The scientific and technological revolution which started in the mid-20th century has proved to be a serious test not only for many scientific theories, but also for a number of philosophical ideas, concepts and even major trends. It affected, first and foremost, those philosophical schools which were, or claimed to be, connected with natural science. The global nature of many scientific problems, the high level of theoretical abstractions, the wide scope of generalisations and the deep differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge enhanced by the scientific and technological revolution have increased the progressive scientists' concern about the ethical aspects and humanistic orientation of research and sharpened their sense of social responsibility for the destinies of mankind. The acceleration of scientific and technical progress has intensified their natural interest in the latest achievements of philosophical thought and emphasised the 7 need for a genuinely scientific philosophical theory that would make it possible to comprehend concrete scientific problems in a broad theoretical, methodological and social context and provide a key to the most crucial issues of our time.
It is not fortuitous, therefore, that of all the major philosophical trends and schools those related more or less closely to science and representing it in some form or other were the first to weather the storm. And no wonder that positivism and dialectical materialism, the two teachings that have always professed their adherence to science, recognised its great mission and expressed their readiness to serve its lofty ideals turned out, as it were, to be the two poles of attraction for increasingly theory-minded natural scientists.
Which of the two philosophical schools will be able to pass through the crucible of time and provide reliable guidance for creative thought in the epoch of scientific and technological revolution? The author of this book undertakes to answer this crucial question and to substantiate the answer to the extent a task of such dimensions is accomplishable within the scope of a single monograph.
Many Soviet and foreign philosophers believe that contemporary positivism, despite its professed adherence to scientific thinking, is undergoing a deep ideological crisis because of an obvious and ever growing rift between its methodological programme and the tasks, tendencies and principles of modern science. The nature of this crisis sharpened by the scientific and technological revolution deserves special attention, the more so as there is a glaring contradiction 8 between the actual results of the evolution of positivism and its professed goals, between its pretentious claims and the real contribution to scientific progress.
Speaking of positivism and its crisis, we shall mainly concentrate on the third stage of this philosophy known as logical positivism and often referred to as logical empiricism or analytical philosophy, and make occasional digressions to the previous stages in order to trace certain current concepts to their sources.
Positivism as a philosophical trend is known to derive from radical empiricism which is one of the pillars of this teaching in all its forms. According to the programme of logical positivism elaborated by the Vienna circle science begins; with the observation of similarities and differences between phenomena, i.e. with the observation of -single facts. Established facts provide a basis for initial empirical generalisations which, after an additional study of separate phenomena and events, are transformed into broader generalisations. Universality of statements can only be attained at a theoretical level and such universal truths are regarded as empirical laws constituting the basis and the core of all theoretical knowledge. The development of science thus consists in the progressive expansion of empirical generalisations, and inductive conclusion turns out to be the main instrument of such development. Expressing the concept of empiricism in a concise logical form, Rudolf Carnap, one of the leaders of logical positivism, wrote: ``...~science begins with direct observations of single facts. Nothing else is observable. Certainly a regularity is not directly observable. It is only when many 9 observations are compared with one another that regularities are = discovered.''^^1^^
The rapid development of fundamental research in the 20th century has clearly shown the untenability of logical positivism based on radical empiricism. As a matter of fact, the entire history of modern science, starting from the development of the quantum theory and the theory of relativity and ending with cybernetics, is a repudiation of the tenet of empiricism. It is not accidental that most contemporary philosophers of science reject the reduction of theoretical knowledge to empirical knowledge. They believe that knowledge does not begin with observations and sensual experience, since observation is always preceded or attended by theoretical concepts. Yet this general premise is still a long way from regular criticism of empiricism as the core of positivist philosophy, as well as from a comprehensive theory of scientific knowledge and its consistent substantiation. The actual relationship and unity of the empirical and the theoretical in scientific cognition, their concrete interaction in the history and logic of science, the passage from lower to higher levels call for a detailed investigation. Nevertheless, the development of the entire Western philosophy of science in the 1960s and 1970s is keynoted by a revision of the programme of radical empiricism found to be untenable both methodologically and theoretically. And this is a very grave symptom of an ideological crisis of this philosophy.
_-_-_^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers New York, 1966, p.~6.
10Another sign of the predicament of the philosophy of science which follows in the wake of positivist traditions is a drastic change in its attitude towards ``metaphysics''. The struggle against ``metaphysics'' and the attempts to oust it from science and philosophy have had both positive and negative aspects. The positive effect of the campaign against metaphysics which was a characteristic feature of early positivism consisted in its opposition to the traditional speculative, particularly religious and idealistic, philosophy which showed little interest in concrete problems of scientific cognition and practical life. On the other hand, positivists rejected as ``metaphysical'' practically all most general and, in essence, traditional problems of philosophy as unrelated to science. These included the problems of objectivity, necessity, causality, essence, etc. Such problems, according to positivists, went beyond the limits of experience, did not accord with the basic tenets and criteria of empiricism and were therefore declared speculative, senseless, non-scientific, etc.
Unlike most pre-positivist critics of the so-called metaphysics who were not opposed to a philosophical theory dealing with traditional problems in one or another form, positivism rejects ``metaphysics'' in principle both as a method and a specific field of knowledge and declares all its problems to be irrational by nature. The negative attitude towards traditional philosophy is regarded by positivists themselves as a characteristic feature of their concept and as one of its fundamental principles. ``If one wishes to characterize every view which denies the possibility of metaphysics as positivistic,'' wrote Schlick, ``this is 11 quite unobjectionable, as a mere definition, and I should in this sense call myself a strict positivist.''^^1^^
In order to overcome ``metaphysics'', logical positivism advanced an extensive programme providing for a logical restructuring of the whole edifice of science in order to standardise the language of science, clear up its logical structure, identify the basic elements of knowledge and reduce all the other concepts and propositions of science to these elements. These tasks, according to the exponents of the new theory, were to be accomplished through the agency of mathematical logic. At this stage the so-called philosophy of science posed as the logic of science, claiming to give the anatomy of science with the help of mathematical logic.
Yet all attempts by positivism to become a pure methodology were doomed to failure. In substantiating the platform of the philosophy of science positivism could not but proceed from a set of definite philosophical principles, i.e. from a new ``metaphysics'' of science. This ``metaphysics'' with its idealistic and anti-democratic premises gave a distorted picture of the world in. which the existence of the object was made conditional on its sensual perception by the subject, the reality was construed as an aggregate of elementary facts, etc.
