Over 30 years have passed since tne end of the Second World War---the most bloody and destructive war in the history of mankind. The countries of the anti-nazi coalition, among them the Soviet Union, whose contribution to the defeat of the enemy was decisive, achieved in this war an historic victory over fascism and Japanese militarism.
Together with the Soviet Army the Yugoslav people, who rose in 1941, and their Popular Liberation Army, the soldiers of the Polish forces, units of Czechoslovak patriots and, in the last stage of the war, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian detachments forged victory. A contribution to the victory over Japanese militarism was made by the Army of the Mongolian People's Republic. As L.~I. Brezhnev noted in his broadcast over American television, on June 24, 1973: ``In the Second World War we achieved a victory of world-wide historical importance. But more than 20 million Soviet citizens died in that war, 70,000 of our towns and villages were razed to the ground. One-third of our national wealth was = destroyed.''^^1^^
The Second World War was an inevitable consequence of the economic and political development of capitalism. Though the war was unleashed by Hitler Germany, the ground had been prepared by the forces of international imperialist reaction: imperialism was the true culprit.
Despite all its efforts, the Soviet Union failed to prevent the imperialists triggering off the Second World War. Wars are alien _-_-_
^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, = Part Two, Moscow, 1973, p.~42.
5 to the very social nature of the Soviet socialist state. Its policy, like that of any other state, is determined by the nature of its economic and political system. And Lenin stressed that ``economic interests and the economic position of the classes which rule our state lie at the root of both our home and foreign = policy''^^1^^.The essential differences in the foreign and home policies of socialism and capitalism are therefore determined by the fundamental differences in their economic bases.
In a capitalist state, based on the private ownership of the means of production and the exploitation of man by man, the motive power for foreign policy is the ruling classes' striving to consolidate their exploitative system, preserve and extend exploitation, retain and seize new markets and alien lands, and enslave other peoples. Because of the social nature of capitalist countries, theif foreign policies have inherent tendencies towards expansion and aggression, predatory wars and the creation of military blocs and an armaments race. It is these aggressive tendencies in capitalist foreign policy which are particularly reinforced at the monopoly stage of capitalism, when the latter is transformed into imperialism.
Socialism, which means the public ownership of the means of production, excluding the exploitation of man by man and the oppression of nations, gives rise to a completely different kind of foreign policy. A planned economy does away with the drive for markets. The aspirations of the working people, in power, to create more favourable conditions for building a new society, the most just and freest on earth, are the motive force of socialist foreign policy. The socialist state therefore aims to satisfy the constantly growing material and cultural demands of the working people. This goal can only be reached if there is peace. Owing to the inherent regularities in socialist society, a socialist state is an implacable opponent of aggression, wars and the seizure of alien territories. The target of socialist foreign policy is, therefore, to curb aggression, and to ensure peace, security, and the independence of nations.
The foreign policy of the Soviet socialist state harmoniously combines the Soviet people's national interests and the international obligations of the working class in power.
For nearly a quarter of a century, the Soviet state alone courageously and firmly withstood the crafty intrigues of imperialist states which stopped at nothing to destroy the socialist country.
_-_-_^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, Collected Works, = Vol.~27, Moscow, 1965, p.~365.
6The drive for peace, freedom and the security of nations was and remains a prime task of Soviet foreign policy originally set by Lenin, founder of the Soviet state. ``From the first foreign policy act of the Soviet power---the Decree on Peace---to the Peace Programme of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, our Party and state have maintained the continuity of the main directions of the struggle for peace and for the freedom and security of the = peoples.''^^1^^
This active, protracted struggle for peace and security has been crowned with success. Every passing week and day brings convincing evidence that the Peace Programme is being successfully carried out. In world affairs, the mighty, authoritative voice of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community calls out for a durable peace, friendship among nations, for their freedom and security.
The international work of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in realising the Peace Programme, and the results of visits by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, to the USA, the FRG, France and India in 1972--1974 have been fully approved by the socialist nations, the international communist movement and the whole of progressive mankind.
While noting the great successes achieved in striving for peace and the security of nations and upholding the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social orders, the CPSU summons the Soviet people and all people of goodwill to be on their guard against the intrigues of the enemies of peace. L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: ``Imperialism's forces of aggression will evidently not lay down their arms for a long time yet. There are still adventurists who are capable of kindling another military conflagration in order to further their own mercenary interests. We therefore consider that it is our sacred duty to conduct our policy in such a way as to avoid being caught unawares by any emergency and to firmly counter any attempt at returning the world to the `cold war' = days.''^^2^^
The onslaught against the aggressive forces of imperialism, reaction and war, to consolidate peace and international security and develop co-operation, remains a major task of the CPSU and the Soviet Government at the present time.
Soviet foreign policy aims to ensure a durable world-wide peace and is in close harmony with the interests of all peoples, for whom peace is one of the greatest blessings.
_-_-_^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, 1973, p. 44.
^^2^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, = Part Two, p.~58.
[7]The presence of favourable prospects for consolidating peace and universal security is a feature of the contemporary situation. The efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet state, of all the fraternal countries of the socialist community and global progressive forces to strengthen peace and organise stable security and co-operation in Europe have been rewarded with substantial success.
The entire history of the Soviet Union confirms that peace does not arrive of its own volition; it has to be stubbornly fought for. This struggle to preserve and reinforce peace is the main foreign policy issue to have constantly concerned the CPSU and the Soviet state. In November 1918, Lenin said: ``...From the very beginning of the October Revolution, foreign policy and international relations have been the main questions facing = us.''^^1^^
The achievement of socialism in the USSR depended, hi the first place, on whether the country could maintain peaceful relations with the capitalist countries which surrounded it up to the Second World War. Meanwhile, throughout the entire inter-war period, the leading capitalist powers clung to the idea of solving their own inter-state contradictions at the expense of the Soviet state. The attempts to achieve this were stepped up particularly hi the years after the world economic crisis of 1929--1933. Europe and Asia then contained two breeding grounds of war and the aggressive fascist states were beginning to form a political and military bloc with the object of preparing for the redivision of the world by force, i.e. war.
At that time, the Communist Party and the Soviet state were pursuing a consistent policy of peace, security and friendship among nations. This policy was in the interests of all peoples of the world, as well as the Soviet people. "The banner of peace and friendship between peoples raised aloft by the Soviet Union is winning for socialism the sympathy and support of millions on all continents,'' said L. I. Brezhnev. "People throughout the world see that in its foreign policy the Soviet Union is consistently implementing the new principles that were proclaimed by our great = Revolution.''^^2^^
Bourgeois falsifiers slander and distort the Leninist foreign policy in order to belittle its influence on the broad masses; they ascribe to it aims which are alien to its very nature. Bourgeois leaders, diplomats, journalists and historians all indulge in the falsification of the USSR's foreign policy. They are particularly _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol, 28, Moscow, 1965, p.~151.
^^2^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Moscow, 1972, p.~54.
8 malicious when they distort the USSR's international policy in descriptions of the pre-war period and the origins of the Second World War. They also give a twisted rendering of the role of the USSR and its foreign policy in the initial period of the war (up to June 22, 1941).In a bid to whitewash the pre-war foreign policies of the leading Western capitalist powers, the bourgeois historians go to the extent of partly blaming the Soviet Union for the outbreak of war. In this way, they misrepresent the history of the war's origins.
It is our urgent task to study the period leading up to the Second World War and the war's origins, and also to give a correct treatment of Soviet foreign policy in that period. This facilitates the struggle against imperialist aggressive forces. Today, the forces of reaction and war have to be curbed; international security must be strengthened. Historical experience, especially a study of the causes and origins of the Second World War, can help us achieve this. Lenin repeatedly stressed the importance of studying the causes of war. "We must explain the real situation to the people,'' Lenin said, "show them that war is hatched in the greatest secrecy.... We must explain to the people again and again in the most concrete manner possible how matters stood in the last war (the First World War---author), and why they could not have been = otherwise.''^^1^^
Lenin drew attention to the need to "examine the policy pursued prior to the war, the policy that led to and brought about the = war".^^2^^ He also said that we should bear in mind a key issue, "the question of the class character of the war: what caused that war, what classes are waging it, and what historical and historico-economic conditions gave rise to = it''.^^3^^ When studying the causes and nature of war, one should pose the question "To whose advantage is it?" The way Lenin looked at the origins of the First World War is just as relevant to an analysis of the Second World War's causes.
The Second World War differed from its predecessor in that it was more complex and contradictory: the rivalry and struggle between two imperialist groupings to rule the world developed in unusual conditions, with the world split into two opposing socioeconomic systems ---the capitalist and the socialist, the latter represented by the Soviet Union. These two systems also were in a state of struggle which was to leave its mark on the policies and diplomacy of every state in the capitalist world. This struggle, as _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, Moscow, 1966, p. 447.
^^2^^ Ibid., Vol, 23, Moscow, 1964, p. 33.
^^3^^ Ibid., Vol. 24, Moscow. 1964, p. 398.
9 Lenin foresaw, was aggravated by the mounting revolutionary processes in the capitalist countries. Lenin wrote: ``...In the present world situation following the imperialist war, reciprocal relations between peoples and the world political system as a whole are determined by the struggle waged by a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states headed by Soviet = Russia.''^^1^^The existence of the socialist Soviet Union and its active peace policy were a heavy weight on the instigators of the new war. This forced them to mask their predatory schemes and plans behind empty words of peace. The latter were a screen for the conflict launched between the groups of imperialist powers as the contradictions within the imperialist camp deepened, and for new attempts to resolve these contradictions at the expense of the USSR. In order to answer the basic question of the class nature of the Second World War and determine the historical and socioeconomic conditions which engendered it, we must examine the international situation of the early thirties in all its complexity and contradictoriness.
For the USSR, then the sole socialist state, those years were marked by the fulfilment of the first historic five-year plans ahead of schedule. Thanks to the heroic toil of the working class, of the whole Soviet people, the foundations of socialist society had been built and a powerful heavy industry had been created ---the basis of the USSR's economic independence and defensive might. Through the people's toil, the collectivisation of agriculture had been carried out, decisive success in the cultural revolution had been achieved, unemployment had been abolished, and the people's well-being improved.
These great achievements by the USSR rendered the idea of socialism even more attractive among the working masses and progressive people of the whole world. This rapidly boosted the Soviet Union's international influence and position.
In contrast to this, the capitalist world had been thoroughly shaken by a profound world economic crisis which brought all the internal and external contradictions of imperialism to a head, especially those between the victorious and defeated countries of the First World War. As the conflict between labour and capital became more acute, the exploiting classes in many capitalist countries embarked on a course of destroying parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy. Overt acts of terrorism became a frequent method of preserving their power. The foreign policy of the _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, Moscow, 1966, p. 241.
10 Western imperialist powers, particularly with relation to the USSR, was determined by this reactionary home policy.Guided by egoistic class interests, the governments of the leading Western capitalist countries did not, in the thirties, support the Soviet proposal for the creation of a system of collectivite security in Europe, without which it was impossible to resist the predatory aspirations of German fascist imperialism, and also of Italy and Japan whose preparations for a new war were well under way.
The report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 17th Party Congress in 1934 stated that "the capitalist countries are frantically preparing for a new war to redivide the world and spheres of = influence."^^1^^ Germany, Italy and lapan were getting ready for a new redivision of the world at the expense of Britain, France, and the USA, which, following the First World War, shared out the colonies, markets and spheres of influence among themselves. These countries were obviously not going to voluntarily relinquish their colonial possessions and greatpower positions. There thus formed two opposing imperialist groupings: Germany, Italy and Japan against Britain, France and America. The uneven development of capitalist countries under imperialism led to a change in the alignment of forces between the two groupings. Contradictions between them were becoming ever more intense --- armed conflict was clearly in the offing.
The aggressive powers masked their war preparations with anticommunist and anti-Soviet statements and declarations. Hitler Germany was particularly zealous in her anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, constantly stressing that Germany's main task was to conquer, subordinate and colonise Soviet Russia, whose territory she announced to be Lebensraum for the German nation. To fulfil this task would allegedly mean the elimination of Bolshevism. The Hitlerites tried to make out that the world was faced with the choice between fascism and communism. Fascist Germany declared herself a "bastion of anti-Bolshevism".
Playing on anti-Sovietism and anti-Bolshevism, the Hitlerites were firmly convinced they had come upon a contradiction which would enable German imperialism not only to destroy the Versailles-Washington system, but to achieve a new redivision of the world to Germany's advantage. This was the contradiction between capitalism and socialism, the capitalist world's antagonism towards the = USSR.^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^ The 17th Congress of the CPSU, = January 25--February 10, 1934. Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1934, p.~13 (in Russian).
^^2^^ Bolshevik, No.~11, 1933, pp. 7--8.
11All the international activities and propaganda of Hitler Germany were therefore based on scaring the exploiter classes and their leaders with the threat of revolution and Bolshevism.
This, then, was the Hitlerites' provocative policy --- a policy of playing on the class contradictions in the capitalist states with the object of frightening the ruling classes with the spectre of revolution; a policy of exploiting the contradictions between the capitalist states and the socialist Soviet Union.
Under cover of this libellous propaganda, fascist Germany was making frenzied war preparations, endeavouring at the same time to create a united capitalist front against the Soviet Union and thus isolate it. Hitlerite diplomats calculated that an anti-Comintern pact would help to do this.
Since early 1933 the Communist Party and the Soviet Government were bending tremendous efforts to show the world the savage essence of German fascism, which paraded as "national socialism'', and 'its aggressive predatory plans in relation to other nations and states. The USSR launched a political-diplomatic campaign of unparalleled scope, with the object of unmasking fascism and revealing the danger of a new war which would spring from it. The campaign was successful in that it helped rally all the forces fighting then against fascism and war. The 1936 International Peace Congress in Brussels was clear evidence of this.
While the leading capitalist powers ignored the threat of war from fascist Germany, and tried to make a deal with Hitler (this was especially typical of British policy) at the expense of other states, above all the USSR, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government drew up a broad programme of collective security based on the principle that peace is indivisible and on a collective rebuff to the fascist aggressors. This programme was approved by a resolution passed by the Politbureau of the CC CPSU on December 18, 1933. It enumerated measures for organising a system of collective security, based on regional pacts --- the Eastern Pact for Europe and the Pacific Pact for the Far East.
The programme also provided for the Soviet Union's membership to the League of Nations with a view to helping transform the latter into an instrument for furthering peace and co-operation between states, as well as a collective defence against aggression.
Having joined the League of Nations, the Soviet Union worked to make promotion of peace and security the organisation's main function.
12It was obvious to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government that German fascism enjoyed the support of world reaction. Soviet international politics was, therefore, not confined to unmasking fascism alone. It also exposed the actions of reactionary forces, the overt and covert enemies of peace and co-operation between states with opposing social systems. The Soviet Union thus furthered the peoples' struggle against fascism and the threat of war, and for peace and security.
A new international situation had emerged: two antagonistic forces were locked in bitter conflict ---the Soviet Union, leading all the forces of peace and progress, and the fascist aggressors, with Hitler Germany at the forefront, backed by international reaction, above all, British imperialism.
Guided by this appraisal of the international situation, and the principle that peace is indivisible, the Party and the Soviet Government took great pains to demonstrate to the British, French and other governments that all non-aggressive countries must take joint action to preserve peace, and that this was the sole means of preventing the outbreak of a new war. Soviet diplomacy and the Soviet press systematically exposed the aggressive states' artificial displays of peaceful intentions, particularly those of German diplomacy, which, to disguise its true intentions, was lavish in ``peaceful'' proposals.
However, London and Paris preferred to stick to a policy of ``non-intervention'', fraught with great dangers. This policy was initiated by the British Government of that time, whose leaders were hoping to make a deal with the fascist powers at the expense of the small states, and also the Soviet Union. In 1933, the Communist Party warned of the danger of British die-hards "seeking and using any favourable opportunities to step up aggressiveness of all anti-Soviet forces with a view to channelling intervention against the = USSR".^^1^^ The reactionary ruling circles of the Western countries tended to see Hitler Germany as a power capable of wrecking the revolutionary and democratic movements in Germany herself and in the countries threatened by German aggression, thereby bolstering capitalism in general. Therefore, in order to prop up Hitler's fascist dictatorship in Germany, they helped Germany arm herself and overcome her political isolation. It was these American, British and French imperialists that "encouraged the Hitlerite aggressors in their claims on Austria and Czechoslovakia, pushing them ever closer to the Soviet borders, _-_-_
^^1^^ Bolshevik, No.~11, 1933, p. 8.
13 and rejecting all Soviet proposals to unite and repulse the = fascist aggressors."^^1^^Reactionary circles in the West saw fascist Germany as the force "most capable of inflicting a blow on the Soviet Union to weaken it and undermine its influence, if not destroy = it".^^2^^
The ruling circles in Britain were, of course, alarmed by the rapidly increasing might of Hitler Germany owing to seizures in Europe. But they deemed that German fascist aggression directed eastwards was better than defeating Germany by joining forces with the Soviet Union, since such a victory would inevitably enhance the USSR's authority and influence. The British Government, therefore, refused to enter into an alliance with the USSR against fascist = Germany.^^3^^
The ruling reactionary cliques in Western countries were guided by these narrow class considerations when they pursued the policy of compliance with the fascist aggressors. They thus frustrated the Soviet plan to organise a system of collective security, the sole aim of which was to rally forces to defend peace against aggression.
This short-sighted and essentially anti-national policy of London, Paris and Washington was conducted under cover of ``nonintervention'' and, later, ``appeasement''. The international positions of the three countries were consequently undermined. The policy was nonetheless further pursued, since the Western ``democracies'' reckoned that fascist Germany would ultimately attack the Soviet Union from the West, and Japan would strike from the East. In this way, London, Paris and Washington would pay off the aggressors at the expense of the USSR, and simultaneously would have destroyed the hated Soviet state. In other words, they wanted to turn the imminent world war between imperialist groupings into a war between the fascist bloc and socialism, i.e. the Soviet Union. The Western powers were ever "throwing new sacrifices to Hitler's feet, cherishing the hope that he would shift his hordes eastwards against the Soviet = Union".^^4^^
With this object in mind, London and Paris held protracted, _-_-_
^^1^^ Forty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution (1917--1957). Theses of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC CPSU and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CC CPSU, Moscow, 1957, p. 24 (in Russian).
^^2^^ A. Zhdanov, The International Situation, Moscow, 1947, pp. 5-6 (in Russian).
^^3^^ See E. Carr, German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919- 1939, Baltimore. 1951, p. 136.
^^4^^ L. I. Brezhnev, The Soviet People's Great Victory, Moscow, 1965, p. 8 (in Russian)
14 fruitless talks with the USSR on the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance, and later a military convention as well. These negotiations were also used to disguise Anglo-German secret talks about a new redivision of the world and the channelling of German fascist aggression against the USSR.However, the Soviet Communist Party and Government saw through this crafty plan concocted by Anglo-French diplomacy and thwarted it by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939. This was, of course, a reluctant yet sensible step. The pact was crucial not only for the Soviet people but for working people all over the world. This time again the Soviet Government and its diplomacy justified the confidence expressed by Lenin that "we shall be able to stand up for ourselves. We have not been and shall not be beaten, nor shall we be = cheated."^^1^^
In a situation where the Soviet Union was alone and surrounded by capitalist countries, and the international working class was split by the Right Socialists, war could not be prevented. But the first socialist country could be --- had to be --- saved from war in such unfavourable circumstances. The Soviet-German pact, concluded in August 1939 upset the Western powers' plans to form a common front with Germany for organising a ``crusade'' against the Soviet Union.
The seizure of Manchuria, Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania had strengthened the strategic positions and war economy of the aggressive powers, i.e. Germany, Italy and Japan. They were now demanding, in line with their increased might, a new redivision of the world among the capitalist powers. They were hoping to establish their supremacy not only in Europe but throughout the world. So Hitler Germany unleashed a new war by attacking Poland.
An appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintern described the war as imperialist and predatory on the part of both capitalist blocs involved. Published after Germany attacked Poland, the appeal noted: ``War is being waged in the very centre of Europe. The ruling classes of Britain, France and Germany are fighting far world supremacy. This war follows on from the years of imperialist strife in the capitalist camp. That is the true meaning of this unjust, reactionary, imperialist = war."^^2^^ The war was precisely that until June 22, 1941.
Moreover, during the war's initia.1 stage, nicknamed the ``phoney'' war, neither of the belligerents was actually carrying out _-_-_
^^1^^ Lenin Miscellany XIII, Moscow, 1930, p. 8 (in Russian).
^^2^^ Kommunistichesky International (Communist International) No.~8-9, 1939, pp. 3-4.
15 any military operations in Western Europe. They were merely learning from each other how they could possibly satisfy the fascist aggressors' demands at the expense of the USSR. The eight-month ``phoney'' war was, in fact, a direct continuation of the anti-Soviet Munich policy of collusion with the fascists pursued by Britain and France after their formal declaration of war on Germany. However, the imperialists were unable to make a deal at the expense of the USSR because of their irreconcilable imperialist contradictions. Soviet foreign, policy and diplomacy also played their role; following Lenin's instructions about taking advantage of interimperialist contradictions, they achieved an extended breathing space for the USSR. Lenin said: ``We must take political advantage of the differences among our opponents, but only of major differences that are due .to profound economic = causes."^^1^^Once the imperialist war had started, the Soviet Union took up the only correct position, i.e. non-participation in the war and continued neutrality. This policy was aimed at preventing the war spreading over Europe and at ensuring the security of the Soviet Union and peace among nations.
The Soviet state used this breathing space to build up its defences, safeguard its security, and prepare to resist the German fascist aggressor. During that period the USSR organised the "eastern front" from the Baltic to the Black Sea and gathered all peace-loving, anti-fascist forces into its camp. Thus, the preconditions had been created for the formation of an anti-fascist coalition and the subsequent victory over fascism. *
Today, over 30 years since the war ended, the question of its nature and causes is highly relevant. People are still asking why German fascist aggression was not averted by the joint action of nations and governments, despite all Soviet efforts to organise a system of collective security in Europe, based on a treaty of mutual assistance signed by the USSR, Britain and France.
This book attempts to give an account of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in the pre-war period, and also the first stage of the Second World War, right up to June 22, 1941.
_-_-_^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 442.
[16] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER I __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE GROWING DANGER OF WAR.Serious economic and political changes in the capitalist world dominated international relations of that period.
The capitalist countries, still recovering from the substantial shocks of the world economic crisis of 1929--1933, were suffering from prolonged economic stagnation. All the internal and external contradictions of imperialism continued to be aggravated. Mass unemployment was still rampant; 10 million were unemployed in the USA alone. Revolutionary enthusiasm was on the increase in countries of the capitalist and colonialist world: the working-class and anti-imperialist movement was gaining ground rapidly. In this situation, ttye ruling classes, who saw the parliamentary system as a threat to their continued supremacy, resorted to more frequent use of force and terrorist methods of government. The German imperialist bourgeoisie established a fascist dictatorship, handing over the reins of power to Hitler's nazi party.
The bourgeoisie of a number of other countries also began to introduce fascist methods in the work of its state machinery and eliminate bourgeois-democratic freedoms. In 1936, only 10 out of 26 European countries had preserved these freedoms, and then only in a rather curtailed form.
German national socialism was the most reactionary and aggressive form of fascism. German imperialism, which by then had rehabilitated its economy with the help of American and British credits, became a dangerous rival to Britain, the USA and France. With every passing year, the latter countries were feeling the strain of growing German competition on the world 17 markets. Japan was also making enormous progress, having seized Manchuria --- an important market and source of raw materials.
This uneven development is demonstrated by the following data on steel-smelting and electricity production in the major capitalist countries of Europe:
1928 1935 1937 1939 Germany Britain Fra Steel (million tons) Italy 14.3 16.1* 19.8* 22.5** 8.7 10.0 13.2 13.4 9.5 6.2 7.9 7.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 Electricity (000 million kwh) 9.6 13.8 15.4 1928 1935 1937 27.9 36.7* 49.0* 15.6 25.9 31.9 14.1 17.4 20.0
* Including Saarland.
** Including Saarland and the territory of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia occupied by Germany.
These data testify that steel and electricity production in Germany developed considerably quicker than in Britain and France.
Another advantageous breakthrough for Germany was in aluminum smelting, which was particularly important for arms production. Germany outstripped Britain in almost all major branches of industry and became her stiffest competitor in the Near and Middle East, Africa and Latin America as well as in the European market. Japan was conducting a regular trade war against the USA and Britain in the Far East and in South-East Asia.
Britain, France and the USA were finding that their great-power positions, consolidated by the post-First-World-War Versailles-Washington treaties, were seriously threatened. The whole system of post-war peace treaties was disintegrating under the impact of the onslaught by the aggressive powers --- Germany, Italy and Japan, who were now preparing for a redivision of the world. However, neither Britain, France, nor the USA were prepared voluntarily to cede their great-power positions, colonies and markets to Germany, Italy and Japan. Only by means of force could a new redivision of the world be achieved. ``This is,'' Lenin 18 said, ``because the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is a calculation of the strength of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the even development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under = capitalism."^^1^^
For Hitler Germany, supported by her expanding economic might, the main order of the day was a fresh redivision of the world, raw material sources, markets and spheres of influence. This meant that the colonial question was brought to the forefront of international politics. It was a matter of concern for many colonial powers, but especially for Great Britain, which possessed a vast colonial empire, as well as the most valuable and significant German colonies seized after the First World War. The ruling circles in Britain were extremely alarmed by Germany's colonial demands, her trade and economic expansion and her subversive activity in the East, aimed at shattering British supremacy there. From 1935 to the end of August 1939 therefore, the colonial question remained a major, highly complex question in Anglo-German relations. Right up to the war itself, Britain and France on one side and Germany on the other could not find common ground on this issue, even though it was the theme of repeated negotiations. The fact that between 1935 and 1939, the British Parliament turned to the colonial question 75 times is an indication of its = acuteness.^^2^^
Anglo-German antagonism over the colonial question was aggravated by Germany linking her colonial demands with plans to reign supreme in Europe and throughout the world.
The whole direction of British foreign policy was, in fact, predetermined by her aspirations to preserve her empire and greatpower positions. British conservatives considered that the onslaught by German and Japanese imperialism, then threatening Britain's great-power positions, could onceivably be channelled against the Soviet Union. This opinion -as also held by highly influential circles in France, whose interests were represented by Laval.
In calculating the chances of redirecting the German and Japanese expansionist threat against the Soviet Union, the British, _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, Moscow, 1964, p. 295.
^^2^^ Voprosy Istorii (Questions of History), = No.~9, 1954, p. 88.
19 French and American ruling circles based themselves on the programme of the German fascists as embodied in Hitler's Mein Kampf&nd many declarations and speeches made by Hitler since his rise to power in Germany. Their main theme was that Germany aimed to fight the threat of revolution and would carry out a broad programme of territorial seizures in the East, and particularly in the Soviet Union.These Hitlerite anti-Soviet plans gained especially strong approval from British ruling circles. The ruling clique in Britain had their own anti-Soviet plans. These boiled down to undermining the USSR's increased international influence, and politically isolating it once Britain had created a united imperialist bloc to oppose the Soviet state. The ultimate British aim was to destroy socialism in the Soviet Union and restore the old capitalist order. This task could only conceivably be fulfilled if Britain managed to come to an agreement with the fascist powers --- Germany, Italy and also lapan.
British reactionary politicians supposed that the Soviet-Japanese war would weaken the influence of the successful socialist construction in the USSR on the liberation movement in the oppressed nations of the East.
Late in 1933, Bolshevik, the theoretical and political journal of the CC CPSU, described the mam goal of the British ruling circles thus: ``The British die-hards' plan is calculated, having first drawn Japan into the war against the USSR, to create a situation which would show other imperialist powers that intervention against the USSR from the West is so simple and promising, that it would be reasonable to form a united imperialist front against the = USSR."^^1^^
This anti-Soviet foreign policy was not in Britain's national interest. The 7th Congress of the Comintern, in describing this policy, noted that "the requirements of struggle for preservation of its colonial hegemony, against revolution and against the national-liberation movements remain today, too, the fundamental mainspring of British = policy."^^2^^
This was precisely why German fascism brought the struggle against revolution and the Soviet Union to the forefront of its programme. This was a provocative policy of playing on the class _-_-_
^^1^^ Bolshevik, No.~11, 1933, p. 10.
^^2^^ Ercoli, (Togliatti, Palmiro), The Fight for Peace. = Report on the Preparations for Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communist International, Delivered August 13, 1935. New York, 1935, pp. 32--33.
20 antagonisms within capitalist states with the object of scaring the ruling classes with the spectre of revolution, a policy of exploiting the contradictions between the capitalist countries and the Soviet socialist state. The Hitlerites hoped that they would be able to intimidate statesmen of the leading Western countries with the threat of revolution allegedly issuing from the Soviet Union. Having declared fascist Germany the ``bastion'' of the West against the threat of revolution and communism, the Hitlerites reckoned that by playing on the antagonisms between the capitalist world and the socialist Soviet Union they would persuade the Western powers to cancel the restrictions imposed on German rearmament; furthermore, they would gradually be able to prepare for a redivision of the world with the object of establishing the world supremacy of German imperialism.Using anti-communism and anti-Sovietism as a convenient disguise, Germany lost no time in building up her defences and preparing for war. On February 26, 1935, she announced the creation of an air force, and on March 16, universal military service was decreed. On March 7,1936, Germany denounced the Locarno agreements and, in the absence of any opposition from France or Britain, sent troops into the demilitarised Rhineland, advancing the Wehrmacht in earnest towards the French frontiers. Not content with individual measures for militarising the economy, the Hitler Government announced, in September 1936, the introduction of a "four-year plan" aimed principally at transferring the whole economy onto a war footing.
The massive Wehrmacht in the centre of Europe, equipped with all manner of offensive weapons, combined with the frenzied aggressiveness of German fascism resulted in an intensified arms race throughout the world. Benefiting from the policy of "non-intervention'', fascist Italy swiftly built up her defences and prepared to invade Ethiopia. Japanese militarists armed themselves and made ready to attack the USSR and China. Thus a seat of war was also developing in the Far East.
In this complex and tense international situation, the Soviet Union, with hostile capitalist surroundings, carried on peacefully constructing a new socialist society, accomplishing the difficult tasks set by the Communist Party in the Second Five-Year Plan (1933--1937).
This plan for developing the national economy was fulfilled ahead of schedule'due to the heroic toil of the whole Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party. The working class and all toilers of the Soviet Union had achieved by their heroic 21 labour a feat unparalleled in history: in record time and with no outside help, they had transformed backward Russia into a mighty advanced industrial state. The 1937 gross output of heavy industry was more than double the 1932 figure and eight times the 1913 figure. The USSR's industrial output was the highest in Europe and the second in the world, surpassed only by the USA.
The collectivisation of agriculture was also completed during those years, which meant the victory of socialism in the countryside and the liquidation of the kulaks, the only remaining capitalist class in the USSR.
Soviet defence capacity was substantially boosted by the country's industrialisation and the creation of a powerful heavy industry. This was crucial for ensuring the USSR's security and also its steadily increasing authority and influence on an international level.
These historic achievements were consolidated in law by the new Soviet Constitution, adopted in 1936. It guaranteed the Soviet citizen's right to work, holidays, education, old-age pension, and so on. This was the most democratic constitution in the world, inspiring the working class in the capitalist countries to fight for their rights against the onslaught of capital, fascism and reaction.
1933--1935 were years of change in Soviet relations with capitalist states. This new stage in relations arose, above all, from the USSR's economic success and increasing authority in international affairs. It was also a consequence of serious changes within the imperialist camp itself. These were due to the emergence of an aggressive fascist bloc, led by Germany, which was openly preparing for a war to redivide the world anew.
The Communist Party, through its 17th congress, warned all nations of the threat of war. The inter-state imperialist contradictions, it noted, had reached a point where "they have paved the way for armed conflict and brought on the prospect of war as a means for a fresh redivision of the world and spheres of influence to the advantage of the stronger = states".^^1^^
The task of opposing fascism and a new war became increasingly urgent for the USSR and all forces of peace and progress.
In the summer of 1935, this was a major issue at the 7th Congress of the Communist International. A report by G. M. Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, entitled "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Drive to Unite the Working _-_-_
^^1^^ The 17th Congress of the CPSU, p. 10.
22 Class Against Fascism'', stressed that "the cause of preserving peace is now supported not only by the working class, peasantry and other toilers, but by oppressed and weak nations whose independence is threatened by new wars. Whether the fascist and imperialist war-mongers will shortly be able to kindle the fires of a new imperialist war, or whether their villainous hand will be lopped off by the axe of a mighty anti-war front will depend on the effectiveness of this world front''. The Congress also examined another important question ---that of the Comintern's tasks vis-a-vis the imperialists' preparations for a new war. A report on the matter noted the Soviet Union's important role in preserving peace. "If it were not for the Soviet Union,'' said the report, "the breathing space between the two rounds of war would have been shorter. Nations would have been thrust into a new carnage long ago.'' The major conclusion of the Congress was that the success of the drive against fascism and a new war depended on whether Communists managed to unite all workers, irrespective of party membership, into a united workers' front, and organise a broad popular anti-fascist front, and also a united anti-imperialist front in the colonial and dependent countries.Having summed up past experience, the Congress adopted its historic resolution on the necessity to create a government of a united workers' and popular front, on communist support of such a government and possible participation in it.
The 7th Congress thus drew up a programme of action to assist all Communist parties in their drive against fascism and the threat of war. Guided by this programme, the Communist parties plunged into action to organise an anti-fascist popular front. Popular Front governments were formed in a number of countries, including Spain, France and Chile. At that stage, these governments saved their countries from fascist dictatorships. Popular Front policies played an enormous role in the struggle against fascism and = war.^^1^^
Though Japanese imperialism, having seized Manchuria, started a new redivision of the world, German fascist imperialism was, nevertheless, the more dangerous plunderer. As noted in the resolution of the 7th Comintern Congress, "German fascism is the main instigator of a new imperialist war and comes forward as the shock troop of international counter-revolution = ".^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^ For more detail, see the article by B. Ponomarev, = ``The Ideological Legacy of G. Dimitrov and the Present Day'', Kommunist, = No.~9, 1972, pp. 21--22.
^^2^^ The 7th Congress of the Communist International, = Moscow, 1939, p. 572.
23``The German fascists, who strive for the hegemony of German imperialism in Europe, raise the question of changing the boundaries of Europe at the expense of their neighbours by means of = war.''^^1^^
The Congress resolution stressed British imperialism's role in kindling aggressive anti-Soviet aspirations in the capitalist powers. "Britain,'' said the resolution, "is striving to strengthen the anti-Soviet tendencies not only of Germany but also of Japan = and Poland."^^2^^ The Congress therefore warned that "although the acuteness of the imperialist contradictions renders the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc difficult at the present moment, the fascist governments and war parties in the capitalist countries endeavour to solve these contradictions at the expense of the fatherland of all the working people, at the expense of the Soviet Union. The danger of the outbreak of a new imperialist war daily threatens = humanity''.^^3^^
This threat grew from year to year, as the aggressive powers, led by Germany, built up their military might. Moreover, enjoying the connivance of the leading Western powers (Britain, the USA, and France), they were perpetrating acts of aggression and conducting local wars. Thus, after the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, Italy invaded Ethiopia, turning her into a colony. This was followed up by German-Italian intervention in Spain with the object of overthrowing the republican Popular Front government.
In a resolution of April 1,1936, the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee noted that fascism "has developed into a direct military threat to peace" and that "instigators of war from both the West and the East, supporting each other's aggressive plans in every possible way, are threatening to involve the whole world in a merciless, destructive = war".^^4^^
At a grand meeting of the Moscow Soviet, on November 6,1936, a report by M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, gave a proper appraisal of this aggressive policy. The fascist aggressive powers, it noted, "have been and are pursuing an extremely provocative policy, deliberately aggravating and creating a tense situation in international relations, and are directing this policy particularly against the Soviet Union.... They are hoping to knock together a united fascist = international front."^^5^^ This "united front" or bloc of fascism was gradually _-_-_
^^1^^ The 7th Congress of the Communist International, p. 588.
^^2^^ Ibid.
^^3^^ Ibid., p. 589.
^^4^^ Kommunist, No.~2, 1969, p. 4.
^^5^^ Pravda, November~10, 1936.
24 taking shape. Approximately parallel talks were being held between Germany and Italy on the one hand, and Germany and Japan on the other. The former were concerned with concluding a political agreement which was subsequently named the ``Rome-Berlin Axis''. The German-Japanese pact, signed in November 1936, was called the anti-Comintern pact to disguise the aggressive aims of its signatories. It had a secret appendix stating that both countries would co-ordinate their policies with regard to the Soviet Union. The anti-Comintern pact was therefore directed against the Soviet Union as well as the leading Western powers. Italy later signed the pact (in 1937). It was thus transformed from a bilateral German-Japanese agreement into an alliance of three aggressive powers.The Soviet Government regarded the pact as an alliance of aggressive powers aimed at preparing for a war to redivide the world. In late November 1936, speaking at the Extraordinary 8th Congress of Soviets, V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, said that this pact in fact resembled an ordinary alliance of imperialists for aggressive purposes. It was further stressed: ``We must say frankly that we are not blind to the true nature of this agreement. It seems to us natural that throughout the world this agreement has raised concern for the cause of = peace".^^1^^
Speaking at the same Congress, M. M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, reminded the Western powers that the fascist states were pursuing a policy which was a threat to British and French security, and that their farcical ``nonintervention'' policy would back-fire.
The USSR, Litvinov said, saw no reason for changing its policy, "which was, is, and will be one of peace.... The USSR ,wants this peace for itself and for other nations, to whom it therefore offers its co-operation. The active organisation of this peace, rather than mere words, is what the Soviet Union awaits from others,'' underlined Litvinov. The same day, Pravda published a leader entitled "The USSR's Foreign Policy Is Immutable!" thus confirming the adherence of the CPSU and the Soviet Government to the policy of peace and their readiness to defend this peace jointly with all peace-loving powers.
The Soviet Union did all in its power to show how the fascist powers, united in their blatantly aggressive aims, endangered peace.
Kalinin described the Soviet state's active peace policy: "It has _-_-_
^^1^^ Pravda, November 30, 1936.
25 been proved time and again this year that our foreign policy is high-principled, consistent and, as formerly, aimed at developing and reinforcing peaceful relations between all countries. We consider,'' he emphasised, "that this is a most important task of international politics, involving the vital interests of the people. Despite bitter opposition from the advocates of violence, this policy is increasingly winning over and rallying defenders of peace in all countries."^^1^^ However, this did not mean that the danger of war had diminished. As Kalinin stressed at the time: "The storm-clouds of war are thickening overhead."The threat of imminent war grew ever more distinct and palpable.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union warned the Soviet people and the international working class about the increasing danger of war. A leader in the new year's day edition of Pravda read: ``The 1937 sky is darkened with heavy storm-clouds. The fascist countries are preparing a war of plunder.... Other bourgeois governments, fearing the crash, clutch at the straw of superficial peace, and, by their inertia, encourage the fascist brigandage."
The Japanese invasion of North China graphically evidenced the consequences of the ``non-intervention'' policy pursued by Britain, the USA and France in relation to the fascist powers.
The Executive Committee of the Comintern gave repeated warnings of the mounting threat of war; in 193? its General Secretary Dimitrov wrote: "Under the guise of a drive against the Comintern and the 'Red Peril', the German, Italian, and Japanese robbers are endeavouring, by means of limited wars, to seize new strategic positions, centres of land and sea communications and sources of raw materials for war industry. Their goal is to step up and spread the imperialist = war."^^2^^
This imperialist war was, in fact, already in progress on two continents---Europe and Asia. Describing the international situation then evolving Izvestia wrote: ``Two parts of the world are already in the throes of war while the war-mongers are arranging future = operations."^^3^^
The year 1937 saw the further complication of the international situation due to the Western powers' policy of connivance with the aggressors.
_-_-_^^1^^ Pravda, November 10, 1936.
^^2^^ Georgi Dimitrov, Selected Works, = Vol. 1, Sofia, 1967, p.~780.
^^3^^ Izvestia, November 11, 1937.
26London and Paris refused to adopt the Soviet proposals to organise a collective rebuff to aggression. The Soviet Government was obliged to make a public declaration on this matter in late November 1937.
It was made by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in his speech of November 27,1937: ``On every appropriate occasion, and even when the Soviet Union's interests were not involved, we have stressed our readiness to work together with other powers, both large and small, for a collective rebuff to the aggressor. But no such collective action is yet = forthcoming."^^1^^
London and Paris reckoned that Britain and France would be able to reach an agreement with fascist Germany. Several bourgeois leaders and journalists were, indeed, aware of the dangerous consequences of this policy. For example, the wellknown French journalist Emile Bure sharply criticised the policy of collusion with Germany in an article published by the newspaper L'Aurore, and suggested that France and Britain join forces with the USSR to repulse the = aggressor.^^2^^
The Soviet press drew the world public's attention to the Western governments' pernicious policy of collusion with the fascist powers. For instance, in describing the policy of London and Paris, Pravda underlined that ``the bourgeois-democratic powers of Europe, in meeting the aggressors' demands, and working towards an agreement with them, are themselves shaking the faith of the smaller countries in the League of Nations and in collective security. By doing this, they are playing into the hands of the aggressors, whereas with a decisive rebuff and united front of peace-loving countries, it would have been easy to bring the insolent aggressors in line, for they are not nearly as strong as they like to make = out."^^3^^
Speaking on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Dimitrov also warned of the danger of a new war threatening mankind. "The threat of a new world war is growing,'' he said, "and this war would have been at hand long ago if there had not been such a factor of peace as the Soviet Union and if a united popular front had not been formed and developed against fascism and war in the capitalist = countries."^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^ Pravda, November 29, 1937.
^^2^^ Ibid. December 24, 1937.
^^3^^ Ibid. December 17, 1937.
^^4^^ Ibid. December 11, 1937.
27Unfortunately, the Western governments ignored all these serious warnings. They continued their policy of connivance with the aggressors, which inevitably led to the increased threat of war. Therefore, in a leading article on December 31,1937, Pravda again pointed out that the world was faced with the danger of war: ``The situation is red-hot. Capitalism, though doomed, is seeking a way out through war. It is waging war already. The past year has been one of unbridled aggression by the fascist plunderers."
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The Danger of War Increases.In the complex international situation of 1933--1937, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government based their foreign policy on the lines laid down in the report of the CC CPSU to the 17th Party Congress. Both the Party and the Government paid great attention to international politics. They warned the international working class and all who cherished peace, as well as governments, of the danger of an impending war. Using every possible means, the USSR battled with the threat of war, meeting halfway any country which, for one reason or another, stood up for peace, and unmasking those who mouthed false words of peace while preparing and provoking war.
The Soviet Union did all it could to convince the British and French governments of the need for joint action to defend peace against aggression.
London and Paris, however, were not inclined to heed the Soviet warnings of war. They were hoping to arrange things with the aggressive powers at the USSR's expense. The most reactionary section of the Conservative Party, i.e. the Cliveden clique, the most notable members of which were Neville Chamberlain, John Simon, Kingsley Wood, Lord Halifax, and Samuel Hoare, inspired this policy. Winston Churchill shared the political views of this group up to = 1934.^^1^^
This policy of collusion was opposed by another line in British politics, that of maintaining normal relations with the USSR and developing economic and trade ties, so vital to the British economy. Its proponents also considered that Britain, along with the USSR _-_-_
^^1^^ I. M. Maisky, Who Helped Hitler (Recollections of a Soviet Ambassador). Moscow, 1962, pp. 35, 54--59, 61, 63--64 (in Russian).
28 and France, must bar the way to German fascist aggression by creating a system of collective security in Europe.^ The most noted among them were Lloyd George, Alfred Duff Cooper, Lord Beaverbrook, and from 1934, Winston = Churchill.^^1^^The instability of Anglo-Soviet relations between 1933 and 1937 was a result of the bitter controversy in British government circles over the line of British policy towards the USSR and fascist Germany.
Lifting the embargo on Soviet imports to Britain in mid-1933 suggests that the British Government could not ignore home public opinion or the stand taken by the moderates in government circles. This is also indicated by the signing of a temporary trade agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on April 16, 1934, as well as a contract of November 4, 1934, between the Chief Concessions Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Lena Goldfields company to settle moot points on a mutual = basis.^^2^^
The visit to Moscow by Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal, in March 1935 also somewhat improved the political atmosphere of the relations between the two = countries.^^3^^
During the talks, the Soviet leaders drew Eden's attention to fascist Germany's aggressive aspirations and underlined the threat of a new world war resulting from the aggressive policies pursued by fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. In comparing the international situation of early 1935 with that of 1913, the last year of peace before the First World War (1914--1918), Joseph Stalin said at the time to Eden that the international situation in 1935 was worse than in 1913, stressing that "in 1913 there was only one hotbed of potential war, namely, Germany, whereas now there are two --- Germany and Japan".
Despite the serious nature of these warnings addressed by the Soviet leaders to the British Government, the latter, as the ensuing events showed, continued to pursue its former policies of collusion with Hitler's government. Eden's Moscow visit was a tactical move on the part of the British Government which saw its main task in exerting pressure on Hitler Germany to make her conclude a comprehensive Anglo-German agreement which would include the demarcation of spheres of influence, world markets and raw _-_-_
^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 61, 63--64.
^^2^^ Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, = Vol. XVII, Moscow, 1971, pp. 826--27 (in Russian).
^^3^^ Ibid., Vol. XVIII, Moscow, 1973, pp. 228--51.
29 material sources, and also colonial possessions. The whole sense of such an agreement would boil dpwn to guaranteeing Britain her colonial possessions and preserving her great-power positions, having met Hitler Germany's expansionist claims at the expense of other states, above all the USSR. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement concluded in 1935 in violation of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, was regarded by the British Government as the starting-point for achieving a general settlement with fascist Germany.Recapping on the above, one can make the following conclusion: between 1933 and 1937, an anti-Soviet trend clearly prevailed in British policies towards the Soviet Union. This trend was closely bound up with the policy of collusion with fascist Germany. It was particularly evident in the Foreign Office's intensive activity during the talks on the conclusion of the "four-power pact'', the draft of which was put forward by Mussolini, who had been working in close contact with Berlin.
British diplomacy seized upon this draft in order to form a directorate of four powers, to be based on close co-operation between Great Britain and Hitler Germany. Fascist Germany and Italy were to be co-signatories to the pact along with Britain and France. It was a new variation of the notorious Holy Alliance of the four powers who would manage all European and world problems. The pact was intended to isolate the Soviet Union, exclude it from the solution of European political problems and undermine its international position as well as to improve co-operation between London and Paris, on the one hand, and the fascist states, on the other.
At the timePravda wrote: ``There is no doubt in the minds of the working people in the USSR and the whole world that the `four-power pact' was designed from the start for anti-Soviet ends.... The die-hards won't be able to hide their interventionist cat in the diplomatic = bag."^^1^^ However, after the failure to conclude the ``four-power pact'', and despite Germany's blatant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, forbidding Germany to rearm herself, the British Government continued its policy of rapprochement with fascist Germany. The signing of an Anglo-German navy agreement on June 18, 1935, in flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty which forbade a German navy, is evidence of this. The agreement gave Germany the right to a navy not exceeding 35 per~cent of the tonnage of the whole British fleet, and almost equal to the French _-_-_
^^1^^ Pravda. June 10, 1933.
30 fleet. Notwithstanding the Versailles Treaty, Germany also gained the right to build a fleet of submarines up to 45 per~cent of the British submarine fleet's tonnage. As well as being against British interests, this agreement dealt a heavy blow at collective security in Europe, the creation of which could have ensured peace for all European nations.By concluding this navy agreement with Germany, Britain had in fact legitimatised her rearmament. The agreement was also the signal for a new race in naval construction in Europe and created a new weapon of aggression in the Baltic Sea before the gateway to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Government took stock of the danger of war issuing from the major breeding ground, fascist Germany.
At its 17th Congress, the Communist Party confirmed the USSR's striving for peace and co-operation and also gave a serious warning to those provoking war. "Our policy is clear,'' stated the report of the CC CPSU to the Congress. "Its goal is to safeguard peace and strengthen trade relations with all countries. There is no question of the USSR's threatening anyone, whoever they are. We stand for and champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are ready to strike back at the war-mongers, blow for blow.''^^1^^
The Party and the Government were fully aware of the complex international situation in the thirties.
A dangerous situation was augmenting in the Far East: Japan, having seized Manchuria, virtually became the Soviet Union's neighbour. Henceforward, Manchuria was used by Japanese militarists as a convenient springboard for war against the USSR. Japanese imperialists dreamt that such a war would give them the whole of the Soviet Far East.
The year 1933 saw an increase in acts of provocation by the Japanese Manchurian authorities on the Chinese Eastern Railway, calculated to paralyse the Soviet-owned railway's normal functioning. The Japanese authorities were hoping to compel the USSR to hand over the railway to Japan or else to provoke matters to the point of going to war against the Soviet Unions and thus seize the railway by force. Japanese violations of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier also became more frequent.
The Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo described the Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union thus: ``The year 1933 was one of the most tense years in Soviet-Japanese relations. Tension especially _-_-_
^^1^^ The 17th Congress of the CPSU, p. 14.
31 mounted in the autumn of this year, when the Japanese made an actual attemp at seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, and war propaganda from the Japanese militarists reached its = peak."^^1^^ The Embassy stressed that Japan had declined the Soviet proposal of a pact of non-aggression. The reason for this refusal was Japan's aspiration "to ensure that she would have the opportunity of black-mailing the USSR with the threat of war, and alarming the Soviet Government into conceding to the main Japanese demands on the USSR (fishing rights, concessions, recognition of Manchukuo, the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, etc.)''. She did not want to "bind herself to a non-aggression pact in case it would prevent her attacking the = USSR".^^2^^The Japanese policy towards the USSR was aimed solely at building up maximum tension which would enable Japan, by using Manchuria, to begin a war against the Soviet Union at the appropriate moment.
The CC CPSU and the Soviet Government decided to warn the Soviet peoples and world public of the serious deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations, and the threat of Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. On December 25,1933, Stalin, interviewed by the New York Times correspondent, Walter Duranty, remarked on the danger of bellicose elements gaining the upper hand in Japanese politics. "This is a real danger and we must prepare for it.'' ``It seems to me,'' continued Stalin, "that it would be unwise of Japan to attack the = USSR."^^3^^ This unambiguous warning showed the Japanese adventurists that the Soviet Union was aware of the threat and was preparing for a decisive rebuff to the aggressor if the latter risked a war.
Describing the Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union, Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said, at a session of the USSR Central Executive Committee on December 29, 1933, that "these relations are riveting the attention of the whole world, as well as the Soviet Union, for the Japanese policy is now the darkest and most threatening storm-cloud on the international political = horizon''.^^4^^
The Japanese war threat in the Far East was stressed at the 17th _-_-_
^^1^^ USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = Vol. IX, Moscow, 1971, p. 21 (in Russian).
^^2^^ Ibid.
^^3^^ Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, = Vol. XVI, Moscow 1970, p. 767 (in Russian).
^^4^^ Ibid., p. 793.
32 Congress of the = CPSU.^^1^^ On April 22, 1934, Litvinov spoke to the American Ambassador on the matter: ``Since Japan had so far met with no obstacles on her path of aggression, and knowing Japan, we were certain that she would follow this road even = further."^^2^^In the spring of 1933, the Soviet Government proposed talks with the Japanese-Manchurian side on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In doing so, it was combining a firm rebuff to Japanese aggression with a constructive policy plus the necessary diplomacy to remove=the sources of conflict and tension.
Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated after the military coup d'etat in Japan in February 1936. In a conversation with Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, held on December 8-9, 1936, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs noted that on no other Soviet border was there so much tension as on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier. Special emphasis needs to be laid, he stressed in conclusion, on the forays into Soviet territory and Japan's obstinate refusal to conclude a non-aggression pact.
If we also take into account the agitation and propaganda in the Japanese press, journals and books in favour of Japanese expansion at the USSR's expense, then it is not surprising that we had been compelled against our will and at great material expense to concentrate a vast number of troops in the Far East for the purpose of self-defence.
The Soviet policy towards Japan was defined in the report of the CC CPSU to the 17th Party Congress: ``We shall continue persistently to pursue a policy of peace and work towards improved relations with Japan, for an improvement in these relations is what we desire."
Unfortunately, this desire was absent on the Japanese side.
The leadership of the Party and the Soviet Government took stock of the fundamental changes in the international situation caused by the emergence of a group of fascist countries whose aim was a fresh redivision of the world by force, i.e. war.
It was plain to both the Party and the Government that this danger of war concerned the Soviet Union insofar as the aggressive plans of the two major countries --- Germany and Japan --- against the Soviet Union were being aided and abetted by world reaction. Britain, as was noted at the 7th Comintern Congress, played a key role: The imperialists of Germany and Japan "are supported and _-_-_
^^1^^The 17th Congress of the CPSU.
^^2^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = Vol. IX, p. 22.
33 encouraged in these efforts by the most reactionary strata of the bourgeoisie of the greatest imperialist power, Great Britain,'' said a report by = Ercoli.^^1^^However, the Soviet Union's significant successes in industrialisation, the final victory of socialism which led to the country's greater defence capacity, and its active Leninist policy of peace and struggle against fascism --- all this could not but strengthen the Soviet Union's international standing and enhance its international influence. During that period, the USSR became a vital factor for safeguarding peace in Europe and the rest of the world. ``The USSR is the main stronghold of peace,'' wrote Izvestia on August 1,1935. "This is now acknowledged by those states and bourgeois parties which at the present stage in world development are disinterested in war as well as by hundreds of millions of working people throughout the world. It is not only its international policies that make the Soviet Union the main stronghold of peace; it is also the real power which backs up these policies."
The Soviet Union was consistent and uncompromising in its endeavours to lay bare the predatory plans of the fascist powers, and demonstrated that these aggressive schemes were threatening the freedom and independence of many European states and peoples. The 7th Congress of the Comintern highly appreciated the CPSU's and the Soviet Government's work in unmasking the fascist war-mongers and their sponsors: ``...The peace policy of the USSR has not only upset the plans of the imperialists to isolate the Soviet Union, but has laid the basis for its cooperation in the cause of the preservation of peace with the small states to whom war represents a special danger, by placing their independence in jeopardy, as well as with those governments which at the present moment are interested in the preservation of = peace."^^2^^
It was becoming more and more obvious to realistic bourgeois statesmen and politicians that serious political issues in Europe and the world could not successfully be solved without the participation of the USSR. They became more and more aware that the Soviet Union and its active peace policy were a major factor for peace. The fact that numerous capitalist states, in particular the USA, established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was also an eloquent confirmation of the USSR's increasing authority throughout the world.
_-_-_^^1^^Ercoli, The Fight for Peace, p. 35.
^^2^^The 7th Congress of the Communist International, p. 590.
34The US ruling circles were the most irreconcilable opponents of the Soviet state. They stubbornly refused to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR even when the leading capitalist powers had recognised it and were maintaining normal relations with it. It was only 16 years after the formation of the Soviet state that the USA took this step. But it was compelled to do so. Washington was still hoping that British diplomacy, skilfully hunting with the hounds and running with the fox, would be able to make an agreement with the German and Italian fascist dictators to organise an anti-Soviet bloc in the form of the "four-power pact''. The US Government therefore approved of the idea of concluding this pact. As the Italian Ambassador in Moscow commented to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs during talks on April 29, 1933, "The US Department of State has informed the Italian Ambassador that the American Government has no objection to the four-power pact and is, on the contrary, sympathetically following the negotiations. It cannot, however, interfere with them or take any part in solving European problems in general''. This, of course, formed a substantial handicap for Soviet diplomacy in its drive against the pact. The Soviet Government nevertheless continued this struggle throughout 1933.
The Soviet Union was internationally recognised for its consistent fight on the cardinal issue of "war or peace''. The USSR could no longer be ignored. This was precisely why the US Government decided to review its attitude towards the socialist Soviet state. The policy of non-recognition had not arisen from some fortuitous combination of unfavourable events. It had not been caused by the considerable material claims against the Soviet Government, connected with revolutionary legislation. It was exclusively a matter of principle: America "was essentially continuing the fight proclaimed by the whole capitalist world after the October Revolution against the Soviet system whose goal was to create a socialist society. It was, in fact, an onslaught against the peaceful coexistence of two = systems".^^1^^
The US Government's decision to reconsider its policy of non-recognition of the USSR was therefore a sign of the times.
