p We turn now to the typical method of arguing—from the propositions stated on a general theoretical level we shall pass without any intermediary links directly to the realm of the quotidian. In ordinary experience the “rationalist” and the romantic" often lock horns over the subject of our discussion. The one endeavours to act strictly "according to science”. His constant opponent, somewhat "removed from reality" is the advocate of moral ideals. The one considers that any goal must be purpose-oriented and verified in terms of its feasibility. The other asserts that his goals are “higher” even if they are not always practicable or even explicable. This is an obvious embodiment of the eternal clash oetween science and morality. To what side do we offer our sympathies?
p We won’t rush to conclusions. Each of these personages, _ frequently encountered in daily life, is at times a true representative of humanity; each is a persistent struggler against evil and each ends up occasionally in rather absurd positions. Think of the moral zealot who in defending a just cause takes no account of circumstances and perishes in unequal battle. Looking back we may say that his cause was from the start doomed to defeat, since the "conditions were not yet ripe”. Yet he still appeals to us, this heroic sufferer, despite the impracticality of his elevated motivations and his “unnatural” activities. Think of the dreamer, wrapped up in 214 fantasies of the invincibility of humanism in an age in which the outcome of the battle is in fact decided by practical activity based on a precise knowledge of the facts ana circumstances. Truly, it is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous. The representative of the "rational thinking" is subject to the same vicissitudes. His sobriety and firm grounding in reality sometimes turn out to be unprincipled acquiescence or reflect the futility of a ploddingly calculated action. The moral dictate granted all its external lack of expedience in the final result turns out to be effective, while the rational assessment which takes only the obvious into account can be disgraced in practice.
p Thus, the alternative: either calculation or high principle, either facts or duty. The long debate over abstract matters is crowned with a simple everyday dilemma. Which should be given preference? The individual is often uninformed of the situation and acts “irrationally”, applying ordinary principles adopted spontaneously from his immediate acquaintances, or perhaps from his distant ancestors. But morality offers no guarantee of success and practical calculation most often emerges victorious from the conflict with circumstances and with "impractical moralists”. The consistent rationalist must always think within the framework of real possibilities, unexpected success is for him simple fortuitousness and is in general excluded from his “scientific” calculations.
p Now let us look trom this angle at the actual passage of history. Movement in history is not effectuated at each point according to preordained prognoses or on the basis of a thoroughly worked out programme. Any truly scientific programme takes into account conceivable deviation and chance occurrence, the element of the unforeseen. In the midst of these vicissitudes in the struggle for a just cause, the moral command takes its place next to the principle of expediency. The moral command means to be true to an ideal not only proceeding from the practical prerequisites for its effectuation (the end doesn’t always justify the means) but also orienting oneself upon "the model" and "the example" in conditions contradicting this ideal. True advocates of human justice have always displayed much “impracticality”: they have suffered “unjustified’ loss and perished in unequal combat, remained honest when deceit, so it seemed, yielded a bountiful harvest and have sacrificed themselves not only with success in mind but also "out of principle”. The expediency of such actions (not calculated in advance) rested not only in 215 preserving the cause itself but also in safeguarding its claim to Tightness in the eyes of its later defenders.
p Morality, consequently, if looked at in a broad historical perspective, forms the spiritual link between the “testator” and the “heir”, the precursor and the successor—a tie implemented by projecting “paradigms” of true humanity into the distant future. What is key is that by becoming the bearer of such an historical link man is elevated over surrounding circumstances and offers a challenge to existing reality from the position of higher standards in human existence. The unending nature of human history contributes to the justification of “mindless” actions. To be sure, the results are not directly credited to the enactor in the form of tangible reward or of "an honoured place in the memories of one’s descendants" (many of history makers have remained "unsung heroes”).The chain of expediency in this case always remains open-ended, neither he who follows a moral impulse nor the witnesses of his act are able to draw conclusions concerning the future impact of the completed act. Succeeding generations are also unable to speak definitively in their assessments of the acts of the past from a more modern point of view—for history remains in a state of transition. Of course, individual or even group conduct of this type cannot be considered commensurate with processes enacted on a historical scale. But without such attempts to bring closer the moral ideal, without “unfounded” activities transgressing the laws of expediency human history could surely not be enacted.
p A few words in conclusion. It would have been sufficient to state that morality and science are different forms of social consciousness, each possessing a distinctive logic and specific mode of conceptualizing social reality and man’s practical activity.
p But science and morality also share common ground. It would seem that an analogy between the two can be drawn only in one sense. Morality like scientific thought is a specific mode of understanding one’s existence in history. If this is not theoretical knowledge it is at least a specific conception of reality, expressing in its distinctive language the objective laws of that reality.