One of the symptoms of the current crisis of positivism consists in that the exponents of the philosophy of science have renounced yet another tenet of their teaching and are turning their _-_-_
^^1^^ Moritz Schlick, ``Positivism and Realism'', in: Logical Positivism, Ed. by A.~J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, p.~83.
12 eyes to what they call metaphysics. Proposals are even made to start developing a new metaphysics on a more or less regular basis. The concept of metaphysics, however, is extremely broad and sometimes reflects a stable interest in the problems of materialism and dialectics. The attempts to solve such problems, though far from being consistent, testify to a search for a new methodological basis and a new system of values.Hebert Feigl, for instance, defends the scientific status of such ``metaphysical'' problems as the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Mario Bunge believes that the main task of the new ``metaphysics'' is the construction of scientific ontology. Marx Wartofsky writes that ``metaphysics represents the most general method of articulating, in critical and systematic form, the alternative conceptual frameworks within which theoretical understanding becomes possible. The heuristic force of metaphysics lies in its closeness to our primary modes of understanding and explaining (by means of the story, the re-enactment of nature in dramatic = form).''^^1^^ Recognising the methodological (and even the heuristic) role of metaphysics, Wartofsky, however, fails to give a clear idea of its content. Despite the obvious tendency towards a more realistic approach to the structure of scientific knowledge, to general philosophical principles and categories and to their role in the development of science, it is already clear that the philosophy of science remains and will evidently _-_-_
^^1^^ M.~Wartofsky, ``Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science'', in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.~III, Dordrecht, 1967, p.~123.
13 remain loyal to some basic traditions laid down by the classics of positivism, focusing on the problems of the logic of scientific cognition, the language of science and special problems of the methodology of science, natural science in the first place. Deviating from some dogmas of positivism, it does not relinquish its claim to the title of the ``philosophy of science'', thus determining the sphere of its interest. In our subsequent discourse we shall use this name too, inasmuch as it is associated with Western, particularly Anglo-American philosophy.It will also be in place here to define our attitude to the term ``metaphysics'' which will be frequently used in the subsequent text. Though it has acquired a positive sense in anti-positivist literature, being almost synonymous to general philosophical problems, we shall abstain from equating these notions and use the term strictly in the sense it has in the context of the philosophical doctrines under consideration---negative in positivist philosophy, positive in the concepts of ``scientific realism'', etc. Each of these doctrines will be treated separately and the reader will have no difficulty in identifying the context in which the term is used thus making the inverted commas unnecessary. As regards the methodological problems discussed in the book, we shall call them all philosophical, distinguishing each time between their specific types, such as theoretical, philosophical-methodological, ontological, epistemological, logical and others.
In the already extensive critical literature on positivism the most controversial problems appear to be those connected with the relationship between theory and sensory experience, the 14 attitude to metaphysics, and the objectivity of knowledge. The concepts of causality and determinism, by contrast, have been relegated to a secondary plan and are usually discussed as separate issues independent of other basic problems, though the most prominent exponents of positivism have always, at all the stages of its evolution, focused their attention on causality, the nature of scientific laws and scientific explanation. There is no doubt that their views on these problems should be critically reappraised.
Besides, the problems of causality and determinism are obviously linked with a number of general epistemological and methodological issues and influenced by radical empiricism, reductionism, induction logic, etc. One or another solution of these general issues---and such solutions, despite the downright rejection or dodging of metaphysics, could never be avoided---has had a direct bearing on the concepts of causality and scientific law. Conversely, any interpretation of the concepts of causality and determinism could not but affect the general conclusions of the theory of knowledge and the positivist methodology of science.
Similarly, the negative attitude towards ``metaphysics'' has predetermined the rejection of causality and determinism as pseudo-problems. In turn, the positivist interpretation of causality was partly accountable for the negative attitude of positivism in general and logical positivism in particular to general philosophical (metaphysical) problems.
In a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1958, Friedrich Waismann, one of the pillars of positivism, referred to 1927 as the year of the funeral 15 of = causality^^1^^. Explaining the title of his lecture ``The Decline and Fall of Causality'', Waismann contended that the collapse of the principle of causality was not unexpected as it had been prepared by a long period of its general recognition. According to Waismann, this recognition dated back to the 18th century, i.e. to the Laplatian concept of determinism which inspired scientists with a hope that the location of all possible systems in space and time, as well as their physical state could be accurately predicted given the knowledge of their initial state. Laplace, in Waismann's opinion, became the exponent of the principle of causal determinism which had prevailed for more than a century and a half as an ideal of scientific explanation. For all the power of human intellect, however, such an ideal was unattainable even in the realm of classical mechanics which was greatly indebted to Laplace. It was called in question as soon as scientists found it impossible to measure physical values with ideal accuracy implicit in the Laplatian doctrine. The concept of causality was bound to collapse as was the Laplatian ideal of scientific knowledge. According to Waismann, causality was dealt a final blow in 1927 by Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty as it dismissed completely the possibility of any prediction of events on the subatom level.
Western philosophers were not slow to attack Waismann's views, yet even in the 1960s most of his opponents stood but for a limited _-_-_
^^1^^ See A.~C. Crombie, Turning Points in Physics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1960, pp. 84--154.
16 rehabilitation of the principle of causality. Of late, the criticism of positivist views regarding causality and determinism has become. sharper, broader and more elaborate. The opposing concepts, inconsistent as they are, tend to restore causality to some of its methodological and theoretical rights. Nevertheless, it is still hard to say which path the philosophy of science will follow in treating these issues.There is no doubt that logical positivism can be credited with posing a number of interesting scientific problems. No less obvious is the contribution made by its outstanding representatives to the development of the logic of scientific cognition, the investigation of some specific problems of the language of science, etc. There is no denying the fact that this school has helped science to get rid of fruitless speculations and dogmatism. We do not focus on the deserts of logical positivism deliberately since our interest lies not so much in positivism per~se as in the lessons that could be learned from the analysis of its weaknesses, limitations and errors.
The sharp criticism of the positivist methodology is not the only obvious symptom of its current crisis. Using Thomas Kuhn's terminology and his approach to the analysis of crisis situations in sciences, one should attach special significance to the emergence, within the framework of the contemporary philosophy of science, of a multitude of rival concepts which go far beyond a critical revision of certain aspects of the positivist methodology of science and lay claim to a new methodological paradigm. In point of fact, they strive to develop a more or less complete methodological alternative to positivism and __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2-1152 17 work out a philosophical programme defying positivism on all or nearly all key issues.
Such alternative programmes are represented by ``critical rationalism'' (Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend), ``scientific (or critical) realism'' (Wilfrid Sellars, J. Smart, Mario Bunge), ``historical trend'' (Tomas Kuhn, Joseph Agassi, Stephen Toulmin) and other, perhaps less influential, schools of the contemporary philosophy of science in the West.