By the end of 1933, the USA could no longer ignore the fact that Germany and Japan constituted a threat to itself. American interests in the Far East were particularly sensitive to the Japanese policy of aggression. The US Government was thus compelled to _-_-_
^^1^^M. M. Litvinov, The USSR in the Struggle for Peace, = Moscow, 1934, p. 14 (in Russian).
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 2* 35 establish contact with the USSR on questions of the Far Eastern policy.This change in US policy towards the USSR was explained in the memoirs of Gordell Hull, the Secretary of State: ``The world is moving into a dangerous period both in Europe and in Asia. Russia could be a great help in stabilizing this situation as time goes on and peace becomes more and more = threatened.''^^1^^
The US Government also had to reckon with the powerful movement to normalise relations with the USSR which developed in the USA during 1932 and 1933 and was supported by business circles. The latter were anxious to restore normal relations in order to improve Soviet-American economic co-operation and trade. A practical solution to the problem was only found under the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. On October 10, 1933, in a message to M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, he expressed his readiness to begin negotiations to normalise relations between the USA and = the USSR.^^2^^
On October 19, 1933, Kalinin replied that the abnormal relations between the USSR and the USA not only harmed the interests of the two states, but also the international situation in general. Kalinin also reported that the Soviet side had accepted the American proposal and that Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had been assigned to conduct the = talks.^^3^^ The negotiations were summed up in letters exchanged between Litvinov and Roosevelt on November 16, = 1933.^^4^^ They expressed the hope that "the relations now established between our nations will ever remain normal and friendly and our peoples will hence be able to co-operate to their mutual benefit and for the sake of peace throughout the = world".^^5^^
The establishment of normal Soviet-US relations was thus summarised in the report of the CC CPSU to the 17th Party Congress: "There is no doubt that this event is of the most profound significance for the whole system of international relations. For one thing, it increases the chances for preserving peace, improves relations between the two countries, strengthens trade ties between them and creates a basis for mutual cooperation. Moreover, it is a landmark between the old and the new; _-_-_
^^1^^The Memoirs of Cordett Hull, New York, 1948, Vol. I, p. 297.
^^2^^Soviet-American Relations, 1919--1933, Moscow, 1934, p. 76 (in Russian).
^^3^^Ibid.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 77.
^^5^^Ibid.
36 between the time when the USA was considered in various countries to be the stronghold of anti-Sovietism, and the new era with this stronghold voluntarily removed from the path of mutual benefit".^^1^^The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA furthered the development of comprehensive ties between the two countries. The necessary legal basis was established for developing trade and economic relations, and in November 1934, consular relations were set up. At the same time, the development of economic links and trade was opposed by reactionary circles backed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a critic of Soviet-American co-operation. Likewise the new US Ambassador in Moscow William C. Bullitt followed this policy line of the State Department towards the Soviet Union. An illustration of this is his suggestion to introduce a discriminatory procedure for Soviet citizens travelling to the USA. Bullitt suggested that Soviet citizens should provide evidence that they were not members of the Communist = Party.^^2^^
Trade and economic relations were particularly affected by this opposition to developing links between the two countries. This was clearly shown during Soviet-American negotiations to abolish mutual financial claims. These talks.lasted over a year and were broken off in January 1935 on the initiative of the American = side.^^3^^ In 1935 and 1936, the development of relations between the USA and the USSR was impeded, despite the willingness of the Soviet Government. The US Government refused to base trade and economic relations with the USSR on the most-favoured-nation treatment principle. Consequently, the Soviet-American trade agreement signed on July 13, 1935, failed to create the necessary conditions to expand mutual trade relations.
The refusal to allocate credits, and the discriminatory procedure vis-\`a-vis Soviet imports into the USA led to the sharp curtailment of Soviet-American trade. Thus, the total value of Soviet imports from the USA in 1934 was only 17 million = rubles.^^4^^
The Soviet Government, however, continued making every effort to find a basis for co-operation with the USA, with the object of maintaining and fortifying peace. Thus, a Soviet note sent to the _-_-_
^^1^^The 17th Congress of the CPSU, p. 14.
^^2^^Foreign Relations of the United States. = The Soviet Union 1933--1939, Washington, 1952, pp. 246--47.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVIII, p. 61.
^^4^^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVII, p. 7
37 US Ambassador in Moscow on August 27, 1935, said that the Soviet Government "is striving to further develop friendly cooperation between the USSR and the United States of America, which is in the interest of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States of America and of such vital significance for world peace''.^^1^^Only after prolonged talks, concluded in August 1937 with the exchange of notes, was an agreement reached between the USSR and the USA, which provided for their trade relations to be based on the unconditional and unlimited most-favoured-nation treatment principle. This opened up broad prospects for expanding Soviet-American trade and economic relations.
The Soviet people's great achievements in industry and agriculture during the period of the two five-year plans and also the USSR's active drive to safeguard peace won the admiration of the American people. These feelings became particularly plain when Chkalov, Baidukov and Belyakov made the heroic non-stop flight to America across the North Pole in the summer of 1937. Ordinary Americans greeted the Soviet pilots with a storm of enthusiasm. At a meeting held in New York on the occasion, Chkalov declared that he and his fellow pilots had brought greetings and friendship to America from 170 million Soviet people. The Soviet pilots received a telegram of greetings from President Roosevelt and were subsequently received by him.
However, US politics was strongly influenced by opponents to Soviet-American co-operation for the cause of peace against aggression. Using their demands for non-intervention in European affairs as a cover, and also shielded by the US Neutrality Act passed by the Congress in 1935, the American ruling circles stood aside while the fascist powers committed aggressive acts against other countries and prepared a war for the redivision of the world.
The maintenance and development of friendly relations with the countries of the East, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, was a victory for Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. A visit to Turkey by Marshal K. Y. Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defence, and L. M. Karakhan, late in 1933, further enhanced Soviet-Turkish relations. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Spanish Republic was an event of great international significance. In 1933--1935 many states, including Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Belgium and Colombia, established _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., Vol. XVIII, pp. 476--77.
38 diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This was convincing evidence of the USSR's growing role in international relations. __ALPHA_LVL2__ Soviet Proposals for Strengthening PeaceThe Soviet state had always considered disarmament to be the best means of reinforcing peace. It therefore submitted its draft for a general and complete disarmament to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. This, however, was rejected by the leading capitalist powers. The Soviet Government then made new efforts to ensure security: on February 6, 1933, it submitted a draft declaration on the definition of an aggressor to the Geneva Conference.
The acceptance of this convention would have formed an enormous obstacle for any state intending to attack another. The Soviet declaration assumed that the most important question was who first started using force. It considered the question of whether the armed aggression had been committed with or without a declaration of war to be immaterial.
Clause~1 of the declaration contained a clear-cut definition of an aggressor: a state was an aggressor if it declared war on another state; if, even without declaring war, its armed forces invaded or bombed the territory of another state, or attacked the other state's ships or mounted a naval blockade of the other country. Clause~2 was also of special importance:
``No considerations whatsoever of a political, strategic or economic nature, including the desire to exploit natural resources or to obtain any sort of advantages or privileges on the territory of another state, nor references to considerable capital investments or other special interests in a given state, nor to the alleged absence of certain attributes of state organisation in the case of a given country, shall be accepted as justification for = aggression...."^^1^^ The declaration also listed over 16 of the most typical reasons which could not serve to justify = aggression.^^2^^
It was in the vital interests of all peoples to accept the Soviet draft convention. It could have and would have been a new instrument in the struggle of all peace-loving forces to deliver mankind _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol.~XVI, p.~81.
^^2^^Ibid.
39 from the threat of bloody conflict and to consolidate international security.However, the Soviet draft met with an icy reception from the leading capitalist states, Britain playing the main role in its defeat. The British delegate at the conference took the initiative in criticising the Soviet draft. Finally, the Western powers managed to forestall its immediate acceptance and in fact shelved it indefinitely under the pretext of handing it over to a committee of the League of Nations.
Despite this, the Soviet proposal made a great contribution to developing the movement for preserving peace by means of creating a situation which would exclude the possibility of aggression with impunity. The Soviet Union had offered peace-loving countries a means of safeguarding peace. World public opinion estimated this important step at its true worth; they named the declaration the Charter of the Freedom of Nations.
When the Soviet Union was finally convinced that there was no possibility of the declaration being accepted by the Disarmament Conference, it took new measures to achieve the same goal, though on a limited scale. It proposed a conference of countries neighbouring and contiguous with the Soviet Union in order to discuss its draft declaration on the definition of an aggressor. The proposal was originally made by the People's Commissar during a meeting with the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Juliusz Lukasiewicz, on April 19, = 1933.^^1^^ The object of this Soviet proposal was to strengthen peace and promote good-neighbourly relations. "Such an event,'' said the People's Commissar, "would have been another demonstration of the desire for peace of the USSR and its neighbours, and would have reinforced mutual trust among them. It would have been a reassuring factor in the present turbulent international situation, and would also have been an incentive to Geneva to accept our = proposal."^^2^^ The Polish Government, however, was negatively disposed to the Soviet proposal, since it was, at that time, pursuing a policy of rapprochement with fascist Germany. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government continued talks on the matter with other neighbouring states. Negotiations were also held in London in July 1933 during an international economic conference. The USSR's efforts were well rewarded: the convention on the definition of an aggressor was signed by Estonia, Latvia, Turkey, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Lithuania. When signing the convention, the Soviet Government declared that the USSR was "ready to sign a similar convention with any state independent of its geographical position _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVI, p. 832.
^^2^^Ibid.
[40] and existing = relations".^^1^^ Thus, the world was again shown the USSR's peaceful intentions and its sincere aspiration to promote peace by encouraging other states to join the convention. Later the convention was signed by Finland.The Soviet Government also continued its drive for peace, security, and international co-operation at the economic conference in London, where it submitted a new initiative. This time, the USSR put forward a broad programme, which included: 1) the normalisation of relations between the USSR and the capitalist countries on the basis of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, and 2) the development of peaceful economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the capitalist states.
On June 14, 1933, the Soviet delegation declared at a session of the conference that ..the USSR firmly and consistently adhered to the principle of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist = countries.^^2^^
Taking into account the capitalist countries' severe economic .situation arising from the world economic crisis and also their ruthless trade war for markets and sources of raw materials, the USSR proposed that a protocol be signed on economic non-aggression, on an economic truce and peaceful co-operation of states with different socio-economic = systems.^^3^^
The Soviet delegation also suggested the abolition of measures of an "economically aggressive and discriminatory nature, i.e. special taxes imposed on goods emanating from any one country, vetoes or special conditions imposed on the import from and export to any country, and trade boycotts of any country = whatsoever".^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid, p. 394.
^^2^^After the Second World War, on the initiative of the USSR the question of defining aggression was put to the UN and was discussed at the following sessions of the General Assembly: 5th (1950), 6th (1951), 7th (1952), 9th (1954) and 12th (1957). The matter was also taken up by the International Law Commission and special committees formed for this purpose (1953 and 1956). In 1968, the USSR again submitted this question for examination to the 22nd session of the General Assembly, which formed a Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. While this committee was in session, the Soviet Union submitted its draft which took into account the constructive proposals of a number of other countries.
On April 13, 1974, the text of the document defining aggression was unanimously approved after prolonged discussions by this special committee. In the autumn of 1974, it was submitted in the form of a Draft Definition of Aggression to the 29th session of the General Assembly for examination and approval. It was unanimously approved on December 14, 1974.
Thus, the Soviet initiative was crowned with success.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVI, pp. 343--48.
^^4^^Ibid, p. 349.
41The Soviet Government, confirming its readiness to develop economic co-operation with capitalist countries, declared that, provided it was granted the necessary credits, it was prepared to and "capable of placing orders abroad to the tune of about one thousand million dollars in the near = future".^^1^^
This constructive programme of peace and business co-operation made fascist Germany look especially ridiculous. Through a memorandum circulated at the conference by Hugenberg, the Minister of Economics, the Hitler Government urged the conference delegates to join forces to stamp out the revolution and do away with the internal dislocation originating in Russia, and laid claim to Russian territory for German = settlement.^^2^^
This programme of German fascism was an alarm signal for the peoples of Europe, since it was evidence of Hitler Germany's aggressive plans. However, ensuing events showed that the proposal to organise the capitalist states into a united anti-Soviet bloc was somewhat premature. The conference atmosphere was such that none of the delegates showed any inclination to support this nazi suggestion. Therefore, Berlin back-pedalled and ordered that the German memorandum be withdrawn, declaring it to be the personal creation of Hugenberg. German diplomacy had miscalculated by putting forward that notorious memorandum. The Soviet Union exposed the false manoeuvrings of imperialist diplomacy. Its proposal to expand and develop trade and economic relations between the Soviet state and capitalist countries was in the real interest of all countries and peoples and was therefore highly commended by public opinion throughout the world.
However, the development of trade and economic co-operation, though important, was not the only means of safeguarding peace and reinforcing the security of nations.
The Soviet state used other means and possibilities in its drive for peace. For example, it was 'to this end that it decided to make use of the international Disarmament Conference, long since forced into a blind alley. It proposed that the conference continue its work and undertake a search for other security measures and guarantees of peace for non-aggressive = states.^^3^^
In the light of the mounting tension, the Soviet Union proposed that the "conference (on disarmament---ed.) be turned into a _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p. 345.
^^2^^Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918--1945. Series~C. The Third Reich: First Phase, = Vol.~I, January-October 1933, Washington, 1957, p. 567.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVII, pp. 356--57.
42 permanent peace conference, to be convened at intervals''. The Soviet Government considered that such a conference "should be created to prevent war and its grave consequences. It should work out, develop and perfect methods of strenthening security, promptly respond to warnings of imminent war, to appeals for help, to SOS messages from threatened states and, at an opportune moment, to render the latter all possible help, whether it be of the moral, economic, financial or any other = sort".^^1^^However, this proposal also failed to win the support of the British, US, and other capitalist governments, who shelved it with the help of various procedural manipulations.
Guided in their foreign policy activity by the principle: "Don't wait for peace; fight for it'', the CPSU and the Soviet Government did everything in their power to isolate the aggressor, mercilessly tearing down the guises of those who provoked war, and exposing those who, while hypocritically sighing for peace, were in fact propagating non-resistance to the aggressor and were thereby playing into his hands and undermining the peoples' faith in their own powers to preserve peace. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government used every means at their disposal in this battle to save peace: their growing influence and prestige, diplomacy, the press, and radio. The world could only be spared a new war if all peace-loving forces united and fought for the common cause: this was the Soviet Union's message to the peoples of the world and to the governments of those countries who, for various reasons, were interested in safeguarding peace.
In order to rally all defenders of peace, the Soviet Union exposed the fascist lie that peace was being threatened by communism rather than fascism and war. The fascist aggressive powers, supported by imperialist reaction, had proclaimed themselves champions against communism.
The Party leadership and the Government, Soviet diplomacy and the pre^s tirelessly explained to the world that the great watershed of our time was not between communism and fascism, but between war and peace. On one side of the watershed stood those countries which advocated war, extolled aggression and ignored the League of Nations. On the other were the countries which desired peace and came out against war, and which endeavoured to consolidate peace on the basis of the League of Nations principles, i.e. collective security. The watershed crossed the entire world. Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy were attempting to activate all anti- _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., pp. 358--59.
43 war forces. It was then that the Soviet Government advanced the formula "peace is indivisible" which achieved recognition throughout the world. The theory was based on the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different socioeconomic systems. __ALPHA_LVL2__ The Soviet Programme for a System of CollectiveGeneral and complete disarmament, in the opinion of the Soviet state, was the absolute guarantee of peace. However, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government had to seek other ways of averting war and fascist aggression, since their proposal for general and complete disarmament had been rejected by the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and the arms race run by the fascist states was gathering momentum, increasing the threat of war. On December 12, 1933, the CC CPSU passed a resolution to fight for an effective system of collective security in Europe with the object of preserving peace and warding off = aggression.^^1^^ In setting this task, the Party and the Soviet state were proceeding from the principle that peace was indivisible and the need was to defend it on a collective basis. The Soviet Union did not consider this principle to" be in any way a product of idealism. On the contrary, it was a practical measure to ensure security for all nations. It was therefore as acceptable to those capitalist countries interested in keeping the peace as it was to the Soviet Union.
In line with the Central Committee's resolution, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs drew up proposals on the formation of a collective security system in Europe. On December 19, the Politbureau of the CC CPSU approved these proposals which suggested the following measures:
"1) The USSR agrees, under certain conditions, to join the League of Nations.
"2) The USSR does not object to the conclusion, within the League of Nations, of a regional agreement on mutual defence from German aggression.
"3) The USSR agrees that the following countries may be signatories to the agreement: Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, or some of _-_-_
^^1^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945 = in 12 vols., Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 283 (in Russian).
44 these countries, but that France and Poland are under obligation to sign."4) Negotiations on the precise definition of the commitments of a future convention on mutual defence can begin when France, as the initiator of the whole affair, submits a draft agreement.
"5) Independent of commitments to the agreement on mutual defence, signatories to the agreement must also pledge to render each other diplomatic, moral, and the possible material assistance in the event of a military attack not foreseen in the agreement itself, and also to exert appropriate influence on their press.'' In addition, paragraph 6 of these proposals listed changes in clauses 12 and 13 of the League Covenant which stipulated obligatory arbitration. Objections were also made to the second part of point 1 in clause 12 of the Covenant which sanctioned war to solve international disputes. Of special importance was also the demand for racial and national equality for all members of the League. This was in accord with one of the most important tenets of the Leninist doctrine on the national question. The concluding statement read: "The USSR will insist on the establishment of normal relations between itself and the rest of the League members or, at worst, that a resolution be included in the League Covenant or passed at a League meeting, proclaiming that all members of the League consider normal diplomatic relations restored among themselves and that they mutually recognise each = other.''^^1^^ This proposal was designed to improve relations among all the League member-states and thus substantially contribute to the strengthening of peace and international co-operation. These Soviet proposals, together with the proposal to the US Government in November 1933 to conclude a regional Pacific pact with the participation of Japan, the USA, the USSR, China and other = states,^^2^^ represented a whole peace programme based on the concept that peace is indivisible, and must be preserved and consolidated, on the principles of peaceful coexistence, and on the USSR's co-operation with capitalist countries to defend peace and organise collective security. The latter would provide everyone with equal rights and security and free them from the threat of attack by the aggressive powers.
In connection with this proposal the Soviet Government began negotiations with France on the conclusion of a multilateral regional pact of mutual assistance, which would subsequently be called the Eastern Pact. The USSR considered it advisable, to help _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVI, pp. 876--77.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVII, p. 659.
45 the matter's successful completion, to offer France the initiative of drawing up the draft of the Eastern Pact and submitting it for examination to the prospective signatories --- Belguim, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland.A new atmosphere had been created in the League of Nations, and was reflected in the changes in France's foreign policy, the breakaway of the aggressive powers --- Germany, Italy and lapan--- from the League, and the positive attitude of many member-nations towards the USSR's entry. The USSR therefore decided to join the League, with the intention of working to make it the focal point of all peace-loving forces interested in preserving peace by organising its collective defence from the encroachments of the aggressors. As another war was becoming an ever more tangible prospect, the USSR, guided by what Lenin had said about "the need to explain the real situation to everyone, and show the great secrecy in which war is engendered'', stepped up its fight for peace, unmasking the war-mongers and their accomplices.
After the exit of Japan and Germany, the League of Nations became strongly influenced by a group of states who stood by a position of safeguarding peace; the Soviet Government thus had high hopes of the League's positive role in the cause of peace. It was, however, under no illusions about the fact that some member-states still remained who were not interested in the effective organisation of peoples' security from aggression. An article published by Izvestia at the time, "The USSR in the Struggle for Peace'', was a convincing illustration of this: it noted that the Soviet Government and peoples "are fully aware that not all the League of Nations' member-states would really fight to safeguard peace. The Soviet Union is joining the League precisely in order to support those powers who will fight to safeguard and = consolidate peace."^^1^^
On September 15, 1934, Moscow received an invitation on behalf of 30 states for the USSR to join the League of Nations. The Soviet Government, "whose basic foreign policy goal is to organise and strengthen peace, and which is always responsive to suggestions for international co-operation in the interests of peace'', read the Soviet reply, "is ready to join the League of Nations, to occupy a fitting place in it, and to accept the ensuing international commitments. The USSR accepts no responsibility for any decisions _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, September 20, 1934.
46 taken by the League of Nations before its = entry''.^^1^^ On September 18, the USSR was accepted into the League and received a permanent place in the League Council.The Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations considerably enhanced the latter's authority; nations of the world began to believe that it would make a decisive contribution to the cause of peace by means of creating a collective security system.
The shameless propaganda of the German nazis, who were calling for revenge, gave rise to grave alarm in France, Germany's close neighbour which was already familiar with the burden of the German military machine. France's position was further complicated by Mussolini's declaration that he was aspiring to establish Italy's complete dominion over the Mediterranean, "Mare nostrum" (Our Sea).
France was thus in the unpleasant predicament of being confronted by two fascist powers, Germany being the most ominous. Paris therefore began to think seriously about protecting the country from possible German fascist aggression. The easiest way was to join forces with the Soviet Union which, in 1933, was the country with a powerful military and economic potential. The significance of rapprochement with the USSR for France's security was grasped by leading French politicians and statesmen such as Paul-Boncour, Edouard Herriot, Jean Louis Barthou, Pierre Cot and others. In late 1933, when Paul-Boncour was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco-Soviet relations took a decisive turn towards rapprochement. The process was further developed the following year when Jean Louis Barthou took over as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his parliamentary speech of May 1934, Barthou declared that French policy was to strive for a sincere rapprochement with the USSR. His speech was highly appraised in the Soviet = press.^^2^^
In the autumn of 1933, after Germany had started overt rearmament and declared her territorial claims, Paris began to seriously ponder the question of how France's international position could be reinforced, and whether there was a possibility of concluding an alliance with the Soviet Union to defend themselves against Hitler Germany. Paul-Boncour repeatedly discussed this _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, Vol. Ill (1925--1934), Moscow, 1945, Doc. 261 (in Russian).
^^2^^Pravda, May 28, 1934. Leading article "Franco-Soviet Relations and the Struggle for Peace".
47 matter with V. S. Dovgalevsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris. In these talks, he stressed the desirability of supplementing the Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the Convention on the Definition of Aggression with a treaty of mutual assistance. PaulBoncour also expressed this idea in a talk with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on October 31, 1933. He emphasised that the USSR and France must start thinking about counter-measures against fascist Germany's rearmament and preparations for a war, i.e. a treaty of mutual assistance.Seriously concerned about the future of peace and at the danger of fascist aggression in Europe, the Soviet Government was favourably disposed towards Paul-Boncour's idea, but considered that a solution to the question of security should be sought on a broader basis, involving the whole of Europe. On December 28, Dovgalevsky passed to Paul-Boncour the Soviet proposals, adopted by the CC CPSU Politbureau on December 19, on the question of concluding a regional pact of mutual assistance in the event of aggression. Paul-Boncour approved of such a pact and even undertook to draw up an appropriate draft treaty.
However, some extremely influential anti-Soviet, pro-German forces suddenly stepped in, and, to the detriment of the French national interest, managed to secure the suspension of the Soviet-French negotiations on the pact, and also freeze Franco-Soviet rapprochement.
In February 1934, a new government took over in France, with Jean Louis Barthou as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had a clear conception of the German threat to France and held the USSR's role as a peace factor in high esteem, and was therefore an active proponent of Franco-Soviet rapprochement. Nevertheless, talks on the pact of mutual assistance were not immediately resumed. Only on April 20, 1934, did Barthou report that the government had instructed him to continue negotiating the pact with the USSR on the basis of Paul-Boncour's proposals.
In order to avoid German reproaches about the pact being designed to ``isolate'' Germany, the French Government simultaneously proposed that the latter should be a signatory to the pact. Barthou also wanted to supplement the Locarno Agreements of 1925 with new clauses which would take the Soviet proposals into account. This was the draft of the so-called Eastern Locarno or the Eastern Pact. It was a point of discussion in negotiations between France and the USSR during May and June 1934.
On June 27, 1934, the French Government handed the draft to Britain. The British ruling circles did not risk open opposition to 48 the pact, but they gradually did all they could to inhibit its conclusion.
The British Government, using its pet tactics of operating behind the scenes, declared that it was prepared to support such a pact on condition that the guarantees mutually offered between France and the Soviet Union be extended to Germany. This meant that Germany would have to become a signatory to the pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and France. Moreover, London was demanding that France agree to German rearmament.
The British Foreign Office asserted that Germany's agreement to the proposed Eastern Locarno would inevitably depend on whether some sort of settlement could be achieved in the matter of rearmament. Charles Corbin, the French Ambassador in London, described the British position in relation to the Eastern Pact thus: The British at first expressed two kinds of objections to the French proposals. The first objection boiled down to the fact that the British wanted to link the question of the pact with that of rearmament. They hinted that they would be ready to support the proposed pact if France made certain concessions in the area of Germany's rearmament.
In order to attain British concurrence with the Eastern Pact, the Soviet Government informed the Britisli Government on July 16, 1934, that it did not object to Germany's inclusion in the Franco-Soviet guarantee agreement and agreed that both French and Soviet guarantees should be extended to = Germany.^^1^^
On July 18, 1934, the Soviet Ambassador, on the instruction of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, informed the French Foreign Minister that the USSR had no objection to Germany's inclusion in the Eastern = Pact.^^2^^ Thus, the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe were to become signatories to the pact: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, the Soviet Union, France, the Baltic states, and Finland. They would pledge to mutually guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers, to render assistance to a signatory of the pact subject to attack, and to refuse any help to the aggressive state. Apart from this treaty, a separate pact of mutual assistance was planned between France and the USSR. France would thus become guarantor of the Eastern Pact and the Soviet Union, together with Britain and Italy, guarantor of the 1925 Locarno Pact. The conclusion of the two pacts (the Eastern and the Franco-Soviet) would allow the anti-Soviet trend of _-_-_
^^1^^International Affairs, 1963, No.~6, p.~115.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVII, p. 479.
49 the Locarno Agreements to be removed and permit the organisation in Europe of a system for collective defence of peace. The draft also envisaged the USSR's entry into the League of Nations.The British Government, using delaying tactics, i.e. advancing different conditions, was striving to bury the Eastern Pact, and to keep France from concluding a bilateral Franco-Soviet military alliance.^^1^^
The Soviet Government cherished no illusions that the Hitler Government would agree to sign the Eastern Pact, since the latter would restrict its freedom to unleash aggression.
Hitler diplomacy was acting very cautiously, having adopted the Foreign Office tactics of biding one's time and manoeuvring. Despite the fact that Berlin received the draft of the Eastern Pact in July, it was September 10, before it gave an answer. A German memorandum, dated September 8, and handed to the British Government, said that the German Government "cannot participate in any new international systems of security until other powers consider it possible to argue against Germany's equality in rearmament''. It said further that Germany was not interested in Soviet and French guarantees and opposed the conclusion of a separate agreement between France and the USSR. Thus, fascist diplomacy deftly concealed its refusal to sign the Eastern Pact behind a smokescreen of references to Germany's inequality in the field of rearmament.
Extensively using threats, blackmail, lies and bluff, the Hitlerites conducted a noisy campaign to promote the idea of bilateral agreements. Hitler proposed the conclusion of such treaties to France, Poland and other neighbouring countries with the exception of Lithuania.
One of the most important tasks of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy was to expose the real aims behind the fascist governments' false professions of peace and their sudden ``adherence'' to bilateral non-aggression pacts. "The fact is,'' said Litvinov, "that bilateral non-aggression pacts are not always conducive to peace. The most deliberately aggressive state can conclude non-aggression pacts with certain states so as to give itself a free rein and to secure its rear or flanks in order to commit acts of aggression against other states. We know of examples where a state, stubbornly refusing to conclude a non-aggression pact with one state, wishes, _-_-_
^^1^^Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919--1939, = Second Series, Vol. VI. p. 806.
50 with the same pertinacity, to thrust one onto another neighbouring state, acting on the principle of divide and = rule."^^1^^Later, in connection with the pacts proposed by Berlin, the People's Commissar noted that the Soviet Union would earlier have considered such pacts desirable and would probably consider them acceptable in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations on the pact of mutual assistance. But insofar as the idea of bilateral pacts is now being countered against the mutual assistance pact, a negative position must be taken on the matter.
The military fascist Government of Poland was one of the first to accept this Trojan Horse of Hitlerite diplomacy: it agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany in the form of a declaration which was signed on January 26, 1934. This German-Polish pact was the first big success for Hitler diplomacy. It marked the beginning of the thaw in Germany's foreign policy isolation, into which she had been thrust the moment the nazis had seized power. This demonstration of ``peaceful'' intentions cost Hitler nothing and did not involve him in any commitment to Poland, since the pact did not contain Germany's formal recognition of Poland's Western frontier. Consequently, the pact did not prevent Germany from making territorial claims on Poland. At the same time, the pact led to a serious weakening of the French system of alliances in the East, and damaged France's foreign policy positions. Moreover, the pact sparked off the chain reaction of concluding by Hitler Germany bilateral pacts with other neighbouring states, envisaged by Hitler diplomacy as a weapon to undermine the efforts of the USSR, France and all peace-loving forces which were striving to organise collective security in Europe. Not without reason, the fascists saw collective security as the major stumbling-block to their aggressive plans.
Thus, "Hitler needed this pact,'' says the Falsifiers of History, "as a means of disrupting the ranks of the adherents of collective security and as an example to show that what Europe needed was not collective security but bilateral agreements. This enabled the German aggressor to decide for himself with whom and when to conclude agreements, and whom and when to attack. The German-Polish pact undoubtedly constituted the first serious breach in the edifice of collective = security."^^2^^
The Hitlerites used the pact to extend the web of their intrigues. The mounting threats to the Czechoslovak frontiers and _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. III, p. 723.
^^2^^Falsifiers of History = (Historical Survey), Moscow, 1951, p. 20.
51 Czechoslovakia's independence, increased German aggressiveness, and the aggravation of the Austrian problem were the immediate outcome of the = pact.^^1^^After signing the pact with Germany, Poland stepped up her activities to sabotage and undermine the Eastern Pact. A Polish memorandum sent to Paris on September 27, 1934, stated that Poland could only sign the Eastern Pact if Germany did likewise. Moreover, Poland declared that she refused to accept any kind of commitment vis-a-vis Lithuania and Czechoslovakia and preferred bilateral agreements.
Having found an ally in the person of the Polish Government, the Hitlerites intensified their subversive activity. They stopped at nothing ---not even assassination ---to prevent the formation of a collective security system based on the united efforts of all states. Their first victim was Jean Louis Barthou.
The removal of Barthou seriously weakened the supporters of the Eastern Pact and co-operation with the USSR within the French Government.
When the Flandin Government took over, with Pierre Laval as Minister of Foreign Affairs, government circles supporting Franco-Soviet rapprochement were further weakened and those in favour of collusion with Germany went from strength to strength. Laval made no secret of the fact that he was a staunch supporter of collusion with fascist Germany. He considered that France should make use of the Eastern Pact negotiations to exert pressure on Hitler, compelling him to enter an agreement with France. According to Laval this could be regarded as the quest for rapprochement with Germany via Moscow. France thus became an extremely unreliable partner in the Soviet Union's drive for collective security in Europe.
To put a stop to Laval's manoeuvrings, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs suggested that a Soviet-French protocol be signed, stating that "each of the two states undertakes not to conclude any political agreements with Germany without a preliminary consultation with the other Government" and to inform each other of their talks with German representatives and of all political proposals "which will be made by Germany in any way whatever''. After negotiating the matter, the two countries confirmed the text of the agreement, which was signed on December 5, _-_-_
^^1^^Ercoli, The Fight far Peace, p. 28.
52 1934.^^1^^ Czechoslovakia also signed the agreement shortly afterwards.Laval subsequently began to manoeuvre and drag out the negotiations for the Eastern Pact. His attitude to the pact determined, to a considerable extent, the French Government's position on this question. The British Foreign Office took advantage of Laval's appointment to hasten the burial of the Eastern Pact and to resume bilateral talks with Hitler Germany. During the Anglo-French talks which took place in London on February 1-3, 1935, the British Government persistently tried to dissuade France from concluding the Eastern Pact. The British suggested that, in its place, a treaty should be concluded which involved no other commitment than that of consultation. London was thereby hoping to do away with the draft of the treaty, which created a firm basis for collectively preserving peace, and was, for that reason, rejected by Hitler.
In the communique summing up the results of the London talks, London and Paris made the conclusion of the Eastern Pact dependent on the achievement of "a general settlement" with Germany which would include the "delicate matter" of Germany's full = rearmament.^^2^^ Actually this was a rejection of a pact of mutual assistance.
Perturbed by this turn of events, the Soviet Government, on February 17, instructed its Ambassador in London to inform the British Government that "Soviet public is inclined to hold Britain responsible for Germany's stubborn opposition to an East European security = system".^^3^^
On February 20, in order to reaffirm its immutable position on the Eastern Pact issue, the Soviet Government handed the British and French governments an official declaration stressing the urgency and importance of this pact. It noted, specifically, that "the only means of countering the real imminent danger of a new armed clash among the nations is a system of regional pacts, ensuring mutual assistance among those states which are sincerely striving to avert this = danger''.^^4^^ At the same time, the Soviet Government declared that the new collective security schemes advanced by various parties were either deliberately or unwittingly aimed at wrecking the regional pacts, now ready for signing. They _-_-_
^^1^^International Affairs, No.~7, 1963, p. 121.
^^2^^Ibid., No.~8, 1963, p. 133.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 135.
^^4^^Ibid.
53 offered nothing except an excuse for prolonged, fruitless international discussion, of use only to those countries opposed to effective security in Europe.The Soviet Government, exposing the manoeuvres of the enemies of collective security, endeavoured to speed up the conclusion of the Eastern Pact talks. It considered the pact to be a firm basis for uniting peace-loving states to resist aggression. For this reason, the Soviet Government decided to remind Eden, during his 1935 Moscow visit, that the USSR was not thinking of abandoning the treaty of mutual assistance and objected to the conclusion of the non-aggression treaty, then proposed by Hitler.
"Where is the guarantee,'' it asked, "that the German Government, which violates its international obligations so easily, will observe a non-aggression pact? There is no guarantee whatever. We cannot therefore be satisfied with a non-aggression pact with Germany alone. Only an Eastern Pact of mutual assistance is such a = guarantee."^^1^^
The Soviet Government repeated once more that the USSR would like Germany to sign the Eastern Pact, since it wanted friendly relations with Germany as well. As regards the British-supported German demand for rearmament, under the guise of a demand for ``equality'', the Soviet Government declared to Eden that "at the present moment, we have to take measures to impede Germany's rearmament'', because the USSR had "not the slightest doubt that Germany is aggressive...."
The USSR tirelessly warned the Western powers that their policy of connivance at Germany's rearmament could back-fire against them. On March 28, Litvinov clearly expressed this idea in a conversation with Eden during the latter's Moscow visit: ``With expansion in the East uppermost in Hitler's mind,'' he stressed, "Hitler wants the Western states to fall for the bait and get them to sanction his rearmament. When these arms reach the level desired by Hitler, then shots can be fired in quite another = direction."^^2^^
On March 29, Eden was received by Stalin and Molotov. During their talks, Stalin noted that Europe had become extremely anxious because Germany "was openly breaking international agreements before everyone's = eyes".^^3^^
Speaking of the Soviet Union's attitude to Germany, Stalin declared that "we are not striving to isolate Germany" or to _-_-_
^^1^^International Affairs, No.~8, 1963, p. 138.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVIII, p. 235.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 248.
54 surround her. "On the contrary,'' he stressed, "we want to live in friendship with Germany.'' Stalin continued further: ``This nation could not be held back for long by the chains of the Versailles Treaty. Sooner or later the German people had to break free from the Versailles chains.'' The Soviet Union did not have any hand in Versailles. "However, the forms and circumstances of this liberation from Versailles are such that could cause alarm,'' Stalin emphasised in his talks with Eden. "If complications are to be avoided there is need for a safeguard; the Eastern Pact is such a safeguard."^^1^^ Here, Stalin stressed Britain's important role in keeping the peace and barring the aggressor's way. Eden remarked that the USSR occupied a large area of the map, whereas Britain was but a small island. Stalin looked at Britain and said: ``It is indeed a small island, but a lot depends on it. If this little island told Germany: 'I shall give you neither money, nor raw materials, nor metal', then peace in Europe would be guaranteed.''^^2^^The communiqu\'e signed in Moscow summed up the results of this visit and contained the two countries' pledges to pursue a policy of peace and collective security. It was a result of the Soviet Union's active and consistent foreign policy. The British side, however, showed no inclinations to realise these pledges.
Ensuing events showed that it was merely a tactical move by British diplomacy whose intention was to exert pressure on Hitler Germany, inhibit Franco-Soviet = rapprochement,^^3^^ and also assuage British public opinion which was demanding improved relations with the USSR.
Germany's overt war preparations .were also causing alarm in that section of the ruling circles which was not so blinded by anti-communism and anti-Sovietism as to be incapable of realistically judging the gravity of the German threat. This is illustrated by the views of Alfred Duff Cooper, the British Minister of War, expressed in a talk with I. M. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, on February 5, 1936. Cooper said: ``Any concession to Germany at the present moment can only boost Hitler's aggressiveness and the basic problem is the creation of a firm front of collective security.'' But Cooper also realised that his views on this matter did not reflect the government's opinion, and therefore gave a negative answer to the Ambassador's question on the possibility of concluding a treaty of mutual assistance between the _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p. 249.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 248.
^^3^^V. I. Popov, Soviet-British Diplomatic Relations (1929--1939), = p. 191.
55 USSR and Britain. He asserted that "British public opinion is not yet ready for a step of this kind''.^^1^^The British Government, extremely hostile to the Soviet socialist state, turned a deaf ear to the USSR's grave warnings, made on the highest level during the talks between Stalin and Eden in 1935. It did not revise its negative attitude' towards the creation of a collective security system in Europe. Moreover, it continued its former policy of helping Hitler in his drive to prevent the conclusion of the Eastern Pact, in order to persuade the fascist dictator to come to an agreement with Britain. Thus, a considerable part of the responsibility for the Eastern Pact's failure rested with Britain. One must add that the lessons of the Second World War were not lost on Eden; in his memoirs, he is compelled to admit, in retrospect, that the conclusion of the Eastern Pact could have staved off Hitler aggression against Czechoslovakia and = excluded Munich.^^2^^ Against the country's national interests, the British Government continued its former course of working towards a broad Anglo-German agreement. The Anglo-German Navy Agreement of June 18, 1935, was one of the first results of this policy.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ Soviet Treaties of Mutual AssistanceThe Eastern Pact thus became an impossibility, owing to German and Polish refusals to take part and also Britain's intrigues to frustrate its conclusion. The Soviet Government was obliged to take new steps to promote the organisation of collective security. With this end in view, it suggested to Paris that they'return to the original 1933 draft, i.e. that they begin to create collective security in Europe with a Soviet-French treaty of mutual assistance as the starting point. The USSR was then firmly convinced that "only pacts of mutual assistance serve the cause of maintaining peace'', since all states interested in supporting peace could participate in them. In the presence of such a pact no one "could regard himself as surrounded by or exposed to any kind of danger, as long as he shared the peaceful aspirations of his co-signatories''^^3^^.
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, = Vol. XIX. Moscow, 1974, p. 375.
^^2^^A. Eden, Memoirs, The Reckoning, London, 1961, p. 171.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVII, p. 430.
56At that time, France was faced with the mounting threat of aggression from fascist Germany which had currently introduced universal military service and set about creating an air force. The French Government was therefore compelled, after some hesitation, to sign a treaty of mutual assistance on May 2, 1935.
In the protocol signed on the conclusion of the treaty the USSR and France declared that, as earlier, they considered it desirable to conclude a regional collective security pact.
The Soviet-French pact stated that if one of its signatories was threatened with attack by any European state, then France and the USSR must immediately consult to take measures in line with clause 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, which envisaged mutual guarantees of the territories of the League's member-states.
Clause 2 of the pact stipulated that if either France or the USSR were subject to an unprovoked attack from any European state, then the contracting parties would render each other immediate assistance and support, acting in conformity with clause 16 of the Covenant, which provided for measures of a military nature.
Clause 4 of the pact stated that the treaty should not be interpreted as either limiting the obligations of the League of Nations or of the USSR and France as its members. The term of the treaty was fixed as 5 years.
The parties declared in the protocol signed on the conclusion of the treaty that they would fulfil their treaty obligations even in the event of the League Council failing to pass the corresponding resolution. It was also stipulated that the obligation to assist only applied in the event of an attack on the negotiating party's own territory.
The signing of the Soviet-French Mutual Assistance Pact was an important landmark in world affairs of the mid-thirties. It boosted the cause of peace in Europe and also enhanced France's military-strategic position in relation to the Hitler Reich which was now faced with the prospect of fighting a war on two fronts if Germany attacked eith'er France or the USSR.
The pact did not, however, provide for the mutual assistance commitments to take effect automatically, which undoubtedly detracted from its value. Another negative feature of the pact was that no military convention was simultaneously concluded to incorporate the articles of the pact as concrete commitments on the forms, conditions and scale of military assistance. These short-comings were due to the activities of Laval who admitted that he 57 had managed to reduce the Soviet-French pact of mutual assistance to the minimum by doing his utmost to limit the volume of commitments on mutual assistance and had not given up the idea of reaching agreement with Hitler.
If France, like the USSR, had based her policies concerning European security on the Soviet-French pact, the latter could have played an important role in the organisation of collective security in Europe.
The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed shortly afterwards, seemed to confirm that the Franco-Soviet pact had laid a firm basis for the organisation of European security. In fact, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty differed from the Franco-Soviet one by one condition which was stated in point 2 of the protocol signed at the conclusion of the treaty. "At the same time, both governments,'' it read, "recognise that the obligations of mutual assistance will apply between them only in as far as, in the presence of conditions envisaged in the present treaty, assistance to the Party subject to an attack is rendered by = France.''^^1^^ Beneš demanded that this highly significant reservation be included in the protocol. The instructions from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its ambassadors said, ``He (Beneš---author) inserted a phrase into the text which stipulated that the obligations should apply to us only if they applied to France. He thereby wished to prevent the pact from taking automatic = effect".^^2^^ Therefore, having made French assistance a necessary and preliminary condition for Soviet help, Beneš and the bourgeois circles supporting him had limited the possibility of Soviet help to Czechoslovakia in good time. The Soviet Government welcomed the pact as the starting point of a new stage in the Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, despite the Czechoslovak Government's obvious inconsistency during the pact negotiations.
The Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance were the realisation of those peace-strengthening measures contained in the resolution of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU of December 19, 1933. Their conclusion played a major role in reinforcing the positions of peace-loving states who had come forward to organise a collective rebuff to the aggressor. These two treaties concluded by the Soviet Union were in accord with the main line of development of the USSR's peace policy whose foundations were laid by Lenin. They were important foreign policy _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVIII, p. 336.
^^2^^Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918--1939. = Collection of Articles, Moscow, 1959, p. 366 (in Russian).
58 acts aimed at "rallying all the forces we can possibly attract, at the present moment, into active defence of peace''.^^1^^These treaties "strengthened the military-strategic positions of their signatories and compelled fascist Germany to reckon with the probability of war on two fronts in the event of her aggressive acts against either of the = countries''.^^2^^ Finally, another significant factor was that these pacts boosted the confidence of the medium and small states in the possibility of preserving peace and security in Europe by way of concluding regional pacts of mutual assistance.
In the thirties, Soviet foreign policy was largely concerned with Europe, since the latter was the focal point of the contradictions of the imperialist powers and the breeding grounds of war.
At the same time, the USSR considered that keeping peace in Asia was also extremely important: Japanese aggression, encouraged by the fact that the leading Western powers were turning a blind eye, was taking on threatening proportions. The Soviet Union therefore proposed that a regional Pacific pact be concluded in order to wreck the predatory schemes of Japanese militarism by a collective effort. The USA, the USSR, China and Japan were to be the possible participants in this pact. It could be a pact of non-aggression and non-rendering assistance to the aggressor. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, presented this proposal in talks with President Roosevelt on November 16, 1933. According to Litvinov, Roosevelt approved the idea of a Pacific pact and immediately instructed Bullitt to deal with the matter and make a report to = him.^^3^^ The Soviet Government then expressed the wish that the US Government put forward the proposal to conclude the pact, hoping that this might facilitate its realisation. The USA suggested that Britain, France and Holland also participate in the pact, in addition to those countries already mentioned. However, the matter came to a full stop --- partly the work of Bullitt, an implacable opponent of co-operation with the Soviet Union. The US Government refused to submit this proposal to the governments of the prospective signatories. The British Government, indulgent towards Japanese aggression, was quick to take advantage of the USA's evasive position on this issue. London avoided giving a plain answer to the Soviet proposal on a Pacific pact of regional security. As for the USA, instead of actively supporting the pact, it embarked on a naval arms race with Japan (for every _-_-_
^^1^^Ercoli, The Fight for Peace, p. 59.
^^2^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945, = Vol. 1, p. 304.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVIII, p. 659.
59 Japanese vessel, the USA began to build three), convinced that Japan would not endure the financial burden and would then be willing to come to terms with America.From November 1933 to mid-1937, the USSR made repeated attempts to persuade the Western powers to conclude this regional pact. The Soviet Government also appealed to the Chinese Government in the hope that it may show an active interest in the matter. Thus, in the talks with the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow on March 11, 1937, Litvinov remarked that the only way of ending the lapanese aggression in China and ensuring peace in the Far East was to conclude a regional Pacific pact. He assured the Ambassador that the USSR was favourably disposed to the idea of such a pact. Therefore, said the People's Commissar, the main task was to gain American and British = concurrence.^^1^^
However, the Kuomintang Government in Nanking was too busy seeking ways of colluding with the Japanese aggressors to bother with organising a collective rebuff to aggression. It therefore talked its way out of the matter. By mid-1937, the question of concluding a Pacific pact finally came to a dead end owing to the US Government's negative attitude to it. "People don't trust pacts,'' declared the US President to the Soviet Ambassador in late June 1937; the only effective guarantee, he said, was a powerful = navy.^^2^^ So, despite all the USSR's efforts, a united force for collectively defending peace was not achieved in the Far East.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The USSR's Activities in the League of NationsThe pernicious effects of the policy of connivance with the aggressive powers rapidly became evident. The actions of the Hitler government were particularly provocative: in March 1935, regardless of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, it introduced universal military service. An extraordinary session of the league of Nations, held in April 1935, discussed these provocative acts by the Hitlerites.
During this discussion, the Soviet representative decisively condemned Germany's actions, stressing that he was speaking on behalf of a country which, as well as playing no part in Versailles, _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = Vol. IX, p. 43.
^^2^^ Ibid.
60 had never concealed its negative attitude to the treaty as a whole, and, in particular, to Germany's disarmament. The USSR nevertheless regarded the unilateral renunciation of this treaty as dangerous and improper. Therefore, for the Soviet Union and all other League members, this was nothing but a violation of an international agreement. The USSR, said the Soviet delegate, upheld the principle that all states should fulfil their international commitments "for the fulfilment of international commitments is fundamental to peace, being directly related to the security = of nations".^^1^^ The delegate noted that Hitler Germany, using demagogic appeals for ``equality'' in armaments as a screen, was making intensified preparations for an aggressive war to redivide the world. The USSR, he said, though recognising the equal rights of all nations in the field of armaments, at the same time considered that "we must proceed from the supposition that these arms will be used exclusively for defence purposes, to protect the existing borders and the country's own security''. However, Hitler's persistent demands for Germany's rearmament hinged upon the German fascist aspiration to realise predatory plans, to "achieve unlimited seizures of alien territories and destroy the independence of whole = states".^^2^^ The League of Nations must rally the forces of all states and peoples to counteract aggression. The League of Nations, declared the Soviet delegate, must strive to "create the kind of international order that will cause the maximum difficulties for anyone attempting to violate = peace".^^3^^Guided by the ideas of collective security and a joint rebuff to the aggressor, the USSR made a decisive stand in support of Ethiopia, which was attacked by fascist Italy on October 2,1935. The Soviet Union appealed to the League of Nations to apply economic sanctions against the aggressor. On the instruction of the Soviet Government, I. M. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, stressed during the talks with Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on November 6, 1935, that the application of sanctions in order to intercept new acts of aggression was a matter of principle. ``Italy,'' he said, ``is an aggressor, but this aggressor is comparatively weak and of no great danger for Europe. There are other prospective aggressors in Europe ---much stronger and far more dangerous. We consider it extremely important that an example be made of Italy, which will be a lesson for all other _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVIII, p. 290.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 291.
61 possible aggressors. Sanctions applied now must be a warning to any future aggressor.''^^1^^On November 22,1935, the Soviet Government sent a note to the Italian Government strongly condemning their aggression against Ethiopia, which, like other countries, was a state enjoying full and equal rights. Any other approach would mean a "rejection of the principles of the League of Nations, a rejection of the collective organisation of security, an encouragement to further aggression, and a denial of the possibility of showing international solidarity in the cause of safeguarding and strengthening universal peace, which is the basis of the Soviet Government's policy and the raison d'etre of its League = membership".^^2^^
However, not one of the leading capitalist powers condemned the Italian aggression against Ethiopia. Britain, moreover, took active steps to obstruct the application of economic sanctions against Italy. She, in fact, used the sanctions issue as a means for establishing mutual understanding with Mussolini and subsequent Anglo-Italian rapprochement.
The impunity of the Italian aggression in Ethiopia had far-reaching consequences: it spurred on other aggressive states. Following Britain's example, other states also tried to evade the applying of sanctions; some of them failed to place an embargo on arms sales to Italy, others refused a financial boycott of Italy, and still others declined to prohibit the export of goods to Italy. In brief, sanctions against Italy were only applied at random. Fascist Italy took full advantage of this to crush the poorly armed Ethiopian army, one of the first to experience the full burden of the US Neutrality Act. This law, which forbade the sale of arms to the belligerent countries, made no distinction between the victims and the aggressors. Italy had her own powerful military potential and could therefore get by with her own armaments. The US Neutrality Act had little effect on her. It was quite a different story for the victims, who were generally in a weak economic position and therefore did not have their own supplies of armaments In these conditions, a refusal to sell them arms condemned them to inevitable defeat. Moreover, the Neutrality Act did not prohibit the sale of strategic materials to the belligerent countries, and Italy continued to buy these from the USA. The Act was consequently playing into the hands of fascist Italy. The League of Nations' inability to put its resolution to apply sanctions into practice _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = Vol. IX, p. 46.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XVIII, p. 561.
62 affected its authority; the peoples' confidence in this organisation was considerably shaken.This unpunished aggression led to an increase in international tension, which was felt most acutely in states situated in the Eastern Mediterranean region, for example, Turkey. She proposed that an international conference be convened to re-examine the regime of the Black Sea straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles). The USSR supported this proposal. The conference opened on June 22, 1936, in Montreux (Switzerland), with delegates from the USSR, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Japan participating.
The USSR and Britain were the main contending parties at the conference. Britain strongly objected to the re-exa'mination of the basic provisions of the Lausanne Convention which had granted military vessels of the non-Black Sea powers broad access to the Black Sea. The Soviet Union, defending the interests of the Black Sea powers, demanded that access to the Black Sea be severely limited for the non-Black Sea powers. Protracted talks were rounded off on July 20 with the signing of a new convention with a 20-year term.
This convention restricted passage by military vessels of non-Black Sea powers to the Black Sea during peace-time. Light surface vessels were permitted passage. The over-all tonnage of vessels permitted to stay at a time in the Black Sea was limited to 30,000 tons, and the period of their stay to 21 days. In war-time, passage of vessels of the belligerent powers was completely forbidden. The new convention was thus more advantageous to the Black Sea powers than was the Lausanne Convention, but it nevertheless did not provide the necessary security for the Black Sea powers, including the Soviet state. The Soviet delegate, in describing the results of the conference, noted that it "acknowledged, though, admittedly, to a limited extent, the Black Sea powers' special rights to the Black Sea and the use of the straits, and also the special geographical position of the Black Sea, which should not be altogether subject to the general concepts of the absolute freedom of the high seas''.^^1^^
The insufficient security provisions of the USSR and other Black Sea powers became evident during the Second World War.
Fascist Italy's seizure of Ethiopia led to a burst of activity by all opponents of peace and collective security, who, under the screen of _-_-_
^^1^^Pravda, July 22, 1936.
63 talk about the necessity of "strengthening the League of Nations,'' were, in fact, working to get the League Covenant re-examined. Their object was to remove clause 16 which obliged the League to apply collective military and economic sanctions to the violators of peace.The Soviet Union made a new attempt to organise the collective defence of peace through the joint efforts of the League member-states during a meeting of the League Council in March 1936, when the latter discussed the question of Germany's violation of the Locarno Treaty, which forbade the introduction of German troops into the demilitarised Rheinland. The Soviet representative warned that if the League did not take a clear decision to reinforce security in Europe, then its authority would be seriously shaken. However, Britain and the majority of League members failed to support the Soviet proposal to take collective measures against the breach of international = obligations.^^1^^
Beating off the attacks on the League Covenant, the USSR contended that in the drive for peace, more active use should be made of the existing Covenant clauses on the application of various sanctions against the aggressors, military sanctions included. In August 1936, the USSR submitted to the League Council its proposals for improving the application of the Covenant's provisions. Above all, it pushed for the simplification of the procedure for passing decisions establishing the fact of aggression and authorising the application of military sanction against the aggressor. Special mention was made of the application of military sanction by signatories to mutual assistance = treaties.^^2^^ Central to the Soviet proposals was the idea of regional or, if necessary, even bilateral pacts of mutual assistance. What the USSR had in mind here were different regions, diverse in geographical size and outline, even whole continents. The Soviet Union suggested that the League Council acknowledge regional pacts of mutual assistance as an additional guarantee to security, pertaining to the League of Nations. The USSR considered it vital that "all continents, starting with Europe, be covered with a network of regional pacts" and that these regional pacts supplement the League of Nations Covenant rather than replace = it.^^3^^
At the League of Nations plenum in late September 1936, the _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, April 18, 1935.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV (1935-June 1941), Moscow, 1946, p. 173.
^^3^^Ibid., pp. 183--84.
64 Soviet Union appealed to all participants to make use of the League's Covenant and principles to organise a collective defence of peace. Likening the League to a bloc of peace-loving states, the Soviet representative said: ``We demand only one thing---that this bloc organise effective mutual assistance and, above all, draw up a plan of action in good time in order not to be taken unawares, so that we have effective action for organising a collective repulse that is equal to the war preparations in progress outside this bloc."^^1^^The USSR appealed for the aggressors not to be let off lightly, and from the rostrum of the League condemned ideas of a predatory war, of contempt for international commitments and the redivision of the world by = force.^^2^^
Guided by ideas of the indivisibility of peace and its collective defence and of rebuffing aggression in any form, the USSR took part in a conference on security of navigation in the Mediterranean, which took place in Nione in early September 1937. This conference was concerned with working out measures to combat fascist aggression at sea. The Soviet delegate declared that the Soviet state was not simply participating in the conference because it was a Mediterranean power, but also because, "as a big power, aware of its rights and obligations, it is interested in preserving international order and peace, and in the struggle against all forms of aggression and arbitrary action in the world arena.
"Consistently defending the idea of collective security, the Soviet Government has responded to the appeal to ensure collectively peaceful navigation on sea routes and especially on such an important waterway as the = Mediterranean".^^3^^ The USSR took an active part in elaborating the whole complex of measures which would ensure navigational security. At the conference an agreement was reached designed to bring a halt to aggressive acts by fascist fleets. The agreement was highly commended by the Soviet delegate, who stressed that it "is a partial realisation of the idea of collective security, and also the idea of regional agreements".^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Izvestia, September 12, 1937.
