress, Brezhnev noted: "It is absolutely obvious that today the Soviet Union and its allies are more than ever the chief buttress of world = peace."^^1^^ More countries have freed themselves from the yoke of imperialism, and the union between world socialism and the national liberation movement has strengthened. Communist parties are more numerous and influential with the masses and there has been a deepening of the general crisis in capitalism. Conflicts between imperialist nations as they fight for markets and sources of raw materials and energy are increasing.
The difficulties which the capitalist system is experiencing today markedly influence its foreign policy.
Faced with a powerful surge in the peoples' liberation movement and the weakening of their own positions, the most aggressive imperialist circles are willing to gamble with the vital interests of humanity in search of their own self-interests. They are trying to accomplish the impossible---to _-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 7.
193 block the road of progressive change in the world and reassert themselves as the rulers of destinies. It is this position which has contributed to a significant increase in international tension with all its dangerous consequences. "To safeguard peace---no task is more important now on the international plane for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world."^^1^^The Soviet Union views the world situation realistically and considers that there are objective possibilities and socio-political forces which today are capable of preventing the enemies of peace from implementing their schemes and dragging the world into another cold war. It is possible to preserve detente and avert the threat of nuclear war. "The military and strategic equilibrium prevailing between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, objectively serves to safeguard world peace. We have not sought, and do not now seek, military superiority over the other side. That is not our policy. But neither will we permit the building up of any such superiority over us. Attempts of that kind and talking to us from a position of strength are absolutely = futile."^^2^^ The 26th Congress of the CPSU emphasised that Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence between two systems of government was not an unrealistic Utopia but a proven basis for further development in the field of practical peaceful cooperation among countries.
The Soviet Union opposes the aggressive forces of imperialism which seek to destroy detente, ac- _-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 40.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 30.
194 celerate the arms race and interfere in the internal affairs of other states with its own policy directed towards curbing a military build-up, strengthening peace and detente and defending the sovereign rights and freedom of nations.The Peace Programme proposed by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU remains a reliable compass. The 26th Congress has pointed out that the world situation today requires new, additional efforts to eliminate the threat of war and strengthen international security. The new concrete measures for improving the international situation and preventing war are a continuation and further development of the Peace Programme aimed at solving the vital issues in the world today.
In striving to ensure world peace, Soviet diplomacy steadfastly adheres to Leninist policy, reveals and undermines the schemes of the instigators of war and decisively rebuffs imperialist claims.
The Leninist course of foreign policy is firm. It was proven in the last decade, and the Soviet Union will continue to follow it in the future. No one will push it from this course.
[195] __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END]REQUEST TO READERS
Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications.
Please send all your comments to 17, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.
[196]PROGRESS PUBLISHERS WILL SOON PUBLISH:
V. MOLCHANOV
There Shall Be Retribution
(Nazi war criminals and their protectors)
A series of essays, based on facts and written by a Soviet news analyst, exposes heinous crimes committed on Soviet territory, temporarily seized by the enemy, by Nazi cutthroats some of whom now reside in the USA, West Germany, Canada and other countries.
Many of them have been recruited by the imperialist reactionary circles and put on the payroll of various anti-Soviet centres, CIA and other Western special services.
But Nazi butchers must be punished---such is the demand of honest people throughout the world.
The book is illustrated with photo documents supplied by archives and is for the general reader.
[197]PROGRESS PUBLISHERS PUT OUT RECENTLY:
V. BEREZHKOV
History in the Making
V. Berezhkov was on diplomatic service from 1940 to 1945 and took part in many World War II conferences and talks. The book opens with a description of the prewar situation in Europe, already overshadowed with the nazi threat. Berezhkov recapitulates the dramatic developments in the winter and spring of 1941, when nazi Germany was preparing to attack the USSR, discusses the complex process through which the anti-nazi coalition took shape, and recalls the Moscow conference of the three great powers' foreign ministers.
The book presents a detailed account of the 1943 Teheran Conference and the talks between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, tells us how the UN Charter was drawn up and shows the different approaches of the three great powers to what the world should be like after the war.
[198]PROGRESS PUBLISHERS PUT OUT RECENTLY:
V. SIPOLS
Diplomatic Battles Before World War II
The monograph by V. Sipols, Dr. Sc. (Hist.), reviews the complicated international problems of the pre-war years, the causes of and events leading up to World War II and brings out the secret designs of the Nazis. It exposes the Western Powers' policy towards German, Japanese and Italian aggressors and gives a wide-ranging account of persistent Soviet efforts to stop Nazi aggression and prevent war.
The author draws extensively on hitherto unpublished material from Soviet and foreign archives.
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