Which course will the philosophy of science follow, what new theory, if any, is likely to emerge as a result of the present crisis? To answer these crucial questions one ought to find out, first and foremost, the real relationship between the above-mentioned schools and positivist philosophy, i.e. the depth of division between them, the existing traditional and conceptual links, the ability of these schools to solve the topical methodological and theoretical problems of contemporary science and the adequacy of the proposed solutions from the viewpoint of scientific and technical progress.
The crisis of positivism has been brought about not only by the internal contradictions of its platform, but also by the inadequacy of its understanding of the real nature of scientific investigation, of the laws and history of scientific knowledge. We shall not concentrate therefore on the issues that preoccupied positivism at different stages of its evolution, but give our main attention to the most general, fundamental problems connected with the world outlook and methodology which are in the focus of attention of scientists, philosophers and practical workers at the present time. What we mean is the 18 relationship between philosophy and natural science, the nature of scientific knowledge, the objective content of notions and theories, i.e. their relation to the ``outside'' world, the role of the subject in the construction of scientific theories, the reliability and verifiability of scientific concepts, the role of the principles of causality and determinism in research, etc.
The fact that throughout its entire history positivism has either been ignoring some of these problems altogether or trying to dismiss them as irrelevant to scientific investigation is, in fact, of little consequence. Willy-nilly, all masterminds of positivism, starting with Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer and ending with Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Ayer, were compelled to come to grips with them. What is more, it is these fundamental problems and not the specifically positivist issues such as the logical structure of statements, the meaning of reduction, the structure of explanation, etc. that proved to be the main battlefield where the fate of positivism as a philosophical teaching was decided.
It should be noted that the above problems will be considered in this book not as separate subjects divorced from one another and from other problems, but in their logical connection with other problems and always in the context of the methodology of scientific knowledge. For instance, the solution of the problem of the source of knowledge predetermines, to a certain extent, the solution of the problem of causality or the relationship of the philosophy to science. Conversely, the solution of the problem of causality will influence the specific form of the analysis of epistemological problems. Hence, we shall __PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 try to deal not with some random distinctions and features of this or that school or some peculiarities in the interpretation of a problem by different thinkers, but with a more or less connected system of their basic principles. We shall focus, therefore, either on the essential common features in the philosophical concepts of different representatives of one and the same school or, on the contrary, on the basic differences in the views of the adherents of different schools. Understandably, some specific features of different philosophical trends and some peculiarities in the views of their representatives will be, of necessity, left out of account.
The controversy over the fundamental problems of philosophical methodology is highly instructive as it highlights their contemporary significance. Thus, the attitude to science on the part of the exponents of positivism is a logical consequence of their absolutisation of the empirical methods of cognition, whereas the attitude to science of ``critical rationalists'' stems from their interpretation of the verification problems. ``Scientific realism'' as a philosophical trend regards science as practically the only source of material for philosophical analysis and for any concepts of the world. The conflict of opinions reveals weaknesses in each of the above philosophical teachings, shows how they distort the actual process of cognition and exposes their prognostication errors.
The present-day significance of the problem of causality, too, becomes more apparent if we, on the one hand, find out the reason for the negative attitude to it on the part of the positivists and, on the other hand, show its revival in ``critical 20 rationalism'' as expounded by Popper who displays special interest in the forms of theoretical explanation and in the deductive models of the process of cognition. Highly instructive is also the collision between the concept of causality rehabilitated and revised by ``scientific realism'' in the spirit of materialism and the logical concept characteristic of the positivist approach inasmuch as this collision highlights the specific demands of contemporary science on the means of a theoretical causal explanation and prognostication and reveals the very essence of the principle of causality.
It would be impossible to define the prospects of the methodology of scientific cognition without considering the confrontation between positivism and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The history of ``critical rationalism'', ``scientific realism'' and other new trends in the philosophy of science runs into several decades at most, whereas the ideological struggle between Marxism and positivism dates from the mid-19th century and is in fact as old as Marxist philosophy itself. Important as they are, the old-time philosophical battles will not command our attention, since our chief interest lies, as has already been indicated, in a comparative analysis of the dialectical-materialist methodology and = post-positivism^^1^^.
As regards the problems which will be considered in the light of dialectical materialism, the author has not set himself the task of expounding in a systematic form the commonly known _-_-_
^^1^^ We shall sometimes use this term to denote all modern schools of the philosophy of science merely to save space, without implying that they form a single homogeneous whole.
21 Marxist concepts or the views of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on these issues. Proceeding from the basic principles of their solution known from Marxist literature the author has attempted to reveal their topical aspects and new forms of interpretation and solution in accordance with the latest scientific data and new philosophical tasks posed by the scientific and technological revolution. The book, therefore, does not pretend to an exposition of any set of truths, but rather underscores the need for a further investigation of the problems of interest from the methodological positions which the author believes to be the most fruitful and promising. It is the author's conviction that the mutual understanding of philosophers investigating the methodology of scientific cognition is more and more becoming a reality. [22] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER ONE __ALPHA_LVL1__ BETWEEN SCIENCEThere is hardly any trend or school in Western philosophy that could compare with positivism in the depth and durability of its influence on society, particularly on intellectuals. Since the first half of the 19th century positivism has suffered many ups and downs and the interest in this teaching has alternately risen and subsided. Its founders have had the greatest of triumphs a thinker can dream of and sunk to the depths of the bitterest humiliation and derision that may fall to the lot of an unlucky philosopher. The powerful grip of positivist philosophy on intellectuals' minds and the periodic tides of its universal popularity can only be accounted for by its sincere devotion to, even worship of, science.
However biting today's remarks about the destiny of positivism as a philosophical trend, one can hardly question the sincerity of its intentions to enter into a firm and durable alliance with science. Born in the atmosphere of universal ecstasies over the successes of the natural sciences, positivism has preserved till nowadays its 23 romantic faith in the power of experimental investigation, its appeal for realism in cognition and genuine interest in the scientific analysis of everyday experience and language. In the light of contemporary science and philosophy which have gone far ahead in the understanding of the laws of scientific cognition and the effectiveness of the interaction of natural and social sciences a number of its concepts appear now to be naive and sometimes even ill-matched, the more so as positivism, like any other philosophical trend, assumed different forms in the works of its exponents: John S. Mill earnestly strove for accurate applied knowledge without realising the fatal narrowness of his concept of such knowledge restricted within the bounds of the bourgeois world outlook and system of values; Bertrand Russell hoped to find strict logical rules for solving philosophical problems, including those in the sphere of ethics; Rudolf Carnap made persistent attempts to resolve the growing contradictions inherited from the previous forms of positivism.