^^4^^Pravda, September 15, 1937.
__PRINTERS_P_065_COMMENT__ 3---615 65 __ALPHA_LVL2__ The USSR and the German-ItalianThe victory of the Popular Front parties in Spain in February 1936, and the new Popular Front Government with its first progressive reforms gave rise to serious alarm in the fascist governments of Germany and Italy.
The news of the Popular Front parties' victory in France at the parliamentary elections of April 26 and May 3, 1936, caused even more anger and hatred in Berlin and Rome. This triumph for the Left guided by the Communists was crowned with the creation of a Popular Front Government. Although this Government was led by Leon Blum, a Right-wing leader of the French Socialists, who was against implementing the Popular Front programme, action by the French proletariat, led by the Communists, nevertheless compelled the government to meet the major demands of the French workers (40-hour working week, higher wages, paid holidays, etc.).
The Popular Front victory was of great significance for France's fortunes --- it prevented the fascists taking power. However, French reaction, led by some 200 of the richest families, waged an all-out offensive to counter the workers' achievements; a noisy press campaign raised a false scare about the "communist threat'', and provided cover for the reactionaries who had inspired these lies. This subversive activity by French reaction received the unmitigated support of nazi propaganda.
Reactionary forces in Spain could not reconcile themselves with their loss of power and, encouraged by Berlin and Rome, they began preparations to overthrow the legal Popular Front Republican Government. With active German and Italian support, the officers' clique, led by General Franco, raised a military revolt against the government. Hitler and Mussolini, using a policy of connivance, organised German-Italian intervention in Spain. Their aim was to overthrow the Popular Front Republican Government and establish Franco's fascist regime. In organising the fascist revolt, Hitler and Mussolini not only had the suppression of the Spanish revolution in mind, serious enough in itself, but also intended cutting British and French communications with their colonies. In addition, they planned to threaten France from the rear, thus compelling her to capitulate even before a war was started by the aggressive powers.
The USSR together with the world's progressive public unveiled this conspiracy by international reaction and urged that everything possible should be done to wreck it. A powerful popular movement 66 in defence of the Spanish Republic swept the whole of Europe and America.
French national interests, her military security and the Popular Front programme required that the Republican Government in Spain be assisted immediately. The Blum Government, however, ignored this obvious truth. Giving way to the demands of reactionary forces, it offered the most refined excuses for declining help to the Spanish people. Blum considered, moreover, that events in Spain could be used to achieve an agreement with fascist Germany.
On July 25, 1936, the Blum Government adopted a policy of neutrality towards Spain and prohibited the export of arms to that country, thereby showing Hitler and Mussolini its desire to come to an agreement with them. This meant that the legal Republican Government in Spain was no longer entitled to buy arms, whereas Germany and Italy were making massive arms deliveries to the fascist rebels.
A similar position was held by the British Government, which was also seeking a suitable excuse for refusing to meet the British people's demands for assistance to the Spanish Republic, which was battling against the fascist rebels backed by German and Italian interventionists. London and Paris decided that an agreement on non-intervention in Spanish affairs would be the answer to their problems, since it would then appear that they were attempting to restrict foreign intervention in Spain. This agreement would enable the French and British governments to discontinue all assistance to the Spanish Republic, while Hitler and Mussolini continued to intervene under cover if false assurances that their assistance would be discontinued. They also justified their intervention by referring to Soviet assistance. On August 2, 1936, the Blum Government, having first arranged things with London, proposed an agreement of non-intervention in Spanish affairs. Since the French Government declared that Germany and Italy would be signatories to the pact, the Soviet Union agreed to sign, hoping that the pact might be a means to stop German and Italian intervention in Spanish affairs.
The Non-intervention Committee, chaired by Lord Plymouth, was formed in London to effect the agreement. I. M. Maisky, the USSR Ambassador to Britain, was appointed the Soviet representative on the committee. After the first couple of months, it became obvious that it was doing nothing to stop German and Italian intervention or the delivery of arms to General Franco's Falangists. At the same time, Britain and France were using the committee as a convenient smokescreen, clouding the fact that 67 they had discontinued arms deliveries to the legal Spanish Government.
On October 4, V. P. Potemkin, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Maisky, exposing the truth behind the establishment of the Non-intervention Committee: ``The French as well as the British did not and do not want to render any sort of real help to the Madrid Government. They took the initiative of signing the Non-intervention Agreement so that, in the face of public opinion in the two countries, they would have a legal base for not rendering = assistance.''^^1^^
The USA also pursued this policy of boycotting the Republican Government in Spain under cover of their Neutrality Act.
As for Franco's Falangists, they were generously supplied with arms from Germany and Italy.
On October 7, 1936, the USSR's representative on the committee read a Soviet statement which cited numerous instances of such aid to the Falangists. The USSR warned the committee that "if violations of the Non-intervention Agreement are not immediately discontinued, the Soviet Union will consider itself free of all obligations arising from the = agreement".^^2^^
On October 23, 1936, the USSR's representative, instructed by the Soviet Government, declared to the committee that the action of Germany and Italy, which were continuing to intervene in Spain, had turned the Non-intervention Agreement into "an empty scrap of paper. It has virtually ceased to exist''. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Government declared its belief in the need "to give back the Spanish Government the rights and opportunities to buy arms from abroad, such as are enjoyed at present by all governments of the world, and the signatories to the agreement should be left to decide whether or not they would sell arms to = Spain''.^^3^^
At a London meeting of the British Committee of Support to the Spanish Republic, on April 30, 1937, the Belgian Senator Rolin said that he could not understand the British and French policy of connivance with the German and Italian interventionists, which sacrificed the interests of Britain and France. He contrasted this anti-national policy with the USSR's policy which gave active support to the Spanish people in their struggle against the fascist rebels. "Speaking as an objective foreigner,'' remarked the senator, "I must say that there is only one power in Europe that is _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = Vol. IX, p. 49.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol.~IV, p.~196.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 200.
68 organising an effective rebuff to Germany and Italy ---that = is Russia."^^1^^The US Government's policy towards the Spanish Republic hardly differed, in essence, from the British and French. Using the US Neutrality Act as a cover, Washington prohibited the sale of arms to the legal Spanish Government. There is scarcely any need to prove that the ``Neutrality'' law had a devastating effect on the Spanish Republic alone, as-was the case with Ethiopia when the latter was under attack by fascist Italy, already mentioned. The US Government, by dint of this law, annulled the earlier agreements on the purchase of American arms by the Spanish Government. As for General Franco's Falangists, they had quite sufficient arms from Germany and Italy.
The Soviet state, in full accord with the norms of international law and fulfilling its internationalist duty, rendered the fighting Spanish people and the legal government a wide variety of assistance, including financial.
Since the Western states plus the USA refused arms to the legal Government of Spain, Soviet arms deliveries, including tanks and aircraft, played an extremely important role. This is eloquently confirmed by the following data on Soviet assistance to Spain. In all, from October 1936 to the end of January 1939, the USSR delivered to Spain: 648 aeroplanes, 347 tanks, 60 armoured cars, 1,186 ordnance pieces, 20,486 machine-guns, 497,813 rifles, numerous shells and cartridges and large quantities of = explosives.^^2^^
In the autumn of 1938, the USSR granted the Spanish Republican Government a credit to the tune of 85 million dollars. In response to a request by the government, the Soviet Union sent military specialists and advisers to Spain, who rendered an enormous service by helping create a regular Republican popular army and prepare and conduct vital operations against the fascist interventionists and Falangists. Volunteers from all over the world who fought in Spain in the International Brigades helped the Spanish people in their battle for freedom. These anti-fascist volunteers totalled 35,000, of which about 3,000, including 160 pilots, were from the Soviet = Union.^^3^^ Many Soviet volunteers were glorified in battle by their feats of arms, and around 200 of them died a hero's death.
A telegram dated October 16, 1936, from Joseph Stalin, General _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = Vol. IX, p. 50.
^^2^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945, = Vol. 2, Moscow, 1974, p. 54.
^^3^^ Ibid., p.~55.
69 Secretary of the CC CPSU, to Jose Ramos Diaz, Secretary of the CC CPS, clearly stated the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state towards events in Spain: ``By doing what they can to help the Spanish revolutionary masses the working people of the Soviet Union are merely fulfilling their duty. They realise that the liberation of Spain from the fascist reactionary yoke is no private affair of the Spanish people, but the business of all advanced and progressive = mankind."^^1^^Until the very last days of the Spanish Republic, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government did all they could to help the Republicans in their struggle for the freedom of the Spanish people. Describing Soviet assistance to the Spanish people, L. I. Brezhnev said in 1967: "The glorious epic of the brotherhood-in-arms with revolutionary Spain is unforgettable. Our country went to the aid of the Spanish people with everything it could---from diplomatic support and economic help to the personal contribution of thousands of Soviet volunteers who to the last day, together with the Spaniards, fought at Barcelona barricades and in the Madrid = sky."^^2^^
But the forces were far from equal. The German-Italian interventionists alone numbered around 300,000 picked troops, to say nothing of Franco's Falangists.
Under British and French pressure the League of Nations refused to defend the Spanish Republic and sacrificed it for the sake of appeasing the aggressors. This verdict was pronounced at the 104th session of the League of Nations in January 1939, when the British and French governments refused to apply collective sanctions against the aggressors, as laid out in clause 16 of the Covenant, as well as failing to condemn the German-Italian intervention. When this decision had been taken, someone shouted out: ``You have destroyed = Spain."^^3^^
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The USSR's Struggle Against JapaneseThe policy of appeasement towards the German-Italian aggressors, which was particularly manifest when Italy invaded Ethiopia, also inspired the Japanese militarists into action: they _-_-_
^^1^^Pravda, October 16, 1936.
^^2^^L. I, Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, = p. 52.
^^3^^History of Diplomacy, = Vol.~III, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1965, p. 720 (in Russian).
70 began to provoke conflicts on the Far Eastern borders of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic.The Soviet Union did all it could to localise these conflicts, and prevent them escalating into a war proper.
The Soviet Government, wishing to restore normal relations with Japan, proposed that they conclude a non-aggression pact. The proposal was repeated on January 4,1933. However, in 1935, Japan replied in the negative and continued provoking incidents on the borders with the USSR and Mongolia. In 1935 alone, 80 incidents were registered. In 1936, Soviet frontier guards detained 137 Japanese = agents.^^1^^ The Soviet Government's report to the 7th Congress of Soviets in 1935 noted: The USSR had information to the effect that Japan was preparing an attack on Mongolia. Aware of these schemes, and complying with Mongolia's wishes to reinforce their close friendship with mutual assistance commitments to repulse the aggressor, the Soviet Government, as early as November 24, 1934, concluded a verbal gentleman's agreement with Mongolia on mutual support and assistance. Japan, however, was not discouraged. In February 1936, the Japanese provoked heavy fighting on the Mongolian-Manchurian border, which indicated that a full-scale war was now threatening Mongolia. The USSR then issued a grave warning to Japan. On March 1, 1936, in a conversation with Roy Howard, chairman of Scripps-Howard Newspapers (an American newspaper combine), Stalin declared that "in the event of a Japanese decision to attack the Mongolian People's Republic, encroaching on her independence, we shall have to help the Mongolian People's Republic''. He also stressed: ``We shall help the MPR just as we did in = 1921."^^2^^ An alliance was then formed with an official protocol, published in the press. The agreement on mutual assistance between the USSR and Mongolia was signed on March 12, = 1936.^^3^^ It provided that, in the event of an armed attack on Soviet or Mongolian territory by a third state, the Soviet and Mongolian governments would "render each other all manner of assistance, including military''. The agreement Came into effect as soon as it was signed. Though in 1937 the Japanese militarists continued their former policy of organising provocations against the USSR and Mongolia, they did not risk starting a war. On July 7, 1937, Japan went to war against China. Within a short period, the major trade and industrial centres of _-_-_
^^1^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945. = Vol. 1, pp. 103--04.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 99--100.
^^3^^Ibid., pp. 106--07.
71 China---Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin, Kalgan and others---were seized. The flames of war, sparked off by Japan, were now raging in Asia.The Japanese aggression had put China into a very difficult situation. The USSR, having concluded a non-aggression pact with China on August 21, 1937, was the only country to render diplomatic and other support to China. The pact committed the USSR and China to "refrain from any kind of attack on each other either individually, or together with one or several other countries".
According to clause 2 of the pact, the USSR and China pledged to render no assistance whatsoever, be it direct or indirect, to the country or countries which have attacked the other signatory to the pact.
Having signed this pact with China, the Soviet Union showed feelings of friendship to the Chinese people and readiness to do everything possible to lighten the burden of China's struggle for independence. Stressing the pact's great significance, Pravda wrote: "The Soviet-Chinese treaty confirms and consolidates in practice the principle that peace is indivisible and must be defended both in the West and in = East."^^1^^ With her rear protected by the pact, China could now afford to concentrate all her forces to repulse the Japanese aggressor. Moreover, the USSR rendered all manner of assistance to China, including military and technical. The Soviet-Chinese negotiations on the granting of credits to China were then concluded, and on March 1, 1938, an agreement was signed whereby the USSR was to lend China 50 million dollars.
Unlike the Western powers' policy of connivance with the Japanese aggressor, the Soviet Union waged a persistent struggle to check the aggression, to safeguard peace and to organise a collective rebuff to the fascist aggressors. In pursuing this policy, the USSR made a fresh attempt to induce the league of Nations to take active measures in defence of peace in Asia as well as in Europe. The Soviet Union used the League plenum, which took place in September 1937, in order to take decisive measures to stop aggression against China. The Soviet representative noted in his speech of September 21: "On the Asian mainland, without declaring war, and with neither ground nor justification, one state attacks another --- China, overruns her with hundred-thousand-strong armies, blockades her shores and paralyses the trade of one of the world's biggest commercial centres. And this is apparently only the beginning of these operations; how they will carry on and _-_-_
^^1^^Pravda, August 30, 1937.
72 where they will end is beyond all calculation. In Europe, another state---Spain---has been invaded by trained foreign armies for over a year = now."^^1^^The League of Nations, after persistent demands by the Soviet Union, finally adopted a resolution condemning Japan's barbaric bombardment of Chinese towns. To avoid further consideration of this question, the League plenum, prompted by London and Paris, submitted the matter to a special international conference, which opened in Brussels on November 3, 1937. Thanks to the joint efforts of Britain and the USA, the conference rejected the Soviet proposal to act in accordance with clause 16 of the League Covenant, i.e. to apply collective sanctions against Japan, including military sanctions. The conference also rejected China's proposal, supported by the Soviet Union, to apply economic sanctions against Japan.
Moreover, the British and US governments repeatedly declared that the Soviet Union was China's neighbour, it could make an independent stand against Japan and thus put an end to the Japanese aggression against China. These American and British proposals were clearly designed to provoke war between the USSR and Japan, with the USA and Britain in a tertius gaudens position, i.e. enjoying the war from the side lines.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The Failure of Anglo-French AttemptsThe 7th Congress of the Communist International warned: ``The British bourgeoisie, by the concessions and support which it gives to the instigators of war in Europe and in the Far East, accelerates the onset of a new world war into which the British Empire will inevitably be = drawn."^^2^^
However, the British bourgeoisie, especially the section whose interests were represented by the so-called Cliveden clique (Neville Chamberlain, Samuel Hoare, Edward Halifax, etc.), reckoned they could avoid a war with Germany and Japan by channelling their aggressive aspirations towards the USSR. Similar plans of colluding with Hitler were nurtured by those French bourgeois circles whose interests were expressed by Blum, Laval, Flandin, _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, p. 304.
^^2^^Ercoli, The Fight for Peace, p. 34.
73 Bonnet and others. Paris and London therefore attempted to draw Hitler Germany into negotiations, particularly on the colonial question, since the Hitlerites were harping on their colonial claims in their press.Hitler first posed the colonial question during the negotiations with the British ministers, John Simon and Anthony Eden, which took place on March 25--26, 1935. But the British Ministers then refused to discuss the matter. The Hitlerites, however, were not disheartened and seized any occasion to raise the question. For instance, in a conversation with S. R. Fuller, the American consul in Berlin, on September 23, 1935, Hjalmar Schacht declared that Germany needed colonies. If possible, they would obtain them by means of negotiation; if negotiations proved fruitless, they would achieve them by = force.^^1^^
In 1936, the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, made several declarations, essentially boiling down to the fact that Britain was not going to give her colonies away to anybody. Nevertheless, during his talks with Lord Londonderry in February 1936, Hitler again raised the question of "colonial equality'', and on March 7, 1936, he made a speech officially demanding that Germany be allotted colonies.
According to British Government documents kept in the London Public Record = Office^^2^^ and only recently made available for researchers, in 1936, the British Government set about studying Hitler's demands for colonies. It created a special sub-committee led by Lord Plymouth, which was charged with examining the question of which former German colonies now under British rule could be given back to Germany. In a report of June 9, 1936, the sub-committee concluded that Britain could not return all Germany's former colonies, in particular, = Tanganyika.^^3^^ The report stated that Britain could give Germany all or part of Togo and the Cameroons, most of whose territory belonged to France. The British Government considered that the matter needed to be clarified, since it was figuring in the Anglo-German negotiations and the Hitlerite press with increasing urgency. So, in his parliamentary speech of July 27, 1936, the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, declared that the question of handing over mandatory territories to Germany would give rise to enormous _-_-_
^^1^^Voprosy htorii, No.~7, 1954, p. 90.
^^2^^Public Record Office. Subsequently given as PRO.
^^3^^PRO, Cab. 27/626, p.~50. For more detail, see V.~Sipols, M.~Pankrashova: ``Britain's Road to Munich'' (Documentary Review), = International Affairs, No.~4, 1973, p.~83.
74 difficulties which the British Government would not be able to = solve.^^1^^ Such a declaration was obviously ineffectual: the question still featured on the agenda of the Anglo-German negotiations. On February 2, 1937, the matter was again raised by Schacht at a meeting with Frederick Leith-Ross, chief economic adviser to the British Government.On March 18, 1937, the British Government once more considered the question of returning Germany's former colonies. Proposals made by Chamberlain (then Chancellor of the Exchequer), and adopted by the government, were essentially a repeat of the June 9 proposals. The government decided to find out the attitude of France, since Togo and the Cameroons were largely her = possessions.^^2^^
The French Government, led in 1936 by Blum, took its own initiative to start negotiations with Hitler. It was concerned with a broad complex of problems of the Franco-German relations. The colonial question was only one of them and was discussed in talks between Blum and Schacht on August 26--28, 1936. Franco-German negotiations were then continued between Blum and Yvon Delbos, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Johannes Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris. France was hoping to satisfy Hitler, not with a share of her colonies, but with other concessions. Thus, on December 26, 1936, Welczek reported to Berlin that Blum and Delbos had expressed their readiness to sacrifice the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance for the sake of an agreement with Hitler. "I have repeatedly informed you,'' wrote Welczek in his report, "that, despite all the indignities suffered by the French in recent years, they are still agreeable, even now, to begin talks in order to reach a mutual = understanding."^^3^^ According to Welczek, Delbos had stressed that if such a mutual understanding were achieved, then "the significance of the Franco-Russian treaty will be gradually reduced to that of the Rapallo treaty".^^4^^ However, the Blum Government was not prepared to return all it had acquired: it considered that Britain and other powers ought to make similar sacrifices. The Franco-German negotiations proved fruitless as Germany's position on the matter became ever tougher.
_-_-_^^1^^Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 315, col. 1132.
^^2^^International Affairs, No.~4, 1973, p. 83.
^^3^^Documents and Material of the Eve of the Second World War, = Vol. II, Dirksen's Archives (1938--1939), Moscow, 1948, p.~261 (in Russian). Subsequently given as Documents.
^^4^^Documents, p. 262.
75In Berlin, on January 20, 1937, Schacht met Joseph E. Davies, the US Ambassador in Moscow, and made a fresh demand for colonies to be allotted to Germany. He proposed that the US President convene a conference to discuss major political and economic = questions.^^1^^ The USA was favourably disposed to this proposal which, of course, encouraged the Hitlerites, but London refused point-blank to have any part in such a conference, since it had no intention of conceding even part of its colonies to Germany.
The Foreign Office, however, made a new attempt to continue the exchange of opinion with Berlin, using the British industrialist Rykens as an intermediary. On February 9,1937, Rykens discussed this matter with Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador = in Vienna.^^2^^ On this occasion, a broad plan of Anglo-German agreement and co-operation was proposed.
This plan foresaw that Germany would be included in the world economy and given markets and a large loan on favourable terms. According to Rykens, this could be achieved in the following way:
"a) By issuing a sufficiently long-term (around 40 years) loan with a negligible interest rate, part of which must be granted in gold in order to provide a sufficient degree of international stability for the depreciated mark. The loan must be used to consolidate Germany's external debts and to expand her markets.
"b) In addition to this loan, in countries where the German market tends markedly to decline, import taxes must be substantially = lowered."^^3^^
"Along with this loan,'' said Rykens, "the colonial question will be settled in such a way as to compensate Germany collectively with territory somewhere on the West coast of Africa, without harming essentially British interests.'' Britain was thus offering to satisfy Germany's colonial claims at the expense of colonies belonging to other powers (Portugal, Spain, France, and Belgium).
Germany, for her part, was to agree to sign treaties on the limitation of land and air armaments, and also to come to terms with regard to her policy in Eastern and South-East Europe. In this connection, Rykens said that Britain's attitude to the problem of "far-reaching economic alliances" would be one of approval. "Thus, for instance, the question of a customs union between Germany and Austria, the latter retaining her autonomy, should be assessed in a positive light.'' Britain thus proposed negotiations on _-_-_
^^1^^ Voprosy Istorii, No.~7, 1954, p. 90.
^^2^^ Historical and Diplomatic Archives, = Istoria SSSR (History of the USSR), No.~3. 1962 pp. 5--6.
^^3^^ Ibid.
76 a wide range of issues with the object of reaching a broad agreement with Germany, agreed to the Anschluss of Austria and proposed an agreement on arms limitation and consultation vis-\`a-vis policy towards Eastern and South-East Europe. This policy of appeasing Hitler Germany was fraught with great dangers for the cause of peace throughout the world, and for those who pursued such a policy. Pravda of March 31, 1937, rightly warned: ``The policy of seeking agreement with the war-mongers will inevitably back-fire on those who effect it."However, these British overtures to begin official Anglo-German negotiations met with a negative response from Hitler.
The formation of the Chamberlain Government on May 27, 1937 marked the beginning of a new stage in the policy of appeasing fascist Germany and Italy. Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Britain, in describing the Chamberlain Government's policy, noted that "an essential part of its programme is to seek a compromise with Germany. The Chamberlain Government is near to understanding the most essential points of Germany's basic demands concerned with ensuring that the Soviet Union has no part in deciding Europe's fate, similarly excluding the League of Nations, and also vis-a-vis expediency of bilateral talks = and treaties."^^1^^ Moreover, Dirksen pointed out the British Government's far-reaching readiness to meet Hitler's demands "on the sole condition that peaceful means be used to achieve these aims."~^^2^^
Lord Lothian, an active proponent of collusion with Hitler, had talks with the latter on May 4, 1937. On May 11, he presented Chamberlain with his memorandum which, as well as summarising the talks, contained proposals on how agreement could be reached with Germany on two major problems: ``the future of Germany in Eastern Europe and the economic-colonial = question".^^3^^ Lothian had earlier imparted his ideas on how to satisfy Germany's territorial claims at the expense of Austria and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Ambassador in London. In this conversation, he had stressed that "German expansion is inevitable" and that "Austria's fate is predetermined ... and Czechoslovakia is not destined to last long in her present form''. Every move made by the Chamberlain Cabinet confirmed that its main foreign policy goal was to reach an agreement with the fascist powers, above all Germany. Nevile _-_-_
^^1^^ Documents, Vol. II, p. 33.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 35.
^^3^^ PRO, Cab. 21540.
77 Henderson, appointed as British Ambassador to Germany, was Chamberlain's fervent helper in this affair. His memorandum, submitted to the government on May 10,1937, laid out a complete plan for Anglo-German rapprochement based on complying with the predatory aspirations of German fascism. In particular, it suggested that Britain should agree to Germany's annexation of Austria and that Germany should be given certain colonies in South-West Africa. It also proposed that Britain should render economic assistance to Germany and raise no objection to her economic and political supremacy in Eastern Europe on the condition that Hitler pledged to keep his promises made in his declaration of May 25, 1935, to the effect that he would only use peaceful methods in working towards a revision of the Versailles Treaty. Henderson even considered it desirable to channel ``Germany's activities'' towards Russia and give Germany a free hand in preparing war with the = Slavs.^^1^^ Describing the covert aims of Chamberlain's policy, Lloyd George said to the Soviet Ambassador in London on July I, 1937: ``I have it on the best authority that Chamberlain's general plan boils down to the following: to reach an arrangement with Germany and Italy within the next year.'' The USSR must be "excluded from the European combination and left to fend for = itself''.^^2^^On July 29, 1937, Chamberlain spoke to the Soviet Ambassador in London about his intentions to reach agreement with Hitler Germany on the basis of meeting the latter's = demands.^^3^^
The Chamberlain Cabinet immediately set to work on attaining the main foreign policy aim, which was to reach mutual understanding and agreement with the Hitler Government. To this end, on June 5, 1937, Eden invited the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, to London, so as to "sit down with the Reichsminister ... to the same table and discuss various = issues''.^^4^^
Hitler, however, turned down this proposal. Then, in June 1937, using Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King as an intermediary, Chamberlain reminded Hitler once more that he was aspiring towards mutual understanding with = Germany.^^5^^
Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, tried hard to launch Anglo-German negotiations in order to fulfil the task _-_-_
^^1^^ L. Thompson, The Greatest Treason. The Untold Story of Munich, = New York, 1968, pp. 270--73.
^^2^^ USSR Foreign Policy Archives, International Affairs, = No.~4, 1973, p. 86.
^^3^^ Ibid.
^^4^^ PRO, Cab.1/334, pp. 6, 11.
^^5^^ Ibid.
78 outlined by Chamberlain. Henderson discussed the matter with Goering on September 11, 1937. The latter drew up the following conditions for an Anglo-German agreement: Germany would guarantee the safety of the British colonial empire, but London would have to acknowledge Germany's prevailing influence in Central Europe, and would, in addition, have to agree to discuss colonial questions. Goering took this opportunity to threaten Britain: if she refused to co-operate with Germany, the latter would begin preparations for the destruction of the British = Empire.^^1^^ He was quite blunt about Hitler's intentions to make annexations in Europe: "The Anschluss (of Austria) has been decided and is inevitable.'' Then, declared Goering, it would be the turn of Czechoslovakia who would forfeit her German population, followed by = Poland.^^2^^ Hitler thus made it quite clear to Britain that he was prepared to hold Anglo-German negotiations provided he was given a free hand in Central and South-East Europe and Germany's colonial claims were complied with. The latter were deliberately left vague. In November 1937, Chamberlain resolved to enter into official negotiations with Hitler, and sent Lord Halifax, who then occupied the important Cabinet post of the Lord President of the Council, to Germany for that purpose. A long talk between him and Hitler took place on November 19, 1937. Halifax declared that Britain appreciated Hitler's services in stamping out Bolshevism in Germany and that now "Germany can rightfully consider herself the bastion of anti-Bolshevism in the = West".^^3^^ Britain, he announced, concurred that the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty should be corrected and envisaged the possibility of territorial changes in Europe, naming, specifically, Danzig, Austria and = Czechoslovakia.^^4^^ The only condition stipulated by Halifax was that these changes should be brought about gradually in order to soften the impact. These were the only terms in which London could think of creating a basis for Anglo-German co-operation, which was to become the main content of the four-power = pact.^^5^^Hitler raised the question of colonies, noting that this was the only issue which the two countries had not resolved. He avoided a clear definition of Germany's colonial demands, but said it was up to Britain and France to put forward proposals. In this connection he declared that, in order to settle the colonial question, Germany _-_-_
^^1^^ Ibid.
^^2^^ PRO, Cab. 21540.
^^3^^ Documents, Vol.~I, p.~23.
^^4^^ Ibid., p. 35.
^^5^^ Ibid., p. 32.
79 would use force, if need be. "There are two possibilities,'' said Hitler. "The first is the play of free forces. In this event, it is impossible to say which colonies Germany would take over. The second possibility is a reasoned = solution."^^1^^It was only after the Second World War that we discovered why Hitler was reluctant, despite all Halifax's efforts, to start a detailed discussion of Britain's proposals to conclude a comprehensive agreement between Germany and Britain. Documents from secret German archives, published after the war, confirm that at a meeting in the Reichschancellery on November 5, 1937, Hitler declared plainly that they must prepare a war for the redivision of the world. During the negotiations with Halifax, it became obvious that Britain would not agree to hand over colonies to Germany, that she would not voluntarily give up even part of her possessions which ensured her status as a world power. For Hitler this was one more argument in favour of going to war with Great Britain.
Chamberlain's Government, however, took quite a different view of Halifax's visit. The results of the negotiations appeared to be promising and favourable as far as a broad Anglo-German agreement was concerned. Chamberlain considered that, in order to facilitate such an agreement, Britain would have to exert influence on the French Government with regard to the Czechoslovak question. To this end, Chautemps, the French Prime Minister, and Delbos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, were invited to London in late November. During the talks, the British side declared that, as far as Britain was concerned, France was overstepping the mark in the matter of her assistance to Czechoslovakia.^^2^^ Chamberlain thus began to exert pressure on France to make her abandon her obligations under the treaty of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia. These were, in fact, the first steps along the road to Munich, where a deal with Hitler was finally concluded.
In the period 1933--1937, despite the counter-measures of world reaction, the Soviet Union managed to attain what was most important: it provided the Soviet people with peaceful conditions for socialist construction, fulfilled ahead of schedule the immense first and second five-year plans and built socialism. These were world-historic achievements. In that period the USSR became the _-_-_
^^1^^Documents, Vol. I, p. 40.
^^2^^PRO, Cab. 27/626, pp. 253--264. See also ``Material on the History of the British Munich Policy'' by V.~V. Losinsky in Sovetskiye Arkhivy = (Soviet Archives) No.~1, 1973, p. 104.
80 main force driving for a durable peace and collective security against fascism and the threat of a fresh war.Having become a member of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union went a long way to turning this international organisation into a rallying point for all peace-loving forces, for the collective defence of peace. The USSR's work in the League of Nations played a significant role in mobilising world public opinion against a new war and in favour of safeguarding peace and strengthening security, and the co-operation of states with different social systems on the basis of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence.
Thanks to Soviet diplomacy, supported by the Communists and progressives throughout the world, the new world war was delayed for several years.
Though the USSR's strenuous, protracted struggle to check fascist aggression did not lead to the formation of a collective security system, owing to the Western powers' opposition, the Soviet Union nevertheless managed to wreck the imperialist powers' crafty schemes to form a united anti-Soviet front.
The Soviet Union worthily fulfilled its historic mission to fly high
the banner of peace and socialism and lead the battle against
fascism and the threat of a fresh war.
[81]
__NUMERIC_LVL1__
CHAPTER II
__ALPHA_LVL1__
THE WESTERN POWERS' POLICY OF AGREEMENT
WITH THE AGGRESSIVE POWERS (1938).
THE USSR AS A MAJOR FACTOR OF PEACE
__ALPHA_LVL2__
[introduction.]
The new economic crisis which broke out at the end of 1937 added even greater emphasis to the unevenness of the capitalist states' economic development. This can be seen from the index of industrial development for the major capitalist powers (as a percentage of = 1929):^^1^^
Year USA Britain France Germany Japan Italy 1937 103 124 82 116 169 99 1938 81 116 76 123 185 98Having outstripped Britain, Germany occupied second place, behind the USA, among the capitalist countries. In 1937, Germany produced 12 per cent of the capitalist world's industrial output and in some sectors her share was even greater. Thus, Germany's share of smelted cast iron was 22 per cent, steel 24 per cent, coal 17 per cent, machine-building 14 per cent, etc. In 1938, Germany's share of European industrial production went higher and was 32.6 per cent compared with Britain's 23.7 per cent and France's 11.2 per cent.
When the aggressive powers embarked upon an armaments race this made the contradictions between the imperialists even more intense. The political contentions between the imperialist powers were growing hand in hand with their economic antagonisms. The new redivision of the world, for which Germany, Italy and Japan _-_-_
^^1^^History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941--1945, = Vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, p. 129 (in Russian).
82 were preparing, was a threat, above all, to the great-power positions of Britain and France, both holding the largest colonial possessions, and also to the USA, the world's leading industrial power. The USA feared an agreement being reached between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other at the expense of the American monopolies.With this in mind, the USA proposed,setting up a conference in Washington, of Britain, France, Germany and Italy, with the US participation, to discuss the "causes of the existing differences''. The USSR's participation in the conference was not proposed, which is evidence in itself of the USA's intention that it should be conducted in a spirit of ``appeasing'' the aggressive powers.
However, the Chamberlain Government did not want to abandon the leading role it had adopted in achieving an amicable agreement with the aggressive powers, Germany and Italy. Therefore Chamberlain did his utmost to bury the US proposal. At the same time London invigorated its policy of agreement with Hitler and Mussolini. Hitler did not hasten to resume talks with London following the visit of Halifax in November, so Chamberlain decided to begin talks with Mussolini, hoping to tempt Hitler into holding talks with London by pursuing a policy of appeasement towards fascist Italy. The Anglo-Italian talks began in Rome on February 22, 1938, and were concluded on April 16 with the signing of an agreement by which Britain recognised, de jure, that Ethiopia had become an Italian colony.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ German Seizure of Austria.After Halifax's visit in November 1937, Hitler knew that Britain and France would not oppose Germany if the latter continued her predatory plans by "peaceful means'', that is, without war; the seizure of Austria was primary in Hitler's plans, in as far as the country was of great strategic importance. The country was called the ``key'' to Central Europe and not for nothing.
The West German historian Niekisch emphasised the importance of the German seizure of Austria when he wrote:
"As a result of Germany's Anschluss of Austria, Hitler penetrated the Balkans, destroyed the Little Entente, drew nearer 83 to fascist Hungary, exerted pressure on Yugoslavia and encircled Czechoslovakia.''^^1^^
For the seizure of Austria the Hitlerites used their agents --- Austrian fascists led by Seyss-Inquart and others, who acted as a "fifth column''. The Austrian fascists were directed and financed from Berlin. Hitler used economic and political pressure to impose several agreements on Austria whereby the Austrian fascists received complete freedom of action in the country. We shall note particularly the agreements of July 11, 1936, and February 12,1938, the latter signed at Berchtesgaden, by which the Austrian fascists gradually seized the key positions in their country's state apparatus.
Then, by threatening a German invasion, Hitler secured the appointment of his agent, Seyss-Inquart, as head of the Austrian state. All that remained to be done was completed very quickly: at dawn on March 12, 1938, the German Wehrmacht occupied Austria, whose army had been ordered not to resist. On March 14, Austria became a province of the "Third = Reich".^^2^^ Thus, an independent state disappeared from the political map of Europe.
The governments of the Western powers did not defend Austrian independence despite their obligation to do this under the Versailles and Saint-Germain treaties. Thus, on March 11, 1938, the Secretary of State, Hull, announced to press representatives that the recent events did not concern the = USA.^^3^^ On March 12, Dieckhof, the German Ambassador to the USA, communicated his talks with Hull to Berlin saying that the latter "completely understands our action over = Austria".^^4^^ The Chamberlain Government, as was noted earlier (see Chapter I), had clearly declared during Halifax's November 1937 visit to Hitler that it would not object to the German annexation of Austria providing this was done by "peaceful means".
Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, announced in his talk with Hitler on March 3, 1938, that he approved of the Anschluss of Austria, recalling Halifax's statement that "changes in Europe are quite possible'', and that Britain insisted on participation in a "reasonable agreement" over such changes. On April 2, 1938, Henderson received an instruction from London to _-_-_
^^1^^N. Niekisch, Das Reich der Niederen D\"amonen, p. 500.
^^2^^For more detail see = The USSR in the Struggle for Austrian Independence, Moscow, 1965, pp. 31--33 (in Russian).
^^3^^V. N. Beletsky, Soviet Union and Austria, = Moscow, 1962, p. 42 (in Russian).
^^4^^The USSR in the Struggle for Austrian Independence, p. 30.
84 inform Hitler that the British Government had decided to recall its diplomatic mission from Vienna and to set up a general consulate there. This was opened on April 15, 1938. In effect, this indicated that the Chamberlain Government accepted the German Anschluss of Austria. The French Government followed suit.The Soviet Union was the only country which strove for several years to preserve Austria's independence, bringing the attention of the world public to the threat of German aggression hanging over the country. "The preservation of Austria's independence,'' stressed Pravda, ``demands rapid and united action by all countries concerned in ensuring European peace. Only this action can restrain the aggressor and prevent the creation of a new hotbed of war."^^1^^ But the Western powers did not respond to the Soviet Union's appeals.
The first reports of the Soviet press described the Anschluss as "the destruction of Austria's independence'', and as the "Hitlerite occupation of Austria''. In an article entitled "The Seizure of Austria'', Pravda branded the Anschluss as aggression of German fascism, which needed Austria as a springboard in Central and South-East Europe and as an "additional reserve of people and materials''. The paper noted that the Hitlerites were confident that they would suffer no retribution for their evil act. "The endless concessions to the aggressors,'' the article continued, "become, as is clearly seen in the case of Austria, direct complicity with and instigation of the war-mongers. This policy is fatal in its consequences. And those who follow this course cannot avoid answerability for their participation in strengthening the war threat = in Europe."^^2^^
In an article entitled "The Annexation of Austria'', Izvestia emphasised that the governments of the Western countries, the Chamberlain Government included, were also responsible for the seizure of Austria. "No matter how one looks at it,'' it said in conclusion, "the British Government carries full responsibility for the aggression of German imperialism in Europe. To those who support peace, the German army's entry into Vienna is the death sentence to Neville Chamberlain's foreign = policy."^^3^^ Some time later, Pravda again wrote about the Anschluss and noted the British Government's responsibility: "The violence of fascist aggression is the direct consequence of the sharp change the British Premier _-_-_
^^1^^Pravda, September 28, 1937.
^^2^^Ibid., March 14, 1938.
^^3^^Izvestia. March 14, 1938.
85 Neville Chamberlain made in Britain's foreign policy. By his policy of overt collusion with the aggressors and his refusal to support a collective security system he freed the hands of the = war-mongers."^^1^^At the same time, the Soviet press stressed the far-reaching consequences of Anschluss, noting the threat it created to the security of many European countries, especially Czechoslovakia and France. Thus, Izvestia wrote: ``All Austria's closest neighbours must take the direct German threat into account.... Austria is only the base for extending the springboard of German imperialism in Central Europe in preparation of a new world war for hegemony in Europe and for colonies in Africa and = Asia.''^^2^^ Two days later, Izvestia, commenting on Hitler's March 15th speech, drew the following conclusions: this speech makes it abundantly clear that "Berlin regards the occupied territory as a base for new seizures in Central and South-East = Europe".^^3^^
Following these evaluations of the Anschluss, the Soviet press clearly and distinctly stated the Soviet position on this question, emphasising readiness of the Soviet Union to contribute to strengthening peace and security. Izvestia wrote: "We long ago formulated our evaluation of the fascist aggressors and compicity with them. German fascism's recent onslaught only confirms the Soviet Union's long-standing warnings. The open threat to peace in Europe can only meet with sharp censure from the Soviet Union, which is always ready to pull its weight in strengthening peace between = nations."^^4^^
On March 17, 1938, the Soviet Government issued a statement on the German seizure of = Austria.^^5^^ The text of this statement, with an accompanying note, was addressed to the governments of many countries, including Britain, France, the USA and Czechoslovakia.
The statement pointed out that the impunity of aggression was an encouragement to the aggressors and that the military invasion of Austria, the Austrian people being forcibly deprived of their political, economic and cultural independence, was clear evidence of this. The statement described the Anschluss as violence right in the centre of Europe, and as having created "an unquestionable danger to all European and, indeed, non-European states as well as to those eleven countries that now border the aggressor''. Aware of _-_-_
^^1^^Pravda, March 25, 1938.
^^2^^Izvestia, March 14, 1938.
^^3^^Ibid., March 16, 1938.
^^4^^Ibid., March 14, 1938.
^^5^^Ibid., March 18, 1938.
86 this serious threat to the whole of Europe, the Soviet Government expressed its readiness to "participate in collective actions, which would be decided jointly and would be aimed at checking the further development of aggression and eliminating the increasing danger of a new world war. The government agrees to hold immediate discussions with the other powers in the League of Nations or those outside it over practical measures dictated by the circumstances. Tomorrow may be too late, but today there is still time if all states, especially the great powers, take up a firm unambiguous position over the collective salvation of peace".^^1^^The Austrian people will always remember the Soviet Union's historically important and decisive action in defending their freedom and independence in the hard days when they were under the boot of the German fascist occupants. The USSR was the only country which warned the whole world about the serious danger that would be threatening the freedom and independence of the other European countries unless the world's leading powers united to rebuff the aggressor. This was the only way left to save European peace. The subsequent course of events, as well as the published documents, completely confirm how correct the Soviet Union was in evaluating the consequences of the Anschluss in terms of its unleashing aggression in Europe and about Britain's role in this. However, Britain rejected the proposals made by the Soviet Government, justifying this by arguing that a conference to adopt "agreed action against the aggressor will not necessarily have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a favourable influence on the prospects for European = peace".^^2^^
__ALPHA_LVL2__ Preparations for the Munich Deal.Hitler was encouraged to prepare for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by Germany's complete impunity over the seizure of Austria and the alacrity with which Britain and France accepted this despite them both being obliged to defend the country under the Versailles and Saint-Germain treaties. The Hitlerites used the same "Trojan horse" tactic they had so successfully employed in the case of Austria, that is, they used a fifth column to undermine _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia. March 18, 1938.
^^2^^Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 105--06.
87 the country from within. In Czechoslovakia this role was to be played by the Sudeten Germans and the fascist party organised and financed from Berlin and led by Hitler's agent Henlein.On March 29, 1938, Ribbentrop held a meeting in Berlin on the Sudeten question, where the programme of action for the Sudeten fascists was planned: they would initially demand autonomy for the Sudeten region and then increase their demands so that it would be impossible to reach agreement with the Czechoslovak Government.^^1^^ At the same time the Henlein party was to provoke disorder in the Sudeten region, organising armed attacks and even murdering Germans so as to accuse the Czechoslovak Government of terrorism against Germans and being unable to maintain order in the country.
Meanwhile Hitlerite propaganda utilised these provocations of the Henlein party to stage a broad anti-Czechoslovak campaign under cover of which Berlin prepared to seize Czechoslovakia \`a~la Austria. On May 19, a build-up of German troops began on the Czechoslovak border. As an excuse for the invasion the Hitlerites planned the murder of Eisenlohr, the German envoy to Czechoslovakia.
However, one thing was overlooked in Berlin: the peoples of Czechoslovakia resolutely rose up to resist fascist Germany. The Beneš-Hodza Government had to take this patriotic move into account and carry out a partial mobilisation. For Hitler, the affair had taken a completely unexpected turn, unforeseen by the Chamberlain Government, which had been seeking a broad British-German agreement. Since the Hitler Government had continued to avoid concluding such an agreement with Britain, a military conflict triggered off between Germany and Czechoslovakia, which had mutual assistance agreements with France and the USSR, could have ended up to Hitler's disadvantage. Therefore even the Chamberlain Government was forced to tell Germany that war between Germany and Czechoslovakia would mean that France would also have to intervene and then Britain could hardly remain on the side = lines.^^2^^ Berlin drew back, declaring that the Hitler Government had no intention of undertaking military action against Czechoslovakia.
The ruling circles in Britain and France used-the "May crisis" in order to have talks with Hitler and to conclude a deal with him at Czechoslovakia's expense. British diplomacy took the initiative in _-_-_
^^1^^Documents, Vol. 1, p. 109.
^^2^^N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, London, 1955, p. 136.
88 this matter. However, the Daladier Government acted in concert with London, despite the fact that France had an agreement with Czechoslovakia which obliged her to give all necessary assistance in the event of aggression against Czechoslovakia. Daladier, like the successive governments before him, "invariably placed cooperation with Britain at the centre of his foreign = policy".^^1^^ At the same time, Daladier and his Foreign Minister Bonnet deliberately ignored the mutual assistance agreement with the Soviet Union by which they could have barred the path of German aggression. On May 27, 1938, in a talk with Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador to France, Bonnet said that "the Franco-Soviet pact is very `conditional',^^2^^ and the French Government is not eager to rely on it''. Moreover, as Lukasiewicz communicated, Bonnet then said that he "would be very pleased to be able, as a result of sorting out the question of collaboration with Poland, to inform the Soviets that France does not require their = aid".^^3^^The Daladier Cabinet's reluctance to co-operate with the Soviet Union was clearly evidenced during the "May crisis'', when it was very important and timely to show the Hitler Government the effectiveness of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact, since this was a matter of defending the independence of Czechoslovakia from the encroachment of the German aggressor.
The French Government held negotiations with the governments of Britain and Czechoslovakia on the Czechoslovak question in clear violation of this treaty's provisions and did not even inform the Soviet Government about this. London and Paris did not want to invite the Soviet Government to these talks because they were aware of its principled stand over the question of a collective rebuff to aggression and the defence of small countries' and peoples' state independence. Moreover, in not inviting the USSR to participate in the discussion of the situation in Europe, London and Paris practically fulfilled Hitler's demand for the Soviet Union's isolation, hoping in this way to placate him and make him more tractable.
Even the Czechoslovak Government did not want to invite the Soviet Union to the talks with the Western powers on ways of settling the Czechoslovak problem. This was precisely the point made by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in its telegram to the Soviet Ambassadors in Prague, London, Paris and _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of Diplomacy, Vol. Ill, p.~728.
^^2^^``Vague'' in the French original.
^^3^^Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 130--31.
89 Berlin.^^1^^ Of course, this was to be expected. Beneš' reluctance to invite the Soviet Union to these talks fully conformed with his foreign policy concept and orientation towards the Western powers, a line he pursued throughout his presidency.The Soviet Ambassador in Prague, S. S. Alexandrovsky, in describing Beneš' policy, wrote to Moscow: ``I have no doubt that this dry pedant and shrewed diplomat from start to finish has hoped to achieve the maximum possible for Czechoslovakia through British and French support and only regards Soviet assistance, from the point of view of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, as an extremely suicidal means of defending Czechoslovakia from Hitler's = attack."^^2^^
Despite Beneš' possession of reliable information about the Soviet Union's readiness to assist Czechoslovakia in her endeavour to preserve her freedom and independence, he was reluctant to rely on the USSR and this seriously weakened Czechoslovakia's position. On Stalin's request, the above information was brought to Beneš' notice by the leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, K. Gottwald. Recalling this in 1949, Gottwald wrote that Stalin had asked him to convey to Beneš that "the Soviet Union was prepared to render military assistance to Czechoslovakia even if France refused to do so, which was a condition of Soviet aid, and even if Poland of the Beck Government or Rumania of the boyars refused to allow Soviet troops to pass through. Naturally, stressed Stalin, the Soviet Union could render assistance to Czechoslovakia on the sole condition that Czechoslovakia would defend herself and request Soviet aid''. Gottwald conveyed this statement to = Beneš.^^3^^
The head of the Soviet military delegation visiting Czechoslovakia, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulik, also expressed the USSR's readiness to give the country military aid. During his talks with General Krejci, head of the Czechoslovak Army's General Staff, which took place on March 28, 1938, in answer to the latter's question about "whether we can help them if the Germans attack'', Kulik assured him that "aid will be forthcoming''.^^4^^
On April 23, 1938, Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak envoy to the USSR, telegrammed the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in Prague _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of Diplomacy, = Vol. III, p. 728.
^^2^^New Documents from the History of Munich, = Moscow, 1958, p. 148 (in Russian).
^^3^^For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, = December 21, 1949.
^^4^^ New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 24.
90 that at a meeting in the Kremlin, chaired by Stalin, the question of the situation in Czechoslovakia was discussed. It was decided at the meeting: "The USSR, if asked, is ready, together with France and Czechoslovakia, to undertake all measures necessary to ensure the security of Czechoslovakia.'' The envoy went on to say that the Soviet Government had instructed Alexandrovsky, its Ambassador in Prague, to convey this decision to President = Beneš.^^1^^ As the documents show, Fierlinger, in his talk on April 27, 1938, with Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, confirmed that Alexandrovsky had already informed Beneš about the Soviet Government's position on = Czechoslovakia.^^2^^Apart from these clear but confidential statements about the Soviet state's position on Czechoslovakia there were also authoritative public statements made.
This was also necessary to squash speculation in the bourgeois press in Britain, France, the USA and other countries about the USSR's position over its treaty obligations in the pact with Czechoslovakia. M. I. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, stated the Soviet Union's position towards Czechoslovakia in a report about the international situation on April 26, 1938. Kalinin explained the essence of the 1935 Soviet-French agreement on mutual assistance and the complex procedure for its application and dwelt in detail on the Soviet-Czechoslovak Mutual Assistance Pact. "The pact concluded between ourselves and Czechoslovakia,'' he pointed out, "is unusual only in that, as is stated in the protocol signed at the conclusion of this treaty, at the same time both governments acknowledge that the obligations of mutual assistance will be enacted between them only insofar as, under the conditions stipulated in the present treaty, help in the event of attack is given by France. In other words this reservation means,'' continued Kalinin, "that the Soviet Union is obliged to help Czechoslovakia only if France also helps her and, in return Czechoslovakia will only help us if France does. Of course, the pact does not forbid either side to give aid without waiting for = France."^^3^^
Despite this completely clear statement of the Soviet Government's position over Czechoslovakia, the Western bourgeois press continued to spread their evil fabrications aimed at discrediting the USSR.
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid., p. 26.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 29.
^^3^^M. I. Kalinin, About the International Situation, = Moscow, 1938, pp. 13--14 (in Russian).
91Continuing, as before, their vigorous defence of Czechoslovakia, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government deemed it necessary to make another public statement about the USSR's position on this question and instructed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, to do this. Litvinov stated this position in detail in a speech made in Leningrad on June 23, 1938. "Our pacts with France and Czechoslovakia,'' the People's Commissar said, "as well as providing for assistance in the event of war, are aimed at averting or lessening the danger of war in certain parts of Europe. In the face of the threat now hanging over Czechoslovakia it must be clear to the whole world that the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact is fulfilling its function, that is, it is the most, if not the only, important factor relaxing the atmosphere around Czechoslovakia. It is necessary to say that in promising assistance to the victim of aggression the Soviet Government does not use this assistance in order to pressure the victim into capitulation to the aggressor and into acting in such a way as to make any assistance superfluous. Naturally, our general policy of peace makes us desire that the conflicts arising between Czechoslovakia and her neighbours be solved in a peaceful way, but we strictly refrain from offering any kind of unsolicited advice to the Czechoslovak Government for we believe in its peaceful intentions and consider that the government itself will know the reasonable limits of concession commensurate with the state's prestige, sovereignty and independence. From the international point of view, Czechoslovakia is the defending side and the responsibility for any consequences will be the = aggressor's."^^1^^ On June 25, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to Alexandrovsky in Prague informing the latter of his speech in which he presented the Soviet Government's position over Czechoslovakia and directing that President Beneš should be informed about = this.^^2^^ But the Soviet Union was not content with a public statement of its position on this question. It also took varied measures to exert pressure on the Hitler Government. To this end the Soviet press conducted a lively and systematic campaign in defence of freedom and independence of the Czechoslovak state. Using a wide range of pretexts, the Soviet Government stressed, on the one hand, the complete groundlessness of the Hitlerite demands on Czechoslovakia and, on the other, the readiness of the Czechoslovak people to fight for national independence. With this, _-_-_
^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 60.
^^2^^Ibid.
92 the Soviet Union left no doubts that it would render all possible assistance to Czechoslovakia should her people fall victim to Hitlerite aggression. Thus, for example, Litvinov informed Alexandrovsky by telegram of his talk on the 22nd of August with Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, in which he spelt out once again the Soviet Government's position on the = Czechoslovak question.^^1^^ The People's Commissar confirmed the USSR's readiness to fulfil its obligations and expressed confidence that "the Czechoslovak people will fight for their independence as one man and that France, in the event of attack on Czechoslovakia, will oppose Germany'', that Britain will be dragged in on the French side and that "we also will fulfil our obligations to Czechoslovakia''.^^2^^The Soviet position is presented in more detail in the minutes of this meeting. It is said in these that Litvinov also quite plainly stated the ulterior motives of the Hitler Government which was deliberately blowing up the spurious question of the Sudeten Germans. He put it straight to the Ambassador that the Sudeten Germans question was no more than Berlin's pretext for carrying out a campaign to seize Czechoslovakia: ``Germany is concerned more to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a whole than it is about the fate of the Sudeten Germans. It wants to seize the country.'' The People's Commissar stressed that should it come to war the USSR would fulfil its promise to support Czechoslovakia, "will keep its word and do everything in its = power".^^3^^
The Czechoslovak Government could not fail to appreciate the Soviet Union's consistent position over giving assistance to Czechoslovakia. On May 30, Alexandrovsky wrote that in his talk with Krofta, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter "several times and with some warmth expressed direct gratitude for the USSR's calm and firm support during the recent critical period. The confidence that the USSR is quite seriously and without hesitation intending and preparing to aid Czechoslovakia in the event of real need is very reassuring and heartening to = us''.^^4^^
In the meantime, London and Paris increased their pressure on the Czechoslovak Government, trying to induce it to capitulate in full. The British press played a very active role in this: it spread anti-Czechoslovak propaganda over its pages, printed articles _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid. p. 66.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, Part 1, 1918--1945, Moscow, 1967, p. 314 (in Russian).
^^4^^New Documents from the History of Munich, pp. 50--51.
93 defending the fascist Henlein party which had provoked bloody clashes in Czechoslovakia, even to the point of killing German fascists in order to accuse the Czechoslovak Government of being unable to ensure order in the country and protect Czechoslovak citizens of German origin from ``oppression''. All the Western bourgeois press spread the most absurd falsifications about the USSR in order to sow doubts among the broad masses in the Soviet Union's ability, in view of its ``weakness'', to fulfil its treaty obligations to give assistance to Czechoslovakia. Spreading such falsehoods was also necessary to justify Anglo-French diplomatic collusion with fascist Germany at Czechoslovakia's expense.One can gain a very clear idea of the methods and means used by London and Paris, and also by Washington, from the telegram which Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Envoy in Britain, sent on April 28,1938, to the Foreign Ministry in Prague. It said that the British War Minister "in strict confidence informed the leading press representatives from the USA of his opinion of the international situation. Everything he said about Czechoslovakia was pessimistic. Nothing apparently could be done to save Czechoslovakia from German dominance, which might even be achieved without direct attack. Literally he said: ``The fate of Czechoslovakia is already decided....' Czechoslovakia was apparently unable to defend herself, since defences had not been prepared on her southern border, and France and the USSR seemed unable to = help."^^1^^ During the "May crisis'', the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bonnet, also exerted heavy pressure on Prague to stop the Czechoslovak Government from carrying out mobilisation against the possible attack from Hitler Germany. As is evident from a telegram of May 22, 1938, sent by Osusky, the Czechoslovak Envoy in Paris, in a conversation with him Bonnet declared that "he hopes Czechoslovakia will not continue mobilisation".^^2^^
Britain and France were not the only countries to exert pressure on Czechoslovakia to capitulate to Germany. The US diplomatic representatives were also acting in the same spirit. Thus, Osusky informed Prague in the above-mentioned telegram about the comments from the US diplomatic representative in Paris:
"The American Envoy told me that we stood on the brink of a war which would destroy all Europe, that this was the most _-_-_
^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 32.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 39.