p The doubt that morality provides a specific knowledge of reality arises precisely because moral demands often differ astonishingly from the real facts. Indeed, this is the true meaning of the imperative as something distinct from the existent: it requires the fulfilment of the moral command and the elimination of the facts which have sunk deep roots in 216 reality by virtue of a number of causes and contributing factors. The moral substantiation of the imperative does not mean the explanation of objective necessity. The justification or condemnation of reality does not imply a comprehension of the logic of the historical process. But it is precisely here, in the counterposing of the ideal to reality, of the morally imperative to the existent that we locate the ability of moral consciousness to penetrate through the curtain of surficial phenomena to the essential definition of man as the subject of history. Regardless of the distance between the formulation of a moral demand to the establishment of the conditions preliminary to its practical effectuation, from the posing of a human problem to its satisfactory conclusion, this very juxtaposing of the imperative and the existent points the direction to progress in history—a progress which serves as a self-affirmation of the individual. Sometimes in this context certain traits of the future also come into view.
p To be sure, the demand for a "higher justice" is by no means equivalent to the creation of a tangible programme of social reconstruction and the course of history is not merely the story of the struggle between good and evil. But there is a definite connection here. It may be remote and at times obscure, however it is sufficiently evident that man constantly transgresses the boundaries of the given and strives in the direction of the as yet unknown future.
p But the good is not to be equated with truth, it will be said. We shall not enter the fray, the more so that this question is often merely a terminological one. We only observe that there is a certain resemblance between the conceptions of moral good and the ideas of verifiable truth. Good, just as truth, is universal. This fact does not contradict the class nature of morality. Each class morality promotes its demands and assessments as the exclusive truth. It is usually opposed by another class morality also making claims to universality. In science, the truth cannot belong simultaneously to two mutually contradictory convictions (although this is not a cut-and-dried case either). In terms of morality there are situations in which both positions have a socio-historical substantiation. The point of the matter is that existing society cannot function without enforcing certain demands put forth by the dominant morality. The opposing morality also reflects the objective social necessity—the transition to a new social order. The contradiction between the two positions, it follows, reflects the actual contradiction of the era, the opposition between the present and the future whose mutually-exclusive 217 laws of existence together form a uniform law—the law of movement and development.
p It is no accident, of course, that opposed systems of morality are most often of all defended by antagonistic classes (for example the proletariat and the bourgeoisie), each of which defends its own interest. But any given class interest in one way or another pertains to objective historical tendencies and laws of development of human society as a whole. In this context only we can speak of the progressive or reactionary nature (speaking in the jargon of politics) of this or that class, of the historical mission (applying the language of social science) of the given class, or of the universal, humane and just meaning of the moral demands of the given class (from the viewpoint of morality).
p The complications begin when we move from the simple juxtapositioning of different class systems of morality to a more tangible comparison in content. Just as in the development of scientific knowledge we observe here a certain degree of continuity. Each class morality (if at one point it was a progressive phenomenon) has an element of universality which becomes the intellectual inheritance passed on to subsequent ages and classes, the latter taking up arms against the morality which has outlived its day. The class representing a progressive force struggles not with this element of universality, but rather with what restricts it. Thereby the class giving battle imparts a fuller resonance and a Qualitatively different tone to the commandments inherited from the past.
p As an example of this continuity we might recall the fact of another ancient commandment—"thou shalt not steal”. The actual bourgeois understanding of this commandment states that private property is inviolable. This commandment is turned against the interests of the dispossessed, rebuffing their infringements upon the privileges of those who maintain possession of social wealth. The practical effectuation of this commandment however is accompanied by an internal contradiction: the historical evolution of private property included the expropriation of petty proprietors. The emergence of the proletariat posed the problem of defending the interests of labour. Fidelity to the above commandment has now come to mean the abolition of private, and above all capitalist property. In actuality, the initial proletarian movements often enveloped its economic and political demands in this moralistic form. Here we observe approximately the same process as occurred with the commandment "thou shalt not kill": if a moral prescription turns out to be impracticable, if it functions with a 218 halter—for some and against others, one must not renege upon the commandment itself but rather rebuild the society as such.
p Thus if concrete social conditions impart a limited and partial shading to moral demands and predetermine an unequal distribution of rights among the members of society, sooner or later these limitations come to the surface and acquire the significance of a demand for. full and impartially enforced equality for all members of society. Such is the logic of the establishment and evolution of the moral consciousness, which of course cannot be equated with the vicissitudes of unmediated historical events. The notion of moral good, we may be assured, is to this date not a truism of the social and historical sciences. For this the moral representation of reality lacks in theoretical substantiation and in a comprehension of the mechanics of the historical process. But let us turn to Engels on this subject: "If we now say: that is unjust, that ought not to be so, then that has nothing immediately to do with economics. We are merely saying that this economic fact is in contradiction to our sense of morality.... If the moral consciousness of the mass declares an economic fact to be unjust, as it has done in the case of slavery or serf labour, that is a proof that the fact itself has been outlived....” [218•1
Accordingly, in at least this sphere of social process and reality the demands stemming from the notion of moral good coincide with scientific truth, if not in form, then at least in substance. Morality is also a “notion”, man’s understanding of his reality, including not only the fact of his immediate situation, but also tendencies, possibilities and perspectives, the alternatives and problems posed by the evolution of this situation, and the meaning and significance of history for the individual.
Notes
[218•1] K. Marx, The Poverty nf Philosophy, p. 12.