In positivism, like in many other philosophical schools, one should always distinguish between the ideas of the classics and their followers. The former, representing progressive tendencies in science, can usually be identified, first and foremost, by their profound devotion to the goddess of philosophy and, alas, by sometimes no less profound delusions. Unlike the wholehearted founders of positivism, their numerous mediocre imitators lack the necessary critical spirit of trailblazers in science and, instead of exploiting the success of their forerunners and rising to a higher level, fall to aggravating their shortcomings and debasing their fruitful ideas.
24For all the delusions of the founders of positivism we cannot but pay tribute to the noble endeavours of such outstanding scholars of their time, scientists in the proper sense of the word as Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein who did everything possible to bring closer together science and philosophy even at the expense of their personal self-disparagement. Indeed, there is something unnatural about a professional philosopher contending for self-destruction of philosophy, its abrogation and dissolution in ``positive'' scientific knowledge. People usually regard this either as cunning, or as reprehensible folly, and are apt to overlook the possibility of the scientist's utter selflessness in the service of his goddess which goes hand in hand with modesty and complete indifference to scientific degrees, honorary academic titles, priority and material benefits. Such selflessness may induce a true scientist of outstanding erudition and talent to be content with the role of a humble clerk in attendance on an endless flow of scientific papers the meaning of which will always remain unknown to him. His devotion to science may even cause him to assume voluntarily the function of a cleaner of scientific Augean stables and become, so to speak, a scientific scavenger.
In the 1830s, when German classical philosophy with its pledges to explain nature by itself, to penetrate the very core of the universe and establish eternal control over its mechanism seemed to be at the summit of glory, the challenge of young positivism and its promise to rid science of quackery, whoever the genius behind it, came as a gust of fresh wind and deserved 25 every respect and recognition. Positivism was indeed a tree planted for the benefit of science and intended to promote its greatness and glory--- however bitter the fruit that was eventually born by it.
The rapid development of experimental science in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the natural attraction held out to scientists by the empirical methods of research gave rise to an illusion that all problems of natural science and social development could be solved exclusively by empirical means and that the techniques used in the natural sciences should be broadly applied to social research. Practicism and utilitarianism characteristic of the way of life in the developing capitalist countries of Western Europe---Britain, France, later Germany and still later the USA--- gradually became a standard of scientific thinking. Referring to this feature in early positivism in the first half of the 19th century one of its founders, Herbert Spencer, said that the wish to possess a ``practical science'' which could serve the needs of life was so strong that the interest in scientific investigation not directly applicable to practical activities seemed ridiculous. Enthusiasm over the new methods of scientific investigation, naturally, went side by side with growing scepticism towards the knowledge which did not conform to everyday experience, could not be obtained within the framework of the empirical approach or had no direct practical application.
Nevertheless, the ideology of positivism contributed to some extent to the development of natural science, particularly experimental investigations, and helped science to free itself from 26 the fetters of the religious world outlook and various speculative doctrines and artificial, not infrequently mystic, concepts and theories. Positivism as an embodiment of this tendency has served as a good purgative. In the 1830s, while still in its cradle, positivism came out with a demand to oust idealistic philosophers from science and subjected idealism and religion to sharp criticism regarding them both a product of the mythological stage in the development of human spirit. According to the positivists, metaphysics had very much in common with theology and differed from it in form only. Both of them represented different systems of world outlook and, as such, were outside the limits of scientific knowledge. Auguste Comte, another founder of positivism, repeatedly stressed the affinity and, in some important aspects, even the identity of the theological and metaphysical methods of thinking. In his opinion, the basic distinction of metaphysical concepts consisted in regarding phenomena as being independent of their carriers, and in attributing independent existence to the properties of each substance. He considered it immaterial whether these personified abstractions were later turned into souls or fluids. They came from one and the same source and were the inevitable result of the method of studying the nature of things which was characteristic in every respect of the infancy of human mind. This method, according to Comte, inspired originally the idea of gods which were transformed later into souls and finally into imaginary fluids.
Comte rejects metaphysics, i.e. everything that goes outside the limits of science (religion, mysticism, idealism, materialism, dialectics, etc.) 27 and proclaims the ideal of positive knowledge and, accordingly, a new philosophy. Yet metaphysics, according to Comte, is not entirely identical with religious thinking. Moreover, it prepares mankind for a transition to scientific thinking. A metaphysical thought is, so to speak, an intermediary between the theological and the scientific ways of thinking and performs simultaneously a critical function in relation to science. Owing to imagination which prevails in metaphysical thinking over observation, the thought becomes broader and is prepared unostentatiously for truly scientific work. According to Comte, another contribution of metaphysics to the emergence of positive science consisted in that it performed the vitally important function of theory until the mind was able to develop it on the basis of observations.
Philosophy in its traditional guise is identical with metaphysics. Its existence can only be justified as long as science is unable to solve certain general problems. Hence, philosophy is only destined to pave the way for science and ceases to exist as soon as science takes over. It is only within this brief lifespan, measured off by history, that philosophy contributes to the emergence of science. Its cognitive value is limited to the preliminary formulation of problems. The social task of philosophy consists in attracting the attention of the broad masses, even amateurs in different fields, to these problems, but their solution should be the concern of the positive sciences and narrow specialists.
Despite the long evolution of positivist philosophy, this understanding of science and of the relationship of science to metaphysics was shared 28 by all exponents of positivism. The problem of demarcation between science and metaphysics, in some periods just implied, in others posed sharply and uncompromisingly, was one of the key issues in the programme of positivism at all its stages and even the main driving force of its development.
In the 1920s, logical positivism, starting from the investigations of the Vienna Circle, continued its struggle against ``metaphysics'' from the positions of empiricism, though less radical than that of Auguste Comte, John S. Mill, Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. According to the principle of verification first defined by Moritz Schlick^^1^^ and further generalised by Ludwig Wittgenstein,^^2^^ the truth of every scientific statement must be ascertained by comparing it directly with the evidence of the senses.
In a later version Alfred Ayer described this principle as follows: ``The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express---that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is _-_-_
^^1^^ Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Springer, Berlin, 1925.
^^2^^ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1949, p. 77.