94 opportune time for Germany since Poland and Rumania were likely to begin a war against Russia; Italy, after a suitable pause, would join Germany. Initially, Britain would do her best not to participate. Czechoslovakia and France would be by themselves. Czechoslovakia would defend herself as long as Hungary did not interfere.'' Osusky informed Prague that he had not agreed with the American Envoy's evaluation of the situation. However, the Envoy disagreed with Osusky, declaring that he was mistaken in his evaluation of the situation that had = evolved.^^1^^ Here is a deliberate attempt to paint the picture black in order to intimidate Czechoslovakia with the inevitability of a German attack and with the fact that the USSR would not come to her assistance because it itself would be under attack from Poland and Rumania. British diplomacy played the main role in the campaign of pressure on the Czechoslovak Government, since the Chamberlain Government was conducting a policy of collusion with Hitler arid Czechoslovakia was the ``concession'' which Chamberlain was prepared to make to the fascist dictator. However, carrying out this deal was hampered insofar as Czechoslovakia was able to rely on the mutual assistance agreements with France and the USSR. British diplomacy was particularly worried about possible interference from the Soviet Union. Therefore, London actively supported the Hitler demand that Czechoslovakia rescind her mutual assistance pact with the USSR. In this way, the Foreign Office hoped to leave Czechoslovakia without her only support and thus reduce her to the role of a pawn in the complex game between London and Berlin. In short, the agreement between Czechoslovakia and the USSR was a thorn in the side of both Chamberlain and Hitler. Henderson was very candid about this in his report to London of July 22. "There can never be appeasement in Europe so long as Czechoslovakia retains her link with Moscow and is hostile to = Germany."^^2^^ Henderson's conclusion was not unexpected. At the end of January 1938, Henderson had announced at a government meeting that Czechoslovakia had to extricate herself from her agreement with the = USSR.^^3^^During the "May crisis" there was deliberate emphasis in London and Paris on the danger of a military conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The object of this was to convince _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p. 39--40.
^^2^^Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919--1939, = Third Series, Vol. 1, No.~534, p. 618 (DBFP).
^^3^^PRO, Cab. 27/623, p. 41.
95 public opinion in both countries and indeed throughout Europe of the necessity for Czechoslovakia to make concessions.The subsequent activity of Anglo-French diplomacy confirmed that the emphasis placed on the danger of war was only to serve as a convenient cover for secret, behind-the-scenes talks with the Hitlerites about an agreement at Czechoslovakia's expense. The Hitlerites, for their part, expressed their wish to improve Anglo-German relations. It was with this aim that Hitler's adjutant, Captain Wiedemann, made repeated visits to London during the summer of 1938.
Dirksen, the German Ambassador in London, says that Wiedemann arrived with Hitler's knowledge that summer in order to explore the possibility of Goering's visit to Britain. Wiedemann had talks with Halifax and his deputy Cadogan. The British Government welcomed the idea of Goering's visit. "Halifax went so far,'' wrote Dirksen, "as to say that it would be the finest moment of his life to see the Fuhrer drive along the = Mall^^1^^ with the King on an official visit to = London."^^2^^
In describing the Chamberlain Government's foreign policy, Dirksen repeatedly noted that the British ruling circles "as'before are seeking agreement with = Germany".^^3^^ On July 24, 1938, Dirksen informed Berlin that during a talk with him, Chamberlain had expressed readiness to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for the sake of an Anglo-German = agreement."^^4^^
On August 23, 1938, Horace Wilson, government advisor and Chamberlain's closest and most trusted colleague, was even more frank about the conclusion of an agreement at the expense of Czechoslovakia in a conversation with Kordt, the German Charge d'Affaires in Britain. Kordt noted in his letter to Weizsacker, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informing the latter about these talks, that Wilson had said straight out, "If we, Britain and Germany, together come to some agreement over the Czech problem then we can overcome any opposition to it that might be forthcoming from France and = Czechoslovakia."^^5^^ Kordt wrote that "they (the English ---author) are, undoubtedly, also ready to do everything in their power to meet our requirements, but, of course, at a = price".^^6^^
_-_-_^^1^^The Mall is a street in London leading to Buckingham Palace.
^^2^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 179.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 254.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 180.
^^5^^Ibid., p. 48.
^^6^^Ibid., p. 36.
96The pro-Hitler mood was widespread among British diplomats; this is seen, for example, in the case of Smart, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Cairo. The German Envoy to Egypt wrote to Dirksen on May 19,1938, that in a conversation with Smart and his wife, the latter in the presence of her husband declared, "It is a pity you did not move into Prague at the same time as you entered Vienna. In any case, if you move at all, I hope you will do it soon, for in two months time the situation in London might be much less favourable."^^1^^
The secret negotiations, conducted on Chamberlain's instructions with the German Ambassador in London in the summer of 1938, convinced Hitler that he would meet no serious opposition in carrying out his aggressive plans with regard to Czechoslovakia.
Therefore, Berlin built up tensions using the Henlein agents in Czechoslovakia. At the beginning of September Hitler began open military preparations against Czechoslovakia.
When the situation became very heated Chamberlain initiated his secret plan for a broad agreement with Germany. This was "Plan~Z'', which had been drawn up in the greatest secrecy. Those few who knew of the plan apart from Chamberlain were: the Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Berlin Nevile Henderson, and Horace Wilson, a close and trusted colleague of = Chamberlain.^^2^^ Wilson wrote that the plan's success depended on its total unexpectedness. In essence, Chamberlain, taking advantage of the situation that had been artificially created around Czechoslovakia by the Hitlerites, would suggest a personal meeting to Hitler, voicing his readiness to arrive in Germany and have discussions in the name of "saving peace''. At these talks Chamberlain intended to come to an agreement with Hitler, promising him help in annexing the Sudetenland, and covering this betrayal by giving the remaining part of Czechoslovakia a British guarantee of its independence. However, as Chamberlain himself admitted at a Cabinet meeting on September 14,1938, the value of this guarantee was very relative, being for the most part a "restraining factor'', and Britain would be unable to save the remaining part of Czechoslovakia if Germany decided to seize = it.^^3^^
Chamberlain estimated that he could achieve, at Czechoslovakia's expense, a broad Anglo-German agreement which _-_-_
^^1^^IDA, Documents, Vol. II, p. 244.
^^2^^The Sunday Times, January 5, 1969.
^^3^^ PRO, Cab. 23/95, pp. 42--43.
97 would guarantee Britain the safety of her colonial empire and at the same time direct German fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. On September 15,1938, Chamberlain, an old man of 70, flew to Berchtesgaden for his meeting with Hitler, which lasted three hours. The whole course of the talks showed that for Chamberlain the ``settlement'' of the Czechoslovak problem was only a means of attaining his main aim, rapprochement between Britain and Germany. He stated that, "from the moment of his appointment as British Prime Minister, he has been constantly occupied with the question of Anglo-German = rapprochement".^^1^^During the talks, Chamberlain said that to have undertaken such a trip at his age was not easy and was evidence of "the importance he attaches to an Anglo-German rapprochement, and is by the same token proof of his sincere wish to do everything possible to find a way out of the present = difficulties''.^^2^^ Chamberlain did not try to conceal that for him the Czechoslovak problem was not that important. "At the present time,'' he said, "considerably more important problems need discussing apart from Czechoslovakia.'' Therefore, he, "aware of these tensions, has undertaken the trip to Germany to try to ease the situation by direct talks with the = F\"uhrer".^^3^^
That is why Chamberlain suggested at the beginning an exchange of views on the situation in general so as to understand each other correctly and to establish "whether or not it is possible to reach an agreement".
However, Hitler succeeded in making the question of the Sudeten Germans the first question to be discussed. Hitler, using his favourite method of blackmail, told Chamberlain that Germany could abrogate the Anglo-German Navy Agreement, since it had been concluded on the assumption that both signatory countries would never go to war against each = other.^^4^^
Hitler, throwing aside everything that had previously been said by his government about the lack of civil rights for the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, stated that his main demand would be the return of three million Czechoslovak Germans to the Reich, which in reality meant the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. He also said that there were similar demands from the Poles, Hungarians and Ukrainians living in Czechoslovakia. It was _-_-_
^^1^^Akten zur deutschen auswartig Politik, 1918--1945, = Ser.~D. Vol.~II; Baden-Baden, 1953, p.~627 (subsequently given as ADAP).
^^2^^ADAP, Vol. II, p. 628.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 627.
^^4^^Ibid. p. 630.
98 perfectly clear that this was a matter of destroying the Czechoslovak = state.^^1^^Blackmailing Chamberlain, Hitler stated that nothing would stop him in achieving his aim, even if this meant going as far as war, even a world war, and that the Czechoslovak problem "would be solved one way or another".
Hitler, having laid down his demands over Czechoslovakia, did not forget to remind Chamberlain about Germany's colonial demands.^^2^^
Chamberlain was not in the least discouraged by all these Hitler's pretensions and cynically declared that Britain did not have an interest in the Sudeten-German question as such and, therefore, "as a practical person he had already thought of how to bring about the possible inclusion of the Sudeten Germans into the Third = Reich".^^3^^ At the same time he said that he personally acknowledged the principle of the cessation of the Sudeten territory but wanted to consult his Cabinet and the French Government.
Chamberlain took the initiative, in the form of a question to Hitler, to suggest the removal of Czechoslovakia's treaties with the USSR and France. The notes of the talks record that he "gave the Fuhrer to understand that Czechoslovakia could not remain poised like the point of a spear threatening the German flank. 'After the Sudeten Germans enter the Third Reich will the remaining part of Czechoslovakia still be regarded as a spear whose point is threatening the German flank?' he asked.'' The Fuhrer, of course, was quick to agree with this saying that "this would be the situation as long as the Czechoslovak state has alliances with other states which threaten = Germany".^^4^^
The British Prime Minister then went further. He "asked if the German apprehensions would be removed vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia if it proved possible to change the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Russia in such a way that, on the one hand, Czechoslovakia would be free from its obligations to Russia in the event of the latter being attacked, and, on the other hand, Czechoslovakia, like Belgium, would be deprived of the possibility of aid from Russia or another = country".^^5^^
_-_-_^^1^^ADAP, Vol, II. p.~628.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Ibid. p. 632.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 632.
^^5^^Ibid.
__PRINTERS_P_099_COMMENT__ 1/2~4* 99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1976/UFPAA243/20051004/199.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2005.07.04) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+This declaration of Chamberlain's shows that he came to Hitler with a well-conceived plan of action which foresaw both the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the destruction of the foundations of European collective security, the most important aspects of which were the Franco-Soviet and Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance pacts. It was these pacts that contained Hitler aggression in Europe and thus preserved peace.
The British Government, by destroying these pacts, gave away Czechoslovakia to Hitler and weakened the positions of France and the Soviet Union, who were deprived of the possibility of helping Czechoslovakia which was bound by alliance treaties with them. The Chamberlain Government strove to isolate the USSR and leave it face to face with fascist Germany, and this in reality meant prompting Hitler to attack the USSR.
Hitler's only ``concession'' to Chamberlain was to agree to hold the next meeting with him in Cologne or Godesberg rather than Berchtesgaden.^^1^^
On September 16, Chamberlain returned to London and the same day a meeting of the Cabinet approved the results of the Chamberlain-Hitler talks.
On September 18, Daladier and Bonnet came to London to discuss the results of the talks. The discussions resulted in the Anglo-French statement of September 19, handed to the Beneš-Hodza Government. It contained demands which the Czechoslovak Government was to accept without delay, allegedly in the name of "preserving peace''. It was given only two days in all to accept this. These demands contained the following: Czechoslovakia was to cede to Germany that part of its territory where the majority of the population were Germans (over 50 per cent). The remaining part of Czechoslovakia would receive international guarantees for its future security from all the neighbouring states plus Britain and France. One of the conditions of such guarantees was to be the replacement of existing treaties with mutual obligations of a military nature, which in reality meant scrapping the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR and the treaty with = France.^^2^^
In its answer to the British and French, on September 20, the Czechoslovak Government pointed out that acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals would mean "the mutilation of all the state's functions. The Czechoslovak economy and transport system would be completely undermined and her strategic position would _-_-_
^^1^^ADAP, Vol. II, p. 631.
^^2^^New Documents from the History of Munich, pp. 94--97.
100 be untenable; sooner or later she would be completely subordinated to = Germany".^^1^^ The Czechoslovak Government further emphasised that acceptance of these crippling demands would not create a firm guarantee of peace in the = future.^^2^^ As the telegram of September 21 to all Czechoslovak missions abroad shows, the British and French increased their pressure on the BeneS Government. The telegram said that the British and French envoys in Prague visited Beneš again at 02.00 in the morning. They stated that if Czechoslovakia rejected their governments' proposals then she would "take upon herself the risk of causing a war. The French Government in such circumstances would not be able to participate and its aid would be ineffectual. Acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals is the only way of preventing a direct attack by Germany. If we persist with our original answer then Chamberlain will not be able to go to Hitler and Britain will not be able to shoulder the responsibility"."In view of this ultimatum and finding ourselves completely isolated,'' the telegram concluded, "the Czechoslovak Government, it seems, will be compelled to submit to insurmountable pressure. An answer will be given to the British and French envoys within 24 = hours."^^3^^
This showed that the Czechoslovak Government had actually yielded to the Anglo-French demands before it officially acceded to them and did so not because it had found itself isolated. Here the matter was more complicated. The Beneš-Hodza Government feared the Czechoslovak people and their democratic anti-fascist aspirations. It feared that if things came to a war between Czechoslovakia and Germany then from the very beginning it would take on an anti-fascist character and might weaken the class position of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie as well as lead to the fall of the Hitlerite regime. Explaining why the Beneš Government, in the critical days of September 1938, took a course of national betrayal, renouncing opposition to fascist Germany and refusing Soviet assistance, Alexandrovsky wrote in his letter to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on September 29: "I feel that Beneš' behaviour is explained by that same social fear that has infected and controls the other 'peace-makers' in Europe. Beneš fears the = masses."^^4^^ Guided by these narrow bourgeois class interests, the _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p. 107.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 116--17.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 117.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 149.
__PRINTERS_P_101_COMMENT__ 5-615 101 Beneš Government decided not to offer military resistance to the aggressor, taking, therefore, the path of capitulation. But it was impossible to make a direct statement to this effect because of the tide of patriotic feeling that swept the Czechoslovak people. Therefore the government was forced to manoeuvre and reassure the people. To justify its betrayal the Czechoslovak Government urgently needed that the Anglo-French demands appear as an ultimatum.In this manoeuvring Beneš showed himself as a very skilful and inveterate bourgeois leader. He was heading to capitulation but arranging it so that it seemed to be a decision forced upon him, leaving him with no other option.
It will be reminded that on September 19, as soon as Beneš received the Anglo-French demands, he promptly summoned Alexandrovsky, the Soviet Ambassador, and told him of the demands. He then requested Alexandrovsky to ask Moscow whether the USSR would render immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia if France did the same. Beneš also talked about the possibility of mobilisation, which could be declared on September = 20.^^1^^
That same evening, i.e. September 19, Beneš summoned the leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, K. Gottwald. During their talk, BeneS repeatedly stressed that Czechoslovakia would defend herself if attacked. "Beneš firmly assured Gottwald that capitulation was excluded.'' In the course of the conversation, "Beneš asked Gottwald's opinion of how the USSR would act''. The latter replied that although he was not empowered to answer for the Soviet Union, still "nobody could have grounds to doubt that the USSR will fulfil its obligations. If it is a question of something above the obligations then BeneS should state exactly what and ask the Soviet = Government".^^2^^
On September 22, 1938, Beneš made a statement to the Czechoslovak people designed to allay their fears, although such a speech was not justified. Thus, for example, he said: "Have no fear for the fate of the nation and the state; they both have deep and strong = roots."^^3^^
It is significant that on the very same day Churchill gave a warning about the grave consequences awaiting the Czechoslovak people if their country capitulated under Anglo-French pressure. _-_-_
^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, pp. 98--100.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 101--02.
^^3^^Izvestia. September 23, 1938.
102 He warned that capitulation to Germany held out no peace and security to Britain and France = either.^^1^^On September 21, 1938, the Beneš Government announced its acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals. Having achieved this victory Chamberlain quickly flew out to Hitler.
At the new meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler on September 22 and 23 in Godesberg, the fascist dictator made additional demands. In particular, he demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army and police from the Sudeten region and their place to be taken by German soldiers. Not rejecting these demands in principle, Anglo-French diplomacy intensively manoeuvred, delaying the final decision so as to force Hitler to agree on co-operation with Britain and France. The latter, however, did not want to give such assurances. Moreover, London and Paris utilised this time to overtly prepare for ``war'' so that it would later be easier to justify their prearranged betrayal of Czechoslovakia as a sacrifice to save peace.
At the same time the British and French cabinets were making appropriate preparations through their press, where they spread false rumours that the USSR, in view of its "military weakness'', was refusing to assist Czechoslovakia.
Not content with this, Paris undertook the following manoeuvre: it wanted "proof in the form of a statement by the Soviet Government that it would not be able to help Czechoslovakia. With this aim, it sent an appropriate request to Moscow calculated to induce a negative reply. Paris, without stating its own position, despite the fact that according to the treaty with Czechoslovakia Soviet assistance was dependent on French assistance, asked whether or not the USSR would help Czechoslovakia if Poland (France's ally) and Rumania refused passage to Soviet troops.
The Soviet Government, despite the form of the question, gave a positive answer. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs said in a telegram to the USSR Ambassador in Prague on September 2 that Payart, the French Charge d'Affaires to the USSR, was informed that "France is obliged to help Czechoslovakia irrespective of our assistance, and our assistance is dependent on the French; it would therefore be more in keeping for us to be inquiring about French assistance ... providing France gives assistance we will carry out to the full our obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact, using every means at our = disposal".^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid.
^^2^^New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 70.
103Since communications appeared in the Polish and Rumanian press from time to time stating that these countries would not allow the passage of Soviet troops through their territory for them to assist Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Government considered it desirable for the League of Nations to discuss the Czechoslovak problem and pass a resolution about aggression against Czechoslovakia. Such a resolution would make it easier for the USSR and France to render assistance to the Czechoslovak state.
Since the forms of this assistance were to be discussed at a meeting of representatives of the Soviet, French and Czechoslovak armies, the USSR stated its readiness to participate in such a meeting. The Soviet Government found it "difficult to imagine the defence of Czechoslovakia by the three states without their military experts having a preliminary discussion on .practical steps''. The Soviet Government also proposed the convocation of a meeting of states interested in preserving peace, which would draw up a declaration against the aggressor. Britain, France and the USSR would have to participate in such a meeting, which would keep Hitler from a military = adventure.^^1^^
The USSR felt it very important that the League of Nations also be included in the defence of Czechoslovakia from fascist aggression. Since France was slow to answer this Soviet proposal, communicated to Payart on September 2, the Soviet Government again raised the matter during a meeting between Potemkin, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Payart on September 5. In answer to the French representative's doubts about whether the League of Nations would be able to come to a unanimous agreement on declaring Germany the aggressor, Potemkin said that "the positive decision of the majority would be enough to produce the required effect on international public opinion and perhaps make Rumania and Poland change their present position about Soviet assistance to = Czechoslovakia".^^2^^
The USSR again repeated its proposal to convene a meeting of the three powers, the USSR, France and Britain, so as to avert a military conflict. As for the concrete forms of assistance to Czechoslovakia, the USSR stated that, as formerly, it felt it desirable to hold a meeting of representatives of the general staffs of the USSR, France and = Czechoslovakia.^^3^^
_-_-_^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, pp. 71--72.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 73--74.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 74.
104Meanwhile, encouraged by Hitler Germany, the reactionary Polish Government began to openly concentrate its troops along the Czechoslovak border. On September 22, Alexandrovsky sent a telegram to Moscow saying that the Czechoslovak Government possessed the appropriate information and requested that the Soviet Government make a representation to the Polish Government.^^1^^ The Soviet Government immediately issued a serious warning to Warsaw.
The Soviet Government statement, handed to the Polish Envoy in Moscow at 04.00 a.m. on September 23, said that the Polish Government as yet had not refuted the alarming information about the concentration of Polish troops on the border with Czechoslovakia. "The Government of the USSR is expecting,'' continued the statement, "to receive such a refutation immediately. Nevertheless, should it not be forthcoming and if in confirmation of this information Polish troops actually cross the border of the Czechoslovak Republic and occupy its territory, then the Government of the USSR would consider it timely and necessary to warn the Government of the Polish Republic that on the basis of clause 2 of the pact of non-aggression" of 1932 the Soviet Government, in view of the Polish act of aggression against Czechoslovakia, would be compelled to denounce this treaty without = warning.^^2^^
Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak Envoy in Moscow, in describing this demarche of the Soviet Government in defence of Czechoslovak independence in his dispatch to Prague on September 29, 1938, gave it his high appraisal. He wrote that the Soviet statement "shows the Soviet Union's intention quite plainly. They have closely followed our negotiations with the Poles and do not intend to leave Warsaw's treatment of us = unpunished".^^3^^
Fierlinger drew the attention of the Czechoslovak Government to the fact that the USSR had always occupied a firm position over the necessity to defend Czechoslovak independence. He wrote that "one can observe far more decisiveness in government circles here to make a significant effort in the event of a world conflict than one at first realises from the outside or from the speeches of = Litvinov''.^^4^^
More than two weeks had passed since September 2, when the Soviet Union had given its clear and positive answer to the French _-_-_
^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 131.
^^2^^lbid., pp. 132--33,
^^3^^Ibid., p. 146.
^^4^^lbid.
105 Government's question about rendering assistance to Czechoslovakia. However, French public opinion remained in ignorance about the position the Soviet Union would take if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia. As formerly, the French press carried a variety of conjectures on this very important question. There could be no doubt that the Daladier-Bonnet Government intentionally withheld the information about the Soviet Union's position from the public and press. The Soviet Union had convincing proof that Anglo-French diplomacy was frantically searching for a way of colluding with the aggressor and was deliberately concealing from the world public the USSR's positive answer about its readiness to render assistance to Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Government therefore decided to make its position on this important question common knowledge by taking advantage of the rostrum of the League of Nations. M. M. Litvinov did this in a speech at the plenum of the League on September 21, 1938. "When the French Government,'' he said, "inquired about our position in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, I gave them, on behalf of my government, a completely clear-cut and unambiguous answer that we intended to fulfil our obligations under the pact and together with France render assistance to Czechoslovakia...."The Soviet representative further stated the desirability for the League to discuss the threat of German aggression so as to work out a collective = demarche.^^1^^ The People's Commissar spoke about the USSR's readiness to fulfil its obligations to Czechoslovakia in a speech at a meeting of the Political Committee of the League on September 23, = 1938.^^2^^ The USSR backed its readiness with appropriate acts. A. M. Vasilevsky, at that time occupying a responsible post in the Soviet General Staff, writes the following in his memoirs: "In September 1938, when danger hung over Czechoslovakia, and we did not know that the Munich treachery would wreck her defence and were getting ready to render her assistance together with France, as the agreement stipulated, the staff of the KSMD (Kiev Special Military-District ---author) received a directive from People's Commissar Voroshilov to bring the Vinnitsa Army Group up to battle readiness and to advance it to the = border."^^3^^ In all, the Soviet Union moved 30 infantry divisions as well as cavalry divisions up to its Western border. The _-_-_
^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 125.
^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 135--36.
^^3^^A. M. Vasilevsky, A Lifetime's Work, = Moscow, 1973, p. 97 (in Russian).
106 air and tank arms were brought up to battle readiness. Some 246 bombers and 302 fighter planes, which were concentrated in the Byelorussian and Kiev military districts, were prepared for dispatch to = Czechoslovakia.^^1^^ The People's Commissariat of Defence informed Paris of these military preparations on September 25, = 1938.^^2^^ Alas, as Voroshilov, the People's Commissar for Defence, said on August 22, 1939, "last year, when Czechoslovakia went under, we waited for a sign from France. Our troops were ready, but the sign was not = given".^^3^^Meanwhile, Hitler Germany, encouraged by the London and Paris appeasers, continued to raise the tension around Czechoslovakia, openly preparing for an invasion. However, the Czechoslovak peoples were not cowed. A powerful wave of patriotic demonstrations spread through the country, voicing demands that the government repulse the aggressor's attack. Mass demonstrations took place in Prague. The demonstrators sent delegations to the Soviet Embassy, where they had talks with Alexandrovsky, the Soviet Ambassador. The latter informed Moscow about these talks during which he assured the delegates that "the USSR holds the Czechoslovak Republic and the interests of her working people dearly, and therefore is ready to defend her from aggression. The possibility of rendering assistance has been complicated by France's refusal, but the USSR is. searching for ways and will find them if Czechoslovakia is attacked and is forced to defend herself".^^4^^ The Czechoslovak Communists appealed to the Beneš Government to decisively rebuff German aggression, firmly believing that the USSR would help them in this struggle against the invaders. "We know,'' pointed out L. I. Brezhnev, "that the Czechoslovak working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party, have always regarded friendship with the Soviet Union as the means of ensuring the lasting independence and freedom of the Czechoslovak state. During the tragic days of Munich the Czechoslovak Communists called on the country to rely firmly on the Soviet Union, which had clearly demonstrated its readiness to honour its treaty = obligations."^^5^^
_-_-_^^1^^History of Diplomacy, Vol. III, p. 737.
^^2^^New Documents from the History of Munich, pp. 139--40.
^^3^^Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II, = Part 2, Moscow, 1973, pp. 262--263.
^^4^^New Documents from the History of Munich, p. 130.
^^5^^ L. I. Brezhnev, = The foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. = Speeches and Articles, Moscow, 1973, p. 266 (in Russian).
107Although the Beneš Government had no doubts that the USSR would side with the Czechoslovak people if they took up arms to defend their national independence and freedom, it was cold-bloodedly preparing to capitulate. But in the atmosphere of great patriotic enthusiasm that ran throughout the country Beneš and Hodza had to tread warily. They yearned to cover their treason with some sort of statement about the USSR not being able to fulfil its obligations to assist Czechoslovakia. With this in mind, Beneš asked Moscow on September 19 whether or not the USSR would help Czechoslovakia in the event of her being attacked by Germany. The Soviet Government's telegram of September 20 gave a clear and positive answer. This was sent by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to Alexandrovsky, for the latter to convey the answer to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic. It contained the following:
``1) To Beneš' question, whether or not the USSR (in accord with the treaty) will give immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia if France also remains true to Czechoslovakia and gives her assistance, you may give, on behalf of the Soviet Government, an affirmative reply.
``2) You may also give an affirmative reply to Beneš' other question on whether or not the USSR will help Czechoslovakia, as a member of the League of Nations, on the basis of clauses 16 and 17, if, in the event of attack by Germany, BeneS requests the League Council to invoke these clauses.
``3) Inform Beneš that we are simultaneously making the content of our answer to both his questions known to the French Government.''^^1^^
Alexandrovsky informed Beneš of the content of this telegram by telephone on September 20, 1938, when the latter was attending a government meeting at which the Anglo-French ultimatum was being discussed. Potemkin gave the same positive reply to Fierlinger on September 22, in response to the question, "Could the Soviet Government give assistance to Czechoslovakia, if the latter was attacked by Germany, without waiting for the Council of the League of Nations' = decision?"^^2^^ However, the bourgeois Czechoslovak Government, despite this assurance from the Soviet Government, decided to accept the Anglo-French demands, which meant complete capitulation to Hitler Germany. In this connection it is worth reminding of Beneš' interview to the Chicago Daily News _-_-_
^^1^^New Documents from the History of Munich, pp. 103--04.
^^2^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of Diplomacy, = Vol. III, p. 737.
108 in May 1942. He admitted in the interview that he had received an official and positive statement that the USSR was ready with every means and with its whole military might to defend the independence of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union remained loyal to us until the last. The Soviet Government solemnly promised me, he said, that it would give the Czechoslovak people military assistance even if France and Britain refused to do so. When Beneš informed his government about the USSR's readiness to render assistance, a group of ministers led by Makhnik, member of the Agrarian Party, decisively opposed this and threatened to stage a revolt in the country if it were accepted. Thus, the reactionary bourgeois ministers in the Czechoslovak Government were driven by their narrow class and egoistic interests to reject Soviet assistance. More than this, the government was afraid to rely on its own people, who were determined to offer armed resistance to the Hitlerite aggression. As Beneš himself said in that same interview, if, at that fateful moment, I had turned to the people, I have no doubt that there would have been neither Munich nor a March 15, 1939.Berlin was well informed of the mood in favour of capitulation that prevailed in the Czechoslovak ruling circles. It also knew that the London and Paris cabinets were guided by these same egoistic class interests in their attempt to conclude a deal with Germany at Czechoslovakia's expense.
This policy of ``appeasing'' fascist Germany, pursued by the British and French governments, which full US approval, encouraged Hitler, who clearly blackmailed the Anglo-French appeasers when, in a speech on September 26,1938, he threateningly declared that if the Sudeten region had not been handed over to Germany by October 1, then he, Hitler, would go as the first soldier to strike against Czechoslovakia.
On the same day that Hitler made this statement, the US Government appealed to both Hitler and Beneš to "settle their dispute peacefully'', in this way putting both the victim and the aggressor on the same = level.^^1^^ Of course, Hitler merely used such an appeal as an additional means of exerting pressure on Prague.
The US President then suggested convening a conference of five countries: Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia, to "solve the dispute''. The Soviet Union, the only country to have supported Czechoslovakia, was not invited to the proposed _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy, Vol. IV, p. 391.
109 conference, which leaves no doubt about how the Czechoslovak question was expected to be solved. Of course, Roosevelt's suggestion helped Chamberlain and Daladier speed up their preparations for Munich, especially as the USA had earlier approved the results of the Berchtesgaden negotiations between Chamberlain and Hitler. The US Secretary of State Hull himself called these negotiations an "historic = meeting''.^^1^^Only the Soviet Union continued the endeavour to defend Czechoslovakia, appealing to the great powers to support her against the Hitler threats and to create a united front to check the aggressor. This proposal was made on September 28.
In London and Paris, this Soviet proposal was ignored as were its predecessors. They had other things on their minds there, viz. how to clinch their shady deal with Hitler at the expense of Czechoslovakia without the USA, whose intermediary Chamberlain particularly opposed. Therefore a conference was promptly convened in Munich on September 29, 1938 with delegates from Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Representatives of Czechoslovakia were summoned there only to be informed of the conference's decision.
In Munich, Hitler realised his plan which he had mentioned to Chamberlain during their September 15 meeting: in alliance with fascist Poland and Horthy Hungary they took other areas populated with Polish and Hungarian minorities from Czechoslovakia as well as the Sudeten region. As a result, Czechoslovakia lost almost a fifth of her territory and about a quarter of her population. Moreover, half the country's heavy industry was concentrated in the ceded territory.
The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was not the end in itself for Chamberlain and Daladier when they organised the Munich deal. The betrayal of Czechoslovakia was to have been the price they paid for Hitler's agreement to conclude pacts of non-aggression and co-operation with Britain and France guaranteeing also the integrity of their colonial possessions. These pacts were the Anglo-German Declaration signed in Munich on September 30, 1938, by Hitler and = Chamberlain,^^2^^ and the Franco-German Declaration signed by Ribbentrop and Bonnet in Paris on December = 6.^^3^^ It was the Anglo-German Declaration that Chamberlain triumphantly raised above his head when he left the _-_-_
^^1^^New York Times, September 16, 1938.
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II, = Part 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 41.
^^3^^Ibid., pp. 130--31.
110 plane on his return from Munich, and loudly declared "peace in our time''. In fact the Chamberlain Government considered this pact to be an agreement on co-operation between Britain and Germany as well as a pact of non-aggression. This indeed was confirmed by Leith-Ross, the chief economic adviser to the British Government, in talks with German = representatives.^^1^^Dirksen, the German Ambassador in London, gave a similar evaluation of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German Declaration. He wrote that the British ruling circles "were secretly glad that, as a result of the Munich Conference, Czechoslovakia was no longer the bone of contention. They regarded the Protocol signed by the Fuhrer and Chamberlain in Munich as a new basis and guide-line for developing Anglo-German relations, as 'peace in our time'. Their belief in the possibility of settling differences and easing the tension was based on = this".^^2^^
Both powers pledged themselves in this Declaration "never to wage war on each other again" and to act in such a way that "consultation has become the accepted method for examining all other questions....'' Moreover, in the Paris Declaration of December 6, it was specifically noted that "there are no more unresolved questions of a territorial nature...."
Thus Munich was an attempt by Britain and France to ``buy off'' the German aggressor by giving him Czechoslovakia and offering him a completely free hand to continue his policy of annexation in Eastern Europe against the USSR. The Anglo-French appeasers felt they had finally achieved the old plan of concluding a ``four-power pact'' spearheaded against the USSR, aimed at its isolation and satisfying Hitler's territorial claims at its expense. This policy of ``non-intervention'' and ``appeasement'' towards the aggressor was properly evaluated in the USSR. Pravda, describing the Munich Agreement, wrote: "All the peoples of the world can clearly see that behind the smokescreen of fine phrases about Chamberlain having saved the world peace at Munich, an act has been committed which by its shamelessness has surpassed all that has taken place since the first imperialist = war."^^3^^
Chamberlain and Daladier did not save peace at Munich, as the bourgeois press clamoured, but the fascist regime in Germany which rested on terror and fear. It is enough to recall that even some generals in the German army at that time were dissatisfied _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p. 66.
^^2^^Docvments, Vol. II, pp. 184--85.
^^3^^USSR in the Struggle far Peace, p. 115.
111 with Hitler's policy of sabre-rattling. However, Anglo-French reaction needed the bloody Hitler regime as a weapon with which to suppress the revolutionary movement in Europe. Georgi Dimitrov wrote at the time: "The British and French reactionaries need fascist dictators as bloody gendarmes for the battle against the international working class and the world democratic movement."^^1^^ Czechoslovakia had been given to Hitler, stressed Dimitrov, also for another reason: the Anglo-French ruling circles wanted a deal at her expense with the intention of "directing fascist aggression against the great country of socialism --- = the USSR".^^2^^Izvestia, in evaluating the Munich betrayal, emphasised at the time that "the so-called democratic countries' capitulation to the aggressor, seeming to reduce the possibility of war, in fact makes it more likely and besides immeasurably worsens the situation for Britain and = France".^^3^^
The appeal by the Communist parties of 10 European countries and of Canada and the USA on October 9, 1938, said that "the Munich betrayal has not saved peace but only endangered it, for it has struck a blow at the alliance of peace forces in all countries and encouraged the fascists to redouble their demands, now that they feel they have the support of reactionary circles in various countries".^^4^^
In the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 18th Congress of the Party (March 10, 1939), these policies of ``non-intervention'' and ``appeasement'' were described as connivance with the fascist predator, as a desire not to hinder the aggressor, "not to hinder, say, Japan from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder, say, Germany from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, 'in the interests of peace', and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. Cheap and = easy!"^^5^^
_-_-_^^1^^Georgi Dimitrov, The Earnest of Victory, = Moscow, 1938, p. 6.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Izvestia. October 4, 1938.
^^4^^Kommunistichesky Internatsional, No.~10, 1938, pp. 125--26.
^^5^^The 18th Congress of the CPSU, March 10--21, 1939, = Moscow, 1939, p. 15 (in Russian).
112D.~Z. Manuilsky, noting British imperialism's leading role in realising a policy of connivance with German fascism and its hope of ``canalising'' German aggression against the Soviet Union, said at the Congress that "the British reactionary bourgeoisie's plan is, having sacrificed the small states of South-East Europe to German fascism, to direct Germany eastwards, against the Soviet Union; to try by counter-revolutionary war to hold back the further success of socialism and the victory of communism in the USSR, and to buy off imperialist Germany's claims on the British colonies. At the same time, British reaction would like to break the teeth of German imperialism on the USSR, weaken Germany for many years and ensure the supreme position in Europe for British imperialism...."^^1^^
The authors of the History of the Second World War 1939--1945, in describing the outcome of the Munich Conference, which decided Czechoslovakia's fate, noted that the Munich Agreement, as well as allowing Hitler to dismember the Czechoslovak state, "gave him an advance to prompt his movement further eastwards. The Munich deal was an even greater danger in that it could have led to the establishment of an anti-Soviet bloc bringing together Germany, Italy, Britain and = France".^^2^^
The Munich deal was the culmination of Britain's and France's policy of connivance with the aggressors, the policy of rejecting collective security and instigating German fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. Even bourgeois historians regard the policy in this light. Wheeler-Bennett, the well-known British bourgeois historian, for example, wrote in 1946: "The object of the Munich Agreement had been to eliminate Czechoslovakia as an independent military, political and economic factor, and to prepare for further German expansion towards Poland and Russia."^^3^^ The Munich deal was drawn up by the London and Paris cabinets with active support and approval from the US Government. It is appropriate to recall the role played by Bullitt, the US Ambassador to France, who constantly supported Chamberlain and Daladier in their preparations for a deal with Hitler. Bullitt lavishly praised Chamberlain on his return from Munich^ calling him a "good man''. It is of definite interest to read what Bonnet writes in this connection in his memoirs: Bullitt visited him at the Foreign Affairs Ministry early in the morning of October 1 with a large bouquet of flowers "and with tears in his _-_-_
^^1^^The 18th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 48--49.
^^2^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945, = Vol. 1, p. IX (in Russian).
^^3^^Foreign Affairs, October 1946, p. 38.
113 eyes gave the fraternal and joyful congratulations of = America".^^1^^ Secretary of State Hull was guided by these same considerations when he stated on October 1, 1938 that the Munich Agreement gave rise to a general feeling of = relief.^^2^^There is quite sufficient evidence for us to draw the conclusion that "when the British and French governments realised their Munich deal with Hitler they had the support of the US Government, which approved of their policy of connivance with the fascist aggressor and the disgraceful Munich = deal".^^3^^
To portray their treachery as "preserving peace for the world" the Anglo-French appeasers were not loath to resort to deliberate lies, declaring that the Soviet Union had also participated in Munich. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) decisively disproved these fabrications on October 2, = 1938.^^4^^ At the same time the Soviet Government lodged a diplomatic protest against the continuing attempts to distort the Soviet Union's position on the Czechoslovak = question.^^5^^ The lies to the effect that the British and French governments regularly informed the USSR about the Czechoslovak situation and even consulted it about this were also exposed. As stated by the TASS communique of October 4, 1938, as far as the Munich Conference and its decisions were concerned, "the Soviet Government played and is playing no part in = this."^^6^^ Moreover, at all stages of the Czechoslovak tragedy, ending in the disgraceful Munich dictate, the Soviet Union gave Czechoslovakia effective assistance and support and was ready at any moment to fulfil its treaty obligations. There is every indication that if the Beneš Government had decided to offer armed resistance to the aggressor and had sought the support of the working class and other sections of the working people and had conducted a war of liberation then there would have been no doubt that the Soviet Union would have given effective assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France. Munich was a convincing demonstration to the whole world of France's attitude to her alliance obligations at that time: not only to her obligations with regard to Czechoslovakia but other states as well, in particular, her obligations under the Franco-Polish Alliance and _-_-_
^^1^^G. Bonnet, Defense de la paix de Washington au Quai d'Orsay, = Geneve, 1946, p. 294.
^^2^^The New York Times, October 1, 1938.
^^3^^History of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, = Part 1, 1917--1945, p. 322.
^^4^^Izvestia, October 2, 1938.
^^5^^Ibid., October 4, 1938.
^^6^^Ibid., October 14, 1938.
114 the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact of 1935. The Munich betrayal drew the world a serious step closer to a new world war. The leadership of the Party and the Soviet state viewed Munich in just such a way in their report on the 21st anniversary of the October Revolution. "This does not mean,'' it is said in the report, "that the appetites of the big and small plunderers of Europe have been satisfied. On the contrary, they have only been whetted and now provoke an intensified struggle over the partition of several other European countries as well as = Czechoslovakia."^^1^^Here it is appropriate to say that the 1938 Munich Agreement hampered normal relations between the CSSR and the FRG until recently. It was only in the course of negotiations over the conclusion of a treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union signed on August 12, 1970, that the Brandt Government agreed that questions associated with the invalidity of the Munich Agreement would be settled between the FRG and the CSSR in a form acceptable to both sides. And now, 35 years later, as a result of protracted negotiations, a treaty was signed on December 11,1973, between the governments of the CSSR and the FRG riormalising relations between both states.
The preamble to this treaty says that both governments "are firmly resolved once and for all to put an end to the ill-starred past in their relations, above all, in connection with the Second World War, which brought immense suffering to the European nations, and, recognising that Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, was imposed on the Czechoslovak Republic by the na/i regime under the threat of the use of force...'' and "striving to strengthen peace and security in Europe'', have agreed on the following:
"The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany consider the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, in view of the mutual relations in accordance with the present treaty, to be null and void" (cl. 1).
The CSSR and the FRG have further pledged "to settle all their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and shall refrain from the threat or use of force in matters affecting European and international security, as well as in their mutual relations'' (cl.~3).
Under clause 4, in accord with the above aims and principles, both sides "reaffirm the inviolability of their common borders now and in their future and mutually undertake in every way to respect the territorial integrity of both states''. "They declare,'' the clause _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, November 10, 1938.
115 reads further, "that they do not have any territorial claims on each other and will not make such claims in the future as = well."^^1^^ Proceeding from the interests of both sides, the CSSR and the FRG pledged to take further steps to develop their mutual relations on a broad front --- embracing the economy, science, scientific and technical ties, culture, = etc.^^2^^This has brought down the curtain on the difficult past in the relations of the neighbouring countries, opening up opportunities for developing equitable and mutnally beneficial co-operation.
_-_-_^^1^^International Affairs, = No.~3, 1974, p. 103. (Translated from Czech.)
^^2^^On June 19, 1974, the FRG Parliament ratified this treaty.
[116] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER III __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN EUROPE IN 1939.After Munich, the London and Paris cabinets activated their trade and economic ties and co-operation with Hitler Germany. The Chamberlain and Daladier governments openly recognised Germany's "special rights" in Eastern and South-East Europe, clearly encouraging German-fascist aggression against the USSR.
Thus, for example, on November 15,1938, Halifax, in a talk with Comnen, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated: "We must not give the slightest or remotest impression that Britain is trying to raise a barrier against German expansion = eastwards...."^^1^^
During the negotiations in December 1938 in Paris, Bonnet also told Ribbentrop that France would not object to Germany's territorial demands on Poland. He stated that France had renounced all political interests hi Eastern Europe, and had specifically agreed not to influence Poland against the conclusion of an agreement with Germany whereby Danzing would return to Germany, and Germany would receive an extraterritorial corridor across the Polish corridor from East Prussia to Greater = Germany.^^2^^
In February 1939, Bonnet, continuing the policy of co-operation with Hitler Germany, stated to the German Ambassador in Paris, Count Wilczek, that France would not impede "the predominance of the German Reich in the East and South East, which the country enjoyed thanks to its geo-political position''. Moreover, Bonnet gave the Ambassador clearly to understand that France would not object if Germany received such special right in Spain, after the _-_-_
^^1^^Survey of International Affairs, 1938. Vol. HI, p. 429.
^^2^^Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1940, = Vol. 1, General, Washington, 1959, p. 53.
117 establishment of "peace and order" there, that is, the establishment of a fascist = regime.^^1^^In as far as Germany was at the time carrying out extensive preparations for war and was therefore in great need of raw materials, it was very advantageous to her to extend trade and economic ties with Britain and France. Further Anglo-German negotiations took place in the winter of 1938--1939, over the development of these ties and the settlement of unresolved economic and financial questions. At the time, an important agreement was achieved between German and British coal owners on the division of the world coal markets. It was also agreed to begin negotiations in Dusseldorf between the big British and German monopolies to conclude a broad agreement for cooperation on the world market. The British and German monopoly-industrial amalgamations' aspiration to co-operate was expressed in the Dusseldorf agreement of March 1939 between the Federation of British Industry and the Amalgamation of German Industry. The agreement demarcated markets and spheres of influence. Dirksen wrote that as a result the "path for economic cooperation" was laid down.
However the irreconcilable contradictions of the British and German monopolies' economic interests proved greater than the tendency to co-ooeration. Germany, nurturing plans of waging a war for world supremacy, was not inclined to conclude a broad agreement with Britain under which Hitler would refrain from presenting new claims on Britain and would guarantee the safety of her colonial possessions and markets. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Britain did not show any inclination in the course of these negotiations to forgo some of her colonial possessions and markets. The French Government occupied the same position on this question. It was still hoped in London and Paris that the aggressor could be bought off by offering him a free hand in smothering the Spanish Republic. But the main thing they were relying on was to channel German-fascist aggression to the East against the Soviet Union. To instigate Hitler to greater activity Anglo-French diplomacy joined with Berlin in pursuing a policy of isolating 'the Soviet Union.
In the first months of 1939, the Hitler Government was intensively occupied in working out the next tactics for the fulfilment of its aggressive schemes. It was decided in Berlin that in the next year or two they should concentrate exclusively on the French and _-_-_
^^1^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 273.
118 British questions, taking into account all matters associated with the USSR. The Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported to Moscow that "Germany's main objective is to attain such political and military might as to compel Britain to recognize without a war Germany's claim to hegemony in Central Europe and to yield to her colonial demands. Only on this basis will Germany be prepared to conclude a lasting peace with England, even at the cost of disavowing Italy, and to start a war with the USSR".The report further noted that a dangerous turn of events must take place in the immediate future, since Germany and Italy had to hurry to gain the upper hand over = Britain.^^1^^ Ensuing events confirmed the correctness of this definition of German foreign policy plans. Germany, and even Italy, continued their territorial annexations whilst avoiding an open clash with Britain: on March 15, 1939, despite the fact that Czechoslovakia had British and French guarantees, Germany occupied the country, thereby eliminating her as an independent state.
A week later Germany seized the Memel region and the port of Memel (Klaipeda). On March 23, 1939, Germany imposed a one-sided economic agreement on Rumania which allowed the Hitlerites to take control of the key sectors of the Rumanian economy, and Italy seized Albania. This led to the fascist powers strengthening their strategic position in Europe, especially that of Germany, at the expense of Britain and France whose position was weakened.
On April 28, 1939, Hitler publicly announced the abrogation of the German-Polish Pact of Non-Aggression of January 26, 1934, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. This led to increased tension in Europe and throughout the world. In this way, the Munich appeasers freed the hands of the German and Italian aggressors and dealt a fatal blow to peace and security in Europe and the world. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union foresaw such a course of events when, in the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 18th Party Congress, it made an appeal that we should "observe caution and do not let our country be dragged into conflict by the provokers of war who are accustomed to make other people pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them''. The Party Congress outlined the foreign policy tasks, taking into account the exceedingly complex and strained situation created by the Munich betrayal:
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 343.
119"1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to it as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.
"2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the USSR. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.
"3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are righting for the independence of their country.
"4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to return two blows for every one delivered by war-mongers who attempt to violate our Soviet = frontiers."^^1^^
Guided by the Leninist principle of supporting peoples who have become the victims of aggression, the USSR took a decisive stand in defence of the Czechoslovak peoples.
The USSR was the only power in the world which decisively condemned the Hitler aggression. The Soviet note of March 18, 1939, stated that the USSR could not recognise the seizure of Czechoslovakia "as legal and as being in conformity with universally recognised standards of international law and justice or with the principle of the self-determination of peoples'', and that moreover these aggressive activities "violated the political stability in Central Europe, increased the elements of alarm which already existed in Europe and struck a new blow to the people's striving for security'', as well as intensified the threat of war. The Soviet Government stated that in view of this it would not recognise the inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the German = Empire.^^2^^
The Soviet Government, with a view to organising a rebuff to the fascist aggressors, took a new step, proposing to the Western powers that a discussion be held on ways to combat aggression. The USSR was thereby showing concern to ensure peace and security for all countries and not just for itself. The Soviet Union, as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs indicated, was quite capable of defending its own borders, more so than any other country, but even now she would not refuse co-operation with other _-_-_
^^1^^The 18th Congress of the CPSU, March 10--21. 1939, p. 15.
^^2^^ Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 252.
120 states. It conceived this co-operation only as a way of effective common opposition to the aggressor.It was obvious to all who seriously thought about the organisation of a rebuff to fascist aggression that the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland and other countries would not stop the aggressor if Britain and France did not conclude an alliance with the USSR. Lloyd George, for example, commented on this to Chamberlain during their talk on March 30. He emphasised the necessity of drawing the USSR into the creation of an Eastern Front and that "without active help from the USSR no 'Eastern front' was possible''. "In the absence of any definite agreement with the USSR, I consider,'' said Lloyd George, "your statement of today an irresponsible gamble which can end up very = badly".^^1^^ On April 4, in a letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Chamberlain's statement was evaluated as an attempt to frighten Hitler, but "no one can say whether Britain will really go to war with Germany under the circumstances = indicated".^^2^^ Another aspect of the British guarantee was also noted in the letter --- to suggest to Hitler another direction for aggression --- the seizure of the Baltic states whose occupation the USSR would resist, thus provoking a German-Soviet war. The decision to grant a British guarantee to Poland was taken hurriedly and Chamberlain did not even try to invite the USSR to participate in the guarantees, stating that Poland did not want to take part in any action involving Soviet participation. The Soviet Government strove to establish mutual understanding and co-operation with Poland for the sake of peace and security. We may recall Litvinov's statement in talks with the French Charge d'Affairs on March 29 in Moscow about the Soviet Union's readiness for such co-operation: "...we considered co-operation with Poland, which we had always offered her, very = important".^^3^^
Despite all the USSR's efforts to convince the Polish Government of the need for the USSR and Poland to collaborate, the latter did not wish to abandon its anti-Soviet course.
Despite this irreconcilable anti-Soviet policy of the leading circles in Poland, in November 1938 the Soviet Union again showed initiative by proposing the publication of a declaration on Soviet-Polish relations which would state that both governments wanted good-neighbourly relations. The Polish Government, for tactical _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 300.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 312.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 294.
__PRINTERS_P_121_COMMENT__ 6---615 121 considerations, agreed to this although it tried to ensure that the declaration did not contain any clear-cut commitments or wording. On the day after the publication of this declaration, the Polish Government informed German journalists in confidence, via the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Press Department, that no changes had taken place in Poland's policy towards the USSR:"In her foreign policy Poland has always been of the view that the Soviet Union's participation in European politics is needless. Today as before it upholds that = view."^^1^^
As formerly, the Polish Government's real intentions were to try for an agreement with Germany on a joint war against the USSR for the seizure of the Soviet Ukraine. Documents published in 1971 show that the Soviet Government had indisputable facts at its disposal about all the aggressive plans discussed by the Polish Government with Berlin. Specifically, it was known at the very time the talks between Warsaw and Moscow were in progress about improving relations between the two countries that the Polish Government had informed Berlin about its readiness to take Germany's side in a war against the USSR for the seizure of the Ukraine. Thus, on November 18, 1938 the Vice-Director of the Political Department of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed the Counsellor of the German Embassy in Warsaw:
"If Carpathian Ruthenia is incorporated into Hungary, Poland would agree subsequently to join forces with Germany in a campaign against the Soviet = Ukraine."^^2^^
On January 26, 1939, Ribbentrop talked in Warsaw with Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the notes of this meeting the following is said: "I then spoke to Mr.~Beck once more about the policy to be pursued by Poland and Germany towards the Soviet Union.... Mr.~Beck made no secret of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed towards the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black = Sea."^^3^^ It was not doubted in Berlin that in the event of Germany's going to war against the USSR Poland would join in in order to annex the Ukraine. At a meeting with German journalists in Warsaw on February 13, 1939, the German Ambassador said: "We know that in the event of a German-Russian conflict Poland will be on our side, this is = quite definite."^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, pp. 114--15.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 100.
^^3^^ Ibid., p. 183.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 210.
122Naturally enough then, when the negotiations between Britain, France and the Soviet Union began on the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact, the Polish Government both decisively refused Soviet assistance in the event of a German-fascist attack and objected to granting the USSR right of passage for its troops across Polish territory so as to help Britain and France.
This position adopted by Warsaw was in every way supported by the British Government, in so far as it was utilised by British and French diplomacy to drag out the negotiations with the USSR over the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact.
At the time, to cover his anti-Soviet position, Beck put forward a special doctrine according to which the Polish Government would undertake not to enter any kind of agreement with one of its powerful neighbours against the other, i.e. neither with Germany against the USSR nor with the USSR against Germany.
This doctrine of Beck's was repeatedly shown to be untenable by the Soviet side. On April 2, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR told the Polish Ambassador: the< Polish argument would have meaning if the USSR had suggested that Poland participate in some kind of combination against Germany, against her interests, against the German people. The Soviet Union would also have declined such a combination. "However, it was not this that had been contemplated,'' he stressed, "but a combination for struggle against German aggression, and this was quite a different = matter."^^1^^ The Rumanian Government also used this argument to refuse passage to Soviet troops across its territory. The Polish and Rumanian governments coordinated their moves and acted in a united front. Poland's and Rumania's hostile policy towards the Soviet Union completely suited Anglo-French diplomacy which did not want to co-operate with the USSR in organising the defence of peace and warding off aggression.
This policy pursued by the British and French governments provoked dissatisfaction among their peoples. The demand for a reliable system of collective security, with Soviet participation, to confront fascist aggression grew in popularity among the British and French public. The Chamberlain and Daladier governments, taking this situation into account, suddenly changed tactics, stating that they intended to create an opposition front against aggression and that they were going over to a policy of unilateral guarantees to the small European countries. This policy was intended to circumvent the Soviet proposal for a European collective security system, and at the same time reassure their peoples with some _-_-_
~^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 306.
123 semblance of activity over the organisation of a "peace front" to oppose fascist aggression. The Chamberlain Government initiated this policy. The main feature of this policy was the granting by Britain of unilateral "guarantees of independence" to a number of small countries. On March 31, 1939, in the House of Commons Chamberlain proclaimed such "guarantees of independence" = to Poland.^^1^^On April 6, 1939, a communique was published about the conclusion of an agreement between Britain and Poland, based on the principle of reciprocity, which was to replace the British unilateral guarantees of March 31.
On April 13, Britain granted similar guarantees to Rumania and Greece. On the same day France confirmed her 1921 treaty of alliance with Poland and announced that she was accepting the same obligations as Britain in relation to Poland, Rumania and Greece.
This policy of granting unilateral guarantees to the small European countries, pursued by Britain and France, was combined with London's overt manoeuvring to draw the Soviet Union into its policy of guarantees and thus utilise the "Soviet card" in a complex diplomatic game with Hitler.
By increasing the pressure on Hitler in this way, London wanted to force him to the negotiating table and to an agreement with Britain.
Dirksen, in analysing this new tactic of the British Government, called it a ``twin policy'' (Zwillingspolitik), a ``reserve means'' for achieving the main aim: to make Hitler come to an agreement with Great Britain. Dirksen informed Berlin that "Britain wants to build up her strength by increasing her armed forces and acquiring allies, so as to reach a par with the Axis, but at the same time she wants to try, by negotiation, to r'each an amicable agreement with Germany and is prepared to make sacrificies to this end: on the question of colonies, on the acquisition of raw materials, on living space and on spheres of economic = interest".^^2^^
One of British diplomacy's first actions was to inquire in Moscow on March 18, 1939, about the possible position of the USSR in the event of German aggression against = Rumania.^^3^^
In reply to this inquiry, the Soviet Government, in line with its active and consistent policy of averting a new war and ensuring a _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 299.
^^2^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 206.
^^3^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 255
124 durable peace and reliable international security, proposed that a meeting be called of the representatives of the USSR, Britain, France, Poland, Rumania and Turkey for a joint discussion of this question.^^1^^"Such a conference, the Soviet Government believes, would best provide an opportunity for appraising the true state of affairs and for ascertaining the position of each of the = participants."^^2^^ However, on this occasion as well, the British Government turned down the Soviet proposal as = ``premature''.^^3^^
So as to disguise its negative attitude to this Soviet proposal, the British Government, on March 21,1939, suggested the signing of a declaration and presented a draft = copy.^^4^^
Despite the fact that the British proposal represented a step backwards from what the Soviet Union had proposed, the Soviet Government nevertheless agreed to the signing of the draft declaration by the USSR, Britain, France and = Poland.^^5^^ However, at the last moment London stated that its proposal-to sign the above declaration was no longer on the = agenda.^^6^^ This rapid withdrawal of the Anglo-French proposal, which could have strengthened peace in Europe had it been realised, confirmed that these two countries had not seriously considered co-operating with the Soviet Union in strengthening peace and opposing aggression.