29 consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant. And with regard to questions the procedure is the same. We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it = does.''^^1^^Hence, empirical verification was assigned a function which went far beyond its possibilities--- to appraise the truth-value of all statements without exception. As compared with the previous forms of positivism, the new element here (actually borrowed from Kant) was the division of all statements into two types: analytical and synthetic. Analytical statements were regarded as tautological or identical, similar to those often used in mathematics and mathematical logic. Synthetic statements were regarded as object judgements characteristic of empirical, factual sciences and claimed to be the only statements which carried any new information.
Regarding the first two types of statements as being of some scientific significance, logical positivism not only denies all other statements any scientific value, but considers them simply _-_-_
^^1^^ A.~J. Ayer ``The Elimination of Metaphysics'', in: Philosophy Matters, Ed. by A.~J. Lisska, Charles E. Merril Publishing Comp., Columbia, Toronto, London, Sydney, 1977, p.~236.
30 senseless. If one or another statement does not lend itself to direct verification, it must at least be reducible by logical means, as a theoretical, nonanalytical statement, to a corresponding basic or protocol statement which can be confirmed by direct observation. Statements which are neither analytical nor synthetic are meaningless and subject to elimination from the language of science as metaphysical.The narrowness of the verification criterion induced the positivists to make repeated attempts at its modification. The watered-down (for instance, Ayer's) version of this criterion admits of both full and partial verification of statements, i.e. of their partial confirmation by empirical data. A theory was needed, however, which being itself in agreement with this criterion, would define more accurately the notion of confirmation, on the one hand, and correspond to the general programme of positivism (construction of the logical language of science) and to the traditions of empiricism, on the other hand.
A most significant attempt to develop such a theory was Carnap's inductive logic expounded by him in Logical Foundations of = Probability^^1^^ and in The Continuum of Inductive = Methods,^^2^^ and then, in an enlarged and elaborated form, in A Basic System of Inductive = Logic.^^3^^ A characteristic feature of both versions of his system _-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago, 1951.
^^2^^ Rudolf Carnap, The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago, 1952.
^^3^^ Rudolf Carnap, ``A Basic System of Inductive Logic'', in: Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Ed. by R.~Carnap and R.~Jeffrey, Berkeley, 1971.
31 consisted, first and foremost, in that the logical probability of the meaningfulness of universal generalisations was recognised to equal zero and that there existed a theoretically neutral language of observations. Out of the three phases of inductive inference---the selection of the language, the selection of the statements of this language and the assessment of the degree of confirmation of a given statement by other statements---Carnap focused on none other than the appraisal of the probability of statements relative to the results of the observation (empirical data).As we see, in Carnap's inductive logic the traditional problem of induction undergoes a considerable transformation. The main task of an inductive conclusion is regarded to be the formulation of a probabilistic prognostication of a particular event rather than of a universal assertion. Induction for Carnap is practically any non-deductive conclusion and, primarily, a metalinguistic statement establishing, on the basis of experimental data, a definite degree of confirmability of a hypothesis. Consequently, Carnap expands the volume of the traditional concept of induction, on the one hand, and, on the other, eliminates the problem of confirmation of universal assertions, i.e. laws, from its content.
According to Carnap, universal laws appear to be senseless from the viewpoint of the verification principle and inconfirmable in inductive logic. In point of fact, universal statements are useless: no one, in Carnap's opinion, will make a stand for the universality of this or that theory in any part of the universe. All a scientist or a practical worker may want is a hope that the next test 32 will confirm his hypothesis. The logical evolution of Carnap's views brought him later to an admission that a shift in emphasis from confirmation to decision-making in the analysis of inductive logic's problems would provide even a more radical method of ousting universal laws as the last remnants of metaphysics in science. Such a shift would indeed free science from universal laws replacing them with specific hypotheses. Finally, in the Foreword to the 2nd~edition of Logical Foundations of Probability (1962), Carnap altogether avoids mentioning the ``degree of confirmability'' in connection with the assessment of inductive probability and prefers to speak of the significance of inductive logic for the theory of solutions only (and not for the theory of confirmation). This looks like the end of the last hope to construct the methodology of science on a strictly logical foundation.
The failure to solve this problem cannot but tell on the prospects of the programme of empiricism, since it affects the two most important and interconnected premises of positivist philosophy. A question is bound to arise: are the principles of Carnap's inductive logic purported to be helpful in the solution of the main task of logical empiricism compatible with the principles of empiricism itself?
It has already been pointed out that Carnap's inductive logic was focused on the evaluation of the degree of confirmation of hypotheses. It proceeded from the assumption that the statements concerning such confirmations by empirical data were the result of metalinguistic analysis and, as such, analytical statements. Carnap emphasised that his inductive logic excluded any __PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3-1152 33 a priori synthetic principles and not only remained loyal to empiricism but even in some respects corrected its shortcomings, thereby strengthening its positions.
The principle of induction, as formulated by Carnap, was based on the assumption that the experimental data testified to a very high degree of probability of the world's uniformity. Since the probability in the formulation of this principle was logical by nature, the statement as such was analytically true. Its truth was not necessarily conditioned by the truth of the principle of induction---it was sufficient to know that this principle was probable. The contradiction inherent in this proposition consisted in that the principle of induction itself was assigned a role of the foundation of logic and, consequently, its analytical truth value could not be deduced from the very same logic, but was to be established within the framework of a more general logical system.
All attempts made before Carnap to develop the logic of inductive conclusion pivoted, as it were, on the principle of the uniformity of nature which lay at the root of the principle of induction. Yet this latter principle is ontological rather than logical and cannot be obtained through inductive generalisation. According to Kant, it could have been classified with good reason as an a priori synthetic generalisation. Carnap, as we see, could not avoid this ill-fated dilemma either and had to make his choice between an a priori synthetic generalisation and an ontological statement (in the spirit of materialism). A detective story writer skilled at stock phrases could have summed up the situation in these words: 34 ``The fateful shadow of metaphysics has again crossed his path.''
It was not fortuitous that Carnap, seeking later to provide a rational substantiation for induction, pointed out that the axioms of inductive logic could only rest on a priori statements and argued that inductive logic as such could be constructed in a formal way. Yet inductive probability could only be justified in the context of the theory of solutions where the concept of probability is linked with utility and rational action.^^1^^ The search for a non-inductive foundation of inductive logic as a form of scientific cognition brought Carnap in the end to the understanding of probability as a reasonable degree of faith. As a result, the theory of induction turned out to be built on the sand of intuitive and subjective propositions. Each of the paths tried by Carnap in his attempts to substantiate induction on the basis of empiricism led him beyond its limits right into the arms of metaphysics.
It is noteworthy that logical positivism seeks to reinforce empiricism in its drive against metaphysics by a logical analysis of the structure of knowledge. For all the internal contradictions of Carnap's version of logical positivism, it turned out to be the most successful of all, as it revealed one of the main trends in the development of positivism and displayed a characteristic feature of its understanding of the subject-matter of philosophy. Significantly, both the adherents and opponents of Carnap's theory often call it ``logical empiricism''. The search for new ways in _-_-_
^^1^^ See Rudolf Carnap, ``Inductive Logic arid Rational Decisions'', in: Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, op. cit., pp. 5--31.
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 the struggle against metaphysics was by no means accidental. Already in the 19th century the development of theoretical sciences revealed the narrowness and inadequacy of the empiricist programme for the revision and restructuring of science which had been advanced by early positivism. It became clear even in that period that the programme of struggle against metaphysics ran counter to the interests of science and hampered the development of theoretical investigation. The theory of the atomic structure of matter, quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity provided ample proof that empiricism as a philosophical and methodological programme was useless and even detrimental to scientific progress.The rapid development of logico-mathematical studies in that period seemed to indicate an attractive and promising way out of the difficult situation---to treat a theory as an aggregate of logically interconnected facts. That anti-metaphysical line was started by Russell and then developed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus into an elaborate theory followed by their successors.
Russell did not yet shun many traditional philosophical problems which he hoped to solve through the agency of strict rules of mathematical logic. His failure on this path caused Wittgenstein to take a more uncompromising position ---not only to divorce science from metaphysics, but also to throw the latter overboard as senseless mysticism. The centuries-old controversy over certain philosophical problems pertaining to the world outlook was viewed by him either as a result of violation of the elementary 36 rules of logic, or as a linguistic confusion. Alfred J. Ayer, one of the contemporary followers of these ideas, keeping his allegiance to more or less orthodox logical positivism writes: ``We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are = nonsensical.''^^1^^ According to Ayer, the typical examples of metaphysical assertions are those underlying the problems of the reality of experience, the unity of the world, the nature of ``true reality'' as distinct from sensory experience, etc.
Richard von Mises who regarded his own position relative to traditional philosophy as the most conciliatory among the neo-positivists, was also of the opinion that metaphysics constituted the sphere of pre-scientific propositions and was not entirely devoid of future as people would always ask questions extending beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. Even in new fields of research, while the adequate scientific language was still nonexistent and the main linguistic rules and logical forms were not yet known, new questions going beyond the familiar ground were bound to be at first non-scientific, i.e. metaphysical. To become truly scientific, new concepts must get a footing in their field, merge with the formal systems adopted earlier and _-_-_
^^1^^ A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1978, p.~56.
37 develop full ability to communicate, so to speak, with other fields of scientific knowledge.Clearly, this contraposition of scientific and non-scientific or metaphysical knowledge is rooted in a peculiar understanding of the ideal of scientific knowledge. This ideal, according to positivism, is represented by empirical science with its principle of empirical verification of any assertion. To become scientific, a proposition must pass through the purgatory of sense-perceptions which alone are capable of providing direct, really verifiable and really objective knowledge.
Metaphysics as a specific set of traditional philosophical problems derives, according to positivism, from the recognition of some unique reality which does not lend itself to scientific cognition and can only be apprehended with the help of the metaphysical, speculative faculties of the mind. ``A more ambitious conception of metaphysics is one that places it in competition with the natural sciences,'' says Ayer. ``The suggestion is that the sciences deal only with appearances: the metaphysician penetrates to the underlying = reality.''^^1^^ All positivists irrespective of the school to which they belong hold that traditional philosophy postulates the existence of some transcendental reality which is different from and independent of the sensual world, but which determines its main features.
The pretension to know something beyond possible experience presupposes the existence of an extraempirical source of knowledge. The only method whereby metaphysical philosophers obtain _-_-_
^^1^^ A. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, London, 1973, p.~4.
38 their truths can be the method of a priori speculative reflection. For instance, Russell considered that one of the essential features of the classical tradition in philosophy consisted in a conviction that a priori reflection alone was capable of penetrating the mysteries of the universe. Nothing but an a priori method was capable of proving that reality was different from what appeared to direct observation. Emphasising that the a priori principle was the essence of traditional philosophy, Mises wrote: ``As soon as one speaks of reaching beyond experience and of the disclosure of the true core, one appeals to the existence of extraempirical sources of knowledge. In spite of all their many differences, such theories as Husserl's `Wesensschau' and Plato's `doctrine of ideas', Spinoza's `knowledge through apprehending insight', Kant's `a priori' and Schopenhauer's transempirical metaphysics, ... are things of a similar = kind.''^^1^^ This stand, despite certain modifications in different forms of positivist philosophy has not changed till nowadays. There is nothing, asserts Ayer, that cannot be expressed in the language of observations, and everything beyond these limits is of a mystic nature. In point of fact, however, along with mystic entities Ayer throws overboard everything that cannot be perceived by senses.According to positivism, the unscientific character of metaphysics springs from its worldview function or, more precisely, from its social orientation and claim to disclose the essence of the world, as well as from the fact that its _-_-_
^^1^^ Richard von Mises, Positivism. A Study in Human Understanding, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951, p. 277.
39 propositions are based on convictions. On these grounds metaphysics is regarded as a false projection of subjective human qualities and emotions on knowledge and on the world in general. The possibility of a scientific world outlook is dismissed altogether, since scientific theories, according to positivism, cannot give answers to questions pertaining to world views.The positivists maintain that metaphysics meets man's psychological need for understanding the world as a whole and his place in the world, and is called to life by the fateful questions as to the meaning of human life, moral responsibility, and human values. Yet science is unable to tackle these questions as they cannot be answered on the grounds of empirico-mathematical investigation which is regarded by positivism as the only form of scientific knowledge. These questions, according to the positivists, will always remain the objects of unscientific methods of comprehension. Man is entitled to use any means to express his world views, including the least suitable one, i.e. metaphysics, but in that case he should not claim it to be what it is not and will never become---a science, a system of knowledge. Carnap regards metaphysics not as actual knowledge, but rather as poetry giving but an illusion of knowledge.