On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Government sent its proposal to the British and French representatives. In doing this it was continuing its consistent peace policy, the most important principle of which was the thesis that peace is indivisible and could only be preserved by the joint efforts of all peace-loving countries. The proposal envisaged the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the USSR, Britain and France, based on the principle of equal rights and obligations for all its participants. This proposal stipulated:
"1. That England, France and the USSR conclude with one another an agreement for a period of five to ten years, by which they would oblige themselves to render mutually forthwith all manner of assistance, including that of a military nature, in case of aggression in Europe against any one of the contracting Powers.
"2. That England, France and the USSR undertake to render _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 256.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 275.
^^3^^Ibid.
^^4^^Ibid., pp. 273--74.
^^5^^Ibid., p. 274.
^^6^^Ibid., p. 268.
125 all manner of assistance, including that of a military nature, to the Eastern European states situated between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea and bordering on the USSR, in case of aggression against these States."3. That England, France and the USSR undertake to discuss and to settle within the shortest possible period of time the extent and forms of military assistance to be rendered by each of these States in fulfilment of paragraphs 1 and 2.
"4. That the English Government announce that the assistance promised-by it to Poland concerns exclusively aggression on the part of Germany.
"5. That the treaty of alliance which exists between Poland and Rumania be declared operative in case of aggression of any nature against Poland and Rumania, or else be revoked altogether as one directed against the USSR.
"6. That England, France and the USSR undertake, following the outbreak of hostilities, not to enter into negotiations of any kind whatsoever and not to conclude peace with the aggressors separately from one another and without the common consent of all three Powers.
"7. That an agreement on the above lines be signed simultaneously with the convention to be elaborated in accordance with paragraph 3.
"8. That the necessity be recognized for England, France and the USSR to enter into joint negotiations with Turkey for a special agreement on mutual = assistance."^^1^^
When handing this proposal to the British Ambassador, the Soviet side emphasised, in connection with paragraph 3, the necessity of supplementing the political treaty with a military agreement, for "mutual assistance pacts not reinforced with a corresponding precise definition of military commitments, are often ineffective. The absence of such definitions in the pacts between the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia undoubtedly played a negative role in what happened to = Czechoslovakia".^^2^^
This Soviet proposal was a broad and durable basis for the conclusion of an equitable and effective mutual assistance treaty between the three powers. A military assistance agreement would have been a constituent part of this. The conclusion of such a pact would have meant that the fundamental thesis of Soviet foreign _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., = Part~1, pp. 346--47. The French Government was informed of this proposal on April 18.
^^2^^Ibid.. p. 345.
126 policy, that peace is indivisible and a necessity for all states, big and small, would have been realised.The Soviet Government considered that a durable European peace could have resulted from such a pact and that this peace could have been a firm guarantee of collective security for all the European states and could have withstood the onslaught of fascist aggression. The Soviet Union received London's answer to this proposal after three weeks. It was a memorandum of May 8, 1939, handed by the British Ambassador Seeds to V. M. Molotov, who had replaced Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on May 3. It again repeated the old British proposal for the Soviet Union to publish a unilateral declaration. In this declaration the USSR was to undertake that "in the event of Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfilment of these obligations, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be immediately available if desired and would be afforded in such manner and on such terms as might be = agreed".^^1^^ In this way London virtually refused the Soviet proposal for a«mutual assistance pact and itself proposed that the USSR give assistance to Britain and France in a unilateral way if they became involved in a war with Hitler in fulfilling their obligations in relation to Poland and Rumania. Furthermore, this proposal only concerned assistance to Poland and Rumania and did not involve the three Baltic states which could become the gateways for a German-fascist invasion of the USSR.
The Soviet Government only needed k few days to prepare an answer to this British proposal. On May 14, the People's Commissar gave the answer to Seeds. This said that "the English proposal does not rest on the principle of reciprocity with regard to the USSR and places it in a position of inequality inasmuch as it does not oblige England and France to guarantee the USSR in the event of a direct attack on it by aggressors, whereas England and France, as well as Poland do have such a guarantee on the basis of the reciprocity which exists between them".
The Soviet Government drew attention in the memorandum of May 14 to the fact that the British proposal only extended a guarantee to Poland and Rumania and left the USSR's borders with Finland, Estonia and Latvia unprotected. This latter fact, the absence of British and French guarantees in the event of a direct attack on the USSR, and the fact that the USSR's North-West borders were unprotected, could encourage the direction of _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 27.
127 aggression towards the Soviet Union. Hitler Germany's aggressive intentions towards the Baltic states were already clear in 1934, when Hitler refused to sign a declaration of non-aggression that the Soviet Union had proposed in relation to these countries.The Government of the USSR proposed:
``1. The conclusion between England, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression;
``2. The guaranteeing by these three great powers of the states of Central and Eastern Europe threatened by aggression, including Latvia, Estonia and Finland;
``3. The conclusion of a cqncrete agreement between England, France and the USSR on the Forms and the extent of assistance to be rendered to each other and to the guaranteed states, for without such an agreement the mutual assistance pacts risk being left hanging in the air, as the experience of Czechoslovakia has shown."^^1^^
The Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact was well received by the British and French public. In the British Parliament it aroused sharp discussion and criticism of the Government. Many of those addressing Parliament unmasked the reluctance of the Chamberlain Government to co-operate with the Soviet Union and to conclude an equal treaty of mutual assistance between Britain, France and the USSR. Protesting voices were even heard from the conservative ranks, i.e. Chamberlain's political friends. The picture was similar in France where a great anxiety had been aroused by the fascist states' aggressive acts and by the news that a German-Italian military-political alliance was in the offing. Such a treaty was indeed signed on May 22, 1939, and was followed by the start of Japanese negotiations to become a party to the treaty. Thus the aggressive powers joined forces preparing for a new redivision of the world.
Given the situation, the British Government was compelled to agree to certain concessions: it finally agreed, in principle, to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. The joint Anglo-French proposals for this were handed to the Soviet Government on May 27, 1939. With this the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations entered a new stage. Although the Anglo-French proposals now envisaged Britain and France giving the Soviet Union assistance in the event of a direct German attack, they still refused to give the Baltic states a guarantee, thereby opening up the Soviet Union's North-West frontiers to an attack by the _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, pp. 39--40.
128 aggressor. Another poinfworht noting is that Britain and France made Soviet assistance to the states .who had received British and French guarantees dependent on an ambiguous reservation to the effect that this assistance could only be given if the states requested it. Poland, for example, even after the Hitler attack did not turn to the Soviet Union for assistance. However, the British and French ruling circles would only acknowledge their obligations to render the Soviet Union assistance if the USSR found itself in a state of war with a European power as a result of either:1) aggression by that power against another European state which the USSR had, in conformity with the wishes of that state, undertaken to assist against such aggression, or
2) assistance given by the USSR to another European state which had requested such assistance in order to resist a violation of its neutrality.^^1^^
The British and French therefore agreed to render assistance to the Soviet Union only if it became involved in a war through rendering assistance to a neighbouring European state whose government had requested this assistance. However the presence of fascist governments in the Baltic states made it extremely unlikely that they would turn to the Soviet Union for assistance. The absence of such an appeal would be the formal basis for the governments of Britain and France to refuse assistance to the USSR in the event of it finding itself at war with Germany.
The draft of their proposed pact envisaged consultations on the forms and extent of assistance. However, these consultations were only to take place after the aggression had already occurred, i.e. at the very time when it was necessary to act without the least delay. Of course the Soviet Government could not agree to such an approach to the question.
All this indicated that the Anglo-French proposal of May 27, 1939, was, in essence, a formal concession to calm the British and French people. It showed the Chamberlain Government's reluctance to co-operate with the USSR and to conclude an alliance with her to combat aggression.
The same day the Soviet Government gave its appraisal of the Anglo-French proposal, pointing out that it not only failed to contain a plan for the organisation of effective mutual assistance among the USSR, Britain and France, but also failed to show that the British and French governments had serious interest in the proposed pact with the Soviet Union. V. M. Molotov informed the _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p.~65.
129 British and French diplomatic representives that he "had come to a negative conclusion about this document''. At the same time he said that the Anglo-French proposal gave one the impression that the British and French governments were more interested in talks about the pact than the pact itself. The Soviet Government's report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on May 31,1939, said that if there really were a desire in London and Paris to create an effective front of peace-loving countries against aggression then the following conditions were to be met as the minimum prerequisites: "the conclusion between England, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression having a purely defensive character; a guarantee on the part of England, France and the USSR to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including all the European countries bordering on the USSR, against an attack by aggressors; the conclusion of an aggreement between England, France and the USSR on the forms and extent of immediate and effective assistance to be rendered to one another and to the guaranteed states in the event of an attack by = aggressors".^^1^^ In this way the Soviet Union once again and before the whole world declared its readiness to conclude a mutual assistance pact and stated its programme for creating a collective security system.On June 2,1939, despite the fact that the Anglo-French proposal gave the Soviet side every reason to doubt the sincerity of its partners' intentions, the Soviet Government sent Britain and France a new = proposal.^^2^^ The Soviet draft contained a detailed formulation of obligations under which the contracting parties would have to render assistance to each other. It said: "France, England and the USSR undertake to render to each other immediately all effective assistance should one of these States become involved in hostilities with a European Power as a result of either:
``1) aggression by that Power against anyone of these three States;
``2) aggression by that Power against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, whom England, France and the USSR have agreed to undertake to defend against aggression, or;
``3) assistance rendered by one of these three States to another European State, which had requested such assistance in order to _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 70.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 75.
130 resist a violation of its = neutrality."^^1^^ The Soviet Union proposed to its partners that a military convention be concluded: "The three States will come to an agreement within the shortest possible time as to the methods, forms and extent of assistance which is to be rendered by them in conformity with paragraph = 1"^^2^^ and "to conclude an armistice or peace only by joint = agreement."^^3^^ The Soviet terms took into account the Anglo-French side's wish for the extension of Soviet aid to cover Belgium, Greece and Turkey, who had already received Anglo-French guarantees of their independence. At the same time British and French assistance to the Baltic states was provided for.On June 15, 1939, the Soviet Government received the Anglo-French notes on its recent proposal for a pact of mutual assistance and new proposals and formulations of the various articles of the said pact. And this time again Britain and France opposed the simultaneous conclusion of a mutual assistance pact and a military convention, proposing that matters be confined to consultations between the general staffs of Britain, the USSR and France. The Anglo-French side even refused to undertake the obligation of concluding an armistice or peace only by joint agreement of all three signatories to the pact, referring to the ``prematureness'' of such a discussion since the reasons for the outbreak of war were not yet known. This position of Britain and France confirmed their unwillingness to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Soviet Government could not either ignore the fact that the British and French governments continued to reject its proposal about rendering assistance to the USSR in the event of its becoming drawn into a war over an attack by an aggressor on its neighbours Latvia, Estonia and Finland, although they considered it possible for the USSR to give immediate assistance to Poland, Rumania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey in the event of the aggressor's attack on them, and British and French involvement in a war as a consequence. The Soviet Government emphasised in its memorandum of June 16, that "it cannot accept the humiliating position of inequality in which the Soviet Union would thereby be placed".^^4^^ With this the Soviet Government called Britain's and France's attention to the fact that if they further refused to grant guarantees to Estonia, Latvia and Finland, "justifying this with reference to these countries' unwillingness to accept such _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Pecae Efforts..., Part 2, p. 75.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 75. "
^^3^^Ibid., p. 76.
^^4^^ Ibid., p. 95.
131 guarantees, then it would also be impossible to solve the question of triple guarantees to the other countries enumerated above and therefore all eight countries would have to be excluded from the draft.^^1^^The Soviet Union considered the question of guarantees to the Baltic states to be very important, having in mind that, owing to their weakness, these states would not be able to repulse the aggressor with their own forces. Moreover, the Soviet Government perceived a serious danger of an attack on the USSR via the Baltic states in view of the fascist character of their governments at that time. These governments could, contrary to the interests of the Baltic peoples, permit Hitler Germany to use their territory as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. Of course, all this was well known to the Western powers. Therefore the Soviet Government regarded the British and French governments' refusal to give guarantees to the Baltic countries and also their refusal to assist the Soviet Union if it found itself involved in hostilities with an aggressor as a consequence of an attack by the latter on one of the Baltic states as an endeavour by the Western powers to leave the Baltic gates open to Hitler. The Chinese Ambassador to Belgium, who had been in Britain at the beginning of June, told the Latvian Envoy to Belgium that authoritative circles in London had informed him about Chamberlain's position on this question, which was that "in leaving the Baltic countries outside the guarantees they point Germany her way to the Soviet frontiers. If certain borders remain unguaranteed then it is clear from this that they can be attacked.... Chamberlain still wishes to get Germany ultimately involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union, which is Chamberlain's long standing = plan".^^2^^
The British bourgeois historian Wheeler-Bennett also noted the existence of such a crafty plan to provoke a German-Soviet war. He wrote: "It was alledged that in certain circles in London there was a secret hope that if the tide of German expansion could be turned eastwards it would dissipate its force on the steppes of Russia in a struggle which would exhaust both combatants. Moscow was not unaware of this school of = thought."^^3^^
The Soviet Government's report on the international position and foreign policy of the USSR to the third session of the Supreme Soviet, May 25--31, 1939, contained full information about the _-_-_
^^1^^
^^2^^Archives of Foreign Affairs, F38-G published in = Der deutsche imperialisms, und der zweite Wdtkrieg. Vol.~II, Berlin, 1961, p. 577.
^^3^^Foreign Affairs, October 1945, pp. 37--38.
132 course of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations to conclude a mutual assistance pact. The report expressed doubt as to whether London and Paris had serious intentions of concluding an equal agreement with the Soviet Union on the forms and extent of immediate and effective assistance in the event of an attack by an aggressor.The Anglo-French proposals to grant guarantees to certain countries and refusal to grant them to other states, bordering on the Soviet Union, caused the Soviet Government to express legitimate concern over the secret intentions harboured by the London and Paris cabinets: ``Is it not likely,'' said the report, ``that these countries' (Britain and France---author) endeavours to restrict aggression in certain areas will fail to check it in other areas? These questions are also being raised in certain bourgeois papers abroad. We must therefore be = vigilant."^^1^^
Since the British and French governments, even after this public warning made from the rostrum of the Soviet Union's supreme legislative body, continued to maintain their previous position and refused to grant guarantees to the three Baltic states, the Soviet press had no alternative but to present the facts. Thus, on June 13, Pravda, in a leader entitled "The Question of the Defence of the Three Baltic Countries Against Aggression'', noted that even the bourgeois press had started to acknowledge that "the question of maintaining the neutrality of the three Baltic countries is of vital importance for the Soviet Union's = security".^^2^^ As for the statements made by several leading figures in the three Baltic states about their governments rejecting the peaceful powers' assistance, they represent either a misunderstanding or a badly concealed desire to impede "the formation of a defensive front of peaceful powers against aggression''. The article said further that it was quite possible that the statements were foreign-inspired: "It is difficult to say at present just who the inspirers are: the aggressive states that want to prevent the setting up of an anti-aggression front, or certain reactionary circles in the democratic states that seek to restrict aggression in certain areas but not to prevent it from breaking out in = others."^^3^^ The Soviet Union displayed the maximum compliance in the negotiations with the Western powers and all its demands boiled down to one thing, viz. that the treaty of _-_-_
^^1^^The Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, = verbatim report, Moscow, 1939, p. 476 (in Russian).
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 88.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 90.
133 mutual assistance be based on the principle of reciprocity and equal obligations and that no loop-hole be left the aggressor to attack our country via the Baltic gates.However, the Anglo-French proposals did not meet these self-evident demands. Such were the Anglo-French proposals of June 15, and 21, = 1939.^^1^^ Although finally Britain and France formally agreed to give guarantees to the Baltic countries in the event of indirect aggression, they accompanied their agreement with such conditions and reservations that the guarantee was reduced to naught. In particular, Soviet assistance to the Baltic states was envisaged only in the event of these countries' fascist governments acknowledging it as desirable. Under various pretexts they virtually refused to grant the Baltic states guarantees which would have made it impossible for Germany to seize them either by force, the threat of force or by inspiring internal coups. The USSR had every reason to fear that such coups in the Baltic states would result in the Baltic gates opening for Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. All this made the British and French proposals of June 21 completely unacceptable and the Soviet Government informed Britain and France of this in its memorandum of June 22, handed to the British and French ambassadors in = Moscow.^^2^^ Besides, the British Government continued to object to the Soviet proposal that in the event of war the three powers would conclude an armistice or peace only by joint agreement. Viewed in this light the British and French proposals did not contain anything. Therefore in the communique of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, published in the Soviet press on June 22, it was noted that these ``new'' Anglo-French proposals were in essence a repeat of their former ones and therefore they "do not represent any sort of progress over the previous = proposals".^^3^^ A. A. Zhdanov, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet, made a profound analysis of the course of the negotiations and the Anglo-French proposals in an article entitled "The British and French Governments Do Not Want an Equal Treaty with the USSR'', published in Pravda on June 29. The article described the USSR's great efforts to successfully conclude the negotiations as quickly as possible. These efforts, however, proved to be fruitless because the British and French governments drew the negotiations out and did not want an equal treaty with the USSR: "this is precisely why the negotiations have reached a stagnant situation". _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., pp. 93--94, 103.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 103.
^^3^^Izvestia. June 22, 1939.
134 Zhdanov cited convincing facts confirming that London and Paris were responsible for prolonging the negotiations: he noted that 75 days had passed since the beginning of the negotiations (April 15). Of these the Soviet Government had needed only 16 to prepare its answers to the various British proposals while the Anglo-French side had taken 59 days. The author also noted that in the course of the negotiations London and Paris had clearly and deliberately built a wall of artificial difficulties.A. A. Zhdanov emphasised that "All this points to the fact that the British and French do not want a treaty with the USSR based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, although they vow every day that they are for equality. The sort of treaty they want is one in which the USSR takes on the role of a hired labourer carrying the whole burden of obligations on her own shoulders. But no self-respecting country will enter such an agreement if it does not want to be a plaything in the hands of people who like others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. The USSR, whose strength, might and dignity is known throughout the world, cannot enter such an agreement either.
"It seems to me that the British and French do not want a real agreement, acceptable to the USSR, but only want discussions about an agreement in order that by speculating on the alleged intractability of the USSR before public opinion in their countries make it easier for them to come to a deal with the aggressor."
The coverage in the Soviet press helped the British and French public to sort out who the real culprit was who did not want to create a united peace front to curb the fascist aggressor. Characteristic in this respect was the visit to Chamberlain by Labour Party and trade union representatives in the persons of Morrison, Dalton and Citrine, who informed the Government about their concern in connection with the aggravation of the international situation and emphasised the necessity of concluding a pact with the = USSR.^^1^^
The Chamberlain Government nevertheless continued its previous course in relation to the negotiations for a pact with the Soviet Union although it was compelled, externally, to change its tactics: Anglo-French diplomacy agreed to make several concessions on the question of indirect aggression against the Baltic countries. The London and Paris proposal of July 1, 1939, _-_-_
^^1^^M. Pankrashova and V. Sipols, Why Was the War Not Averted?, = Moscow, 1970, p. 68 (in Russian).
135 contained just such a show of = ``concessions''.^^1^^ However, this Anglo-French proposal in reality hardly changed matters concerning indirect aggression against the Baltic states: London and Paris qualified their concession in clause 1 (rendering assistance in the event of direct aggression against the Baltic countries) with such reservations, contained in clause 3 on the question of consultations, that they practically reduced their obligations to nothing. In this way the vexed question about effective guarantees to the Baltic countries remained unsettled, since in the event of a so-called indirect German attack in the Baltic the British and French governments, under clause 3, only pledged to enter into consultations with the Soviet = Government.^^2^^ Britain and France proposed, clearly to complicate and draw out the negotiations, that the USSR guarantee three more countries, Switzerland, Holland and = Luxembourg.^^3^^ In addition the Anglo-French draft of clause 1 was not to contain any mention of the countries which had received guarantees. It was suggested that these countries be listed in the protocol or agreement they proposed, which would not be liable to publication. This, of course, would reduce the effect of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact since the peoples of the small guaranteed countries would not know about it. The whole significance of the treaty and its mobilising force should lie precisely in giving the peoples confidence in their power by having created a united peace front to rebuff aggression. On July 3, the Soviet Government gave its answer to the Anglo-French proposal of July 1. The Soviet Government suggested that clause 1 of the treaty be formulated in such a way that the contracting parties could render each other effective aid both in the event of direct and indirect attack.The USSR further declared that it could not extend its obligations by granting guarantees to Switzerland, Holland and Luxembourg because on May 31,1939, in a decision passed by the Supreme Soviet on the report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs these countries had not been included among those which could receive Soviet guarantees. On July 8, Anglo-French proposals were = received,^^4^^ showing the Western countries' desire to endlessly drag out the negotiations with the USSR, piling one difficulty on top of another with the clear intention of avoiding precise obligations on the question of Britain's and France's rendering assistance to the Soviet Union in the event of a German _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts...,Part 2, p. 120.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 121.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 120. The draft of agreement was not subject to publication.
^^4^^Ibid., pp. 129--30.
136 attack. On July 9, the Soviet Government handed its answering proposals to the British and French = ambassadors.^^1^^Besides, as formerly, it insisted that a military agreement be concluded at the same time as the political treaty. This demand was contained in the Soviet draft treaty of April 17,1939. However, the British and French governments evaded in every way presenting any concrete proposals on this matter.
The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs gave a detailed analysis of the course of the negotiations in a telegram sent to the Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris on July 17. This said:
"There is still disagreement on how the definition of 'indirect aggression' should be worded; our partners are resorting to all kinds of trickery and disgraceful subterfuge.
"Also, we are insisting that a military pact is an inseparable part of a military-political agreement which is what the draft treaty under discussion is, and categorically reject the Anglo-French proposal that we should first agree on the 'political' part of the treaty and only then turn to the question of a military agreement. This dishonest Anglo-French proposal splits up what should be a single, treaty into two separate treaties and contradicts our basic proposal to conclude the whole treaty all at once, including its military part, which is actually the most important and most political part of the treaty. You understand that if the overall agreement does not include as an integral part an absolutely concrete military agreement, the treaty will be nothing but an empty declaration, and this is something we cannot = accept."^^2^^
In describing the dishonourable methods Anglo-French diplomacy used to endlessly drag out the negotiations the People's Commissar wrote:
"Only crooks and cheats, such as the negotiators on the Anglo-French side have shown themselves to be all this time, could pretened that our demands for the simultaneous conclusion of a political and military agreement are something new in the negotiations, while at the same time leaking a canard to the press intimating that we are demanding a military pact first, that is, before signing a political agreement. It is hard to understand just what they expect when they resort to such clumsy tricks in the negotiations."^^3^^
At the same time the Foreign Office was making a great effort to create the impression that Britain was striving for agreement with _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, pp. 131--32.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 140.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 141.
137 the USSR and to shift all the responsibility for the delay in the negotiations and their fruitlessness onto the Soviet Union. The statement made by Butler, the British Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Parliament on July 31, 1939, had just such an aim. It contained a false assertion suggesting that the basic disagreement in the negotiations with the USSR was the question of whether or not we must encroach upon the independence of the Baltic states.^^1^^In connection with this kind of falsification, the USSR was compelled to clarify the essence of the disagreements in the negotiations for the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty. On August 2, 1939, TASS published a statement called "About one of the reasons for the delay in the negotiations with Britain".
The statement said that TASS had been authorised to say that if "Mister Butler has really said the above then he has distorted the Soviet Government's position. Indeed the disagreement is not about encroaching or not encroaching on the independence of the Baltic countries, for both sides want to guarantee this independence, but about the wording of the formula 'indirect aggression' which should not leave any sort of loop-hole for the aggressor that is encroaching on these countries' independence. One of the reasons for the delay in the negotiations is that the British formula leaves such a = loop-hole".^^2^^
An analysis of the Anglo-French proposals submitted during the Moscow political negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939 shows that their authors did not intend to conclude an equal agreement with the Soviet Union on co-operation to combat aggression. They did not want to render assistance to the Soviet Union. And this constituted a provocative hint to Hitler, viz. if he attacked the USSR then Britain and France would remain on the side-lines and the Soviet Union would fight Germany one to one. They wanted to utilise the Moscow political, and later the military, negotiations of 1939 for this very purpose.
Lloyd George was right when, at the end of July 1939, he posed the following parliamentary question to the Chamberlain Government: Why did the Prime Minister or Lord Halifax not set off immediately for Moscow to specify the details as soon as Russia showed a readiness to enter into an alliance with the Western democracies to stop the aggressors? The Government did not give _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, August 2, 1939.
^^2^^Ibid.
138 an answer to this = question.^^1^^ But then Lloyd George answered it himself. He wrote that Neville Chamberlain, Halifax and John Simon did not want any sort of agreement with = Russia.^^2^^ Anglo-French diplomacy planned to delay in every way possible the negotiations with Moscow since the latter were a very important element in their complex diplomatic manoeuvres the main aim of which was to achieve a broad agreement with fascist Germany. By endlessly dragging out the negotiations with the USSR the British Government wanted to create the impression in Berlin that Britain had such a great power as the Soviet Union as an ally. Dirksen, in describing this British policy, noted that: "Britain wants to build up her strength, by increasing her armed forces and acquiring allies, so as to reach a par with the Axis, but at the same time she wants to try, by negotiation, to reach an amicable agreement with Germany and is prepared to make sacrifices to = this end."^^3^^Curtailing the negotiations with Moscow was to be one of London's important concessions in the event of Hitler Germany's assent to conclude a broad Anglo-German agreement.
In order to show the British Government's crafty double game we will examine the course of the Anglo-German secret negotiations, which were conducted at the same time as the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The Anglo-German Secret NegotiationsAs we have already noted in chapters I and II, the ruling circles in Britain for a long time conducted talks in the hope of reaching a mutual understanding with Hitler about a new redivision of the world. These talks were broken off after March 15, 1939, when Germany occupied Prague and dissolved the Czechoslovak state in violation of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German Declaration of September 30.
As the documents show, by the middle of June the British side was already attempting to resume the suspended negotiations. _-_-_
^^1^^We should note that Chamberlain travelled to Germany to see Hitler three times and also went to Rome for talks with Mussolini. Halifax also went to Berlin. The only person sent to help Seeds in Moscow was a member of the Foreign Office, Sfrang, who headed the Central European section.
^^2^^Ce Soir, July 26, 1939.
^^3^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 206.
139 Thus, as the record of the June 13, 1939, talk between German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Weizsacker, and Henderson shows, the latter, clearly acting under instructions, "spoke of London's readiness to negotiate with Berlin''. Henderson further said that it would be possible to discuss such questions as "curtailing the arms race and stepping up economic relations. It would also be possible to discuss the question of the colonies''. Characteristically, Weizsacker gained the impression from this conversation with Henderson that the latter "would not attach any significance to the pact with = Russia".^^1^^ On June 27, Henderson again discussed this same = question.^^2^^The Anglo-German secret negotiations began in Berlin by the British Ambassador Henderson on June 13 and continued in London, with the arrival there of Wohlthat, Hitler's economic adviser. Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's economic adviser and one of his most trusted and closest colleagues, led the British side in the negotiations.
At the end of June, Halifax, in a speech at the Royal Institute of International Relations openly declared Britain's readiness to come to terms with Germany on the most important controversial questions and this must have confirmed the proposals Wilson had already made in the negotiations.
Dirksen emphasised in his dispatch to Berlin that what Wilson had said was as if it were said by Chamberlain himself. The negotiations also continued in July 1939, with Hudson and Wilson taking part. As Dirksen reported in his dispatch of July 21, Wilson proposed to Wohlthat that Britain and Germany conclude a comprehensive political and economic agreement and "made it quite clear that Chamberlain approved of this = programme".^^3^^ It contained three sections: political, military and = economic.^^4^^
In explaining the contents of his programme's "political points" Wilson indicated that the British Government had in view the conclusion of two pacts with Germany: the first on non-aggression and the second on non-intervention. Wilson assured _Wohlthat_ that as for British compensation to Hitler, if the latter agreed to conclude the proposed two pacts, Chamberlain would end the British "guarantee policy" and agree to an acceptable settlement of the problems in Eastern Europe.
_-_-_^^1^^Akten zur deutschen ausw\"artigen Politik, 1918--1945, = serie D. (further---AD AP), Vol. VI, p. 599.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 666.
^^3^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 72.
^^4^^Ibid., pp. 72--74.
140The Labour politician Charles Buxton spoke about British ``concessions'' to Hitler in even greater detail in a talk with Kordt, Counsellor at the German Embassy. The British Government was not only prepared to break off the negotiations on the conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union but also to assist Hitler in getting the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact abrogated. Kordt said that Buxton promised on behalf of the British Government that it would "act in such a way that France would cancel her alliance with the Soviet Union and abandon all her ties in South-East = Europe".^^1^^
The British ``guarantee'' to Poland, just like the negotiations with the Soviet Union, were nothing more than a supplementary way to achieve the main aim ---a broad alliance with Hitler. Hitler and his diplomats had no doubt of this. Thus, for example, Dirksen emphasised in his report of August 3, 1939, that "the ties that have arisen in the last few months with other states are only a supplementary means for achieving a genuine reconciliation with Germany and will cease as soon as the only important and worthwhile aim, agreement with Germany, has been = effectively achieved".^^2^^
Both Wilson and Buxton repeatedly emphasised in their negotiations with the Germans that the British Government was prepared to give Hitler Poland to dismember as well as call off their negotiations with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to note in this connection that the Polish question only played a secondary role in the Anglo-German negotiations; it was rather the pretext which Chamberlain used in his efforts to reach an alliance with Hitler. On July 21,1939, Dirksen reported to Berlin that "Sir Horace Wilson definitely said to Wohlthat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would allow Britain to free herself from her obligations in relation to = Poland".^^3^^
As the documents show, the British Government's secret aim was to remove its obligations in relation to Poland under cover of the Anglo-German Non-Aggression Pact, utilising Hitler's ``obligations not to use aggressive methods'' as a pretext for this.
Dirksen considered that "an agreement with Germany would chemically, so to speak, dissolve the Danzig problem and would open the way for a German-Polish settlement, in which Britain would no longer need to take any = interest".^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^Documents, Vol. II, pp. 125--26.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 142.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 75.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 117.
141The second factor under the heading "political points" in Wilson's programme was the conclusion of a ``non-intervention'' pact with Hitler. The title ``non-intervention'' concealed none other than a general demarcation of spheres of influence throughout the world and was equivalent to a redivision of the world between Britain and Hitler Germany. Dirksen, in explaining this point, said that the pact of non-intervention "must include the demarcation of the extended territory between the great powers, especially between Britain and = Germany".^^1^^ No commitments were demanded from Hitler in this respect and the British Government agreed to make a statement about non-intervention in Germany's spheres of influence.
Wilson included four questions, in addition to the colonial questions; under the heading "economic points''. These were: 1) raw materials and Germany's acquisition of them; 2) industrial markets; 3) the settlement of international debts and 4) mutual financial assistance. Even a simple enumeration of these questions shows that this was a broad programme to settle Anglo-German economic relations.
Evaluating Wilson's proposals, Dirksen wrote:
"Wide-ranging proposals were made in the economic sphere --- negotiations were envisaged on colonial questions, about providing Germany with raw materials and about demarcating industrial markets, on international debts and on the granting of most-favoured-nation = status."^^2^^ Besides Wilson, Hudson also paid a lot of attention to economic questions in the Anglo-German negotiations. In a talk with Wohlthat he developed in more detail the idea about "the demarcation of British and German spheres of interest and the possibility of removing the terrible competition on the common = markets".^^3^^ He also said a lot aboutfhe possibility of British and German economic co-operation in foreign trade so as to "open and exploit" the existing world markets, including the USSR, China and the British Empire. Hudson declared, that "in the world there are three more large areas in which Germany and Britain could find many opportunities for applying their efforts, that is, the British Empire, China and = Russia".^^4^^ In Hudson's opinion these three areas represented an immense field for economic exploitation.
_-_-_^^1^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 73.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 216.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 71.
^^4^^Ibid., pp. 70--71
142On July 29, 1939, in a talk with Kordt, Biixton spoke in more detail about Germany's spheres of interest. According to Kordt, Buxton said that "Great Britain promises fully to respect Germany's spheres of interest in East and = South-East Europe".^^1^^
In his opinion, the agreement demarcating spheres of interest would give the contracting parties the right, first, to demand the non-intervention of other states in their spheres of interest, and second, to intervene in the foreign and internal policies of the states included in the British and German spheres of interest under the pretext of not allowing "policies hostile to = them".^^2^^
The British Government was prepared to do everything to collaborate with Hitler. It was not by accident that Wilson said that in proposing its programme of Anglo-German negotiations, the British Government was ready to discuss any German desires. Wilson emphasised that "the Fiihrer only has to take a clean sheet of paper and list the questions he is interested in; the British Government would be ready to discuss = them".^^3^^
On August 9, just before Dirksen's departure for Berlin, Lord Halifax once more assured Hitler's Ambassador that the British side sincerely wanted to overcome the difficulties preventing Anglo-German mutual understanding and would go to great lengths to achieve agreement with = Germany.^^4^^
Buxton's arrival in Berlin in August 1939, and his talks with Hetzler, a senior official in the "Ribbentrop bureau'', confirm that attempts were made by the British side even in August to come to an agreement with the Hitler Government on a wide range of questions. The proposals Buxton made in the negotiations were then stated by him in a confidential letter of August 14, 1939, to Hetzler.^^5^^ According to these proposals, Britain pledged: "to recognise East Europe as Germany's natural living space''; to settle the colonial question; "to withdraw all so-called 'encircling' alliances in East Europe" and so = on.^^6^^
Germany, in turn, had "to recognise the British Empire as England's natural living space'', "to enter into a system of European co-operation'', "for the resettlement of Europe with common guarantees for the new agreements" and so forth.
_-_-_^^1^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 125.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 76.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 146.
^^5^^ADAP, Vol. VII, pp. 81--82.
^^6^^Ibid.
143These proposals were essentially a repeat of what Buxton had already said in London during the negotiations with Kordt on July 29, 1939. And this shows that the plan for a broad Anglo-German agreement set out by Buxton fully and completely corresponded to Chamberlain's intentions.
The documents indisputably confirm that even when the British Government sent its military mission to Moscow to negotiate a military convention it had not abandoned its attempts to collude with Hitler.
In working towards a broad Anglo-German agreement, the British Government hoped to preserve the British Empire and ``canalize'' German aggression eastwards, against Poland whom she had recently ``guaranteed'' and the Soviet = Union.^^1^^
The Chamberlain Government was not alone in pursuing a policy of ``channelling'' German aggression eastwards; the French Government aided it in every possible way. This was a "big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention".^^2^^ However, despite all Britain's efforts she did not manage to achieve an agreement with Hitler: the contradictions turned out to be irreconcilable. Hitler was not content with what Chamberlain promised him. He was working towards establishing the supremacy of German imperialism in Europe and throughout the world.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The Anglo-Franco-Soviet Military NegotiationsDespite the Soviet proposals of April 17, 1939, speaking about the necessity of concluding a military agreement which was to be a constituent part of a mutual assistance treaty, the British and French governments deliberately reduced the whole matter, in the course of the negotiations, simply to a political agreement. Therefore on July 23, the Soviet Government formally proposed to Britain and France that negotiations begin on a military agreement. On July 25, London = agreed.^^3^^ On July 26, Bonnet stated that the French military mission could leave for Moscow in the near future. However, in reality, things happened differently: London _-_-_
^^1^^Falsifiers of History = (Historical Survey), Moscow, 1951, p. 73.
^^2^^The 18th Congress of the CPSU, March 10--21, 1939, p. 18.
^^3^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 158.
144 and Paris were not in a hurry to send the military missions to Moscow although the international situation demanded this.Instead of flying to Moscow to save time, the two missions set off in a slow ship and arrived first in Leningrad and only later in Moscow, where they turned up on August 11. Almost two weeks were lost in this way. Of course it was not by accident. It was just this tactic that Chamberlain had in mind when he spoke in the House of Commons and sought to create the impression among the British people that the talks would take a long time and gave examples of talks lasting over a year.
In contrast to this the USSR did everything so that the talks about a military agreement could begin sooner: on August 3, it informed London and Paris about the composition of the Soviet military delegation, which was led by the People's Commisar for Defence, Marshal K. Y. Voroshilov. The other members of the delegation were: Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, B. M. Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar for the Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov, Chief of the Red Army Air Force, A. D. Loktionov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, I. V. = Smorodinov.^^1^^
Admiral Drax, chief aide to the King on naval affairs, led the British delegation, i.e. a person who had no direct hand in leading the country's armed forces. The delegation also included Air Chief Marshal Burnett and Major-General Heywood.
Neither of these occupied prominent positions in the British armed forces. Therefore the British delegation, in reality, could decide nothing. The Soviet Ambassador to Britain wrote that the members of the delegation "according to the nature of the official posts they occupied could not decide anything on the spot and everything would have to be referred to London''; moreover "they could remain in Moscow for an indefinite = time".^^2^^
Dirksen stressed in his report that the composition of the British military delegation "shows that the military mission is to assess the fighting efficiency of the Soviet Army rather than to conclude an effective = agreement".^^3^^ General Doumenc, a member of the.French Supreme Military Council, led the French delegation whose members included General Valin, the commander of an air _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 177.
^^2^^USSR Foreign Affairs Archives, see M. Pakrashova and V. Sipols, op. cit, p. 92.
^^3^^Documents, Vol. II, p. 117.
145 division, Professor Willaume from the Naval School, General Palasse, the French military attache in Moscow, and others.Surits, the Soviet Ambassador to France, in describing its membership noted that it was made up of little-known persons and that "its selection, for the most part from narrow specialists, also shows its observationary aims, that is, the primary intention of acquainting them with the state of our army''. The Ambassador suggested that as the delegation was composed in this way it meant that the leadership in the negotiations would rest with the = British.^^1^^
The secret instructions which the British Government gave to its military mission before the latter's departure, show that the Chamberlain Government did not think in terms of working towards an equal agreement with the Soviet Union on co-operation to rebuff German-fascist aggression. However, it wanted to give the appearance that it was striving towards such an agreement and was therefore prepared to conduct protracted negotiations with the USSR. Paragraph 8 of these instructions stated that "the Delegation should therefore go very slowly with the conversations".^^2^^ In the bitter end the British Government sanctioned the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union but on the conditions that it would be of a general nature without definite obligations so that Britain would have complete freedom of action. Paragraph 15 of the instructions said in this connection that "the British Government is unwilling to enter into any detailed commitments which are likely to tie our hands in all circumstances. Endeavours should therefore be made to confine the Military Agreement to the broadest possible terms. Something on the lines of an agreed statement of policy may meet the = case."^^3^^ "If the Russians propose that the British and French Governments should communicate to the Polish, Rumanian or Baltic states proposals involving co-operation with the Soviet Government or General Staff, the Delegation should not commit themselves but refer home. The Delegation should not discuss the defence of the Baltic States, since neither Great Britain nor France have guaranteed these States, and if requested to do so should refer home for instructions."^^4^^
The instructions advised the mission not to discuss the passage of Soviet troops across Polish and Rumanian territory. Without _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, pp. 175--76.
^^2^^Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919--1939. = Third Series (hereafter given DBFP), Vol. VI, p. 461.
^^3^^Ibid., pp. 461--62.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 463.
146 such passage the USSR was, in reality, unable to participate in any military actions against Germany because the two countries had no common frontier. It followed from the instructions that the British and French missions arrived in Moscow without serious intentions of agreeing on joint actions in the event of German-fascist aggression.At the first session on August 12, after the fixing of the timetable of work, the head of the Soviet delegation proposed that the missions mutually acquaint themselves with each other's written powers. The extent of the powers, he declared, must corroborate the limits in which we are empowered to conduct the negotiations, the questions we are able to touch upon and "what can come at the conclusion of these = negotiations''.^^1^^
In the powers presented by Voroshilov it was stated that the Soviet delegation "Is empowered to conduct negotiations with the British and French military missions and to sign a military Convention on questions pertaining to the organisation of the military defence of Britain, France and the USSR against aggression in Europe".^^2^^
A quite unexpected picture was revealed at the session: the British Government had not given its delegation the corresponding written powers. Admiral Drax, in answering Voroshilov's question, stated that he did not have written powers and that he "was empowered only to conduct negotiations but not to sign a pact (convention)".^^3^^
The British mission's absence of powers could not but arouse anxiety in Moscow, the more so since on August 2, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, having in mind the importance of the forthcoming negotiations, had drawn attention to this matter in a talk with the British and French = ambassadors.^^4^^
As regards the powers of the French military mission they said that General Doumenc had been appointed its head and that he had been empowered "to come to an agreement with the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces on all questions pertaining to co-operation between the armed forces of both = countries".^^5^^
The French delegation was empowered only to conduct negotiations; they did not have the right to sign definite agreements. _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 187.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 178.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 187.
^^4^^DBFP, Vol. VI, p. 570.
^^5^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 188.
147 Consequently, although the British and French governments sent their military missions to Moscow, they did not intend to conclude a binding military agreement with the USSR. They only wanted to engage in lengthy negotiations which could be drawn out until October 1, = 1939.^^1^^ Therefore the dispatch of these missions completely corresponded to the previous Munich course pursued by London and Paris.Since the three powers' military negotiations were to be devoted to drawing up a military convention envisaging joint action against the aggressor it was implied that the British and French missions had to bring plans to Moscow for conducting joint military operations and for organising the defence of Britain, France and the USSR. This was reminded of by the head of the Soviet mission at the session on August 12. "Have the Missions of Britain and France to put forward in this connection military plans?" Voroshilov = asked.^^2^^ Drax tried to avoid answering by referring to the fact that the Soviet mission would be presenting such a draft and that it would be best to start with this.
The head of the Soviet delegation explained to Drax why it would be better to begin by laying out and discussing the British and French = plans.^^3^^
However the British and French missions insisted on having their own way, demanding that the Soviet plans be examined to begin with and declaring that they were especially interested in two questions:
1) The possibility of Germany conducting a war on two fronts;
2) Direct communications between the Soviet Armed Forces and those of the other countries, i.e. Britain and France.
Touching upon these points, Voroshilov declared: "Our aim is clear and now it is a matter of drawing up a plan to achieve this aim".~^^4^^
On August 13, the head of the French mission gave a report to the session but completely avoided the question of joint actions by Britain, France and the = USSR.^^5^^ When General Heywood laid out the British plan it was seen that it also did not envisage joint military operations by the three = powers.^^6^^
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid., p. 180
^^2^^Ibid., p. 188.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 189.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 189.
^^5^^Ibid., pp. 189--96.
^^6^^Ibid., pp. 197--200.
148At the evening session on August 13 Voroshilov asked what part did the British and French missions consider "The Soviet Union should take in a war against the aggressor if he attacks France and Britain, or if he attacks Poland or Rumania, or if he attacks them together, and also if he attacks Turkey"?
On August 14, the head of the Soviet delegation again returned to the question of how the British and French General Staffs conceived of the USSR's participation in a war against the aggressor.
Of course, the Soviet mission could not be satisfied with the sort of answers which Doumenc gave. The latter declared that "our initial task is for each party to hold firm on its own front and group all its forces on that front''. In relation to Poland, Rumania and Turkey, he said that "it is their duty to defend their own territory. But we must be prepared to come to their assistance when they ask for = it."^^1^^
The head of the Soviet mission was again compelled to ask the British and French missions to answer the clearly formulated question "concerning the joint action of the Armed Forces of Britain, France and the Soviet Union against the common enemy ---the bloc of aggressors, or the main aggressor ---should he = attack".^^2^^
The explanations which Doumenc gave at the session showed that Britain and France only had in view Soviet assistance to Poland and Rumania in the form of raw materials, arms, etc. The actual participation of Soviet troops was not envisaged in the assistance to be given to Poland.
Since the British and French missions constantly avoided giving definite answers to the question of joint action, Voroshilov asked several additional specific questions:
"Do the French and British General Staffs think that the Soviet land forces will be admitted to Polish territory in order to make direct contact with the enemy in case Poland is attacked? And further:
"Do you think that our Armed Forces will be allowed passage across Polish territory, across Galicia, to make contact with the enemy and to fight him in the south of Poland? And one more thing:
"Is it proposed to allow Soviet troops across Rumanian territory if the aggressor attacks Rumania? These are the three questions _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 203.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 205.
149 which interest us most.'' He also asked, "Whether the British and French General Staffs envisage passage of our troops towards East Prussia or other points to fight the common = enemy?"^^1^^Instead of giving answers, the British and French missions tried, in essence to side-step the issue with empty excuses about Poland and Rumania being sovereign states whose governments must decide this question = themselves.^^2^^ And then General Heywood promised, as if he were doing a favour, "However, if the Marshal specially wishes it, we are prepared to refer to London and Paris to request our Governments to ask the Polish and Rumanian Governments the following = question."^^3^^
The Soviet mission explained in answer to this statement that it had not forgotten and was not forgetting that Poland and Rumanian were sovereign states. Moreover, it was precisely this indisputable fact which caused the Soviet mission to ask the British and French missions to answer the above-mentioned questions. Voroshilov then emphasised that "The Soviet Military Mission considers that without a positive solution of this question the whole present attempt to conclude a Military Convention between France, Britain and the Soviet Union is, in its opinion, doomed to failure".
The Soviet mission asked, with reference to the above stated, that the British and French governments speed up their answers to these = questions.^^4^^
The British Ambassador in Moscow sent a telegram to London about this session in which he acknowledged that the problem raised by the Soviet delegation about the passage of Soviet troops was fundamental to the negotiations and their success or failure rested on its = solution.^^5^^
Naggiar, the French Ambassador in Moscow, in complete agreement with General Doumenc, considered that the Soviet proposals were consistent with the interests of France's security and the security of Poland herself. The Ambassador emphasised that the USSR offered France quite definite assistance in the East and was not laying additional claims in the West, but on the condition that Poland, by her own negative attitude, would not make it impossible to create an opposition front in the East with the participation of Russian forces.
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, pp. 205--06.
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 208.
^^3^^Ibid.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 210.
^^5^^DBFP, Vol. VIII, p. 1.
150In the minute of the French Foreign Ministry on August 15, 1939,^^1^^ in which Naggiar's opinion was laid out it is stated: "Far from seeking to exploit the negotiations in order to obtain our effective support in the West in exchange for limited support on its part in the East, the USSR is offering us, in M. Naggiar's opinion, quite definite assistance in the East, without advancing additional demands in the West, but on condition that by her negative attitude Poland should not make it impossible to create resistance front in the East with the participation of Russian forces''. However, if the Polish Government did not change its negative attitude to the passage of Soviet troops, then, as the French Ambassador noted, the Russians considered "the military negotiations, and consequently also the political treaty, one of whose basic aims is the rendering of assistance to Poland by the Soviet Union, would be = meaningless".^^2^^
As a corollary of this, Naggiar also came to the conclusion that the Rumanian as well as the Polish question would have to be decided if the negotiations were to be = successful.^^3^^
The reactionary ruling circles in Poland continued their antipopular course of enmity towards the Soviet Union. They repeatedly declared their unwillingness to participate in any kind of agreement for a collective rebuff to the aggressor if the Soviet Union also participated in this and that they categorically objected to the passage of Soviet troops through Poland.
On August 20, 1939, Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, drew attention to this once again in his telegram to the Polish Ambassador in Paris: ``No kind of military treaty connects Poland with the Soviets [USSR ---author] and the Polish Government does not intend to conclude such a = treaty."^^4^^
The anti-Soviet stance of the reactionary Polish ruling clique was, of course, very convenient for the London and Paris cabinets, since from the very beginning of the negotiations they had not intended to conclude an equal and binding political treaty of mutual assistance and a military convention with the USSR. The British and French governments tried to draw out the Moscow negotiations for as long as possible by agreeing to make an inquiry "about a clarification of the Polish position''. This is confirmed, in _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, pp. 225--26.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 226.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 226.
^^4^^Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-polskikh otnosheny. = 1939--1943. (Documents and Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish Relations. = 1939--1943) Vol. VII, Moscow, 1973, p. 163.
151 particular, by Beaufre, a member of the French delegation and a participant in the negotiations. He wrote in his memoirs: "The problem was not to obtain an answer from the Poles about whether or not they would allow the passage of Soviet troops across their territory, but to find a loop-hole that would allow the negotiations to = continue."^^1^^ They wanted one thing: to drag out the negotiations with the USSR until they were able to achieve a secret agreement with Germany at the expense of Poland and the Soviet Union.The statement made by the Soviet mission to the session on August 15, about three possible variants for joint military action by the Soviet, British and French armed forces in the event of aggression in Europe, is convincing proof that the USSR strove to conclude a definite agreement on joint military action to repulse aggression. According to this plan the USSR pledged to commit to a front against the aggressor in Europe 120 infantry divisions, 5,000 heavy artillery pieces (guns and howitzers), 9,000--10,000 tanks, and from 5,000 to 5,500 combat planes (excluding auxiliary aircraft). The Soviet plan also envisaged Polish and Rumanian participation in the joint action. The plan foresaw Soviet operations in the event of an attack on Britain and France, and attack on Poland and Rumania and finally an attack on the = Soviet Union.^^2^^
All three variants of the Soviet plan presupposed that the Soviet Union would conduct offensive operations.
"This is why the Military Mission of the Soviet Union insists,'' said Voroshilov, "that the question of allowing passage of Soviet troops across Polish territory (in the North and South) and Rumanian territory should be settled before we come to terms on the appropriate documents that are to culminate our = conference."^^3^^
Guided by the principle of the indivisibility of peace, the Soviet Union attached great significance to achieving active co-operation with Britain and France with a view to jointly defend peace from the aggressor and, therefore, it was not content with the working out of abstract principles not binding on anybody. Hence, the Soviet mission stated that the "three principles" formulated by Doumenc could only serve as material for an abstruct declaration. The purpose of the negotiations, however, was to work out a concrete military convention specifying the number of divisions, _-_-_
^^1^^General Beaufre, Le Drame de 1940, Paris, 1965, p. 156.
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, pp. 212--15.
^^3^^ Ibid., p. 207.
152 artillery pieces, tanks, aircraft, naval squadrons, etc., for the joint defence of the contracting parties.The refusal by Britain and France to grant triple guarantees to Estonia, Latvia and Finland, justified with references to the latters' objections to accept such guarantees, evidenced the unwillingness of London and Paris to sign an effective mutual assistance pact with the USSR on the basis of equality and the reciprocity of commitments. The Soviet delegation emphasised that if Britain and France refused to grant such guarantees to the Baltic countries, whose inviolability was a vital element of the USSR's security, then the Soviet Union would not be able to be a party to the triple guarantees to other countries mentioned in the discussion and all eight countries would have to be dropped out of the'draft.
London's and Paris' reluctance to accept a formulation of the concept of indirect aggression in relation to the Baltic states which would not leave any loop-hole for the aggressor was eloquent evidence that Britain and France had no serious desire to end the Moscow negotiations by signing a pact on collective defence from aggression.
Molotov spoke about the importance of the military missions' negotiations on August 16, at a talk with Steinhardt, the American Ambassador in Moscow.
"The Soviet Government,'' he said, "takes a most serious attitude towards the situation in Europe and towards its negotiations with England and France. We attach great significance to these negotiations, as may be seen from the amount of time we have given them. From the very beginning we have approached these negotiations not as something that would end with the adoption of some general declaration. We feel it would be wrong, and for us it would be unacceptable, to limit ourselves to such a declaration. Consequently we insist, as we have done from the moment the negotiations started, on discussing concrete obligations for mutual assistance to counter possible aggression in = Europe."^^1^^
At the end of the session on August 17, Drax proposed a halt in the work until August 21. It was presumed that during this time London and Paris would give an answer to the cardinal question raised by the Soviet side about the Soviet troops' right of passage through Polish and Rumanian territory. On August 21, the missions met and Drax and Doumenc once again arrived empty-handed: neither London nor Paris had given an answer. This was very typical of Britain's and France's attitude to the Moscow negotiations.
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 238.
__PRINTERS_P_153_COMMENT__ 7---615 153However, Drax was not discouraged and tried to continue the tactic of procrastination, thus creating the appearance that the negotiations were continuing. To this end he again proposed "to postpone the meeting for 3-4 days''. This ruse was exposed by the Soviet mission.
At the session, the Soviet delegation came to the conclusion that if "This axiomatic question is turned by the British and French into a great problem demanding long study, this means that there is every reason to doubt their desire for effective and serious military co-operation with the USSR. In view of the above the responsibility for the delay in the military negotiations naturally falls on the British and French = sides."^^1^^
At the time the Soviet Government did not know the nature of the instructions the British and French missions had brought with them to Moscow. However, London's and Paris' reluctance to conduct negotiations for a definite agreement on military questions, precisely formulating the conditions of co-operation in the conduct of military activities to repel aggression, was quite clearly confirmed by their missions' tactics, aimed at turning the negotiations into endless logomachy about the "three principles" mentioned above.
The Polish Government played an unseemly role in this dirty game of Anglo-French diplomacy, aimed at steering the Moscow negotiations into a blind alley and practically wrecking them. Contrary to the interests of the Polish people its ill-starred rulers pursued a rash policy of hostility towards the USSR, an anti-Soviet policy of playing on the contradictions between the USSR and Germany. With their provocative anti-Soviet policy they played into the hands of the fascist aggressor, helping to wreck the Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement. The British and French governments encouraged the Polish Government's obstructionist stance, knowing, incidentally, the approaching date of Hitler's attack on Poland. On April 3, Hitler had ordered the attack to be planned for September 1, 1939.
It was not a chance coincidence either that the Chamberlain Government continued its secret negotiations with Hitler during the Moscow military negotiations. The Labour politician Buxton's arrival in Berlin and his proposals for a broad Anglo-German agreement bear witness to = this,^^2^^ as does the trip made by the Swedish industrialist Birger Dahlerus to organise Anglo-German _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 257.
^^2^^ADAP, Vol. VII, pp. 81--82.
154 negotiations.^^1^^ Further evidence can be seen in the visit made to Hitler by Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzing, who tried to find out whether there was a possibility of a meeting between a representative of the British Government and the fascist dictator. In the evening of the same day (August 21) that Drax proposed to have a further break in the discussions, Chamberlain sent a secret message to Hitler in which he stated his readiness to begin Anglo-German negotiations to discuss the problems affecting the future of international relations, including questions of interest to both Britain and = Germany.~^^2^^These British proposals meant that the Chamberlain Government was proposing a new division of the world to Hitler. This time Britain declared her readiness to conclude a comprehensive agreement with Germany at the expense of her ally France as well as that of Poland whom she had ``guaranteed''.
For the London Cabinet, the achievement of an Anglo-German agreement remained the main aim and the Moscow negotiations for a military agreement were only a reserve means to achieve this end. Therefore the British Government, with the agreement of Daladier, planned, from the very beginning, to conduct the Moscow negotiations extremely slowly, intending to draw them out for several months, hoping that it would have managed in this time to come to an agreement with Hitler Germany. The British Government, as its instructions to its military mission indicate, was prepared, if forced, to conclude an agreement on military cooperation with the USSR providing such an agreement were of a general nature without definite obligations. The reluctance of London and Paris to accept specific obligations to render military assistance to the Soviet Union was very clearly shown in their refusal to grant triple guarantees to the Baltic states. The absence of guarantees to these countries was to show Hitler that he could attack the USSR via these open gates.
In describing Britain's policy on the eve of the Second World War, Ickes, the former Secretary of the Interior under Roosevelt, wrote in his memoirs:
"It is a terrible situation, but I find it difficult to blame Russia. As I see it, Chamberlain alone is to blame. I entertain no doubt that England could have concluded a satisfactory treaty with Russia months ago or even years ago. Russia was ready to join _-_-_
^^1^^Nyurnbergsky protsess nad glavnymi voyennymi prestupnikami = (The Nuremberg Tribunal over the Major War Criminals) = Collected Materials in 7 Vols.; Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 400--19.
^^2^^DBFP, Vol. VII, pp. 127--28.