The world-view character of philosophy is considered by positivism as the main cause of its incompatibility with science. Justly underlining the inseparable ties between the world view, on the one hand, and ideology and politics, on the other, the positivists come to the conclusion that no problems relating to nature, society and cognition can fee solved by 40 philosophy (metaphysics) on a scientific basis for the simple reason that these problems are treated in the broad context of the world outlook and their solution depends, in the final analysis, on the views and ideological stand of the philosopher. ``The desire to arrive at practically useful answers (predictions) in the most difficult and most general questions of life,'' says Mises, ``leads to the construction of systems of metaphysical propositions.''^^1^^
Ambitious and noble were the aspirations of positivism which set out to free philosophy from the fetters of religious and idealistic dogmas. The 20th century seemed to have been destined to become the age of triumph of positivist philosophy. Indeed, it has started with fundamental scientific discoveries and its closing decades are marked by a profound revolution in the entire system of scientific knowledge, technology and social relations which are being successfully restructured on truly rational and scientific principles. Ironically, however, this century has also borne witness to the decline and fall of the philosophy that has made science its fetish.
Dramatic as it may be, the situation is not likely to rouse our emotions unless we perceive a human drama behind the ideological vicissitudes. In point of fact, the reverses of fortune in the realm of ideas are never divorced from the destinies of human beings and usually entail a drama of a whole galaxy of outstanding personalities, who believed in the viability of the principles they had advanced and did everything possible to defend and elaborate them. One can _-_-_
^^1^^ Richard von Mises, op. cit., p. 370.
41 hardly blame any one of them personally for the long and, alas, futile wanderings in the labyrinths of methodology. If only it were a matter of personal fallacies, mankind would have long ago found a way to avoid them.Yet the bitterest irony consisted, perhaps, in that positivism, whose credo was service to science, failed to find a common language with its master for any appreciable length of time. True, there were periods when positivism was in vogue. Its shares went up at the turn of the 20th century with the discoveries of the complex structure of the atom and of the electromagnetic field. Hopes also soared in the 1920s which were marked by the successful development of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity. Another spell of good luck came with the intensive investigations into the problems of linguistics and psychology in the 1930s and 1940s. Finally, the last boom was connected with the rapid development of cybernetics and genetics, neurophysiology and psycho physiology.
The philosophy of science has been favourably commented upon and can even boast of the homage paid to it by Henri Poincare, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Jacques Monod. Yet it is also known that the heights of their mutual sympathies invariably coincided with the periods of abrupt breakdown of old fundamental theories rather than with constructive periods in the history of science. Once a crisis in science comes to an end and the gulfs are bridged, the philosophy of science in its logico-empirical version would inevitably reveal its inability to offer a positive programme for scientific, technological or social 42 progress. Each new upswing of theoretical thought was a sure sign of approaching depression in positivist philosophy. Yesterday's followers and adherents of positivism would promptly turn away from the ``friends of science'' and the short-lived mutual understanding would give place to even a more profound and lasting mutual distrust than before. These tides remind one of something like intermittent fever in Western science, and the blame for it can hardly be put on any particular individual. The disease must evidently be traced to a source other than the human qualities of each separate thinker---be he great or mediocre, honest or hypocritical, egoistic or unselfish. It proved to be contagious for altruist Einstein and misanthrope Heisenberg, great Bohr and mediocre Paul = Volkmann^^1^^. The true cause of the illness lies not in the merits or demerits of individuals, outstanding or at least interesting as they are, but in the conditions of contemporary society.
The role of social conditions in the emergence and development of positivism is a separate subject that lies outside the scope of this work. Here I shall confine myself to discussing the general laws and tendencies of scientific cognition which provide, as it were, an epistemological background of the developing ideological drama. Paradoxical as it may seem, this drama is contained in embryo in the basic tenet of positivism determining its attitude to science. It is precisely the glorification of science and the disparagement of philosophy that did positivism an ill turn accounting for the scepticism and even for the _-_-_
^^1^^ Paul Volkmann (1856--1938) was a professor of theoretical physics in Konigsberg and wrote several philosophical works.
43 downright denial of the value of scientific cognition that are characteristic of positivist works. How did the extremes meet? To answer this question, let us turn once again to the positive platform of the philosophy of science.Rejecting traditional philosophy as unscientific and metaphysical and using many other disparaging epithets to belittle its role, positivism has never denied the need for philosophy in general. On the contrary, the exponents of positivism have underscored the significance of a new, scientific philosophy which was called a ``philosophy of science'' and given it many other no less pretentious titles. What was the real meaning of their contentions?
Philosophy as a theory of the most general and essential laws of being was eliminated by Comte in favour of some universal system of scientific knowledge. All scientific knowledge, according to Comte, can only be obtained by special sciences through observation, experiment, description and generalisation with the help of broadly used mathematical means. There can be no specifically philosophic understanding of nature different from that ensured by the natural sciences. Whatever the particular distinctions in the understanding of the subject matter of positivist philosophy revealed by different representatives of the ``first'' form of positivism, there is every reason to assert that their views are in the main identical: new philosophy has in fact nothing in common with old metaphysics and does not basically differ from other ``positive'' sciences: both the positive sciences and scientific philosophy are absolutely neutral in the metaphysical sense, i.e. in relation to materialism and idealism. The 44 main object of a philosophical investigation is science, its concepts and method. The methods of ``philosophical'' investigations .are also borrowed directly from science. In short, science is its own philosophy. It is these ideas, developed and elaborated during the evolution of positivism that underlie its understanding of the subject matter of philosophy.
Just like the rapid development of special sciences and the strengthening of their experimental base in the 18th century gave the early positivists occasion to contend that scientific investigation should substitute for philosophic cognition of the world, so the development of biology and psychological sciences was in the late 19th century interpreted by Machism as the elimination of metaphysics from the studies of man's cognitive activities in favour of a scientific theory of knowledge. This idea was clearly expressed by Mach's follower and commentator V. V. Lesevich, one of the first Russian positivists: ``What will remain of philosophy after the theory of knowledge, too, gains the status of a separate and independent science?'' he asks and proceeds as follows: ``When psychology, thanks to its successes, rose to a truly scientific level, no fragment was left of the old all-embracing and undivided science, philosophy, which could be said to possess the property of universal and comprehensive knowledge: its place was taken up by a number of separate independent sciences, and philosophy in the old sense of the word = disappeared.''^^1^^
The achievements of biology and psychology _-_-_
^^1^^ V. V. Lesevich, Collected Works, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1915, pp. 7--8 (in Russian).