__PRINTERS_P_155_COMMENT__ 7* 155 hands with England and France to fight for Czechoslovakia.'' But Britain did not do this simply because, "She kept hoping against hope that she could embroil Russia and Germany with each other and thus escape scot-free = herself'.^^1^^Numerous documents confirm the correctness of the statement that Voroshilov made at the time that "the military negotiations with England and France were not broken off because the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany; on the contrary, the USSR concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany because, amongst other things, the military negotiations with France and England had reached a deadlock as a result of insurmountable differences of = opinion."^^2^^
The whole course of the Moscow negotiations irrefutably confirms that Britain and France did not intend to conclude a military convention with the USSR. British diplomacy's crafty scheme was, by the very nature of these negotiations, "to make it clear to Hitler that the USSR had no allies, that it was isolated, and that he could attack the USSR without the risk of encountering resistance on the part of Britain and = France".^^3^^
The behaviour of Anglo-French diplomacy in the negotiations with the USSR over the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty gave the Soviet Government more than sufficient grounds for doubting the desire of London and Paris to conclude an effective agreement with the Soviet Union based on equality and reciprocity in the obligations accepted. Stalin voiced these doubts in a talk with Gavrilovic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow. In June 1941, in the American Embassy in Turkey, Gavrilovic related this talk with Stalin.
The American minute on this says: "Mr.~Gavrilovic said that, in his conversation with Stalin, the latter had referred to the negotiations [with] the allies prior to the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. Stalin has stated that the fact that the allied negotiators were subordinate officials not vested with full powers, the attitude of Poland in refusing to consent to the passage of Russian troops or the flight of Russian aeroplanes over Poland, the attitude of the French Military officers which indicated that France was planning to remain behind the Maginot Line and not undertake any offensive operations against Germany, made it clear to the Soviet Government that the conclusion of any pact [with] the allies would result _-_-_
^^1^^The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, = Vol. II, New York, 1954, pp. 703, 705.
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 2, p. 272.
^^3^^Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey), p. 68.
156 in the Soviet Union having to bear the full brunt of the German attack at a time when the Soviet Union was in no position to cope with a German = attack."^^1^^During the summer 1939 political crisis, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government had to act with the maximum caution, so as not to allow the Soviet Union to be drawn into a war in a situation where it was almost completely isolated internationally and had no allies. Moreover, for the Soviet Union this would have been a simultaneous war against two very strong powers, Germany in the West and Japan in the East. In addition Germany could draw on the support of fascist Italy since they were linked by a political-military alliance, to say nothing of the anti-Comintern pact between Germany, Japan and Italy.
At that time, the Soviet Government was in possession of absolutely reliable information about Japanese preparations for a war against the USSR. In addition, the Soviet Union had to assist the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in repelling the armed Japanese attacks in the Khalkhin Gol area which began in May, 1939. At the end of May, 1939, in the third session of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Government issued a serious warning to Japan that it would not tolerate any kind of provocations from the Japanese militarists on its borders and the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, and would defend the border of its ally as decisively as it would its own.
In conclusion it was pointed out that patience had its = limits.^^2^^
Tokyo, however, pretended not to hear this warning. Moreover, in June, the fighting in the Khalkhin Gol area was escalated: it involved 38,000 Japanese officers and men, 145 tanks and armoured cars, 310 ordnance pieces and 225 aircraft. Later the Japanese 6th Army numbering 76,000 men was thrown into the fighting; the number of tanks grew to 182, aircraft from 300 to 500, ordnance pieces to more than 500.
'^
Since the Mongolian People's Republic did not have sufficient armed forces of its own, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, undertook the whole burden of the battle against the Japanese aggressors. The USSR's position in the military conflict with Japan was extremely complicated as a result of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Craigie-Arita Agreement of July 22,1939, which became known as the "Far-East Munich''. Under this agreement Britain _-_-_
^^1^^Foreign Relations of the United States. 1941, = Vol. 1, pp. 313--14.
^^2^^The Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, = verbatim report, Moscow, 1939, p. 476 (in Russian).
157 acknowledged the Japanese seizures in China and pledged not to hinder Japanese aggression there. This was in fact an encouragement to Japanese aggression against the MPR and the USSR. __ALPHA_LVL2__ The Soviet-German Treaty of 1939:The Soviet Union had to act with the utmost caution in order not to find itself in a state of war, both in the East and in the West.
A German attack on Poland could have occurred at any moment and, therefore, its was necessary to take every possible measure, without delay, to avoid Hitler aggression against the USSR. It was vital not to allow the flames of war to be thrown across the Soviet state's western borders. Having found it impossible to create a reliable system of collective security for defence from aggression by way of concluding a pact of mutual assistance with Britain and France, the Soviet Government was forced to consider other possibilities for preserving peace and warding off war between Germany and the USSR.
The Soviet Government was guided in what it did by the directions of the 18th Congress of the CPSU: "to pursue a policy of peace and the strengthening of business ties with all countries" and "to be cautious and not allow our country to be dragged into conflicts by the war-mongers, who are accustomed to getting others to pull their chestnuts out of the fire".
The negotiations with Britain and France in the spring and summer of 1939 proved to be fruitless because of the Western powers' reluctance to conclude an effective treaty of mutual assistance and a military convention with the USSR based on complete equality between the sides and reciprocity in the obligations accepted in the drive against fascist aggression. Moreover, the policy London and Paris pursued actually encouraged aggression against the USSR in Europe, as is evidenced by their refusal to apply any sanctions against German and Italian aggression. The Craigie-Arita Agreement proved that Britain, with US backing, was pursuing the same anti-Soviet policy in the Far East by pushing Japanese aggression against the MPR and the Soviet Union. Of course, the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government could not help concluding from their analysis of international politics at the time that Britain and 158 France, occupying as they did the leading position in the capitalist world, did not want to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR and had not abandoned their hope of steering German and Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union. The USA did their best to support this policy of the British and French Munichmen. If there could have been any doubts in this then the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations for the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty and later the Moscow negotiations for the conclusion of a military convention should have dispelled them.
As it says in the preface to The History of the Second World War, the negotiations with Britain and France in the summer of 1939 showed that the governments of these countries preferred an anti-Soviet agreement with Germany, with whom they had already exchanged non-aggression obligations to a treaty with the Soviet Union.
Throughout the whole summer, British diplomacy was frantically seeking to overcome the irreconcilable imperialist contradictions between Britain and Germany so as the two could conclude a broad agreement at the expense of and against the USSR.
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government were faced with the urgent task of preventing the formation of a joint imperialist front to organise war against the Soviet Union, to destroy it and to satisfy the aggressive powers' claims at its expense. In the fulfilment of this cardinal foreign-policy task, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government were guided by Lenin's instructions about the necessity to use the differences between the imperialist powers so as to impede their coming together for an onslaught against the Soviet state. He said, "Is it the correct policy for us to use the discord between the imperialist bandits to make it more difficult for them to unite against us?... Of course, it is the correct = policy."^^1^^
The USSR's main foreign policy task then was to prevent the formation of a joint anti-Soviet imperialist front for an onslaught against the Soviet Union and to prolong the peace period for it. The conclusion of a Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression pursued just this end. Berlin had repeatedly made proposals about this during the summer of 1939.
Berlin had begun cautiously probing the possibilities of improving relations between Germany and the USSR from the beginning of May, 1939. On May 5, Braun von Stumm, Deputy Head of the Press Department of the German Ministry for Foreign _-_-_
^^1^^V.~I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 470.
159 Affairs, made the first such attempt during a talk with Astakhov, the Soviet Charg\'e d'Affaires in Berlin. Stumm especially noted the German press' change in tone vis-\`a-vis the USSR, regarding this as a turning point in Germany's policy towards the Soviet Union.In answer to Stumm, Astakhov stated that "As regards the symptoms of improvement, which Braun von Stumm spoke about, then, dismissing or at least doubting the majority of them, I noted that we had not yet had any grounds to take them seriously, beyond the limits of a short-term, tactical = manoeuvre."^^1^^
Hilger, the Councellor to the German Embassy in Moscow, wrote in his memoirs that on May 6, 1939, Hitler demanded information about the USSR. On May 9, Hilger was summoned to Ribbentrop in Munich for the preparation of this information. On May 10, Hilger was with Hitler, who among the questions he put to the Councellor, asked if it was possible "that Stalin might, under certain circumstances, be ready for an understanding with Germmany?"^^2^^ Shortly after this Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, received instructions from Berlin to continue probing the possibilities of improving relations with the USSR. Accordingly, on May 20, 1939, Schulenburg met Molotov and proposed that negotiations be started in Moscow on economic questions, saying that Schnurre, who dealt with trade and economic relations with the East European countries in the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, would like to come from Berlin to conduct them. In answer the People's Commissar expressed doubt in the advisability of such talks. As the German Ambassador reported to Berlin, during the talk the Soviets displayed the old mistrust --- Molotov expressed suspicion that the German side was only pursuing a political goal in resuming the negotiations. The Ambassador decisively objected to = this.^^3^^
But several days earlier Schnurre had had a talk with the Soviet Charge d!Affaires to Germany on the same theme. This meeting took place on May 17. In answer to Astakhov's statement that the Soviet Government did not have "any information that Germany has radically changed her policy'', Schnurre began to assure that "Germany has no aggressive intentions whatever in relation to the USSR" and asked "what must be done to dispel your doubts?" Astakhov informed Moscow that in this talk he had confined himself to general comments, saying that improving the _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives in ``On the Eve of the Second World War'', Voprosy Istorii, No.~9, 1972, p. 136.
^^2^^G. Hilger, A. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies, New York, 1959, p. 296.
^^3^^ ADAP, Vol. VI, p. 465.
160 atmosphere between the two states depended on the German Government.^^1^^Bearing in mind the hostile nature of the Hitler regime's policy towards the Soviet state, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government displayed great distrust towards Berlin's proposals as regards both the development of trade and economic ties and a 'major review of the course of German policy. As an example of this distrust one may note the stance taken up by Mikoyan, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Trade during his talk in Moscow with Hilger on June 2, 1939.
Having heard Hilger's statement about Germany's desire to develop and "to extend economic relations" with the USSR, Mikoyan confined himself to comments to the effect that it was the German Government's own fault that the February Soviet-German talks on this question ended without any = results.^^2^^ On June 17, a new meeting took place with Mikoyan at Hilger's request. Hilger again spoke about the German Government's "sincere wish" to extend trade and economic ties between Germany and the USSR. In answer to this the People's Commissar said that "he could not as yet be certain that these new economic proposals from Germany ... were not a matter of continuing a political game which only interests the Germans at present and from which they eventually intend to gain an = advantage."^^3^^ Initially the Soviet Government had no intention of concluding a treaty with fascist Germany because it did not believe the latter's peace assurances. Here are a few facts. On June 26, Schnurre, in a talk with Astakhov, stated the "need to improve political relations between the USSR and Germany" and hinted that "all German attempts to start talks on this theme are left unanswered by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs".
In a talk that took place two days later (June 28), also as a result of German initiative, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires said, in particular, to the same Schnurre: "We are not certain that the hinted changes in German policy are of a serious and non-conjectural nature and are calculated for a long period''. Therefore Schnurre was compelled to try to find out: "Tell me what proof you want? We are ready in deed to demonstrate the possibility of reaching agreement on any question, to give any = guarantees."^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^~~~USSR Foreign Policy Archives published in = History of the Second World War 1939--1945, Moscow, 1974, Vol. 2, p. 279.
^^2^^ADAP, Vol. VI, pp. 521--22.
^^3^^Ibid., pp. 623--24.
^^4^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives published in = History of the USSR, No.~3, 1962, p. 21.
161Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to the USSR, in a talk with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on June 28, assured and emphasised in every possible way, that "the German Government desires not just to normalise but to improve its relations with the USSR''. Schulenburg added that this statement, made on Ribbentrop's instructions, had Hitler's approval. This desire of Germany's to ``improve'' relations with the USSR was confirmed by Schulenburg on August 3, during talks at the Commissariat for Foreign = Affairs.^^1^^ At the same time Ribbentrop repeated these proposals to Astakhov.
From the beginning of August German diplomacy worked intensely to persuade the Soviet Government to begin, negotiations. Weizsacker emphasised Britain's unreliability as an ally. "If the Soviet Union were to prefer a mutual understanding with us,'' said Weizsacker, "then it would find the security it wants, and would receive every guarantee for its = preservation."^^2^^-
On August 4, 1939, Schulenburg informed Berlin about the Soviet Government's mistrustful attitude towards the German proposals and noted with alarm, that "the Soviet Government has at present decided to sign [a treaty---author] with Britain and France if they satisfy all the Soviets' wishes''. Schulenburg asserted further that "considerable efforts will be required on our part in order to change the Soviet Government's = policy".^^3^^ On August 7, he wrote, "With every word and with every step one can see a great distrust towards = us."^^4^^
Astakhov, in evaluating the German proposals, reported to the Soviet Government on August 8,1939, that the German rulers did not have in mind "a serious and long-term observation of the eventual commitments. I think,'' he wrote, "that in the immediate future they consider it viable to come to a certain understanding..., in order to neutralise us at this price.... As regards the future, then here the matter would depend, of course, not on these obligations but on the new situation which would be = created."^^5^^
Throughout the summer of 1939, the German Government repeatedly put forward its proposals to begin Soviet-German negotiations. To prove the seriousness of its intentions to improve relations with the USSR, the German Government concluded a _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^ADAP, Vol. V, p. 894.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 905.
^^5^^History of the USSR, No.~3, 1962, p. 21.
162 Soviet-German economic agreement in which it granted credit worth 200 million marks to the Soviet Union.On August 14, 1939, Berlin telegraphed Shulenburg that he was empowered to inquire about a trip to Moscow by Ribbentrop for talks with Stalin. "Only by such direct discussion,'' said the telegram, "is it possible, in Ribbentrop's opinion, to achieve changes, not excluding the creation of the basis for a decisive improvement of German-Russian = relations."^^1^^
From August 14 to 21, the German Government persistently and repeatedly confronted the Soviet Government with the need to settle Soviet-German relations. In particular, on August 20, Hitler informed the Soviet Government by telegram that a crisis could break out between Germany and Poland at any time, and proposed the urgent signing of a German-Soviet pact of = non-aggression.^^2^^
In connection with the breaking-off of the political negotiations with 'the Western powers (because the British representative, Strang, flew out from Moscow on August 7 for London, where he had allegedly accumulated "a lot of business'') and the blind alley into which the Moscow military negotiations with the Western powers had come, exclusively because of the latter, the Soviet Government was compelled, on August 21, to accept the German proposal that Ribbentrop should come to Moscow for talks on the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression. Britain, France, Poland and other European countries already had non-aggression treaties with Germany.
In concluding the non-aggression treaty with Germany the Soviet Government did not have any illusions about Hitler's true intentions. It had no doubt that in the final analysis Germany would not hold back from a war against the USSR. But despite this, in the situation as it was, with the pre-war political crisis during the summer of 1939 and in order to prevent the creation of an anti-Soviet front, it was necessary to conclude a treaty with Germany. Only in this way was it possible to prolong the peace period, to delay the imminent war with Germany, gain time to prepare for defence and to remove the danger of a war on two fronts. No one can dispute the evident truth that the USSR only concluded a treaty with Germany when she was finally convinced of the impossibility of creating a collective security system in Europe to maintain peace and check aggression by concluding on the basis of equality and mutual benefit an assistance treaty and a military convention __PRINTERS_ERROR_P_163_COMMENT__ Last line (above footnotes) on page 163 ends with "." and 3 inches of whitespace. It should have "Britain and France. The French Military Attache" from page 164. with. _-_-_
^^1^^ADAP, vol. vn,,p. 52.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 131.
163 Britain and France. The French Military Attache in Moscow, General Palasse, a participant in the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Moscow military negotiations, confirms this in his report to Paris on August 23, 1939; he wrote, "I continue to consider that for the USSR the solution of the problem by an agreement with Germany is only the last resort and, perhaps, a means to press for the more rapid creation of a durable and well-coordinated coalition, which has always seemed to me to be the object to the Soviet leaders' desires."^^1^^ On August 27, 1939, that same Palasse again wrote about the Soviet Government's position: "As before I believe, that, fearing an excessively strong Germany, it would prefer an agreement with France and Britain, if only this achievement proved to be possible on conditions clearly defined in the course of military negotiations."^^2^^Throughout the summer of 1939, when the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations on a mutual assistance treaty and later on a military convention were in progress, the USSR did everything it could to achieve an effective and equal agreement with Britain and France to rebuff fascist aggression. It only proved impossible to achieve this because of the British and French, since the governments of these countries preferred "an anti-Soviet agreement with Germany, with whom they had already exchanged non-aggression obligations, to such an agreement. This compelled the USSR to agree to the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Germany. The Soviet Union warded off the formation of a joint anti-Soviet front by using the acute imperialist contradictions between the capitalist = powers."^^3^^
The documents, published after the Second World War, irrefutably confirm that the Chamberlain and Daladier governments pursued a policy which betrayed the vital interests of their countries. This is the only way one can and must evaluate their actual encouragement to the Polish and Rumanian governments to refuse the passage of Soviet troops across their = countries.^^4^^
It is beyond doubt that the British and French governments' refusal of a political and military alliance with the USSR not only undermined the basis of their own security but also opened the way to Hitler aggression and therefore made a second world war _-_-_
^^1^^History of the USSR, No.~3, 1962, p. 23.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voini Vol 1, pp. IX-X.
^^4^^A. A. Shevyakov. ``Vneshnyaya politika SSSR i Sovetsko-Rumynskiye otnosheniya (Yanvar-Avgust 1939)" in = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, pp. 112--23.
164 inevitable. Considerable responsibility for unleashing the war rests with the US ruling circles who approved and supported the London and Paris cabinets in their policy of sabotaging the creation of a collective security system in Europe by the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty between Britain, France and the USSR. This was clearly demonstrated when Davies, the US Ambassador to Belgium, submitted a proposal that he should go to Moscow in order to utilise his former good personal ties with leading Soviet personalities, established during his stay in Moscow (1936--1938) as American Ambassador, to help in the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact, the negotiations for which had begun on April 17, = 1939.^^1^^However, Secretary of State Hull quickly informed Davies that the US Government declined his = proposal.^^2^^
Washington maintained its stance of negative attitude to the organisation of collective security to oppose fascist aggression throughout the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. The USA refused to have anything to do with these negotiations even after on August 16, 1939, the Soviet Government informed Steinhardt, its Ambassador to the USSR, in detail about the deadlock which the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations had reached thanks to London and = Paris.^^3^^
The Chamberlain and Daladier governments regarded this position of the US Government as approval of their Munich policies.
Only after the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Government had tried all the possibilities and means of achieving an agreement with Britain and France on co-operation in creating a collective security system for a rebuff to Hitler aggression did they accept the German proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty which was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939.
This treaty contained an obligation to refrain from aggressive activity and from attack on one another. Clause 2 envisaged that in the event of an attack by a third power on one of the contracting parties the other contracting party would not render support to the attacker. According to clause 3, the contracting parties had to consult each other on the questions of common interest. The treaty also provided for the non-participation in groupings of states directed against one of the contracting parties and the solution of _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, pp. 348--349.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 349.
^^3^^Ibid., Part 2, pp. 238--239.
165 all controversial questions by peaceful means. The Treaty was concluded for 10 years.In the given situation, the conclusion of this treaty was the last possibility of maintaining peace and ensuring security for the Soviet Union, for a certain period, at that time the only socialist country.
The West German bourgeois historian Niekisch, in his work published in 1953, had to admit that for the Soviet Union the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Hitler Germany was the only way to remove the threat of the German attack on the USSR. "Of course, the Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression was a daring, even a risky undertaking. But the international situation was so involved that only such an undertaking could save Soviet Russia.'' "The Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression,'' he wrote, "offered Soviet Russia some time, a breathing-space, for the necessary organisation of a rebuff to the fascist = attack."^^1^^
It must be stressed here, that at that very time our country was carrying out a fundamental renovation of its armed forces, i.e. mass rearmament with modern military equipment. However, as noted by Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, late Minister of Defence: "Obviously, the vast amount of work involved in reconstructing and modernising the Soviet Armed Forces required time. This meant that the outbreak of war, which was ever more clearly unavoidable, had to be delayed as long as possible. We faced this problem when Hitler Germany had already begun military operations in Europe, while the Western states persisted in their anti-Soviet policy. In the circumstances, the Soviet Union had no other choice but to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. This gave us nearly two years for the additional strengthening of our = defences."^^2^^
Meanwhile, the British and French Munich-men conducted matters so as to provoke a war between the USSR and Germany. The English historian Fleming acknowledged that "They dreaded a pact with Germany, yet the West offered them = nothing."^^3^^ It goes without saying that the USSR's agreement to this was a compromise of sorts. Lenin had talked about the necessity of such a compromise, calling the Brest Treaty a necessary and timely _-_-_
^^1^^E. Niekisch, op. cit, p. 489.
^^2^^Andrei Grechko, ``The Great Victory and Its Historical Sources.'' = See World Marxist Review, Vol. 18, March 1975, No.~3, p. 1.
^^3^^D. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins. 1917--1960, = Vol. 1, London, 1961, p. 111.
166 compromise. Lenin emphasised, that "it was indeed a compromise with the imperialists, but it was a compromise which, under the circumstances, had to be = made".^^1^^The 1939 treaty with Germany was a compromise for the sake of prolonging the peace period, vitally necessary for the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was obligatory given the pre-war crisis in the summer of 1939. The USSR did not waive any of its fundamental Leninist foreign-policy principles. As formerly, it was a class policy, for the Communist Party was guided by Lenin's direction to the effect that through compromise, in as far as it proved to be necessary, "to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its = revolutionary purpose".^^2^^ The USSR continued a consistent endeavour for peace and for peaceful coexistence between states of the two opposing socio-economic systems. The Soviet Union did not stop its struggle for the freedom and security of nations, helped people who had become the victims of aggression and who were fighting against the invaders for their independence and supported the liberation movement of the peoples in the colonies and dependent countries.
In concluding the treaty, the Soviet Union avoided the trap laid by the Munich-men and upset their crafty plans to draw the USSR into a simultaneous war in the West and in the East without having any allies.
At the time, the USSR knew that aggressive plans had been drawn up in Japan, where things were being engineered so that the fighting at Khalkhin Gol could be turned into a full-scale war against the Soviet Union. As the documents show, the Japanese ruling circles were awaiting the German and Italian attack on the Soviet Union with impatience and assured the Hitlerites, that "in the event of Germany and Italy starting war with the USSR Japan will join them at any moment without raising any = conditions".^^3^^ The Soviet-German treaty upset these aggressive Japanese plans. The Japanese Government resolutely protested to Germany over the signing of this = treaty.^^4^^
The Soviet Union used the treaty to deal a decisive blow on the Japanese invaders in the Khalkhin Gol area. (The reader will recall that the Japanese 6th Army was routed in the decisive fighting between August 20 and 31.) Only after this, in September 1939, did Japan move towards discontinuing military activities and settling _-_-_
^^1^^V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 36.
^^2^^Ibid., Vol. 25, p.~305.
^^3^^Soviet Peace Efforts...,Part 1, p. 344.
^^4^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives in History of the USSR, = No.~3, 1962, p. 24.
167 the conflict by peaceful means. In November, they started talking about the necessity of improving political and economic relations with the USSR.Of course, in concluding the Soviet-German treaty, the Soviet Government took into account Hitler's aggressive schemes in relation to the USSR and therefore saw to it that Hitler's army should not be near the then existing Soviet borders, which ran close by Minsk and Leningrad, and that "the line along which the German forces were to be deployed be pushed back as far west as possible, as far as possible from the USSR's vital centres. The Soviet Government also saw to it that the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who were the majority populations in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, were saved from Hitler = bondage."^^1^^ In concluding the treaty with Germany, the Soviet Government obtained agreement that Hitler's army would not go further East than the line formed by the rivers Pissa, Narev, Bug, Vistula, and San. As Pravda said on September 23,1939, the governments of the USSR and Germany had "established the demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies as that formed by the River Pissa up to its confluence with the River Narev, further along the River Narev up to its confluence with the River Bug, further along the River Bug up to its confluence with the River Vistula, further along the River Vistula up to the point where the River San flows into the River Vistula and along the River San to its sources."
Almost two years passed from the time the treaty was concluded until Hitler Germany perfidiously attacked the Soviet Union on June 22,1941. This time was used by the Soviet people for peaceful creative endeavour and also for strengthening the USSR's defensive might. The treaty prevented the capitalist powers creating a joint anti-Soviet front. By concluding the treaty with Germany the USSR wrecked the crafty plans of the Munich-men, who calculated that by unleashing German-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet wars they could play the role of world rules and arbiters. In September 1939 the war started ---but not in the way the Munichmen had wanted: They had wanted Germany and Japan to attack the USSR while they played the part of the "complacent onlooker".^^2^^ Instead of this, Britain and France had themselves to declare war on Germany. It turned out, as the proverb goes, that "He who sows the wind will reap the whirlwind".
_-_-_^^1^^V. M. Khvostov. ``Pouchitelniye uroki istorii'' in = Kommunist (Communist), No.~12, 1959, p. 99.
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part 1, p. 35.
168By June 1941, when fascist Germany attacked the USSR, the international situation had undergone a basic change. Foreign-policy isolation no longer threatened the Soviet Union, as had been the case in the summer of 1939, when it faced a danger of a war on two fronts, in the West and in the Far East. "The respite gained by the USSR in consequence of signing the non-aggression treaty with Germany had enabled it to avoid getting involved in a war in the extremely unfavourable international conditions, that had developed in the summer of = 1939."^^1^^
In the exceedingly complex international situation, with local wars raging across a vast territory from Gibraltar to Shanghai, the Soviet state was the only one in the world rendering assistance to the peoples who had become the victims of aggression and who were fighting for their independence. This assistance was given to the peoples of Spain, China, MPR and other countries. Assistance to the MPR and Spain was discussed earlier. The USSR also gave the most varied assistance to China. In 1938, the USSR offered her two credits amounting to 50 million US dollars each. Then in June 1939, China received a new Soviet credit of 150 million US dollars. Under these credits the USSR sent to China in 1938--1939 about 600 aircraft, 1,000 ordnance pieces and howitzers, more than 8,000 machine-guns, various means of transport, shells, cartridges and other military = supplies.^^2^^ By the middle of February 1939 3,665 Soviet military specialists were working in China and taking part in the battle against the Japanese invaders. More than 200 Soviet volunteers died in the bitter fighting for the liberation of the Chinese = people.^^3^^ Thus, the CPSU and the Soviet state faithfully fulfilled their internationalist duty.
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts, Part 1, p. 35.
^^2^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., Part II, pp. 278--79, 314--15.
^^3^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945, Vol. 2, p. 74.
[169] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER IV __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.On September 1, 1939, fascist Germany attacked Poland. On September 3, Britain and France declared war on Germany. The British dominions, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, declared war on Germany on October 3. The Second World War began. It started as an inevitable consequence of the economic and political development of capitalism, which had led to the acute aggravation of the contradictions between the states in two imperialist blocs. From both sides the war was a predatory one. The war was unleashed by fascist Germany, but imperialism was the real guilty party.
The Executive Committee of the Communist International, describing the new war in its appeal on the 22nd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, noted that "the British, French and German ruling classes are waging a war for world supremacy''. The appeal also stressed that "this war is a continuation of the years-long imperialist competition in the capitalist camp".^^1^^ Britain and France obviously had no alternative but to declare war on Germany, which amounted to an acknowledgement of the total insolvency, the bankruptcy of these countries' entire pre-war policies, aimed at collusion with the aggressive powers at the expense of other countries, including the Soviet Union. If Britain, France and the USA had joined forces with the Soviet Union in struggling for peace and a system of collective security, a world war could have been averted. But they consciously turned _-_-_
^^1^^Kommunistichesky Intftnatsional = (Communist International), No.~8-9, 1939, pp. 3-4.
170 down this sole chance of a way out, thereby freeing the hands of the fascist aggressors. In that situation, the Soviet Union, then internationally isolated, was unable to stave off the imperialist war. In the existing historical conditions, the path of imperialist aggression could not be barred. The anti-war forces were uncoordinated and proved to be insufficient to sweep away the threat of war hanging over mankind. In refusing to ally themselves with the USSR, the British and French governments were fully aware of Germany's impending attack on Poland and of the existence of "Plan Weiss" (the plan to attack Poland) of which they had been informed soon after Hitler had approved it on April 11, = 1939.^^1^^ The Chamberlain and Daladier governments thus quite knowingly left Poland, their ally, to the mercy of fate. All later attempts by bourgeois historians to present a distorted picture do not hold water: they allege that the cbnclusion of the pact between the USSR and Germany on August 23, 1939, allowed Hitler to attack Poland; yet it is common knowledge that the attack on Poland was pre-arranged and could only have been .staved off if Britain and France had concluded a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR. Only a British-French-Soviet alliance would have left Hitler out in the cold.Hitler was confident that Britain and France would not fight Germany when he started a war against Poland. At a meeting with his generals on August 22, 1939, Hitler branded Daladier and Chamberlain as worms and declared that they were too cowardly to launch an attack and would go no further than a blockade. The only thing that Hitler feared was that Chamberlain or some other "filthy swine" would come up with new = proposals.^^2^^ Hitler's confidence remained unshaken even after he learned that Britain and France had declared war on Germany. His response to this information was: "This does not mean that they will fight."^^3^^
Hitler turned out to be right. Britain and France went no further than-a formal declaration of war. Poland was virtually left to the mercy of fate and in the course of two weeks was crushed by the German Wehrmacht. An attempt was made to cover the British a^d French governments' betrayal of their Polish ally by discourses to the effect that "the fate of Poland will depend upon the ultimate outcome of the war, and this, in turn, will depend upon our ability _-_-_
^^1^^W. Erfurth, = Die Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes von 1918 bis 1945 Gottingen, 1956, p. 203.
^^2^^Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, = Vol. VII, Washington, 1946, pp. 753--54.
^^3^^E. Kordt, Whan und Wirklischkeit, Stuttgart, 1948, p. 218.
171 to bring about the eventual defeat of Germany, and not on our ability to relieve pressure on Poland at the = outset".^^1^^Political considerations, rather than military unpreparedness, lay behind the inaction of Britain and France. The Chamberlain and Daladier governments, having declared war on Germany, went to great lengths to avoid starting military operations against Germany in the West, since "they did not want to rout Genhan fascism ---that system, which, already in peace time, they had recognised as answering their class = interests".^^2^^ In acting in this way, London and Paris thought Hitler would appreciate their conduct for what it was. This was, of course, a solid down payment for a possible broad agreement between the Western powers and Germany. Hitler was to take the next step. It was hoped in London and Paris that Hitler would immediately take advantage of this free hand in Poland, and, having seized her, would advance against the USSR. War between Germany and the Soviet Union would ultimately be provoked. This was precisely why Britain and France, having declared war on Germany, refrained from any military action for several months. In France the situation was known as drole de guerre (``phoney war'') and in Germany, as Sitzkrieg (``sedentary war''). Everywhere, the British and French action was "described as a false, unreal war".
This "phoney war" was essentially a continuation of the Western powers' former Munich policy of appeasing the aggressor, adapted to the specific situation of war with the German Third Reich.
Hitler Germany took advantage of the almost eight-month "phoney war" in order to prepare for war in Western Europe. To prolong this period, Hitler diplomacy made wide use of "peaceful manoeuvres'', willingly playing up to the various types of Anglo-French "peace probes'', launched via different intermediaries.
At the same time, London and Paris were drawing up diverse plans for extending the war against Germany, with the object of dispersing the latter's forces, thereby removing the threat of a German attack on France. One of these plans foresaw the extension of the area of conflict into the Balkans. Another envisaged a Scandinavian front opened against Germany, thus involving Sweden, Norway and their neighbours in the war.
The various Anglo-French plans for extending the war, including the Balkan and Scandinavian variants, were essentially designed to draw the fronts nearer to the Soviet borders, and then, with a _-_-_
^^1^^J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, = Vol. II, September 1939--June 1941, London, 1957, p. 12.
^^2^^History of the Second World War 1939--1945, Vol. 1, p. XI
172 united capitalist front, conduct a war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, from late 1939 to early 1940, Britain and France were working out plans for a direct attack on the Soviet Union. __ALPHA_LVL2__ The USSR's Struggle to Ensure the SecurityHitler's armies, having crushed Poland, were now advancing towards the USSR; the US-supported British and French imperialists were colluding with Hitler with the object of organising a general war against the USSR: the resulting dangerous international situation obliged the Soviet Government to observe the utmost caution in order to save the Soviet state from being dragged into a military conflict.
In conditions when a world war had been started, the USSR's foreign policy and diplomacy were guided by the Leninist direction of combining cautious 'diplomacy with a firm policy in defending Soviet international interests, and above all in preserving peace. "All our politics and propaganda,'' V. I. Lenin said, "however, are directed towards putting an end to war and in no way towards driving nations to = war."^^1^^
The Soviet Union pursued a policy of neutrality. The Soviet Government made a statement to this effect in the notes handed on September 17,1939 to the ambassadors and envoys of all countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the USSR. A Pravda leader of that period read: "The Soviet Union wants to live peacefully with all countries. The Soviet Government has publicly declared that the Soviet Union will pursue a policy of neutrality with regard to all countries with which the USSR maintains diplomatic = relations."^^2^^
At that stage the basic aim of Soviet foreign policy was to maintain a position of neutrality and non-participation in the war and thus to ensure international conditions which would allow the Soviet people to continue successfully socialist construction and build their defences against the impending danger from world imperialism, above all fascist Germany, its shock force. The Soviet Union was particularly concerned about when the future conflict with Germany would arise, since it was clear that Hitler Germany would attack the USSR sooner or later. Soviet diplomacy did all it _-_-_
^^1^^V.~I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 470.
^^2^^Pravda, September 19, 1939.
173 could to contain Germany within the limits of a non-aggression treaty, and, without waiving any principles, it took every opportunity to delay the attack. The USSR developed mutually beneficial trade with Germany, the latter buying Soviet foodstuffs and raw materials in exchange for machinery and equipment as well as arms necessary for the USSR's defence. At the same time, the Soviet Government took steps to strengthen its security, using any opportunity which arose trom the imperialist contradictions between Germany and her rivals. From the very first day of the war, the Soviet state pursued the only policy possible for a socialist state in the given situation. It served the vital interests of all other peoples interested in limiting the war as well as those of the Soviet people. __ALPHA_LVL2__ The Reunification of Western UkraineThe approach of Hitler's armies towards the western borders of the USSR was a threat to the latter's vitally important centres. The Soviet Government could not permit Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, which had belonged to Russia from time immemorial and were almost totally populated by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, to fall into Hitlerite hands and be used by the fascists as a springboard for attacking the USSR, nor could the Soviet Government permit that their 13 million-strong population be turned into slaves of the "Third Reich''. V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, said in a radio broadcast at that time: "The Soviet Government considers it its sacred duty to give a helping hand to the fraternal Ukrainians and Byelorussians living in = Poland."^^1^^ This referred to the Ukrainians and Byelorussians who had been living within the borders of Poland since 1920 when bourgeois-landowner Poland had seized Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands.
A note from the Soviet Government passed to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow on September 17, 1939 indicated that, owing to the situation that had arisen, the Soviet Government had ordered its troops to cross the border and take under protection the population in Western Ukraine and Western = Byelorussia~^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, (1935--June 1941), Moscow, 1946, p. 447.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 448.
174The swift advance of the Red Army wrecked the Hitlerites' attempts to seize part of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. The Red Army moved 250--350 km westwards and liberated the whole of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Shortly afterwards, democratic elections were held and popular assemblies formed. The popular assemblies, acting in accordance with the unanimous demands of the people of those regions, proclaimed Soviet power and appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to include Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Their requests were met. On November 1, 1939, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a law accepting Western Ukraine into the USSR, reuniting her with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
On November 2,1939, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a similar law, fulfilling the request of Western Byelorussia to include her into the Soviet Union, reuniting her with the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia was important from the strategic as well as the political point of view. The USSR was now able to begin building new defence lines along the western border of Ukraine and Byelorussia. This formed a barrier which stretched far into the west, blocking the advance of the fascist aggressor. In this way, as well as reinforcing her own security, the USSR was barring the way to the unimpeded advance of German fascist aggression to the East. The German Government was compelled to conclude a Soviet-German treaty on September 28, 1939, whereby the western border of the USSR was fixed along the rivers Western Bug and Narev, i.e. roughly along the so-called "Curzon Line" put forward in 1919 by Britain, France, the USA and several other countries as the border between Soviet Russia and Poland, based on ethnographical = divisions.^^1^^
In the West, the reunification of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia was used to launch a furious anti-Soviet campaign. This was yet another indication that Chamberlain and Daladier were making every effort to bring about a clash between Germany and the USSR, once the German fascist troops had reached the Soviet borders. When these attempts failed, the British and French ruling circles and propaganda organs set about portraying the Soviet Union as Hitler Germany's ``ally''. Several bourgeois leaders actually protested against this dangerous policy of distorting the USSR's action. Winston Churchill declared in a radio broadcast: _-_-_
^^1^^See History of Soviet Foreign Policy, Vol I, p. 356.
175 ``But that the Russian armies should stand on this line, was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an eastern front has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare = assail...."^^1^^ Lloyd George, in a letter of September 27,1938, to the Polish Ambassador in London said that the Russian armies had occupied territories which were not Polish and which Poland forcibly seized after the First World War. The inhabitants of Polish Ukraine, he said, belonged to the same race and spoke the same language as their neighbours living in the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. He considered it to be of prime importance that attention be turned immediately to these vital considerations. He said that he had done this because there was a danger that Britain might imprudently start a war with Russia if she were taken in by the impression that Russia's intervention was of a similar kind to Germany's. It would be an act of criminal madness to equal the Russian advance with that of = Germany.^^2^^ The former French Ambassador in Warsaw, Leon Noel, in answering the question whether the USSR could, in the situation as it was by September 17, permit the German fascist army to occupy the whole of Poland, declared: "This was impossible. The Soviet Union had no alternative but to introduce its army before it was too = late."^^3^^ Literally every move by the British Government demonstrated its hostile attitude towards the USSR, and its attempts to ignore the Soviet Union's rights, as a neutral country, to conduct trade during wartime. Referring to the state of war,.the British Government wished to establish its own control over Soviet foreign trade. To this end, the British Government declared in notes dated September 6 and 11,1939, that a part of the commodities were war contraband and unilaterally established a system of inspecting neutral countries' merchant ships. In a note of October 25,1939, the Soviet Government resolutely refused to recognise the legality of the British measures and reserved the right to demand compensation from Britain for the losses inflicted on Soviet organisations and citizens by these = measures.^^4^^ _-_-_^^1^^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, = Vol. I, ``The Gathering Storm'', London, 1948, p. 353.
^^2^^Quoted in = History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR, Vol. II, 1939--1945, ed. Prof. V.~G. Trukhanovsky, Moscow, 1962, p. 23.
^^3^^L. No\"el, Une ambassade \`a Varsovie 1935--1939. = L'Aggression attemande contre la Pologne, Paris, 1946, p. 501.
^^4^^Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, pp. 459--60.
176 __ALPHA_LVL2__ The Soviet Union Concludes PactsThe German fascist armies took only three weeks to crush and occupy Poland, and it was obvious that the small Baltic countries bordering on the USSR would not be able to offer any sort of serious resistance to Hitler Germany, who had long been planning to turn the Baltic into a springboard for attacking the Soviet Union. There was a danger that the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could at any moment be used for anti-Soviet acts by Britain and France as well as Germany.
In September 1939, the Soviet Government suggested to the governments of these countries that they conclude pacts of mutual assistance with the USSR. This was not only in the interests of reinforcing Soviet security; these pacts corresponded to the vital interests of the peoples of the Baltic, since they ensured peace by protecting them from attack by Hitler Germany. The USSR concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Estonia on September 28,1939. On October 5, a similar pact was signed with Latvia, and on October 10---with = Lithuania.^^1^^ All three pacts were almost identical. Article 1 of the pacts with Latvia and Estonia (article 2 in the pact with Lithuania) stated that the contracting parties pledged to render each other all manner of assistance, including military, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack from any big European power, whether by land or sea. The Soviet Union pledged to assist the armies of these countries with arms and war materials on favourable terms.
According to article 3 of the pacts (article 4 in the pact with Lithuania), with the object of strengthening the security of the USSR and the Baltic states, the latter granted the Soviet Union the right to hold naval and air bases on their territory, where a given number of. forces could be stationed, at the Soviet Union's own expense. The numbers of these forces would be duly established by a special agreement. Moreover, the contracting parties pledged not to enter into any kind of alliances, nor join coalitions, directed against one of the contracting = parties.^^2^^
The pact with Lithuania differed from the other two in that article 1 stated that the Soviet Union, in order to tighten the bonds of friendship with Lithuania, would give the latter Vilno (Vilnius) and the Viino (Vilnius) province. The pact also envisaged the joint _-_-_
^^1^^See Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 450--51, 454--58.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 451, 455, 457.
177 Soviet-Lithuanian defence of the western border of = Lithuania.^^1^^ A Pravda leader described the treaty with Lithuania thus: "In concluding this treaty with Lithuania, and the earlier ones with Estonia and Latvia, the Soviet Union has ensured the security of its borders and built up ever stronger defences. The Soviet Union has removed the imperialist threat to her poorly defended neighbours.''^^2^^ These pacts between the Soviet Union and the three Baltic states helped to consolidate peace in that part of Europe and the Baltic Sea area. At the same time, they upset the Munich-men's calculations that the fascist regimes in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia would offer Hitler their territory as a bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, and would even take part in this attack. The Soviet Government, concerned with strengthening the security of the USSR's southern borders, took advantage of a visit to Moscow in October 1939 by Siikrii Saracoglu, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to hold a thorough discussion on Soviet-Turkish relations. This exchange of opinions reaffirmed the immutability of friendly relations between the two countries and their aspirations to preserve = peace.^^3^^ __ALPHA_LVL2__ The USSR's Struggle for the SecurityThe Soviet Union strove, as before, to maintain good-neighbourly relations with all countries sharing its borders. Finland was such a country. The Soviet-Finnish border lay only 32 km from Leningrad, the second largest city in the Soviet Union, and the cradle of the Great October Revolution. There was an urgent need to ensure the security of this border. The Soviet Government could not close its eyes to the fact that the Finnish ruling circles had constantly pursued overtly anti-Soviet policies, systematically fanning frantic chauvinistic propaganda pursuing the aim of creating "Great Finland" which was to include Leningrad and Soviet Karelia.
Since Finland could never fulfil this task without the help of strong allies, the former president, P. E. Svinhufvud advanced a thesis which soon became the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend to Finland.'' Hilter _-_-_
^^1^^See Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, p. 457.
^^2^^Pravda, October 11, 1939.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, p. 458.
178 Germany, as well as Britain, France and the USA were counted among the Finnish reactionary ruling circles' friends and allies. Germany was working for the transformation of Finland into a springboard for an attack on the USSR.This turn of events was a source of concern for the Soviet Government which took measures designed to radically improve Soviet-Finnish relations. One of them was the proposal to start negotiating a mutual assistance pact made unofficially to the Finnish Government in April = 1938.^^1^^ Such a treaty would have ensured the security of the USSR's North-West borders and would also have helped strengthen Finland's international position. However, against its own interests, the Finnish Government rejected the Soviet proposal, under the pretext that such a mutual assistance pact would "mean an infringement upon Finland's right to self-determination''. Moreover, the Finnish Government justified its refusal by referring to the need to observe Finland's ``neutrality''.^^2^^ Meanwhile, in 1938--1939, Finland was frantically rearming herself with the help of American loans and Anglo-French deliveries of arms and war materials. It is significant that in 1938, 25% of her budget was devoted to military purposes. On the Karelian Isthmus, the powerful "Mannerheim line" of fortifications was erected under the guidance of German specialists. Along the Soviet-Finnish border, military aerodromes were built whose number and dimensions were far in excess of Finland's own aviation needs; they were designed for offensive operations against the USSR. In addition, the Finnish Government was working to abrogate the convention on the demilitarisation of the Aland Islands in order to erect military fortifications there.
Early in March, 1939, the Soviet Government made a fresh attempt to improve Soviet-Finnish relations in the interests of both Soviet and Finnish security. It proposed to lease the islands in the Gulf of Finland: Suursaari (Gotland), Lavansaari, Seyskaari (Seskar) and Tyurinsaari for the creation of a military base there which would ensure Leningrad's security from the sea. The Finnish Government, then led by Aino Kaarlo Cajander, immediately rejected the Soviet proposal.
The Finnish envoy in Moscow, Yrjo-Koskinen, declared in a conversation of March 8. 1939 with M. M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, "The Finnish Government finds it _-_-_
^^1^^See History of Soviet Foreign Policy, Part 1, p. 364.
^^2^^Rauhan puolesta, No.~6, 1959, p. 8. See also V. G. Fedorov, = ``Finland and the Imperialist Powers on the Eve of the Second World War'', = Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya (Modem and Current History), No.~6, 1964, p. 47.
179 impossible to consider the proposal to lease the Finnish islands.'' The Finnish Government dismissed even the idea of starting negotiations to discuss the Soviet proposal.Despite the Finnish Government's unfriendly position vis-a-vis the Soviet proposal, litvinov nevertheless tried to persuade Yrjo-Koskinen to continue discussing the matter. He expressed the hope that the reply he had received "would not be the Finnish Government's last word, and that it would be ready to review its attitude towards our proposal".
Moreover, in an effort to keep this discussion going, the People's Commissar made a new proposal during that same March 8 conversation: "It seems to me,'' said Litvinov, "that we could even carry on the talks in terms of an exchange of territories. The concession of a part of our territory along the Karelian border could, for instance, be of greater interest to Finland than barren islands.'' Litvinov insistently requested the envoy to suggest to the Finnish Government that they discuss this matter in the light of this argument.
The Soviet Government made a formal proposal to Finland on the matter of exchanging territories, ft declared its readiness to give in exchange for the above-mentioned islands the territory of Soviet Karelia, which was twice their area.
But the Finnish Government, as before, refused to discuss the Soviet proposal in a business-like manner. The Cajander Government refused to improve Finnish-Soviet relations, to consider the interests of Soviet security, or to co-operate with the USSR in preserving peace. It was also acting against the vital interests of the Finnish people, which demanded that peaceful relations be maintained with the USSR.
During the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow, in August 1939, the Finnish Government once more showed its implacable hostility towards the USSR, declaring that it had no desire for Soviet assistance in the event of aggression against Finland. The Cajander Government did its best to make the August 1939 military exercises, involving nearly the whole Finnish army, reservists and fascist detachments, an openly anti-Soviet demonstration. The Finnish Government took advantage of the Swedish Defence Minister's presence at these exercises to discuss the matter of Sweden's participation in "a possible war between Finland and the = USSR".^^1^^ In preparation for this "possible war", _-_-_
^^1^^V. Niukkanen, Talvisodan puolustuministeri Kertoo, = Helsinki, 1951, p. 46. See also V. G. Fedorov, = ``Finland and the Imperialist Powers on the Eve of the Second World War'', in = Modern and Current History, No.~6, 1964, p. 48.
180 the Finnish Government passed several laws aimed at stepping up war preparedness, and introduced universal labour conscription. Throughout the country, so-called ``unreliables'' were arrested, and anti-Soviet propaganda crescendoed, portraying the USSR as Finland's enemy from time immemorial.With the outbreak of war in Europe, when Finnish territory could easily have become a springboard of aggression for any of the belligerent imperialist groups, the Soviet Government suggested on October 5, 1939, that the suspended Soviet-Finnish talks be resumed, and the Soviet proposal for a mutual assistance pact reconsidered.^^1^^ On October 11, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, State Counsellor and Finnish envoy to Sweden, arrived in Moscow for talks.
Paasikivi was received by Stalin and Molotov. During the first session, Paasikivi attempted to understand the Soviet position determined by the danger of Finnish territory being used by another state for attacking the USSR. He later defined this position thus: "The Soviet Union wants to settle matters with Finland in such a way as to be able to trust Finland, and so that Finland will no longer com'e out on the side of the Soviet Union's = enemies.^^2^^ In September 1963, another eminent leader, Urho Kekkonen, declared: "Today, more than 20 years later, if we put ourselves in the Soviet Union's position, we can, in the light of the nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, appreciate the USSR's anxiety for its security in the late = 1930s."^^3^^ But in the thirties, the Finnish Government took quite a different view of the USSR's legitimate alarm for its security. Vaino Tanner, the Finnish Finance Minister, was responsible for defining Finland's policy towards the USSR, and therefore was present at the talks in Moscow. While Paasikivi had been conducting the talks, there had been a fair chance of their success. But after Tanner's arrival, the Finnish position turned sharply for the worse. In connection with Tanner's part in these negotiations, the head of the Soviet Government, V. M. Molotov, remarked to the US Ambassador in Moscow on December 2,1939: "If the Finnish side of the talks had been led by Paasikivi, without Tanner's participation, as was the case at the _-_-_
^^1^^See History of Soviet Foreign Policy, Part 1, p. 365.
^^2^^Paasikivi's line. = Articles and speeches of Juho Kusti Paasikivi. 1944--1956, Moscow, 1958., p. 54. See also Y. S. Borisov, L. A. Inguolskaya, = "Paasikivi and Finland's New Foreign Policy'', in = Modern and Current History, No.~2, 1971, p. 81.
^^3^^Quoted in = The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941--1945. Outline History, Moscow, 1965, p. 46.
181 first stage, the negotiations would probably have ended with an acceptable agreement. But Tanner's participation in the talks spoilt everything, and evidently tied Paasikivi's = hands."^^1^^After Tanner joined the delegation, the latter began to turn down every Soviet proposal, and thus the break-down of the talks was inevitable. US intervention (the President of the USA sent a message to the Ch airman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M. I. Kalinin, on October 12, 1939) only served to incite the Finnish Government to take up an implacable stand against the Soviet proposals.
Britain, France and fascist Germany exerted a strong influence on the Finnish Government. All three countries were making efforts to undermine the negotiations and encourage Finland to reject any kind of agreement with the USSR.
As a result, the Finnish side categorically turned down the Soviet proposal to conclude a mutual assistance treaty. On October 14, the Soviet Government submitted a new proposal, viz. to lease the port of Hanco to the USSR for a period of 30 years, and also transfer the islands Gotland, Seyskaari, Lavansaari, Tyurinsaari, Bierke, a part of the Karelian Isthmus and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas (aggregating 2,761, sq. km.) in exchange for Soviet territory in the region of Rebola and Lake Poros (aggregating 5,523 sq. km.). The Soviet Union was therefore offering twice as much territory to = Finland.^^2^^
Throughout the talks with Finland, the Soviet side was sincerely trying to reach a mutual understanding with the Finnish Government. The USSR was striving towards a mutually acceptable agreement based on the principles of equality, which would serve as a starting point for developing friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust.
The same aspirations inspired the final Soviet proposal that the USSR and Finland should mutually disarm the fortified regions on the Karelian Isthmus along the Soviet-Finnish border, retaining only the habitual border guard. Yet this Soviet proposal was rejected by the Finnish side too.
The Finnish Government shortly broke off the negotiations and on November 13, the Finnish delegation left Moscow. On the return of the delegation to Helsinki, FJjas Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister, declared that Finland had "more important business" than negotiating with the USSR. Paasikivi, who later _-_-_
^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol.~IV, p.~471.
^^2^^See History of Soviet Foreign Policy, Part 1, p. 365.
182 became Prime Minister and then President of Finland, regarded the failure of the talks as: "one of the grimmest, most serious mistakes in a series of foreign policy errors made by Finland" at that = time.^^1^^On November 12, 1939, TASS published a denial of the false insinuations made by the foreign press that the Soviet Government had declined "the last concessions made by Finland''. This denial stated that the Finns had made no concessions to the USSR. "According to TASS, not only are the Finns failing to respond to the most modest of the Soviet Union's proposals, they are actually becoming more implacable. Until recently, the Finns maintained 2-3 divisions on the front against Leningrad, but now they have increased the number of divisions threatening Leningrad to 7, thus demonstrating their = obstinacy."^^2^^
The Finnish Government, incited from the outside, undermined the talks and made preparations for a war with the Soviet Union. Armed provocations took place along the Soviet-Finnish border. The Soviet Government had no alternative but to resort to the ultimate measure --- on November 28,1939, it denounced the 1932 non-aggression treaty with Finland. On November 29, V. P. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on the Soviet Government's behalf, notified the Finnish envoy in Moscow that the Soviet Government "can no longer maintain normal relations with Finland and is compelled to recall its political and trade representatives from = Finland".^^3^^ But the Cajander Government still remained deaf to the voice of reason. Finnish reaction cherished hopes of creating a "Great Finland" at the expense of Soviet territory. The Finnish Government was incited by Western diplomacy to provoke armed conflict between Finland and the USSR.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ The Soviet-Finnish Conflict 1939--1940.During the Soviet-Finnish conflict, it became abundantly clear that Anglo-French policy was directed at forming a united front of the capitalist powers against the USSR. The USA also did its bit _-_-_
^^1^^Y.~K. Paasikivi, = Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939--1941, Helsinki, 1960, o. 1, S. 57. See also V. G. Fedorov, = ``Finland and the Imperialist Powers on the Eve of the Second World War'', Modem and Current History, = No.~6,1964, p. 51.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, p. 461.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 466.
183 towards provoking war against the USSR. It imposed a "moral embargo" on trade with the USSR.Throughout the Soviet-Finnish conflict the Soviet Union was concerned with rinding a peaceful solution to it. The Soviet Government responded positively to the first peace probe made through the writer Hella Wuolijoki. On January 8, 1940, she met Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, and discussed the matter of opening peaceful negotiations to settle the Soviet-Finnish armed = conflict.^^1^^
The Soviet Government, sincerely striving to settle the question of Leningrad's security, accepted Sweden's offer to act as mediator to facilitate an unofficial Soviet-Finnish discussion on a peaceful settlement. On January 29,1940, it sent a statement to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Christian Gilnther, which stated that the USSR did not, in principle, object to the conclusion of peace with the Ryti-Tanner = Government,^^2^^ but before beginning peaceful negotiations, wished to know Finland's = terms.^^3^^
However, the unofficial Soviet-Finnish contacts were complicated by intervention from London, Paris and Washington, which did all they could to drag out the war between the USSR and Finland. The British and French governments sent Finland arms, and it was planned to dispatch an expeditionary corps to Finland for the war against the USSR. Thus, according to a statement made by Chamberlain on March 19, 1940, Britain sent Finland: 101 aircraft, 214 ordnance pieces, 185,000 shells, 50,000 hand grenades, 15,700 bombs, 10,000 antitank mines and other war supplies.^^4^^ Although, at that time, the nazi armies were concentrated on the French borders, France was not to be outdone by Britain: the Daladier Government sent Finland 175 aircraft, 4% ordnance pieces, over 5,000 machine-guns, 400 sea mines, 200,000 hand grenades, and 20 million = cartridges.^^5^^
During the Soviet-Finnish war, the USA rendered Finland enormous political, as well as financial-economic assistance. In addition to sending arms and ammunition, the USA offered Finland a loan for the purchase of American arms. On December _-_-_
^^1^^See = History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941--1945, = Vol. 1, Moscow, 1960 p. 271.
^^2^^The Ryti Government was formed on December 1, 1939. Tanner held the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.
^^3^^See = History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941--1945, = Vol. 1, p. 271
^^4^^See History of Soviet Foreign Policy, Part 1, p. 366.
^^5^^Annales de la Chambre des deputes, Debats parlemantaires, 1940, = p. 508.
184 2, 1939, the USA imposed a "moral embargo" on trade with the USSR, which was virtually equivalent to a boycott. This US intervention reinforced the position of the extreme right, chauvinist elements in Finland, who strongly opposed the war's immediate end and were thus responsible for its continuation.Spurred on by the Western powers, Sweden's ruling circles also rendered Finland every possible assistance: over 84,000 rifles, 300 ordnance pieces, 50 million cartridges, 30,000 shells, 25 aircraft and other armaments. Over 8,000 Swedes took part in military operations in = Finland.^^1^^
The British and French governments, under the pretext of ``helping'' Finland, were themselves preparing to start military operations against the USSR. In December 1939, the Anglo-French military command discussed the question of despatching Anglo-French troops to Finland, and a 150,000-stfong expeditionary corps was hurriedly prepared for this purpose. A decision to send Anglo-French troops to Finland was passed at a meeting of the Supreme Allied Council on February 5, = 1940.^^2^^ At the same time, the Chamberlain and Daladier governments launched a wide-ranging political and diplomatic campaign, designed to prepare the general public for the military intervention of Anglo-French imperialism in the Soviet-Finnish war. The USA also played an active part in this. Moreover, the League of Nations was used to this end: on the insistence of the Western powers, an extraordinary session of the League Council was convened on December 14, 1939, where under British and French pressure the USSR was farcically ``excluded'' from the League of Nations and declared ``aggressor''. The Western governments needed this decision as a screen justifying the beginning of war preparations against the USSR by London and Paris.
At the same time, Britain and France stepped up their pressure on Sweden and Norway to obtain their permission to the passage of the Anglo-French expeditionary corps through their territory. At the same time, steps were taken to force the Finnish Government to make a formal appeal for help from Britain and France. This would be a kind of justification for the proposed entry by Britain and France into the war against the Soviet state.
At that time, attempts were also made to draw Sweden and Norway into a war with the Soviet Union. On December 27, 1939, _-_-_
^^1^^Franclin D. Scott, The United States and Scandinavia, Cambridge, Massachusettes, 1950, p. 233.
^^2^^J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, = Vol.~II, September 1939-June 1941, pp. 107--08.
__PRINTERS_P_185_COMMENT__ 8---615 185 the Chamberlain Government thus decided to inform Sweden and Norway immediately that Britain and France "...were prepared to help them against the consequences which might result should they send help to = Finland."^^1^^ The Swedish and Norwegian governments realised that permission for the passage of Anglo-French troops was incompatible with the policy of neutrality and could lead to these countries' involvement in the war with the USSR. The Soviet Government then warned the Swedish and Norwegian governments that the violation of neutrality was fraught with serious consequences. The two Scandinavian governments refused to grant the permission demanded by Britain and France.However, Tanner, the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in yielding to pressure from the Western powers, was clearly in no hurry to conclude the unofficial dialogue with the Soviet side so as to start Soviet-Finnish peace talks.
The Soviet Government was fully aware of the dangerous game Britain and France were playing and that they were using the Ryti-Tanner Government to this end. It therefore once more took the initiative and, on February 23, made its peace terms known via Kollontai. At the same time, it requested the Chamberlain Government to pass these terms to the Finns and take on the role of mediator, setting in motion a Soviet-Finnish peace dialogue. The point of this request was to neutralise the British Government's policy which aimed at dragging out the war.
The British Government lost no time in giving a negative reply to the Soviet proposal. On February 24, R. Butler, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, notified the Soviet Ambassador in London, I. M. Maisky.that the British Government felt it could not possibly hand over the Soviet peace terms and regretted that it was not in a position, at that time, to take on the role of = mediator.^^2^^ On February 27, Tanner again went to Stockholm for assistance. On February 28, the Soviet Government repeated its peace terms to Finland, using Sweden as intermediary. By this time, key changes had taken place in the political and military situation: units of the Red Army had stormed through the main sections of the "Mannerheim Line''; the road was open for an advance on Helsinki. Since Sweden had refused passage to Anglo-French troops, Finland lost any hope for military assistance from Britain and France. The Finnish Government therefore declared its _-_-_
^^1^^J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, = Vol. II, September 1939-June 1941, p. 101.
^^2^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives in = History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941--1945. Vol. 1, p. 272.
186 readiness to enter peace talks with the USSR, and informed Kollontai that it accepted the Soviet terms in principle, and regarded them as a starting point for = negotiations.^^1^^ On March 4, Mannerheim reported to the Government that the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus were in a critical position.Nevertheless, the Ryti-Tanner Government, encouraged by London and Paris, delayed sending a delegation to Moscow for the talks.^^2^^
The Soviet Government, displaying great restraint, continued its endeavours to begin the peace negotiations at the earliest possible moment: on March 6, it issued a fresh proposal to the Finnish Government to send a delegation to Moscow for talks. This time the Finns agreed and sent its delegation, led by Ryti. The first official meeting of the Soviet and Finnish delegations took place in Moscow on March 7. After hearing out the Soviet peace proposals, the Finnish delegations requested time to consult Helsinki and the Western powers. In a parliamentary speech of March 11, Chamberlain declared that the British and French governments would give further help to Finland. With the Anglo-French expeditionary corps in mind, London and Paris again reminded the Ryti-Tanner Government that, if Finland wished, "action would be started immediately by the West; Norway and Sweden would no longer be asked, only = informed."^^3^^
The eminent British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, described the Anglo-French policy of that time as follows: "The motives for the projected expedition to Finland defy rational analysis. For Great Britain and France to provoke war with Soviet Russia when already at war with Germany seems the product of a madhouse, and it is tempting to suggest a more sinister plan: switching the war on to an anti-Bolshevik course, so that the war against Germany could be forgotten or even = ended."^^4^^ London and Paris were doing everything to change their war against Germany into one against the USSR. This provocationary policy was shared by the USA.
Finland, however, was not so easily persuaded. Her military position made it imperative that peace be concluded immediately. Moreover, the terms of the peace treaty contained nothing incompatible with Finland's honour and independence as a _-_-_
^^1^^V. Tanner, The Winter War, California, 1957, p. 198.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 203.
^^3^^E. Maseng, = 1905 og 1940. En Leksion in Maktpolitik, Oslo, 1953, p. 214.
^^4^^A. J. P. Taylor, = English History. 1941--1945, Oxford, 1965, p. 469.
187 sovereign state. The negotiations were therefore concluded on March 12 with the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and Finland.^^1^^According to this treaty, the USSR gained possession of the Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg and the Gulf of Vyborg together with the island in it, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, several islands in the Gulf of Finland, territory east of Merkjarvi with the town of Kuoloyarvi in North Karelia and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas on the shores of the Arctic Ocean. In addition, the USSR obtained a 30 year lease on the Hanko peninsula with the adjoining islands for a naval base, designed to cover the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its troops from the Petsamo region (Pechenga), which they had occupied during the war. This region was primordial Russian territory which Soviet Russia voluntarily ceded to Finland in 1920. The treaty provided for Finland's full independence and non-intervention into her home affairs. "Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain mutually from any attack upon each other, and not to conclude any alliance or participate in coalitions directed against one of the Contracting = Parties."^^2^^ The Moscow treaty provided the necessary basis for developing good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and Finland. It also wrecked the plans of the Anglo-French imperialists to organise a war against the USSR in the North.
While contriving to attack the USSR from the north, the Anglo-French military command was also planning a direct invasion on the Caucasus, and the bombing of Trans-Caucasus, especially the Baku oilfields. French land units stationed in the Middle East were to take part in the operations, as well as Turkish troops, and also French bombers based in the Middle East. The British and French submarine fleet was assigned the task of paralysing Soviet navigation on the Black Sea.
This Anglo-French plan for attacking the Soviet Caucasian oilfields was long entertained by British and French specialists at various levels, including the Supreme Allied Council. The pretext for this plan of attack was "to impede oil deliveries to Germany'', whereas its real object was to damage the Soviet economy and weaken the USSR's military potential.
At that time, the Western bourgeois press continued its anti-Soviet campaign. In France, for example, the propagandists _-_-_
^^1^^See Soviet Foreign Policy, = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 493--96.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy, = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, p. 495.
188 took full advantage of the open telegram sent to Moscow by the Soviet Ambassador to France, Y. Z. Surits, concerning the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of March 12, 1940. The telegram contained the following phrases: "Thanks to the wisdom of the Soviet Government and our heroic Red Army, the Anglo-French war-mongers' plans to kindle the flames of war in North-East Europe have once again failed" and "The Soviet Union remains an unassailable fortress against which the sinister plans of the enemies of socialism and the working people of the whole world will be dashed in the future.'' The French Government regarded this telegram as interference by the Ambassador into France's internal political life. It announced, via Paillard, the Acting French Charge d'Affaires in the USSR, that the French Government would no longer consider Surits persona grata, and expressed the desire that Surits be recalled by the Soviet = Government.^^1^^The Soviet reply was handed over by the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR C. A. Lozovsky to Paillard on March 26 and read:
``1. The Soviet Government finds no essential reason why the telegram sent to Moscow by Surits, the Soviet Ambassador, which did not even mention the French Government, should cause the latter to cease considering Surits as persona grata.
2. However, since the French Government is raising a formal question of confidence, the Soviet Government is informing you that Surits is being relieved of his duties as USSR Ambassador in France."^^2^^
Following this Soviet and French representation remained on the level of charg\'es d'affaires. This is one more instance of the short-sightedness of France, for whom friendly relations with the USSR were essential in the light of her being at war with Germany.
The memoirs of Marshal G. K. Zhukov tell us of a conversation with Stalin in early May 1940 on British and French policy during the "phoney war''. Stalin stressed: "The French Government led by Daladier and Britain's Chamberlain Government do not want to be seriously involved in the war with Germany. They are still hoping to push Hitler into a war with the Soviet Union. Their refusal, in 1939,to form an anti-Hitler bloc with us, was due to the fact that they did not wish to tie Hitler's hands in his aggression _-_-_
^^1^^See Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, p. 498.
^^2^^Ibid.
189 against the Soviet Union. But nothing will come of this. They will have to pay for their short-sighted = policy."^^1^^Ensuing events confirmed the correctness of this appraisal. The Anglo-French Munich-men had offered fascist Germany almost eight months to prepare her attack in the West. On April 9, Germany started an attack on Norway and Denmark, which ended with the occupation of these countries. On May 10, Hitler's armies invaded Belgium, where they crushed the Anglo-French troops, and, having turned the flank, launched an offensive on Paris. This marked the end of the "phoney war" which thus resulted in fatal danger to France and Britain. The USSR continued to pursue a policy of neutrality, and non-participation, working for peace and the freedom of nations. In the "phoney war" period, the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government served to preserve peace for the USSR, and also opposed the spread of war and aggression.
_-_-_^^1^^G. K. Zhukov, Memories and Reflections, = Moscow, 1969, p. 184 (in Russian).
[190] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER V __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACEThe Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government were well aware of the danger arising from fascist Germany, who, despite the agreement signed with the USSR on August 23, 1939, continued her aggressive plans vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Germany was a black storm-cloud hanging over the Soviet Union's Western border. The Party and the Soviet Government therefore observed the strictest caution and restraint, effecting their policy of peace and taking pains not to give any grounds for the USSR's involvement in military conflict. At the same time all necessary measures were taken to ensure the Soviet Union's security. Every available opportunity was taken to develop the country's military-economic potential and build up her defensive might. In pursuing this course, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government were guided by Lenin's instruction that the main task must be "to ensure the continued existence of an isolated socialist republic surrounded by capitalist = enemies."^^1^^
``Our Party and the Soviet people,'' noted Brezhnev, ``remembered the warning by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin that imperialism could, at any point in time, unleash another period of wars against the Soviet Union, and took measures to build up the country's economic and defensive = might."^^2^^
The Soviet Government's report at the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which took place from March 29 to April 3,1940, underlined the .task of ensuring peace and security of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet once more asserted that in the _-_-_
^^1^^V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 486.
^^2^^L. I. Brezhnev, = Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 121 (in Russian).
191 sphere of international relations, the Soviet Union would continue to wage a consistent struggle to safeguard peace and ensure its own security, to expose and wreck machinations spearheaded against the world's first socialist state. "In a word,'' noted V. M. Molotov, head of the Soviet Government, "our foreign policy tasks are to ensure peace among nations, and our country's security. This implies a position of neutrality and non-participation in the war between the big European powers. This position is based on the treaties already signed by us and fully conforms to the Soviet Union's interests. At the same time, this position helps restrain the spread of war and its fanning in Europe and it is therefore in the interests of all nations striving for peace and who are already suffering the hardships of = war."^^1^^ This foreign policy course was unanimously approved By the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and was consistently put jnto practice.After France's defeat in June 1940, the international situation deteriorated, and there was a growing threat of German aggression against other countries. At the Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in August 1940, a government report was heard on internal and foreign policies. The report held that the world was on the eve of a new stage in the war's = escalation.^^2^^ This threat meant an increased danger of war for the Soviet Union, as well. "In this situation,'' stressed the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars at the session, "the Soviet Union must show vigilance over its external security, reinforcing all its internal and external positions.'' The Soviet Government urged the people to do all they could to ensure a further, even more powerful upsurge in the country's defensive = might."^^3^^ Shock labour was the Soviet people's response to this appeal by the Party and Government. The nation was successfully fulfilling the third five-year economic development plan which provided for the accelerated development of the major branches of the defence industry and the creation of energy and fuel reserves and expansion of industry in the country's eastern regions. In 1940, 166 million tons of coal were mined, and 15 million tons of cast iron and over 15 million tons of steel were smelted; 48,300 million kilowatt-hours of electricity were produced. By mid-1941, the gross industrial output had reached _-_-_
^^1^^The Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. March 29--April 3, 1940, verbatim report, Moscow, 1940, p. 42 (in Russian).
^^2^^The Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, August 1--7, 1940, vermatim report, Moscow, 1940, p. 24 (in Russian).
^^3^^N. A. Voznesensky, = The Soviet Military Economy during the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1948, p. 15 (in Russian).
192 86% of the 1942 target level adopted by the third five-year plan; output of the means of production had reached 90% and output of the means of consumption---80% of this target. In the first half of 1941, rail freight turnover had reached 90% of the projected 1942 = level.^^1^^ 2,900 new enterprises were brought into operation.From 1938 to 1940, the total volume of output by the machine-building and metal-working industries had increased 76% over the 1937 figure. During the first three years of the third five-year plan, the annual increase in production for the defence indusrty was, on average, 39%.
The economic plan for 1941 envisaged a substantial increase in the production of cast iron, steel, rolled metal, and in coal and oil extraction, the Party and the Government thus provided for a further steady consolidation of the Soviet state's economic might and defence capacity. A powerful war industry was built up on the basis of heavy industry. Industries were created which were quite new to Russia: the aircraft, tank-building, motor-car, tractor, alluminium, magnesium and rubber industries.
This was undoubtedly one the USSR's greatest achievements of that time. "Back in the pre-war period,'' wrote N. A. Voznesensky, "a war industry was built up in the USSR with specialised aircraft, tank, shipbuilding, and other military equipment and ammunition industries. During the Great Patriotic War, they helped multiply the capacity of the USSR's war = industry."^^2^^
On the eve of nazi Germany's perfidious attack on the Soviet Union, the Party and Government passed as a precaution the mobilisation plan on ammunition supply for' the second half of 1941 and for 1942 with a view to switching industry on a war footing in the event of = war.^^3^^
In February 1941, the 18th Conference of the CPSU discussed the tasks facing the Party in industry and transport. With the growing danger of attack from fascist Germany, the Conference regarded the development of industry by every possible means as its primary task, and outlined the quickest ways of eliminating defects in industry and transport.
The resolution of the Conference noted that "the production growth rates of the defence industries in 1940 were _-_-_
^^1^^N. A. Voznesensky, = The Soviet Military Economy during the Great Patriotic War, p. 15.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 86.
^^3^^Ibid., p. 78.
193 considerably higher than the production growth rates for industry as a whole".^^1^^Every month the war industry stepped up its output of new aircraft, tanks, various ordnance pieces, small arms and ammunition. Enterprises connected to the war industry received first priority for the supply of raw materials, equipment, fuel, and electricity. While in 1938 appropriations under the People's Commissariat of Defence amounted to 2,700 million rubles, in 1941 the figure had grown more than 2.5 times to the tune of 7,100 million = rubles.^^2^^
N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy during the Second World War, wrote in his memoirs that "due to the international situation, the Government implemented wide-ranging, energetic measures to build up the country's defence capacity. There was essentially no limit to the means allotted for defence needs. The war industry sharply increased its output of new aeroplanes, tanks, pieces of ordnance and ships (excepting capital ships)".^^3^^
Thus, as the threat of German attack on the Soviet Union became more tangible, the Party and the Government drew the proper conclusions and speeded up the implementation of defence measures. Soviet foreign policy was of no small account in the matter of ensuring the USSR's security.
The Soviet Government attached great significance to providing for security in the Baltic. It was important for the Soviet Union that the Baltic countries were not transformed into an open door through which the aggressor could invade.
The treaties of mutual assistance concluded by the Soviet Union with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1939 conformed to the vital interests of those peoples. Apart from creating the conditions for equal and advantageous co-operation with the USSR, they ensured the security of the Baltic peoples from the threat of Hitler aggression. However, these countries' fascist governments, against their people's national interests, carried on with their anti-Soviet course even after signing the mutual assistance pacts. The Soviet Ambassador in Kaunas, describing the policy of Smetona and the rest of the ruling clique, wrote to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on June 3, 1940: "After concluding the mutual _-_-_
^^1^^The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the CC, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1971, p. 460 (in Russian).
^^2^^A. G. Zverev, = Notes of a Minister, Moscow, 1973, p. 175 (in Russian).
^^3^^N. G. Kuznetsov, ``Before the War'', in Oktyabr, No.~11, 1965.
194 assistance treaty with the USSR in October 1939, Lithuanian ruling circles started looking for ways of counterbalancing the Soviet influence in Lithuania.''^^1^^The three Baltic governments' hostility towards the USSR came to light especially during a discussion on contingents of Soviet armed forces to be stationed in these countries. Their total number had been established when the mutual assistance treaty was signed. However, as soon as the Soviet Union began introducing military units into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, their governments erected every possible obstacle to sabotage the operation. They demanded that negotiations be held on the categories of personnel to be included in the contingent of Soviet armed forces. The "Soviet Government agreed to discuss this matter and also other related questions ---when Soviet military units, aircraft and tanks would be introduced and the conditions of leasing land and buildings and constructing military bases. The negotiations began at the end of October 1939, but were drawn out for several months by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In order to cut down the number of Soviet troops to the very limit, the Baltic governments demanded that their overall number should include not only the auxilliary construction units, who would be building and equipping the military bases and settlements, but also the civilian personnel (cooks, waitresses, food and supply workers, teachers, nannies, etc.). Endless disputes on all matters were still unsettled by the time the fascist regimes in the three Baltic countries were overthrown in June = 1940.^^2^^
In order to politically prepare the Baltic peoples for a war against the Soviet Union, the ruling circles of those countries were at pains to spread anti-Soviet propaganda. One of its targets was also the Red Army units stationed in the Baltic countries. "With the authorities' knowledge and on their initiative,'' wrote the Soviet Ambassador in Riga to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, "the most absurd and hostile rumours are circulating in Latvia concerning our Red Army.... As soon as our troops arrived, the authorities themselves started creating a defamatory and malignant atmosphere.'' "The Latvian Government,'' the report reads further, "has launched a campaign of terror against all who sincerely express sympathy with our Red Army and see it as genuine support for Latvia's independence. The high-ranking _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p.~28.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 29.
195 officers and government circles are waging a cowardly and base war of propoganda against the Soviet = Union."^^1^^Describing this anti-Soviet policy of the Baltic countries' fascist governments, the journal Bolshevik wrote: "Despite the mutual assistance pacts between the Soviet Union and these Baltic republics, the corrupt governments in power in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have done all they could to sabotage peaceful cooperation, to reverse everything and turn the Baltic into a springboard against the Soviet Union. The ruling circles of these countries not only shunned their commitments: they defied the will and vital interests of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia."^^2^^
In the light of these circumstances, the Soviet Givernment decided to take additional measures to ensure the security of its western borders and their approaches. This was especially necessary since by mid-1940, vith the increasing threat of German attack on the Baltic countries, it became plain that the bourgeoisie .of these countries were incapable of defending their nations from nazi aggression. A crisis arose in the ruling strata which created favourable conditions for the people's victory over the bourgeoisie. The ruling circles in the Baltic used repressive measures in an effort to forestall the imminent revolutionary crisis. At the same time, they stepped up acts of sabotage against the treaties with the USSR, since these isolated them from international imperialism. Moreover, the governments of these countries embarked on «a course of uniting all reactionary forces for an onslaught against the Soviet Union. In December 1939, a conference was held in Tallinn on the question of organising a military alliance of the Baltic countries which would be spearheaded against the USSR. In March 1940, another conference took place in Riga on the same issue. In June 1940, a so-called Baltic week took place in Tallinn, which was something in the nature of a demonstration of the Baltic countries' anti-Soviet forces. The ruling circles of these states increasingly appealed to Berlin for help and even intended asking Hitler Germany to establish her protectorate over the whole of the Baltic. Every month saw increased provocations against the Red Army servicemen stationed there according to the treaties; a hostile, anti-Soviet atmosphere was deliberately built = up.^^3^^
_-_-_^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 29.
^^2^^Bolshevik, No.~13, 1940, p. 10.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV (1935-June 1941), pp. 510--513.
196In mid-June, the Soviet Government made representations to the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviet Government demanded that governments be formed in these countries that would, both in word and deed, fulfill their obligations under the treaties of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union,^^1^^ These Soviet statements helped the broad masses of the people in the Baltic to realise the anti-popular nature of the ruling circles' home and foreign policies. The working people of the Baltic countries therefore ardently supported the Soviet demands. Their patience finally ran out and anti-government rallies and demonstrations began to crop up all over the Baltic.
The ruling cliques, being isolated from international imperialism, did not risk using force against their peoples. Besides, the presence of Soviet units in the Baltic countries had a sobering influence on the most bellicose bourgeois circles, deterring them from this extreme measure. In connection with the revolutionary situation which arose in Estonia in early 1940 and the favourable conditions for the Estonian people's peaceful victory over the bourgeoisie, A. I. Mikoyan noted: "The Estonian bourgeoisie found themselves isolated and, in contrast to their 1918 or 1919 position, they were now unable to rely on direct military help from the imperialist powers. The working people were backed by a truly mighty force ---the Soviet people, who had, by that time, gained decisive victories in socialist construction and in turning their country into a mighty socialist power. All this ensured a quick victory by the people and, moreover, with neither bloodshed nor armed conflict. Power passed peacefully into the hands of the working = people."^^2^^ A similar situation took shape in Lithuania and Latvia, where the working people seized power peacefully. Popular Front governments were formed: in Lithuania the government was led by the eminent progressive journalist Justas Paleckis, in Latvia, by Professor August Kirhenstein, in Estonia, by a well-known poet J. Vares. In those historic days, Bolshevik wrote the following about these events: "The Chinese wall which these pitiful governments attempted to erect between the USSR and the Baltic countries has collapsed. A broad popular movement has risen up and cast out from their long-occupied positions the riff-raff that had seized power and scoffed at the working people for = many years."^^3^^
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid.
^^2^^lbid., p. 510.
^^3^^Bolshevik, No.~13, 1940, p. #1.
197The restoration of Soviet power in the Baltic states, as well as being a victory for the peoples of those countries, was also a triumph for the Soviet people and the Leninist national policy. At the same time, it was a success of Soviet foreign policy; the Baltic peoples had been rescued, if only for a short while, from the blows of the imperialist war, and the security of the USSR's North-West borders had been consolidated.
Once Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia became part of the Soviet Union, the latter's position in the Baltic was strengthened, which in turn promoted peace in Scandinavia.
The consolidation of the USSR's position in the Baltic Sea was also significant in that it enabled the Soviet Union to scotch the far-reaching plans of the German General Staff, viz. to turn the Baltic Sea into an "internal German sea''. This would have allowed Germany to supply Finland, her ally in the war against the Soviet Union, by sea. Besides this, the nazis were planning to make use of this "internal German sea" for a rapid seizure of Leningrad.
The fact that the Soviet armed forces occupied positions west of the former borders meant, actually, that an ``eastern'' front had been organised against the aggression of fascist = Germany.^^1^^
The question of recovering Bessarabia was also of great importance to the USSR. The Soviet-Rumanian conflict over Bessarabia arose in 1918 when the bourgeois-landowner government of Rumania, incited by the Western powers, who were out to weaken the Soviet state, seized this parcel of Soviet territory. The Soviet Union had never accepted the fact of Bessarabia's forcible annexation and had made repeated statements to this effect. A new statement was made at the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the spring of = 1940.^^2^^
However, instead of making a realistic appraisal of the situation and entering into negotiations with the Soviet Government to solve the Bessarabian question, the Rumanian Government started a Inilitary built-up in preparation for war and appealed to a number of governments for help, including fascist Italy and = Germany.^^3^^ The anti-Soviet attitude of the Rumanian Government gave rise to its policy of rapprochement with the fascist powers, Germany in particular, turning Rumania into the latter's obedient satellite.
_-_-_^^1^^See = History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941--1945, = Vol. 1, p. 258.
^^2^^See The Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, p.~40.
^^3^^B. M. Kolker, I. E. Levit, = Rumanian Foreign Policy and Rumanian-Soviet Relations, September 1939--June 1941, Moscow, 1971, p. 88 (in Russian).
198In the light of the tense, alarming state of international affairs, the USSR could no longer accept the Bessarabian situation. In the evening of June 26, 1940, Davidescu, the Rumanian Envoy in Moscow, was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and handed a Soviet Government statement on the Bessarabian question. "The Soviet Union,'' it read, "has never accepted the fact of Bessarabia's forced annexation and has repeatedly made public statements on the matter. Now that the USSR's military weakness is a thing of the past, and the present world situation demands a rapid solution of questions which have long been left unsolved, in order to lay a foundation for durable peace between the nations, the Soviet Union considers it necessary and timely to start working jointly with Rumania towards an immediate solution of the question of Bessarabia's return to the Sovjet Union to restore justice.'' Furthermore, the Soviet Government declared that the question of returning Bessarabia was integrally tied up with the question of returning to the USSR "that part of Bukovina whose population was largely related to the Ukraine, both by their common historical fate and their common language and national = composition".^^1^^
The Soviet demand for the return of Northern Bukovina reflected the national aspirations of the latter's population: in November 1918, the People's Vetche of Bukovina adopted a decision on reunification with the Soviet = Ukraine.^^2^^
In conclusion, the statement said that the Soviet Government proposed to the government of Rumania that:
1. Bessarabia be return to the Soviet Union.
2. Northern Bukovina be passed over to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government expressed the hope that the Rumanian Government "would accept the present proposals amd enable the protracted conflict between the USSR and Rumania to be settled peacefully".^^3^^ The Tatarescu Government gave the required answer on June 27, 1940.
``His Majesty's Government declares,'' it stated, "its readiness to enter immediately, in the broadest sense, into a friendly discussion by mutual agreement, of all the Soviet Government's = proposals."^^4^^
This declaration of readiness to "solve by peaceful means" and discuss in "a friendly spirit all proposals" was intended to screen _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, June 27, 1940.
^^2^^N. I. Lebedev, The Iron Guard, Karol II and Hitler, = Moscow, 1968, p. 278.
^^3^^Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, pp. 515--516.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 516.
199 ~ Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1976/UFPAA243/20051004/244.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2005.07.04) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ the Rumanian Government's reluctance to give a clear answer to the USSR's demand for the return of primordial Soviet territory, Bessarabia.By attempting to embark on a prolonged correspondence on this issue, Tatarescu wanted to play for time to enlist the support of the fascist powers and other states for opposing the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Government immediately saw through this "peaceful manoeuvre" by the Rumanian authorities. It declared the Rumanian Government's answer to be ``indefinite'' for it had not given a clear acceptance of the USSR's proposal that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina be returned directly to the Soviet Union. The USSR therefore demanded a plain answer to its question and. when Davidescu stated that Bucharest agreed to accept the Soviet proposal, suggested that within 4 days the Rumanian troops should Vacate the territory of Bessarabia and North Bukovina and Red Army units enter the territory. The Soviet Government demanded a reply from Bucharest no later than 12 noon on June 28, 1940. Tatarescu gave Moscow a positive reply before this deadline. On the same day, units of the Red Army entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and on June 30 reached the River Prut, which now marks the border of the Soviet state. The Red Army was greeted with immense joy by the inhabitants of the towns and villages which it liberated. Bessarabia was reunited with Soviet Moldavia which was proclaimed on August 2, 1940 the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The removal of historical injustice by returning Soviet lands formerly annexed by the Rumanian landowners and capitalists meant that the Leninist principle of the self-determination of nations had been put into practice.
At the same time, Bessarabia's return to the Soviet Union had a great political and strategic significance. The Soviet Union was again a Danube state and made every effort to reestablish its rights as a Danube state. It demanded the right to participate in the drawing up of a new Danube navigation regime and also the restoration of the other Danube states' rights which had been grossly violated by the Entente powers at the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty.
At that time, the USSR continued its active diplomatic drive against fascist aggression in South-East Europe. The Balkans had long been small change in the political game played by the big imperialist powers. The latter had, in their own mercenary interests, used every means possible to stir up the strife and hostility between the peoples of the Balkan countries. This was also the 200 situation in the initial period of the Second World War, when the Balkans continued to remain the powder-keg of Europe.
Nazi Germany represented a particularly serious threat to the peoples of South-East Europe, and the danger increased after France's defeat. From the middle of 1940, the fascist "Third Reich" assumed the offensive and aspired to subordinate the South-East European states both economically and politically. Germany needed these countries for raw materials, food-stuffs, and as cheap labour reserves. The Balkans also constituted an important springboard for a German attack on the USSR.
At the same time, Germany saw the Balkans as the shortest route to the British and French colonies in the Middle East. The Hitler Government therefore strove to turn the Balkan countries into German satellites and station its troops there.
The Soviet Union was the only country whose policies conformed to the interests of the Balkan countries. The main aims of the Soviet policy towards the Balkan Peninsular were to bar the German fascists' way to the Balkans, help the Balkan peoples preserve their freedom and independence and prevent the spread of war into this part of Europe.
However, this Soviet policy was opposed by the British and French ruling circles as well as by Hitler Germany. After France's defeat, Britain took up an even more obstinate stand.
In the given situation, the Balkan countries could only preserve their independence and resist German pressure and the intrigues of other imperialist powers with Soviet backing and political and economic co-operation. The Soviet Union was making serious efforts in this direction. This is illustrated by Soviet policy towards Bulgaria.
Evidence in point is the instruction from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador in Bulgaria to declare to the Bulgarian Government that "if the Bulgarians,get into any kind of difficulties, they can count on the Soviet Union which will not abandon them and, if the Bulgarians wish, will be ready to render them effective = assistance."^^1^^ The USSR's suggestion to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria illustrates its desire to help Bulgaria safeguard her independence and sovereignty. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs made this proposal to the Bulgarian Envoy in Moscow, Antanov, on September 20, 1939. The latter promised to hand the Soviet proposal over to Sofia and report his government's = reply.^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 32.
^^2^^lbid.
201On October 16,1939, the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs advised the Soviet Charge" d'Affaires in Sofia that Bulgaria could not conclude a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. On December 13,1939, Antanov informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Bulgarian Government considered it impossible to conclude any kind of political treaty with the USSR.^^1^^
There were a number of reasons for the Bulgarian refusal. A significant factor was British and German pressure. According to the Soviet Embassy in Sofia, Britain threatened the Bulgariar Government that "if it agrees to further rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the British Government will denounce its credit agreement and will demand payment of all debts from = Bulgaria".^^2^^
Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Government once more suggested a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria. A. A. Sobolev, General Secretary of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was sent to Sofia with a special mission. On November 25, 1940, Sobolev informed King Boris III of the Soviet Government's statement to the effect that the USSR, taking into account the community of interests of both countries, "renews its proposal of September 1939 to conclude a mutual assistance pact "and that it was ready to "render Bulgaria all manner of assistance, including military, in the event of a threat of attack on Bulgaria, any financial help, foodstuffs, arms and supplies in the form of a loan, if Bulgaria needs it. At the same time, the USSR is prepared to increase its purchases of Bulgarian = goods".^^3^^ In conclusion, Sobolev asserted that "The Soviet Union considers it expedient to conclude precisely a pact of mutual assistance which, unlike unilateral guarantees, stresses the full equality of both interested parties."^^4^^
Several days later, the Bulgarian Government informed the Soviet Government of its rejection of the Soviet = proposal.^^5^^
Despite this refusal, the Soviet initiative in extending the hand of friendship to Bulgaria played an important role. Large sections of the public in the Balkan countries regarded it as an act aimed at keeping the Balkans out of the war zone.
The Bulgarian workers' party put out a special leaflet containing the text of the Soviet proposal. An article supporting this proposal _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 32.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Ibid.
^^4^^Ibid.
^^5^^Ibid.
202 was printed in Rabotnichesko delo, the newspaper published illegally by this party. It read: "The overwhelming majority of the Bulgarian people, irrespective of organisational affiliation and political conviction, enthusiastically welcome the pact and proclaim their support for its acceptance. The campaign for a petition in favour of the pact has turned into a genuine public plebiscite.... The Bulgarian people ---workers, peasants, artisans, intelligentsia, all honest Bulgarians who love their native land, including those sons of Bulgaria who have been sent abroad in soldier's garb ---declare their support for the Soviet = proposal."^^1^^The USSR could do nothing to prevent Bulgaria being turned into a German satellite, since the fascist ruling clique, led by King Boris III and Prime Minister Filov, were blinded by class hatred and were pursuing, against the people's interests, a policy of collusion with Hitler. In mid-November 1940 King Boris III and Hitler came secretely to an understanding about Bulgaria joining the aggressive Triple Pact.
To justify this policy, the Filov Government spread the rumour that it had the support of the Soviet Union, which allegedly had no objection to the introduction of nazi troops in Bulgaria. On January 13, 1941, TASS published a statement refuting these false allegations. The statement emphasised that "if German troops are in fact in Bulgaria, and if their further movement into Bulgaria is actually taking place, then this is all being done without the knowledge or agreement of the = USSR...."^^2^^
On January 17, 1941, the Soviet Government made a representation to the German Ambassador in Moscow to the effect that the USSR could not remain indifferent to the events in the Balkans. On the same day the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin made a representation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that "the Soviet Union warns against the entry of German troops into Bulgarian territory and into the straits zone, since, as it has repeatedly informed the imperial government, it regards these territories as a zone of its = security".^^3^^
On February 28, 1941, the Soviet Government reaffirmed its position in relation to Bulgaria. Nevertheless, Filov's monarcho-fascist clique clinched its deal with Hitler: on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria was proclaimed signatory to the Triple Pact and the _-_-_
^^1^^Quoted in = History of Bulgaria, Vol. II, Moscow, 1955, pp. 254--55 (in Russian).
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, p. 539.
^^3^^H. Holdack, = Was wirklich geschah. Die diplomatischen Hintergriinde der deutschen Kriegspolitik, Munich, 1949, p.~246.
203 fascist Wehrmacht entered Bulgaria. She thus became Hitler's satellite and a springboard for a German fascist attack on the Soviet Union.To justify this perfidious policy, which was against the people's interests, the Filov Government announced to the Soviet Union that it had agreed to the introduction of German troops into Bulgaria allegedly in order to "preserve peace in the Balkans''. On March 3, the Soviet Government once more asserted that such a policy "leads not to the strengthening of peace, but to the enlargement of the sphere of war, and to Bulgaria's involvement in that war.... The Soviet Government, faithful to its policy of peace, cannot, in view of this situation, render any kind of support to the Bulgarian Government in pursuing its present = policy".^^1^^
The USSR took great pains to prevent Germany advancing into Yugoslavia and spreading the war into that country. To this end, on April 5,1941, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. Clause 2 of the treaty stated that if one of the contracting parties were subject to attack by a third state, the other contracting party pledged "to observe a policy of friendly relations towards = it".^^2^^
By concluding this treaty, the USSR confirmed its friendly relations towards Yugoslavia. In those difficult days, this constituted valuable moral and political backing for the people of Yugoslavia.
On April 6, 1941, Hitler Germany, without declaring war, invaded Yugoslavia. Nazi Germany had thus decided to turn a deaf ear to the Soviet Union's warnings, one of which was issued on April 6, 1941, to the German = Ambassador.^^3^^
The security of Turkey as well as the Soviet Union was threatened by the German occupation of the Balkans. During that uneasy period the USSR came out in support of Turkey: on March 9, the Turkish Ambassador was invited to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs where he was informed, on the Soviet Government's behalf, that "if Turkey is actually subjected to attack by any foreign powfer and is compelled to take up arms to protect the inviolability of her territory, then Turkey may rely on the Soviet-Turkish non-aggression pact and can count on the full understanding and neutrality of the Soviet = Union".^^4^^ The Turkish _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, March 4, 1941.
^^2^^Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, = Vol. IV, p. 548.
^^3^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = No,~1, 1974, p. 32
^^4^^Ibid., p. 34.
204 Ambassador replied that this "declaration will be of great moral support to the Turkish Government" and that it "has no doubt that the Soviet Union will not attack Turkey if the latter is subject to an attack by any = power''~^^1^^The threat of an attack through the territory of Finland became ever more obvious. After signing the Moscow treaty, the Finnish Government stepped onto the path of drawing closer to Germany and preparing a new war against the USSR. The Finnish Minister of Defence Niukkanen declared that peace meant "coming over to the side of Germany'', and so Finland became an ally of Germany and joined in the preparation of war against the USSR. She allowed German troops, which were preparing to attack the Soviet Union, to be deployed on her territory.
The Finnish Government, in violation of clause 5 of the peace treaty, began to erect fortifications in the Petsamo region, build air bases, and extend moorings in Liinahamari, etc. Finnish reactionary circles regarded the treaty with the USSR as a means of playing for time while preparing a new war against the Soviet state. Ryti, the Finnish President, admitted in July 1941 that "three weeks after signing the peace treaty it became clear that we would again be waging war against the Soviet = Union".^^2^^
In order to prepare the people ideologically for such a war the Finnish Government launched an intensive anti-Soviet campaign and banned the Society for Peace- and Friendship with the USSR. Aiming to intimidate anyone who showed feelings of friendship towards the USSR, the Finnish Government organised police reprisals and used firearms to break up a meeting of the above-mentioned society in Turku. These and other measures were all part of a plan to prepare the country for war against the = Soviet Union.^^3^^
Finland failed to fulfil her obligations under the trade agreements with the USSR, while the latter was irreproachably supplying Finland with = provisions.^^4^^ Ryti had to admit this on August 18, = 1940.^^5^^
On June 22, 1941, Finland, along with Germany, attacked the Soviet Union. Ryti, however, tried to conceal this from the Finnish _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, in = Izvestia, March 25, 1941.
^^2^^V. G. Fedorov, = ``Finland and the Imperialist Powers on the Eve of the Second World War''. = Modem and Current History, No.~6, 1964, p. 53.
^^3^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives. History of the USSR, = No.~1, 1974, p. 34.
^^4^^Ibid.
^^5^^Ibid.
205 people, declaring that Finland had become the ``victim'' of Soviet aggression.^^1^^The USSR did everything it could to preserve the independence of Sweden who, already in the spring of 1940, after the seizure of Denmark, was under threat of attack from Germany.
G\"unther, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an interview with the newspaper Dagens Nyheter in April 1946 commented on Sweden's position after the Germans had occupied Denmark and Norway: "On April 9, 1940, hardly any of the members of the government believed ---I for one did not ---that Sweden would be able to avoid war in the long = run."^^2^^
On April 13, 1940, a representation was made to the German Ambassador in Moscow in defence of Sweden's neutrality, reading as follows: "The Soviet Government has great interest in the preservation of Sweden's neutrality; its violation would be undesirable for the Soviet Government and the latter hopes that Sweden's inclusion in the German action will not take = place."^^3^^
In reply to this stern warning, the German Ambassador made a statement to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on April 16, saying that Germany had no intention of spreading her northern military operation to Swedish territory and would certainly respect the neutrality of Sweden so long as the latter, for her part, observed strict neutrality and did not give any assistance to the Western = powers.^^4^^
Hansson, the Swedish Prime Minister, thanked the Soviet Government "for the understanding expressed by the Soviet Union on the Swedish position and for supporting her neutral line''. Hansson went on to say that "friendship with the Soviet Union is Sweden's main = support".^^5^^
Later on, the Soviet Union continued to help Sweden preserve her neutrality. In July 1940, Boheman, the General Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, was informed during his stay in Moscow that the USSR was interested in Sweden's long-term neutrality.
On October 27, 1940, the Soviet Ambassador in Sweden was instructed to make a fresh statement to the Swedish Government _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = No.~1, 1974, p. 34.
^^2^^International Affairs, No.~9, 1959, p. 67.
^^3^^History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR, = Vol. 2, 1939--1945, ed. Prof. V.~G. Trukhanovsky, Moscow, 1962, p. 50 (in Russian).
^^4^^International Affairs, No.~9, 1959, p. 67.
^^5^^History of Soviet Foreign Policy, = Part 1, 1917--1945, Moscow, 1966, p. 371.
206 that ``~an unconditional recognition of and respect for the full independence of Sweden is the unalterable position of the Soviet Government".^^1^^During the Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin in November 1940 the Soviet Government again mentioned that the USSR was interested in the preservation of Sweden's neutrality.
After the Second World War, Swedish Government representatives publicly acknowledged the Soviet Union's important role in safeguarding Sweden's independence in 1940. Unden, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, made this particularly clear on October 12, = 1945.^^2^^
Thus, during the war years, the Soviet Union was the only great power to give decisive support to Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality.
The problem of relations with Britain, France and the USA was uppermost in the USSR's international policies. A major source of worry for Moscow was Britain's hostile policy which essentially boiled down to provoking conflict between the USSR and Germany.
On March 18, 1940, the British Government, still led by Chamberlain, proposed to the USSR that the trade talks broken off in October 1939 be resumed. The Soviet Government accepted this proposal. The USSR was prepared to develop trade with Britain on a mutually beneficial basis, but came out firmly against British control over Soviet foreign trade and the development of trade relations with Britain at the expense of Soviet-German trade relations. Yet, this was precisely what the British were working towards, and this was eloquently illustrated by the British memorandum of April 4, drawn up by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The memorandum demanded that British control posts be set up on Soviet territory to observe and restrict Soviet exports to Germany.
On April 27, 1940, the Soviet Government sent London a memorandum containing its proposals for developing Soviet-British trade.
However, a British memorandum of May 8, 1940, passed over these proposals and contained no specific suggestions on this matter. Instead, it raised the questions of guarantees against the re-export of British goods to Germany, of the content of trade agreements concluded between the USSR and Germany, and the _-_-_
^^1^^International Affairs, _No,~9,_ 1959, p. 68.
^^2^^Morgentidningen, October 13, 1945.
207 limitation of Soviet deliveries to Germany. All this was plain evidence of Britain's reluctance to adopt a business-like approach to developing trade relations with the USSR, which would have promoted a favourable political atmosphere in relations between the two states. A statement to this effect was made by TASS on May 22, 1940, which indicated, in particular, that "a number of measures taken by the British Government to curtail and limit trade with the USSR (cancelling Soviet orders for machinery), the detention of Soviet merchant ships carrying cargoes for the USSR, the British Government's hostile position towards the USSR during the Soviet-Finnish conflict and also its leading part in excluding the USSR from the League of Nations could not be conducive to the satisfactory progress of these = talks".^^1^^On May 10, 1940, the Churchill Government was formed in Britain. No essential changes, however, came about in the British policy towards the USSR.
The Churchill Government deliberately made a great fuss over the appointment of Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador in Moscow, and the British press published a lot of propaganda about his "special mission''. It was all done with an eye to arousing Berlin's suspicion towards the USSR, thereby' achieving a deterioration in Soviet-German relations.
The Soviet Government saw through these crafty schemes and declared its readiness to accept Cripps or any other British Ambassador of normal status. On June 5, 1940, Cripps was appointed Ambassador and on the 12th he arrived in Moscow without credentials, which were passed to him by telegraph on June 21, 1940. He brought a message from Churchill to Stalin which proposed "to discuss fully with the Soviet Government any of the vast problems created by Germany's present attempt to pursue in Europe a methodical process by successive stages of conquest and absorption".^^2^^
Soon after his arrival in Moscow, Cripps met and talked with Soviet leaders: J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and also A. I. Mikoyan, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.
On July 1, Cripps had a 3-hour talk with Stalin, during which Cripps showed special interest in the state of trade between the USSR and Germany and expressed doubts as to whether _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, May 22, 1940.
^^2^^W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, = Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, Boston, 1949, p. 136.
208 ``Anglo-Soviet relations were good and friendly enough to ensure a situation in which there would be no danger of any goods supplied by Britain for the internal needs of the Russian economy being sent to the = enemy".^^1^^As a result of these talks, Cripps was satisfied that there was a good chance of developing trade ties between Britain and the USSR, since the latter was interested in normalising political and economic relations with Britain and the Soviet Union's trade relations with Germany would not be able to impede this.
One might have assumed that the Churchill Government, after receiving this information from Cripps, would have reconsidered its policy towards the USSR and submitted constructive proposals to improve Anglo-Soviet economic and political relations. This did not in fact happen. On the contrary, in the summer of 1940, the British Government took a number of measures which led to their deterioration. In a conversation with Cripps on August 7, 1940, Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, compared the briskly developing trade and economic relations between the USSR and Germany with Anglo-Soviet trade and economic relations: "This is not being achieved with Britain; quite on the contrary, the British side has not fulfilled our earlier orders, and, what is more, ill-intentioned moves in respect to the USSR, like the delay over the gold purchased from the Baits, have again taken place---something that does not help to improve = relations."^^2^^ Britain refused to acknowledge the admission of the three Baltic states into the USSR, seized the gold deposited in British banks and belonging to these Baltic republics, impounded 24 Estonian and Latvian steamers then docked in British ports, and their crews, who demanded to be allowed to return home, were thrown into concentration camps.
On July 23, 1940, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, S. A. Lozovsky, handed Cripps a note protesting against the illegal action of the British Bank and Treasury which had arrested gold bought from Estonian and Lithuanian banks and now belonging to the State Bank of the = USSR.^^3^^ The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs repeatedly raised the question of the Baltic gold with Ambassador Cripps.
Cripps replied with an ``unofficial'' proposal to ``freeze'' all mutual claims and counter-claims until the end of the war.
_-_-_^^1^^V. G. Trukhanovsky, = Britain's Foreign Policy During the Second World War (1939--1945), = Moscow, 1965, p. 174 (in Russian).
^^2^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = International Affairs, No. 11, 1972, pp. 64--65.
^^3^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 38.
209In a talk with Cripps on September 14, 1940, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said on the matter: ``I do not consider it correct or expedient to `freeze' these questions. The Soviet Government regards the British Government's arrest of Soviet gold as an illegal = act."^^1^^
On October 9,1940, Vyshinsky had another talk with Cripps and handed him a note concerning the Baltic steamers, illegally impounded by Britain. Cripps declared that he had been instructed by his government "to make an official proposal to the Soviet Government to postpone for 6 months discussion on the controversial Baltic questions and open trade = negotiations".^^2^^ On October 19, Cripps visited the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the USSR and handed over the British proposals on extending trade. On October 22, 1940, during a talk with Vyshinsky, Cripps handed him a British memorandum, to be passed to the Soviet Government, on measures for improving Anglo-Soviet relations and the conclusion of a pact between Britain and the = USSR.^^3^^ In doing so, he stressed that the handing over of this memorandum and the proposals it contained, plus the suggestion to begin Anglo-Soviet talks, were regarded by the British Government as secret and confidential.
The memorandum stated that if the USSR observed "friendly neutrality" in its relations with Britain, concluded a trade agreement with her, and then a non-aggression pact, similar to the treaty with Germany, then Britain would be prepared to take on the following commitments:
a) In the event of victory, to consult with the USSR on a level with other powers which had rendered Britain assistance or direct military help, on questions of post-war arrangements in Europe and Asia and to take into account the USSR's point of view;
b) At the end of the war, not to organise or enter into any kind of alliance directed against the USSR if the USSR refrained from engaging in hostile actions in relation to Great Britain;
c) "To acknowledge the de facto power of the Soviet Union in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and those parts of the former Polish state which are now under Soviet supremacy'';
d) On the basis of a general trade or barter agreement, to supply _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 38.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Ibid.
210 the USSR, in the event of an attack on it by a neighbouring power, with available goods or expert assistance, depending on which the USSR required, as far as Britain's own needs and obligations towards third countries allowed this;e) Great Britain guaranteed that an attack would not be made on the USSR by Turkey or Iran or their future = allies.^^1^^
On November 11, 1940, Vyshinsky gave Cripps a negative appraisal of the British proposals. But Cripps did not take this as a final answer and continued to push for an official reply. During a meeting with Cripps on February 1,1941, Molotov stressed that the personal viewpoint voiced by Vyshinsky on November 11, that the proposals contained in the British memorandum could not serve as a basis for adjusting Soviet-British relations, had been approved by the Soviet = Government.^^2^^ Molotov said that the memorandum had given no evidence of a British desire to improve relations with the USSR. He emphasised that the hopes of "the Soviet Government for improving relations with Britain have by no means been justified. On the contrary, while the Soviet side has taken no unfriendly steps whatsoever in relation to Britain, the latter has carried out a number of new unfriendly acts vis-a-vis the USSR in 1940, which does not indicate the British Government's wish to improve relations between both = countries".^^3^^
Indeed, an analysis of the British memorandum confirms that the British Government remained silent on all the USSR's claims (the Baltic gold, the ships, and the return of the seamen, etc.). Besides, Britain avoided recognising the USSR's Western borders. Thus, to conclude a trade agreement and then to sign a non-aggression pact with Britain would do nothing to change the situation which had taken shape. Moreover, Britain would not accept any firm commitments to supply goods to the Soviet Union even if the latter was subjected to an attack by "a neighbouring power" (i.e. Germany---author). Several days after handing the memorandum to the Soviet Government, the British Government issued a protest on October 29 against the USSR's participation in the work of the Danube Commission. This plus the ensuing actions by the Churchill Government confirmed that the latter had submitted the proposals without the slightest intention of achieving a radical improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations. These proposals were calculated to worsen Soviet-German relations, and arouse _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 38--39
^^3^^Ibid.
211 German suspicions towards the USSR. This is also confirmed by the fact that, in early November 1940, on the eve of a visit by the Soviet Head of Government to Berlin, an American journalist was informed in the Foreign Office of the contents of the British memorandum of October 22. In order to cover up the tracks, Cripps ``complained'' on November 16 to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, making out that the Soviet Embassy in London had divulged the contents of the = memorandum.^^1^^On November 19, Vyshinsky declared to Cripps that, according to Maisky, "the Foreign Office is the source of the rumours; its officials have for several days been informing various journalists about Cripps' demarche of October 22'', and that he should therefore seek the "source of the divulgence of the October 22 proposals in the British Foreign = Ministry".^^2^^
In a talk with Cripps on October 2, 1940, Laurence Steinhardt, US Ambassador in Moscow, clearly defined the aims of British policy towards the USSR: ``The fundamental error of Allied, and subsequently British, diplomacy in respect of the Soviet Union has been that it has at all times been directed towards attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to undertake positive action which if not leading immediately to an armed conflict with Germany would at least involve the risk of such a contingency."
Steinhardt drew the conclusion that this policy was doomed to failure. He wrote: " ... It is most unlikely that the Soviet Union will through any serious negotiations or agreement with Great Britain provoke the very event which its entire policy is designed to prevent, namely, involvement in war against the Axis = Powers."^^3^^
From time to time, the Churchill Government was compelled to put forward proposals on improving relations with the USSR since it could hardly ignore the growing realisation among the British working people that the salvation of the British people lay in cooperation with the Soviet Union.
This mood gradually penetrated liberal circles. Evidence of this is the fact that the liberal newspaper, News Chronicle, published several articles asserting that Britain would never be guaranteed a genuine peace unless, sooner or later, she co-operated with Moscow.
Trade union meetings of various kinds, meetings of workers' and women's co-operative organisations constantly demanded that _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 39.
^^2^^Ibid.
^^3^^Foreign Relations of the United States. 1940, = Vol 1, Washington, 1959, p. 616.
212 friendly relations be established with the USSR. The most notable was a meeting in January 1941 of the People's Convention, attended by 2,300 delegates from trade unions, workers' and women's co-operative organisations. Many delegates pointed out the necessity of opening up friendly relations with the = USSR.^^1^^The Churchill Government obviously had to reckon with this growing mood, and so, to counteract the mounting dissatisfaction with its policy towards the USSR, it occasionally advanced proposals on extending Anglo-Soviet trade and economic ties. However, it continued to build its policy line vis-a-vis the USSR on the premise that any improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations must necessarily entail a worsening of Soviet-German relations and would, in the final analysis, lead to a Soviet-German war. With this aim in view, incidentally, Churchill sent a message to Stalin, via Cripps, on April 18, 1941, which spoke of the transfer of three German armoured divisions into the Balkans. On forwarding this message, Cripps drew the Soviet Government's attention to the fact that if the latter did not take a quick decision to co-operate with the countries still resisting the aggressive powers in the Balkans (implying Britain---author) then the Russians would lose their last chance of defending their borders together with = others.^^2^^ Churchill's letter sent to Eden on March 28, 1941, gives us a clear idea of the ends pursued by the Churchill Government in putting forward a plan to form a front against Germany in the Balkans: "Is it not possible that if a united front were formed in the Balkan Peninsula Germany might think it better business to take it out of Russia.'' In that situation Cripps' proposal on co-operation virtually meant that the USSR would have had to abrogate its non-aggression treaty with Germany and go to war with her. Such an approach could only arouse strong misgivings in the Soviet Government concerning the true intentions of the Churchill Government. These were made most clear by the activities of the British intelligence centre in New York during the Second World = War.^^3^^ This centre, in the spring of 1941, collaborating with the American Federal Bureau of Investigation, let it be known to the German Embassy in the USA that, according to very reliable sources, the Soviet Union was preparing to embark upon military aggression at the very _-_-_
^^1^^Mirovoye khozvaistvo i mirovaya politika = (World Economics and World Politics), No.~2, 1941, p. 105.
^^2^^L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, = London, 1962, p. 149.
^^3^^Montgomery Hede, = Room 3603. The Story of the British Intelligence Centre in New York during World War II, New York, 1963.
213 moment Germany was to engage in a new big military = operation.^^1^^ The desire to mislead the German Government was given as the reason by the British Intelligence Service for the infiltrations of such kind of material. It was quite obvious, however, that the true aim was to provoke Hitler into attacking the USSR.Further evidence of this can be found in the Churchill Government's position on the ``mission of Rudolf Hess'' who enjoyed Hitler's unlimited confidence and was his deputy. One need hardly mention that in war-time no one could make a flight to Britain unless he had permission. Hess flew out on May 10, 1941, fully aware of the imminent attack on the Soviet Union. He landed by parachute in Scotland near the estate of Duke Hamilton with whom he had previously exchanged letters.
In the ensuing negotiations the British side was represented by John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ivon Kirkpatrick, an official in the British Embassy in Berlin before the war, now representing the Foreign Office, and also Lord Beaverbrook.
Hess proposed concluding peace between Britain and Germany and also waging a joint war against the USSR. The Churchill Government rejected these proposals, since it had become quite clear by that time that peace with Germany would be merely a short-term breathing space to be followed by an attack on Britain and her relegation to a second-rate state. Despite this refusal, the Churchill Government refrained from making a public statement explaining its position as regards the "Hess mission" and the proposals made by him. It remained quite silent in spite of the anxiety in Britain and other countries as to whether Britain would continue the war or seek a compromise peace with Germany. Churchill's mysterious silence amounted, in effect, to a definite assurance for Hitler that Britain would not obstruct him in a war against the Soviet Union and that Germany would thus avoid a simultaneous war .on two fronts. By way of confirmation, the British side virtually discontinued military operations against Germany after June 22, 1941. In particular, British air-raids over Germany practically stopped.
To return to the first months of 1941, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Government had more than enough facts indicating the British Government's unwillingness to support and develop friendly relations and co-operation with the Soviet Union.
Thus, Britain's policy up to the very perfidious attack by nazi _-_-_
^^1^^Montgomery Hede. op. cit.
214 Germany on the Soviet Union was aimed not at improving Anglo-Soviet relations, but at pushing the Soviet Union from its position of neutrality and, in the final analysis, provoking a war between the USSR and Germany.In the tense situation ensuing the outbreak of the Second World War, the USSR made great efforts to improve political and business relations with the USA which had noticeably deteriorated since the end of 1939, when, on December 2, 1939, the USA had proclaimed a "moral embargo" on trade with the USSR. At the same time, a fierce anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the USA: articles in the press demanded that diplomatic relations with the USSR be broken off. Legal action had been taken against a number of American organisations which maintained business and commercial ties with Soviet economic bodies, and American specialists were recalled from the USSR. The American authorities forbade Soviet specialists to visit the plants of those firms with which the corresponding Soviet organisations had signed agreements on the supply of machinery and equipment. The authorities even withheld machines and equipment accepted by the Soviet specialists from American firms. The USA was thus endeavouring to curtail trade relations with the Soviet Union. Late in March 1940, the report by the Soviet Government at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR gave a corresponding assessment of the state of Soviet-American relations.
Several days later this assessment was conveyed by K. A. Umansky, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Umansky also said that the Soviet side was ready to work towards an improvement in these relations. "We base ourselves on the fact that the USA also pursues a policy of neutrality,'' he remarked, "however, relations between the two greatest neutral powers, the USSR and the USA, leave much to be desired. They suffer, above all, from the American Government's discriminatory policy with regard to trade with the USSR.'' Hull replied that he was not promising anything but "changed his tone and for the first time began talking about the possibilities of improving = relations".^^1^^
In practice, the US Government did nothing to improve relations or remove barriers obstructing Soviet-American trade. The Soviet Government was therefore compelled, in the first half of June 1940, again to lodge a protest against the illegal discriminatory acts _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = International Affairs, _No,~12,_ 1972, p. 53.
215 undermining trade between the two countries. The USA meanwhile continued its former course. On July 2, 1940, the American authorities prohibited the export, without a special licence, of all types of military and semi-military supplies, including equipment for their production. The following were also affected: aluminium, tin, mercury, graphite, rubber, chemicals and = others.^^1^^Certainly, these measures theoretically involved many countries, but, in practice, they were spearheaded against the USSR, since machines and various equipment were a major element of Soviet import from the USA. These acts showed the American Government's insincerity in its repeated avowals of readiness to further Soviet-American trade and improve political relations between the two countries.
V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, spoke of these relations at the 7th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 1, 1940: "I shall not dwell on our relations with the United States of America, if only because there is nothing good to be said about them. It has come to our knowledge that some people in the United States do not like the Soviet foreign policy successes in the Baltic. However, the Soviet side energetically protests against the American authorities' illegal arrest of gold recently bought by our State Bank from the banks of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In the given case, we can only remind both the United'States Government affld the British Government, which has embarked on the same policy, of their responsibility for these illegal = acts."^^2^^
Washington's repeated acknowledgement on August 15, 1940, of the diplomatic status of the three Baltic states' former envoys also confirmed the USA's unwillingness to improve relations with the USSR.
This was also demonstrated by the protracted Soviet-American talks which began in August 1940 and ended in early April 1941. The Soviet side was represented by the Ambassador K.A. Umansky and the Counsellor A. A. Gromyko. Despite their efforts, none of the important trade and economic problems was solved during these 8-month talks. Admittedly, mutually acceptable decisions were made on several of the questions discussed.
The US Government was compelled to take into account the growing dissatisfaction of business circles who were demanding the _-_-_
^^1^^R. G. Gorbunov, = Soviet-American Trade Relations, = Moscow, 1961, p. 20--21 (in Russian).
^^2^^Ivestia, August 2, 1940.
216 restoration of normal conditions for trade and economic relations between the two countries. The Department of State could not also fully ignore the fact that American public opinion was demanding more and more emphatically that friendly mutual understanding be established between the USA and the USSR. The fact that the US Government decided on January 22,1941, to annul the "moral embargo" on trade with the USSR demonstrates that the Department of State was obliged, in some measure, to take these factors into account. It must be noted, however, that even after the embargo was cancelled, the system of granting licences for selling American goods to the Soviet Union continued" to function, retaining its full authority, and was used to limit American-Soviet trade. Moreover, the US Government took new measures to hamper trade with the USSR: the so-called general licences were introduced on January 15, 1941; only Britain and Canada had the right to receive general licences for importing all goods from the USA. The USSR had to obtain licences for the import of each type of goods for each transaction with American firms. This was blatant discrimination against the Soviet Union. On May 7, 1941, the American authorities impounded a cargo of wool and leather purchased by the Soviet Union in Argentina and Uruguay and transferred in the USA onto the Swedish ship Colombia, chartered by Amtorg for shipping to the USSR. On May 14, the Soviet Government made a protest to the American Government via the Soviet Ambassador in = Washington.^^1^^ On June 14, the US Government decreed the freezing of foreign accounts, which immediately told on Soviet exports to the USA. All these and similar actions seriously frustrated the development of trade between the two countries. On January 15, 1941, Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, reiterated the declaration on the Baltic countries, which signified the USA's refusal to acknowledge the USSR's Western border. The American authorities' unfriendly position with regard to Soviet organisations in the USA was made vefy plain. All this seriously complicated and hampered the normalisation of Soviet-American relations. As Cordell Hull, then the US Secretary of State, admitted in his memoirs, the essence of US ``Russian'' policy on the eve of Germany's invasion of the USSR was to "make no approaches to Russia. Treat any approaches toward us with reserve until the Russians satisfied us they were not maneuvring merely to obtain unilateral concessions for = themselves".^^2^^ Hull _-_-_^^1^^Soviet Foreign Policy. = Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, p. 558.
^^2^^C. Hull, = The Memoirs, Vol. II, New York, 1947, pp. 972--73.
__PRINTERS_P_217_COMMENT__ 9-615 217 practically confirmed that the USA entertained no desires to improve relations with the USSR. Moreover, Washington did not even wish to respond to the attempts made by the Soviet side to improve Soviet-American relations. Its excuse was that it wanted to "make certain" that the Soviet proposals were not merely ``manoeuvres''. This meant that the USA was demanding that the USSR offer some kind of proof of the sincerity of its intentions to improve Soviet-American relations. Obviously, these preliminary demands were designed to impede in advance Soviet attempts to work towards better relations with the USA.With the mounting danger of imperialist aggression and the continual attempts to form a united anti-Soviet, imperialist front to organise a military campaign against the USSR, the Soviet Government tried to maintain peaceful relations with Germany and thereby prolong the spell of peace.
With this in mind, the Soviet Government showed constant concern over removing elements of friction in its relations with Germany. To this end, a Soviet-German convention was signed on June 10, 1940, on the procedure for regulating frontier conflicts and incidents, and also a Soviet-German treaty on the border legal relations was concluded on August 31, 1940. With a view to maintaining peaceful relations, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Germany on January 10,1941, concerning the Soviet-German border from the River Igorka to the Baltic Sea and a Soviet-German agreement on the settlement of mutual property claims in the Baltic.
Early in 1941, the Soviet Government proposed that the Soviet-German border be demarcated and redemarcated in order to remove border incidents, or at least reduce them to the minimum.
Peaceful relations between the USSR and Germany were also promoted by trade ties between the two countries, which began to expand after an agreement was concluded whereby Germany granted a long-term loan to the USSR of 200 million German marks.
Soviet-German trade ties developed on the basis of two agreements, the first being signed on February 11, 1940, the second on January 10, 1941. These agreements provided for a considerable increase in the volume of Soviet-German = trade.^^1^^
This development was of great importance to the Soviet Union, which could buy German machinery and equipment vital for the _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives. Economic agreements between the USSR and Germany of February 11, 1940, and January 10, 1941; see = Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 491, 537.
218 rapid growth of its heavy industry. As a result of the Soviet-German negotiations of December 1940 and January 1941, the Soviet Government achieved Germany's agreement, on a reciprocal deliveries basis, for the placing of substantial Soviet orders with German firms worth almost 6 million German marks for planers, drilling, grinding and polishing machines, and machines for processing wire, etc. Moreover, up to May 11, 1941, the USSR could order more of these machines, worth another 8.3 million German marks, and also receive ammunition for naval anti-aircraft guns and armour plates and buy the cruiser L\"utzow. The USSR was thus buying equipment from Germany which was essential for building up its defensive might, i.e. it was buying exactly what Britain, the USA and other countries had refused. In exchange Germany was supplied with cotton, flax, food products, including cereals, and also timber and oil = products.^^1^^As a West German military historian acknowledged, "The USSR agreed to supply food products and raw materials in return for German machinery, naval equipment, arms and licences for producing important military goods.... Thus, in return for Soviet deliveries, Germany handed over the fitted-out heavy cruiser Liitzow, naval armaments, models of heavy artillery equipment and tanks, and also important = licences."^^2^^
By February 11, 1941, the Soviet Union had delivered goods to Germany worth 310.3 million German marks and had placed orders with Germany to the tune of 362.7 million German marks. It is worth noting, however, that by February 1, 1941, a lag had already begun to appear in the German firms' fulfilment of Soviet orders (30 million German = marks).^^3^^ The Soviet side demanded a discussion on ways to remove this lag. Such a discussion took place in March 1941 and concluded with the signing of a protocol, into which were written German commitments on the = matter.^^4^^
A major aim which the Soviet Government pursued in Soviet-German relations was to prevent the spread of fascist aggression in Europe.
The political and diplomatic effort of the Soviet Government in defence of the Balkan countries' freedom and independence and against nazi aggressive acts led to an acute aggravation of the Soviet-German relations. Hitler attempted to assuage the Soviet _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of Diplomacy, Vol. IV, p. 148.
^^2^^B. M\"uller-Hillebrandt, = Das Heer 1935--1945, Darmstadt, 1954, Vol. II, p. 75.
^^3^^ADAP, Vol. XII, 1, Gottingen, 1969, pp. 232--33; USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 42.
^^4^^ Ibid.
__PRINTERS_P_219_COMMENT__ 9* 219 Government, since he did not wish to reveal his aggressive plans against the Balkan countries until the time was ripe. To this end, Ribbentrop sent a letter to Stalin which was handed to Molotov by Schulenburg on October 17, 1940.The letter contained Ribbentrop's attempts to explain all Germany's aggressive acts against the small countries in terms of her conflict with Britain. He made assurances that Berlin was striving towards the further improvement of relations with the USSR and invited Molotov to visit = Berlin.^^1^^ The Soviet side accepted this invitation, but rejected all Berlin's attempts to use this Berlin visit to launch a propaganda campaign demonstrating the "friendly relations between Germany and the USSR''. In the event, a brief information was published in the press about the forthcoming visit, and later another one about its = completion.^^2^^
Molotov's visit to Berlin took place on November 11--13, 1940. A. M. Vasilevsky, a member of the Soviet delegation, wrote in his memoirs that from a talk with the leader of the delegation which took place on the way to Berlin "it became plain that the Berlin talks would be of a purely political nature and that our trip's basic purpose was connected with the Soviet Government's desire to define Hitler's further intentions and help hold off German aggression as long as = possible."^^3^^ During the talks, the German Government's aspirations to receive Soviet approval for all German aggressive acts (the Balkans, Hungary and Finland) were revealed quite distinctly. Hitler endeavoured to justify this aggressive policy in terms of the need to wage war against Britain, and gave assurances that "Germany has no political interests in the Balkans and is presently operating there exclusively out of the need to furnish herself with certain raw materials. This is purely a matter of military interest, the defence of which is not a pleasant task; for example, in Rumania German troops have to be stationed hundreds of kilometres away from the supply centre''. Hitler even promised that "German troops will leave Rumania immediately peace has been = established".^^4^^ At the same time, Berlin wanted the Soviet Government's agreement on the division of the world into spheres of influence among the powers of the aggressive fascist Triple Pact. Germany's participation in this pact was a blatant violation of clause4 of the Soviet-German treaty of 1939. To escape _-_-_
^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 42.
^^2^^Izvestia, November 10 and 14, 1940.
^^3^^A. M. Vasilevsky, = A Lifetime's Work, p. 113.
^^4^^Aktenzur deutschen auswartigen Politik. 1918--1945, = Serie~D, 1937--1945, Vol. XI, 1, Die Kriegsjahre Vierter Band, Erster Halbband, Bonn, 1964, pp. 458--59.
220 explanations to Moscow on this matter, Berlin resolved to propose that the USSR join the Triple Pact, and a draft agreement was drawn = up^^1^^ which envisaged the Soviet Union's "political cooperation" with Germany, Japan and Italy and committed all participants to respect each other's spheres of influence and strive towards expanding trade and economic ties. Hitler did all he could to incite the Soviet Union to begin conquering territories leading towards the Indian Ocean, i.e. the British colonies, thereby provoking war between the USSR and Britain.In order to avoid discussing the Soviet Union's demands and claims Hitler repeatedly suggested that they stop talking about Soviet-German differences and "concern ourselves exclusively with the dismemberment of the British Empire''. Hitler was thus hoping to draw the Soviet Union into a war with Britain and receive the USSR's tacit approval of the German fascist aggressive policies in the Balkans and throughout South-East Europe. Ultimately "Hitler was counting on isolating the Soviet Union internationally and dealing a perfidious blow at it. But he made grave miscalculations".^^2^^ As H. Holdack, a West German historian, correctly noted, "Moscow had no intention of engaging the Western powers and conceding Germany her claims in Eastern = Europe".^^3^^
The Soviet Government guessed the intentions of nazi diplomacy. This is shown by the information sent on November 17, 1940, by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador in London, which read: "As the talks have made clear, the Germans want to appropriate Turkey under the pretence of guaranteeing her security in the Rumanian manner, and they want to whet our appetite by promising to reconsider the Montreux convention in our favour, and offering us their help in this matter. We have not agreed to this, as we consider that, for one thing, Turkey must remain independent, and, for another, the Straits regime can be improved as a result of our negotiations with Turkey, but not behind her back. The Germans and the Japanese are evidently very keen on pushing us towards the Persian Gulf and India. We have refused to discuss this question, as we consider it inappropriate that Germany should offer such = advice."^^4^^
_-_-_^^1^^Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik. 1918--1945, = Serie~D, Vol. XI, Zweiter Halbband, Bonn, 1964, pp. 597--98.
^^2^^V. Berezhkov, Diplomatic Mission to Berlin, 1940--1941, = Moscow, 1966, p. 53 (in Russian).
^^3^^H. Holdack, = Was wirklich geschah. Die diplomatischen Hintergrtinde der deutschen Kriegspolitik, Munich, 1949, pp. 240--41.
^^4^^History of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, = Part 1, 1917--1945, pp. 374--75.
221The Berlin talks gave the Soviet Government an opportunity to probe Hitler's intentions, and were of definite help in this sense. "Having drawn these useful conclusions,'' states the Falsifiers of History, "the Soviet Government never again resumed the talks on these questions, despite Ribbentrop's repeated reminders. As will be seen, this was a sounding out. a probing by the Soviet Government of the position of the Hitler Government, which did not lead, and could not lead to an agreement of any = kind."^^1^^
Despite the failure of the Berlin talks, nazi propagandists tried to use them to create the impression that the Soviet Union approved Germany's aggressive acts, in particular, the introduction of German troops into Rumania, and Hungary's and later Bulgaria's accession to the Triple Pact and so = on.^^2^^ The Soviet Government lost no time in publicly refuting these false allegations in a TASS communication of November 23, 1940. Referring to information in the foreign press to the effect that "the Kremlin was informed about the purpose and numbers of troops sent (by Germany --- author) into Rumania'', and to an article in the German newspaper Hamburger Fremdenblatt alleging that Hungary's accession to the Triple Pact was achieved "with the cooperation and full approval of the Soviet Government'', TASS refuted them as incongruous with reality.
This refutation by TASS was strongly resented in Berlin. Schulenburg was immediately instructed to pay a visit to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and express his displeasure at the TASS communication concerning = Hungary.^^3^^
However, the Soviet Government rejected Schulenburg's representation. Moreover, he was handed a Soviet Government statement raising the question of Berlin withdrawing German troops from Finland and strongly objecting to German penetration into Bulgaria.
An important element of the CPSU's and Soviet Government's foreign policy activity was to provide for the security of the USSR's Far Eastern borders, and limit the further spread of war in that region.
While showing a desire to maintain good-neighbourly relations with Japan, the USSR issued a stern warning to the Japanese ruling circles that it would not tolerate any action by the latter which _-_-_
^^1^^Falsifiers of History. (Historical Survey), p. 99.
^^2^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of Diplomacy, = Vol. IV, p. 155.
^^3^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, History of the USSR, = No.~1, 1974, p. 44.
222 would harm Soviet interests. "Japan must finally realise,'' said the Soviet Government's report to the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in late March 1940, "that the Soviet Union will on no account permit its interests to be violated. Only on this understanding can Soviet-Japanese relations develop = satisfactorily."^^1^^Japan's hostile policy towards the Soviet Union was once more shown when Japan signed, on September 27, 1940, an alliance treaty with Germany and Italy called the Triple Pact. In this connection, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yusuke Matsuoka, stated on December 9, 1940: "The conclusion of the Triple Pact has established the path Japan will take. Close cooperation with the axis powers has become the guiding principle of Japan's foreign = policy."^^2^^
The Japanese Government, forced to reckon with the fact that the USSR had gained a strong international position, started working towards the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. In particular, this was reflected in Japan's changed position in the Soviet-Japanese talks about establishing the border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo in the region of the 1939 conflict on the River Khalkhin-Gol. This was the only reason why the talks ended with the signing of an agreement delineating the border between the two states mentioned.
Mid-1940 saw the resumption of the negotiations which were concerned with the conclusion of a new fishing convention. Shortly afterwards, in early July, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, proposed that the two countries start negotiating on a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. Japan, however, put forward a condition which was unacceptable to the USSR: she suggested basing Soviet-Japanese relations on the outdated Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1925. The Soviet Union had no objection to talks on a neutrality pact, but demanded that the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin be abolished as an indispensable condition; fair compensation would be paid for this. But Japan insisted on her demands and even tried to use the conclusion of the Triple Pact with Germany and Italy to exert pressure on the Soviet Union (Japanese protests of December 19 and 24, 1940 against actions by the Soviet authorities concerning the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin).
_-_-_^^1^^The Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, = verbatim report, Moscow, p. 41.
^^2^^L. N. Kutakov, Japanese Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, = Moscow, 1964, p. 167 (in Russian).
223In February 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed the Soviet Ambassador of his intention to visit Moscow and Berlin, declaring that the main purpose of his European visit was to meet the Soviet leaders. He gave it to be understood that Japan wished to conclude Soviet-Japanese trade and fishing agreements before the start of the talks on a political treaty.
On March 24, 1941, Matsuoka arrived in Moscow. While proposing a non-aggression treaty, he advanced a quite unacceptable condition, viz. the sale to Japan of Northern Sakhalin. The Soviet reply to this suggestion was: "Is this a joke?" Matsuoka said that in exchange for this concession, Japan was prepared to replace the Portsmouth and Peking treaties with other agreements and also to renounce several of her "fishing rights".
On March 26, Matsuoka arrived in Berlin where he had several conversations with Ribbentrop, whom he put in the picture about the Moscow talks. Matsuoka made it quite plain that Japan would always be a loyal ally of Germany in the event of a German-Soviet war.^^1^^
Since a Japanese-American war was then imminent, Japan considered it necessary to conclude a neutrality pact with the USSR. So, on April 8, Matsuoka came to Moscow from Berlin and continued negotiations. But until April 13, the very day of his departure from Moscow, he objected to the abolition of the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin, thereby preventing the conclusion of a pact. Only on the day of his departure did he finally concede and the talks were rounded off with the signing of a treaty of neutrality. The signing was accompanied by the exchange of letters stating Japan's obligation to abolish her concessions in Northern Sakhalin within a period of six months.
The pact was based on the wording of the Soviet draft put forward to Japan as early as the end of 1940. According to clause 1, the Parties pledged to maintain peaceful and friendly mutual relations and to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being theobject of a military attack by one or several third parties, stated clause 2, the other Contracting Party would observe neutrality throughout the conflict. Clause 3 stipulated that the treaty was to be effective for 5 years and envisaged the possibility of its automatic renewal.
The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was a
_-_-_^^1^^P. Schmidt, = Statist aufdie diplomatischer B\"uhne, Bonn, 1949, p. 509. Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka of March 27, 1941.
224 contribution by the Soviet Union to strengthening peace in the Far East and the security of Soviet Far Eastern borders. It also frustrated American and British attempts to provoke a Soviet-Japanese war. Needless to say, the USSR did not overestimate the significance of the pact, realising that though concluding the pact, the Japanese Government did not abandon its former aggressive plans against the Soviet Union. As before, the Kwantung Army was stationed at the Soviet border. As Matsuoka told the German Ambassador in Tokyo shortly after the neutrality pact was signed, the latter did not mean that Japan would remain neutral in the event of war between Germany and the USSR. No Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would be able to keep Japan neutral in the event of conflict between Russia and Germany, he said. In this event, Japan would, by force of necessity, have to attack Russia on Germany's side. In these conditions, a neutrality pact would be useless. Several days after the pact was signed, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs said he did not believe in the pact's durability.^^1^^By mid-1940, nazi Germany had taken over 9 states, including Austria, Belgium and France, and also the region and town of Memel (Klaipeda). Their territories amounted to over 850,000 square kilometres, and their population, to 107 million. The human potential of these invaded states was not the only thing of import for Germany. The Third Reich had acquired the very considerable economic and military resources of nearly the whole of Western Europe. Hitler Germany had seized the total West European arsenal of armaments, the war industry, massive supplies of metal, the metallurgical and other important industries.
These easy victories had turned the heads of the Third Reich's leaders and they decided that the time had come to realise the longstanding German imperialist plans to establish German supremacy in Europe and throughout the world. However, it was clear to Hitler and the other fascist ringleaders that while the USSR existed nazi Germany's supremacy over occupied Europe and her bloody "new order" would remain precarious. What is more, Germany would not be able to fulfil her wild plan of establishing world supremacy. "Hitler understood,'' said L. I. Brezhnev, "that the Soviet Union was the stronghold of all revolutionary forces, the most implacable and consistent enemy of fascism and the principal obstacle in the way of the realisation of his criminal = designs."^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives, = History of the USSR, No.~1, 1974, p. 46.
^^2^^L. I. Brezhnev, = The Great Victory of the Soviet People, Moscow, 1965, p. 7 (in Russian).
225Therefore from mid-1940 Germany began preparations for a war against the USSR which were carried out in top secret. Obviously, this was bound to be reflected in Germany's relations with the Soviet Union and in all her diplomatic activities. On September 27, 1940, the Triple Pact was concluded in Berlin (Germany, Italy and Japan) constituting a military alliance of the three aggressive powers. It therefore resulted, as Pravda stressed at the time, in the "further aggravation and spread of the = war".^^1^^ Nazi Germany started intense activities to recruit allies for her war with the Soviet Union, using political and economic pressure to achieve her aims. Work was started on the plan of war with the Soviet Union. In its final form, the plan was given the code name Barbarossa. It envisaged a Blitzkrieg against the Soviet = Union.^^2^^ Berlin regarded the USSR's defeat as a principal precondition for establishing nazi Germany's supremacy in Europe, which would secure Hitler's supremacy over the whole world.
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government were well aware that nazi Germany was preparing to attack the USSR. They engaged in preparing the country for a rebuff to German aggression but time was vital for an effective preparation. The Soviet Government therefore observed extreme caution and restraint, consistently carrying out the Leninist peace policy and taking care not to give Hitler Germany any/grounds for attacking the USSR.
At the same time, the Party and the Government took every opportunity to develop the country's heavy industry and defence might.
Bourgeois falsifiers of history distort the essence of Soviet foreign policy during the initial period of the Second World War. They ``accuse'' the Soviet Union of ``collaborating'' with Germany. These false assertions are designed to relieve the Western powers of responsibility for the outbreak of the war and at the same time to justify the secret talks conducted by British and French diplomacy with German emissaries aimed at ending the war between them and organising a war against the Soviet Union.
Recently published documents have fully refuted these false accusations against the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government were well aware of the _-_-_
^^1^^Pravda, September 30, 1940.
^^2^^For more details of this plan see = Top Secret! For the Command Only! Fascist Germany's Strategy in the War against the USSR, Moscow, 1967, pp. 149--55 (in Russian).
226 growing threat of attack by Hitler Germany. This was confirmed by the US Ambassador in Moscow, Steinhardt, in his September 1940 report to the Department of State. Stating Stalin's views voiced in his talk with Cripps, British Ambassador to the USSR, Steinhardt wrote that Stalin was very frank and realistic. He made it quite clear that his policy was aimed at avoiding conflict with the German army. Stalin admitted that Germany represented the only threat for the USSR and that a German victory would put the USSR in a difficult, if not dangerous, position. He considered, however, that at the time, it was important not to embark on a course of provoking a German invasion by way of changing Soviet policy.^^1^^Describing the Soviet state's dangerous position at the beginning of 1940, A. I. Shakhurin, former People's Commissar for the Aviation Industry, reported a characteristic detail: on January 9, 1940, he was suddenly summoned from Gorky,where he worked as First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee to Stalin in the Kremlin. After a brief conversation the following day, he was appointed People's Commissar and was instructed to start work immediately in his capacity of People's Commissar for the Aviation Industry. He was not even permitted to return to Gorky to complete his business there. "The Communist Party and the Soviet Government,'' he wrote, "aware of the real danger gradually approaching the USSR, implemented a number of important measures of a political, economic, military and diplomatic nature, in order to defend the world's first socialist state and to postpone as long as possible our entry into the war. At the same time, they did all they could to ensure that the country was prepared for = war."^^2^^ To sum up, he said: "Yes, we were preparing for war both economically and politically."
As the danger of war grew, the Party and the Government took serious measures to strengthen the armed forces and prepare them for combat. With every passing year their numbers increased. Thus, according to data quoted by the late Minister of Defence Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko. from "1939 to 1941 alone the Armed Forces' personnel more than tripled, 125 new divisions were formed and the Red Army raised its combat readiness. The Navy became noticeably more powerful. Within only 11 months in 1940,100 new warships were put into operation. _-_-_
^^1^^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940. See = International Affairs, No.~11, 1972, p. 64.
^^2^^Voprosy Istorii, No.~2, 1974, p. 82.
227 The anti-aircraft defence system was perfected, and air-borne troops were = organised."^^1^^On February 25,1941, the CC CPSU and the Council of People's Commissars adopted the resolution, "On the Reorganisation of the Red Army Air Force'', which approved the plan drawn up by the People's Commissariat for Defence on the rearmament of the air units.^^2^^
The question of perfecting the Armed Forces and their equipment was the subject of repeated discussion at meetings of the Politbureau of the Party Central Committee.
The CC CPSU based its work on the assumption that the Soviet state and its Armed Forces would have to beat off an attack by the German fascist Wehrmacht. The General Staff also had this in mind when they began work on a draft and plan for the strategic deployment of Red Army troops to repel aggression from the West. This work was carried out under the guidance of B. M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff. According to the memoirs of Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, who contributed to this work since April 1940, the draft plan of strategic deployment was reported straight back to Stalin in September = 1940.^^3^^
As a result of discussing this plan with Stalin, the General Staff was instructed to re-work it, providing for the main concentration of our troops in the South-West. This work was to be completed by December 15, = 1940.^^4^^
Late in 1940, the CC CPSU and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR examined and approved the measures for raising the Armed Forces' combat readiness. In February 1941, the Party Central Committee and the Government approved the mobilisation plan which was implemented by means of large-scale mobilisation measures. In the spring of 1941 a new plan was elaborated for defending the state = borders.^^5^^ Crucial steps were taken to reinforce the defence capacity of the Soviet Western borders. From the middle of May 1941, a number of armies (totalling 28 divisions) began advancing from inner military districts to the border areas. This was the "beginning in the _-_-_
^^1^^A. Grechko, = ``V. I. Lenin and the Armed Forces of the Soviet State'', Kommunist,No.~3, 1974, p. 19.
^^2^^A. S. Yakovlev, = The Aim of a Lifetime, Moscow, 1972, p. 241.
^^3^^A. M. Vasilevsky, op. cit., pp. 105--06.
^^4^^Ibid., p. 110.
^^5^^History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union = in 6 volumes, Vol V, Moscow, 1970, p. 128 (in Russian).
228 fulfilment of the plan to concentrate and deploy Soviet troops along the Western = borders".^^1^^As well as building up the country's military and economic potential, the Party also carried out an extensive political work in preparing the Soviet people to repel aggression the threat of which was growing. The warning of this was given in particular in the order of the People's Commissar for Defence on the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of the Great October Revolution, on November 7, 1940, which began with the words: "Comrades, the capitalist war is spreading, it's reaching our borders, it's threatening our territory and can endanger our Soviet Motherland."
The Party stepped up its propaganda campaign imbuing the minds of people with the Leninist idea of the just nature of a war in defence of the socialist state and also of national liberation wars. Young people were brought up oil the heroic feats of the workers and peasants performed during the civil war and on the heroic past of the peoples of Russia. A special kind of patriotism was cultivated which combined love for the Soviet Motherland and internationalism. The Communist Party did everything in its power to consolidate the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, regarding this as an important means of preparing people for the fight against the fascist aggressor.
The press, radio and other propaganda media were all used to mobilise the Soviet people, to strengthen its moral and political unity and readiness to beat off the enemy. Thus, the new-year edition of Pravda came out with the leader entitled "The Year 1941'', which gave a survey of the USSR's international and internal position. One of its principal conclusions was that the USSR must build up its defences. "All our work must be subordinated to this need; indeed, it must become the highest law for every citizen of the Soviet = Union."^^2^^ The article also stressed the danger of the further extention of the world war which was raging in Europe and could at any moment spread towards the USSR.
From early 1941, the Soviet Government began to receive a mass of information about Germany's preparations to attack the USSR. In particular, these reports were forthcoming from the Soviet intelligence officer R. Sorge. So, the information sent by Churchill on April 18, 1941, to the Soviet Government via Cripps contained nothing new. Churchill himself confirmed in his memoirs that Stalin knew an attack was being prepared. Describing his Moscow _-_-_
^^1^^A. M. Vasilevsky, op. cit., pp. 118--19.
^^2^^Pravda, January 1, 1941.
229 visit in August 1942, Churchill tells us that one day, during a conversation with Stalin, he mentioned this information. When Stalin was reminded of its contents, he shrugged his shoulders and said: "I remember it. I did not need any warnings. I knew war would come, but I thought I might gain another six months or = so.''^^1^^ The purpose of this warning and similar one issued by Washington in early 1941 was to increase German suspicions, aggravate Soviet-German relations and thereby speed up the outbreak of a Soviet-German war to provide Britain with a much-needed breathing space.Every month of peace was of great significance to the USSR. Stalin considered it to be vital to avoid giving Hitler Germany the slightest grounds for provocation. At the same tune, the Soviet Government continued to urge the Soviet people to be on their guard and be ready to defend their Motherland. For example, on May 5,1941, in a speech to the graduates of the military academies at a grand meeting in the Great Kremlin Palace, Stalin described the international situation as extremely complex and stressed the danger of deterioration. He appealed for increased vigilance, and also an increase in the combat readiness of the troops. Stalin stated quite definitely that there was a possibility of war with = Germany.^^2^^ On June 5,1941, M. I. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet spoke at the Military Political Academy on the danger of an attack on the Soviet Union: "We do not know when we will fight: tomorrow or the next day; and, therefore, in such a situation, we must be ready to fight = today."^^3^^ In this way, the leadership of the Soviet state urged the officers to be ready to rebuff the enemy at any moment. The Party leadership and the Government were informed through various channels of Germany's preparations for war against the USSR. But, while stepping up preparations to repel the enemy, they also attempted to postpone this attack by political and diplomatic means. With this aim in view a TASS statement was issued over the question of Soviet-German relations.
On June 13, i.e. before the statement was published in the Soviet press, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs handed the text _-_-_
^^1^^W. Churchill, = The Second World War. The Hinge of Fate, London, Vol. IV, 1951, p. 443.
^^2^^P. A. Zhilin, = How Fascist Germany Prepared to Attack the Soviet Union. (Calculations and Miscalculations), = Moscow, 1966, pp. 223--24. (in Russian).
^^3^^See = Essays on the History of the CPSU far the Party Training System, = Moscow, 1966, p. 305 (in Russian).
230 over to the German Ambassador in Moscow. The Soviet Government was thereby not only demonstrating its peaceful intentions and devotion to the cause of peace, but was also showing its readiness to enter into formal talks with Berlin, hoping, in this way, to prolong the peace with Germany, if only temporarily.This statement published in the Soviet press on June 14, 1941 spoke of the rumours appearing in the foreign press about "the nearness of war between the USSR and Germany" and that Germany was therefore concentrating her troops at the Soviet borders in order to stage an attack. The statement noted further that false, provocatkmary rumours were being spread that the Soviet Union had, in its turn, started strenuous preparations for a war with Germany and was concentrating its troops at the Soviet borders. The document stated further that the USSR and Germany were steadfastly observing the 1939 Soviet-German treaty, and "the recent movement of German troops, freed of their Balkan operations, into the Eastern and North-Eastern regions of Germany are supposedly prompted by other motives which have nothing to do with Soviet-German = relations".^^1^^
The statement said in conclusion that "the summer camp training of Red Army reservists now taking place, and the forthcoming manoeuvres are merely aimed at training the reserves and checking the work of the raiways, which, as is common knowledge, is effected every year. Therefore to make out that these Red Army measures are hostile to Germany is absurd, to say = the least".^^2^^ To this day, the statement is subject to the most arbitrary interpretations. It is frequently alledged that it played a totally negative role, taking the edge off the vigilance of the Soviet people, including the military, etc. Such allegations are clearly far-fetched and groundless. The opinion of Marshall A. M. Vasilevsky, who worked in the General Staff in June 1941, is of great interest in this respect. His memoirs contain the following passage on the subject: "Needless to say, we, the workers of the Operational Division, were at first somewhat surprised by this. But there followed no fundamentally new instructions concerning the armed forces nor a review of former decisions on combat readiness, and we came to the conclusion that this was a diplomatic move by our Government and that nothing was to change in the affairs of the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, N. F. Vatutin, the chief of the Operational Division, had explained by the end of the day that the purpose of _-_-_
^^1^^Izvestia, June 14, 1941.
^^2^^ Ibid.
231 the TASS statement was to check the true intentions of the Hitlerites. I therefore consider it incorrect to present the TASS statement as a document which assuaged us almost to the point of demobilisation".^^1^^The Soviet Government, having made this diplomatic move, continued its former preparatory measures for a rebuff to a nazi aggression. It also carefully watched Berlin's reaction to the TASS statement. The Soviet Embassy in Berlin then received instructions from Moscow to follow attentively the reaction of the German press to this statement and immediately report back to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow.
The nazi government refused to enter into negotiations with the USSR to discuss the state of German-Soviet relations, and the German press hushed up the TASS statement. At a press conference for foreign journalists, the head of the press department of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs merely remarked that the TASS statement "confirms the peaceful intentions" of Germany.
Despite Berlin's failure to react to this peace probe, the Soviet Government made a new attempt at entering negotiations with Germany to elucidate the question of Soviet-German relations. On June 20, it instructed its Ambassador in Berlin to hand a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs or his deputy about the violations of Soviet frontiers by German aircraft. The note remarked that the German Government had not yet answered the Soviet notes of March 27 and April 21, and that for two months ---from April 19 to June 19---German aircraft had violated Soviet airspace 180 times.^^2^^ Discussion of the questions raised by the note could have helped clear up Soviet-German relations in all their totality.
But even then the German side showed no sign of wanting such a discussion.
On June 21, the German Foreign Minister and his deputy refused to meet the Soviet Ambassador all day long. It was only at 9.30 p.m. that Weizsacker, the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, received him. However Weizsacker refused to discuss the Soviet note and would only comment that it was Germany rather than the Soviet Union that had grounds for such complaints.
In the evening of June 21, the Soviet Government made one more attempt to start negotiations with the German Government. To this end, Molotov invited Schulenburg to see him at 9.30 p.m. and _-_-_
^^1^^A. M. Vasilevsky, op. cit., p. 120.
^^2^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives. The Soviet note of June 20, 1941.
232 acquainted him with the contents of the Soviet note. The People's Commissar informed him that the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin had been instructed to hand this note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The People's Commissar then asked Schulenburg why Germany resented the Soviet Union, if, indeed, it did, and why there were increasing rumours about an imminent war between Germany and the USSR. He also asked Schulenburg what was the reason for a mass departure from Moscow of German Embassy officials and their families and why the German press had shown no kind of reaction to the reassuring and peace-loving TASS statement of June = 14.^^1^^On June 22 (at 00.40. a.m. Moscow time) a ciphered message was phoned through to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin informing him of the contents of Molotov's talk with Schulenburg, with a list of the questions posed by the Soviet side. The telegram also instructed the Ambassador to meet Ribbentrop or his deputy immediately and ask him the same questions. But the Ambassador could not carry out these instructions. Every attempt to obtain a meeting with the minister or his deputy was of no avail. In Berlin, negotiations were already considered irrelevant, since Germany was then making her final preparations for her perfidious attack on the USSR. Only a few hours separated peace from war: at 4 in the morning on June 22, nazi Germany launched a treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. Though the Soviet people knew that the war was inevitable and prepared for it, it nevertheless broke out unexpectedly, like any great misfortune.
_-_-_^^1^^USSR Foreign Policy Archives. Record of the talk between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador, June 21, 1941 (see History of Soviet Foreign Policy, Part~I, p. 386).
[233] __ALPHA_LVL1__ CONCLUSIONFrom 1933 to 1941 was the period when the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, undertook the strenuous and heroic drive to construct socialism in the USSR. The Soviet working class and all working people completed an historically unparalleled heroic feat of labour whilst fulfilling the first five-year economic development plans. They turned backward Russia into a mighty socialist industrial and agricultural state, second in the world for gross industrial production (after the USA). Small-scale farming was transformed into a large-scale collective-farm production. The exploiting classes were eliminated and the cultural revolution completed. One of the most important achievements of the latter was the formation of intelligentsia from among the people. The most important achievement was the moral and political unity of the whole Soviet people, convincingly shown in the heroic feats during the Great Patriotic War.-
The new Constitution of the USSR, adopted in 1936, consolidated in law these historic conquests of the Soviet people, the grandiose socio-economic transformations carried out in the country, including the elimination of the exploitative classes, the victory of socialism, the great civil rights and freedoms, the equality of socialist nations, fraternal friendship and the co-operation of all peoples.
The achievements of the USSR between 1933 and 1941 were a convincing demonstration of the decisive advantages the Soviet socialist order held over the capitalist.
The extention of democracy in the USSR, consolidated in the new Soviet Constitution, _ACQUIRED A GREAT INTERNATIONAL_ significance in the situation where the bourgeoisie was switching to fascist methods of government to ensure its supremacy.
234Peace was a necessary condition for the Soviet Union's further creative work in building socialism. Hence the great role of the consistent Leninist foreign policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet state in ensuring peace and security. Guided by the principle that "peace is indivisible'', the USSR led an indefatigable struggle to create conditions for prolonged and durable peace and international security. It did everything so that its relations with the capitalist countries would be built on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous co-operation.
It was exceedingly difficult to pursue this Leninist policy of peace in view of the hostile capitalist encirclement and the tense and complex situation of the time. This tension particularly heightened as a result of the creation of a hotbed of war in the centre of Europe following the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in Germany, when German-fascist imperialism openly embarked on preparations for a new world war to redivide the world. Other aggressive powers, Italy and Japan, were also striving towards this end. This was precisely why they unleashed a frenzied arms race and began gathering alliances, the creation of which was facilitated by the anti-Soviet policy of the leading Western states and their allies. The leading Western states were quite satisfied with the fact that the fascist dictators constantly declared their readiness to fight the USSR. To mask their plans for preparing to redivide the world, the aggressive powers called their alliances the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and even the Anti-Comintern Pact.
The Western powers pursued' a policy of ``non-intervention'' and ``appeasement'', hoping that through this they could come to an agreement with the aggressive powers at the USSR's expense. In practice, this policy meant a refusal to create a collective security system for the collective defence of peace through a rebuff to aggression.
The Soviet programme for the organisation of collective security, approved by the historic decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on December 19, 1933, and envisaging the conclusion of regional treaties of mutual assistance in Europe and Asia, was the-focus of activity for the Soviet Government and Soviet diplomacy for several years. The conclusion of the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance was a great achievement of the Leninist foreign policy of peace in realising the programme of collective security.
These treaties provided the necessary basis for organising collective security throughout Europe. Only the opposition of British diplomacy and the rejection of the Soviet proposal to 235 conclude a mutual assistance treaty between the USSR and Britain at the beginning of 1936, allowed Hitler Germany to wreck the organisation of collective security in Europe.
The British ruling circles' anti-Soviet policy also exerted a negative influence on France's position. It facilitated the activity of Laval and his supporters, whose main aim was to achieve mutual understanding with Hitler Germany. The reactionary forces, uniting around Laval, succeeded in preventing the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact from becoming the starting point in developing and strengthening relations between the two countries and in organising co-operation to preserve peace and check German-fascist aggression.
Another important Soviet foreign policy task during this period was to expose all the actions and manoeuvres of the enemies of peace and the aggressive schemes of the fascist powers. The active Leninist foreign policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet state allowed the Soviet people to build socialism peacefully between 1933 and 1941 and went a long way towards hampering the unleashing of the Second World War.
The Soviet Union, by its consistent and implacable drive against fascism and exposure of the latter's aggressive essence ---"fascism means war'', greatly helped all the peoples realise the danger to peace that fascism represented. Thus, during this period the USSR made a great contribution to the preparations for the creation of an anti-fascist coalition of nations such as was the antiHitler coalition of the USSR, USA, Britain and France that arose during the Second World War. "During the years when the threat of fascist aggression loomed over the world, the Soviet Union persistently worked for a system of collective security which could have bridled the aggressors and prevented a second world = war."^^1^^
However, all the Soviet Union's pre-war proposals for the conclusion of an agreement on creating a system of collective security were rejected by the London and Paris cabinets, with Washington's approval. At the same time Britain and France continued to pursue a policy of collusion with the aggressive states, dubbed the Munich policy. This Munich policy only whetted the predatory appetites of the aggressors and thus accelerated the outbreak of the Second World War.
With the threat of war issuing from Germany and in fact already begun by Japan (the battles at Khalkhin Gol) and in view of the impossibility of achieving an agreement with Britain, France and _-_-_
^^1^^L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 54.
236 Poland on a joint rebuff to German aggression (which impossibility became clear during the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations on a mutual assistance pact), the Soviet Union was compelled to accept the German proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. In the prevailing conditions this was the USSR's only chance for upsetting the crafty plans of Munich-men directed at provocating war between the USSR and Germany. Thus, the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Germany proved to be the USSR's only possibility of avoiding war, extending the period of peace, and turning the course of events into a route favourable to itself and to all the progressive forces.The pre-war political crisis, coming to a head in August 1939, demonstrated the sharp aggravation of the contradictions in the imperialist camp. It had already become impossible to solve these contradictions by peaceful means. The Second World War proved to be the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces based on contemporary monopoly capitalism.
The policy of connivance with Germany and the other aggressive powers, pursued under the guise of ``non-intervention'', and the refusal to actively defend peace and strengthen international security on the basis of peace being indivisible inevitably led to the unleashing of the Second World War which began with the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939.
Nevertheless the Soviet policy of exposing the aggressive schemes of fascist Germany, and the policy of actively defending peace and strengthening international security clearly and convincingly demonstrated to the peoples the possibility and necessity of cooperation between states with different socio-economic systems as well as providing the peoples of Europe with several years of peace. In this way it morally prepared the peoples, showing them the necessity of uniting their forces to destroy fascism --- a fatal threat to all humanity.
Prior to the Second World War, the Soviet Union underwent its development in the complex and tense international situation and in circumstances involving the ever growing danger of imperialist aggression. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government did all they could to prevent and later to limit nazi aggression, to put a bar against the spread of war and to organise an "eastern front" against the aggression of fascist Germany. These were the aims of the USSR's foreign policy, a policy of struggle against aggression, a policy of defending the big and small nations from nazi enslavement. The peace policy of the Soviet Union thereby represented the interests of the working people of all countries. 237 With the help of this policy' the Soviet Union counteracted the further spread of war and the involvement of more countries and peoples. Throughout the two years of peace, obtained as a result of signing the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty which allowed the country to remain outside the war, the Soviet people worked tirelessly to strengthen the country's defence capacity and prepare a rebuff to aggression.
In conditions of a military conflict between the two imperialist groupings, the USSR's consistent struggle for peace, to prevent other states' and peoples' being drawn into the war, and its policy of strict neutrality led to a favourable situation in which the victory of the socialist revolution was attained in the Baltic states by peaceful means. The formation of the Baltic republics on the western borders of the USSR and their entry into the Soviet Union signified the organisation of an "eastern front" against nazi Germany's aggression. The return of Bessarabia and the transfer of Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union demonstrated the growth of its might and its weight in international affairs. As a result of this the USSR again became a Danube state and began an active struggle for the rights of all the Danube countries to regulate by themselves the navigation on this great water highway in the interests of developing economic ties.
The return of Bessarabia to the USSR also signified the completion of the organisation of the ``eastern front'' against fascist aggression stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Whilst organising and strengthening the "eastern front'', the Soviet Union did everything it could so as not to allow the spread of war and German-fascist aggression into the Balkans, Sweden and other regions.
The Soviet policy was one of equality between the big and small nations, directed at establishing frierfdly and good-neighbourly relations with all the Balkan countries, a policy aimed at developing trade, economic and other ties on the basis of equality and mutual benefits. All this was to promote the elimination of discord and conflict between the Balkan nations, a necessary precondition for stabilising the situation there and turning the whole of the Balkan Peninsula into an important factor for safeguarding peace.
The main result of the Communist Party's and Soviet Government's foreign policy during this period was that the Soviet Union managed to avoid involvement in the war and to prolong the peaceful building of a new society. This allowed Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy to launch, between 1939 and 1941, an active 238 campaign to isolate the fascist states. By the time Hitler Germany attacked the USSR, the latter's active foreign policy had helped its international position and the international situation to undergo a fundamental change. The Soviet Union had emerged from international isolation and by this time the danger of an anti-Soviet collusion between the Western powers and Germany had almost vanished, since by the summer of 1941 the imperialist powers had been divided into two belligerent camps.
Soviet diplomacy skillfully used the German-Japanese imperialist contradictions and, by concluding a pact of neutrality with Japan, achieved the weakening of the German-Japanese alliance. This played a positive role in strengthening peace in the Far East and limited the further spread of war in this region. The basic task of Soviet foreign policy at this stage was not to allow the forces of international imperialist reaction to crush the USSR and to secure peace for the building of socialism. Safeguarding the USSR, the bastion of socialism, meant at the same time the practical realisation of the principle of proletarian internationalism to which the Communist Party and the Soviet state remained forever loyal. The delay of the USSR's entry into the Second World War gave it time to further strengthen its economic and military might and to prepare a successful rebuff to the aggressor.
The respite that the Soviet Union gained by concluding the Non-Aggression Treaty with Germany was enougn to save it from being drawn into the war in the extremely unfavourable international situation pertaining in the summer of 1939. "This respite was not enough, however, for the country to complete its preparations for war---especially since by that time the Hitlerites had at their disposal the resources of almost the whole of Western Europe.... But nevertheless, the Soviet Union's defence preparations had advanced far enough to enable the heroic Soviet armed forces to achieve, in the extremely arduous initial phase of the Great Patriotic War, a result of paramount importance: they frustrated the strategic concept of the nazi leadership --- to effect a lightning-like rout of the Soviet = Union."^^1^^
The successful resistance offered by the Soviet Union to the aggression in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War laid the prerequisite for the subsequent defeat of the nazis. It also vividly demonstrated to all peoples the possibility of bringing nearer the victory over the nazis on joining efforts.
_-_-_^^1^^Soviet Peace Efforts..., pp. 35--36.
239Today, thirty years after the end of the Second Wdrld War, which culminated in a great historic victory over the bloc of fascist aggressors, the struggle for peace is the CPSU's and the Soviet State's most important task in the field of international relations. This Leninist policy of peace and friendship among peoples conforms to the vital interests of all peoples. The Programme of the CPSU stresses that socialism confronts imperialism with a new type of relations and that "The foreign policy of the Socialist Countries, which is based on the principles of peace, the equality and self-determination of nations, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, as well as the fair, humane methods of socialist diplomacy, are exerting a growing influence on the world situation".^^1^^
The dynamic and purposeful activity of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in realising the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, was crowned with great success.
As was noted in Pravda, in connection with the third anniversary of the 24th Congress, the main result of this activity had been that the danger of the outbreak of a world nuclear war, hanging over mankind since the second half of the forties, had been reduced and the possibilities of ensuring a general peace were becoming better and more = promising.^^2^^ This is now acknowledged by many statesmen in various countries. Thus, U. Kekkonen, President of the Finnish Republic, stated, that "the historic prerequisites now exist for the peoples of the world to build a peace which will exclude the threat of = war."^^3^^
The Soviet Union has demonstrated in practice that socialism and peace are inseparable and that socialism means peace and constructive activity. The CPSU and the Soviet Government together with the countries of the socialist community are carrying out a great struggle for peace in the interests of all the peoples of the world as well as in the interests of their own peoples.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government, whilst noting the impressive successes achieved in the endeavour to strengthen peace and security and to develop co-operation, do not rest content with this achievement and do not forget the necessity of continuing to step up efforts in this matter. "We are gladdened by the current relaxation of international tension and the growth of peaceful _-_-_
^^1^^The Road to Communism, Moscow, 1962, p. 503.
^^2^^Pravda, March 30, 1974.
^^3^^See Za Rubezhom, No.~9, 1974, p. 3.
240 co-operation among states'', Leonid Brezhnev noted in a speech at the World Congress of Peace Forces. "But I should like to stress most emphatically that neither peace nor detente will descend on the world in the manner of some divine blessing. Peace and detente can only be the result of persistent and tireless struggle by all peace forces ---the states, political parties and tendencies, public bodies and individuals ---against everything resisting detente imperilling peace and creating the danger of = war."^^1^^The historically crucial transition from the cold war and confrontation to the consolidation of the principles of peaceful coexistence as the norms in relations between states with different social systems continues to develop but against the background of sharp struggle in world affairs. The Central Committee of the CPSU and Soviet Government stress that the historic contest and antagonism between socialism and capitalism throughout the world is inevitable and that it will continue. The only question is, said Leonid Brezhnev, that "We must see to it that this process does not develop into armed clashes and wars between countries, into the use of force or threat of force in relations between them, and that it does not interfere with the development of mutually advantageous co-operation between states with different social systems."^^2^^
The continuous, consistent and strenuous struggle of the CPSU, the Soviet state, the countries of the socialist community and all the progressive forces to consolidate peace and security has crowned with major successes. "The main thing is,'' noted Leonid Brezhnev in his speech on June 14, 1974, "that it has proved possible to seriously strengthen the base of peace and security of peoples and to weaken the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet people and all the peoples of the world regard this as a success of truly historic = significance."^^3^^
Thanks to the implementation of the Peace Programme proclaimed by the 24th CPSU Congress, the last five years have seen important changes for the better in the international situation, further progress in the cause of detente and the consolidation of world peace. -The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki and convened on the initiative of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries was an event of historical significance. It not only summed up the political significance of the Second World War and confirmed the fruitlessness and _-_-_
^^1^^L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, = Moscow, 1973, p. 85--86.
^^2^^Ibid., p. 41.
^^3^^Pravda, June 15, 1974.
241 harmfulness of ``power politics''; it also formulated the basic principles of relations between states, relations founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence and co-operation. The reorientation of relations on these principles will make Europe a continent of durable peace and fruitful co-operation among nations.With their labour successes, the Soviet people have raised even higher the economic and defence might of the Soviet Motherland, which has everything necessary to ensure the calm and confident labour of the Soviet people. Among other things, it is the great services of the Leninist foreign policy that have enabled the Soviet people for over thirty years since the end of the last war to devote their forces to the creative work of building communism and the Soviet Union to win for itself the respect of the peoples of the world as a bastion of peace, an active fighter against imperialism and aggression and a faithful ally of peoples fighting for peace, liberation, democracy and socialism.
The Soviet people and all European nations are living and working peacefully. "That is a great achievement,'' noted Leonid Brezhnev, "and we take pride in saying that a considerable contribution to this has been made by the policy of our Leninist Party.'' The CPSU appeals to the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole world not to reduce their efforts to strengthen peace and security even for a moment, as "the struggle for peace goes on, and there must be no pauses or intervals in = it".^^1^^
The vitally important and strenuous foreign policy work carried out during the five years since the 24th CPSU Congress by the Party's Central Committee and its Political Bureau, headed by the Central Committee's General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, were summed up at the 25th Party Congress which ended March 4, 1976.
The success of the Party's foreign-policy work in realising the Peace Programme drawn up by the 24th CPSU Congress was clearly proved by the CPSU Central Committee's Report to the 25th Party Congress, read by Leonid Brezhnev. This persistant, consistent and successful work has ensured that the Soviet Union's international position is now firmer than ever before. The Soviet people are living in their fourth decade of peace. At the same time the CPSU's Leninist policies serve the vital interests of all peoples.
An historic turn has been achieved away from cold war policies towards the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, from tension to detente and mutually advantageous _-_-_
^^1^^L. I. Brezhnev, Immortal Exploit, Moscow, 1975, pp. 16, 19.
242 co-operation. The CPSU's new foreign-policy tasks were outlined in the Central Committee's Report which was approved by the Congress. This is a well-thought-out, long-term programme in the sphere of international politics. Its main aim is to work towards a situation where durable peace becomes a natural way of life for all peoples. As in previous years, a most important trend in the foreign-policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet State is the steady strengthening of the unity between the fraternal socialist states, the development of all-round co-operation in the building of a new society and the increase in their joint active contribution to the consolidation of peace.The development of co-operation with countries liberated from colonial dependence remains a vital task. In its relations with capitalist states, the Soviet Union will consistently strive to uphold the principles of peaceful co-existence, for a durable peace and for weakening and ultimately eliminating the danger of the outbreak of a new world war.
~---~Work for a cessation of the growing armaments race which represents a danger for the whole world, and a transition to reducing the accumulated stock-piles of armaments, to disarmament. To these ends:
a) do everything (in their power) to complete preparations for the new Soviet-American agreement on limiting and reducing strategic weapons, to conclude international treaties for the complete and universal cessation of nuclear weapon testing, for banning and abolishing chemical weaponry, banning the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and the influencing of the environment for military and other hostile purposes;
b) make new efforts to speed up talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and, after reaching an understanding over initial definite steps in this direction, to continue military detente in the given region in the ensuing years;
c) strive towards replacing the present constant growth in many states' military expenditures by the practice of systematically reducing them;
d) take all possible measure for the speedy convocation of a world disarmament conference.
~---~Concentrate the efforts of the peace-loving states on eliminating the remaining war breeding-grounds and above all, establishing a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. With a view to achieving such a settlement, the states concerned should examine the question of helping to put an end to the armaments race in the Middle East.
243~---~Do everything possible to extend international detente and embody it in definite forms of mutually advantageous co-operation between states. Pursue an active policy towards implementing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and developing peaceful co-operation in Europe. In line with the principles of peaceful co-existence, to continue consistently developing long-term mutually-advantageous co-operation in various spheres, namely, politics, economics, science and culture, with the United States of America, France, the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Canada and also Japan and other capitalist states.
~---~Work towards ensuring security in Asia based on the joint efforts of the states of that continent.
~---~Strive to conclude a world agreement on the non-use of force in international relations.
~---~Consider a major. international task to be the complete elimination of all vestiges of the system of colonial oppression, of restricting the equality and independence of peoples, and of all hot-beds of colonialism and racialism.
~---~Seek ways of removing discrimination and any artificial obstacles in international trade, abolish all displays of inequality, diktat and exploitation in international economic relations.
The CPSU regards the above-listed foreign-policy tasks as the organic continuation and creative development of the Peace Programme of the 24th Party Congress, as a programme for further struggling towards peace and international co-operation, the freedom and independence of peoples.
[244] __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END] REQUEST TO READERSProgress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications.
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