45 in the study of man, his psychical and cognitive activity were interpreted by the ``second'' form of positivism as the emergence of a scientific theory of knowledge opposing traditional epistemology as unscientific metaphysics. Machism, like classical positivism, made the concepts and methods of special sciences the object of philosophy which, consequently, was to be metascientific by nature. According to Mach, a philosopher differs from a natural scientist in that the former has to deal with a broader range of facts. Justly stressing the need for a broad approach to philosophical matters, Mach maintains, in full agreement with the positivist principles, that it is achieved not through the generalisation of the process of cognition in philosophical categories and its interpretation on the basis of a definite world view and methodology, but with the help of some new specialised science which would study knowledge with the use of special scientific means of investigation. Such means, according to Mach, could best be borrowed from biology and psychology, since it was precisely these disciplines that studied man as the subject of cognition and could provide a reliable basis for the understanding of his cognitive activity.The most explicit presentation of the positivist concept of the relationship between science and philosophy can be found in the works of Schlick, Carnap, Wittgenstein and other members of the Vienna Circle which is usually associated with the emergence of logical positivism. The representatives of the new trend fully agreed with their predecessors in that scientific philosophy was an immanent product of the development of science, that philosophy should give up 46 metaphysical problems if it was to be promoted to a rank of science and that it should get both its object of inquiry and its method from science itself. According to neopositivists, the only reason why philosophy had been unable to become scientific for a long period consisted in the insufficient development of science itself which could not provide the necessary means for philosophy to fulfil its metascientific functions. The emergence of ``scientific'' philosophy at the present stage of the evolution of science was a result of the development of mathematical logic which devised the technical means for the analysis of science. The initial methodological models developed within the framework of positivism were in fact nothing but the application of the ready-made body of mathematical logic borrowed from Principia Matematica by Russell and Whitehead to the logical development of some hypothetical system of ``ideal scientific knowledge''.
Logical positivism was a full-scale realisation of the analytical tendency in the understanding of ``scientific'' philosophy. Yet unlike Mill and Mach, who initiated this tendency, logical positivism did not regard philosophy as a theory dealing with the principles of the classification of sciences, the system of laws common to all sciences and with cognition as such (interpreted in terms of either inductive logic or the psychology of cognition), but as an instrument for the analysis of science. This approach reduced philosophy to a scientific system of actions, a kind of analytical activity. Wittgenstein's thesis that ``philosophy is not a theory but an = activity''^^1^^ _-_-_
^^1^^ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., p. 77.
47 became the banner of an influential trend in analytical philosophy. ``The great contemporary turning point,'' wrote Schlick, ``is characterised by the fact that we see in philosophy not a system of cognitions, but a system of = acts.''^^1^^ The attempts of the earlier positivists to construct scientific philosophy as a theory are regarded by neopositivists as a relapse of old metaphysics.In view of the growing proportion of highly specific logico-methodological problems in scientific investigations, logical positivism demanded that methodology should be completely independent of philosophy and that a new ``pure'' methodology, free from any presuppositions should be developed that would banish philosophical epistemology together with other philosophical worldview elements from genuine science. According to the logical positivists, the ``reflection upon scientific knowledge'', hitherto the domain of philosophy, turns into a special field of concrete scientific investigation. In this respect the only distinction of logical positivism from other forms of positivist philosophy consists in that it turns into an absolute the logico-methodological analysis of knowledge instead of empirical science in general and psychology and biology in particular. Logical positivism regards the use of accurate logico-methodological means in the investigation of the structure of scientific knowledge as a ``scientific'' method of the formulation and solution of philosophical problems. The emphasis on logic as an instrument of philosophical research is the keynote of the latest stage in the realization of the _-_-_
^^1^^ M. Schlick, ``The Turning Point in Philosophy'', in: Logical Positivism, Ed. by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, p. 56.
48 principal aim of positivist philosophy, viz. discarding traditional philosophical problems and substituting formal-logical and linguistic methods of analysis for the philosophical approach to science.It should be noted that positivism denouncing the so-called extrascientific metaphysics is in effect carrying out a programme based on entirely ``extrascientific'' principles. It is wrong to take for granted the assertions of the positivists that their philosophy is free from metaphysics as the premises of positivism, unlike those of other forms of philosophy, are allegedly self-evident. Positivism is shy of declaring and exposing to analysis the postulates underlying the entire system of its arguments.
The metaphysical content of the philosophy of science is admitted retrospectively by the positivists themselves. It has become a peculiar tradition with the positivist philosophers to accuse their predecessors of metaphysicism, inconsistency in the struggle with metaphysics, various concessions to metaphysics and deviations from the principle of ``neutrality'' in philosophy. Spencer reproached Comte for concessions to metaphysics, the Machists are advancing similar charges against both of them. As regards the neo-positivists, they are laying claims to a final break with metaphysics which allegedly has never been banished completely from the writings of all positivist philosophers. Defending the concept of phenomenalistic analysis, Gustav Bergman reproaches physicalists for their inclination to metaphysics, which term, as it transpires, he applies to some of their materialistic statements. Even within logical positivism itself the palm of the __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4-1152 49 most consistent fighter against metaphysics is claimed now by one, now by another of its representatives.
It will be shown later that despite all attempts of positivism to discard such problems as the relation of man to being, consciousness to matter, interdependence of space, time and movement, causality, the nature of contradictions, etc. it is in fact unable to ignore them altogether and has to tackle them in one way or another, often in a disguised form. Moreover, the more persistent the attempts of each new generation of positivist philosophers to dismiss the above problems as metaphysical and nonsensical, the more obvious their importance for science and philosophy. All positivist theories invariably started from some sort of denunciation---be it the denunciation of metaphysics, idealism, dualism or materialism. Yet all their criticism designed to clear the way for the new ``scientific'' methodology always contains in a hidden form some positive, assertory elements.
The metaphysics of positivism is all the more dangerous as it is concealed behind loud phrases about the need to fight it and rid science of the cobweb of the past. The oversimplified idea of scientific knowledge and the disregard of its hierarchical multilayer structure, as well as the primitive understanding of the nature of the scientific reflection of the world that leaves no room for the throbbing thought proved detrimental to positivism even in its self-evaluation and prevented it from understanding the hidden purpose of its own dogmas. Not only did positivism fail to uncover its social face and state its social aims, it proved unable even to define its 50 place in the general process of cognition. The hidden part of the positivist programme, its basic general postulates covered up by loud and pretentious declarations have never been brought to light for open examination. Yet for the purpose of this analysis it is advisable that acquaintance be made of these ghosts of metaphysics kept from the public eye in the backyard.
A curious paradox with the positivist philosophy, besides its unhappy relations with science, consists in that in its struggle against metaphysics (which happened to be now the speculations of German classical philosophy, now the philosophical principles of classical science, i.e. mechanistic materialism, now Freudism, now dialectical materialism which has synthesised the most valuable achievements of progressive philosophical thought), positivism at all the stages of its evolution has invariably found itself in a snare of metaphysical concepts, sometimes not a bit more elaborate than those of the 18th-century materialism or Hegel's idealistic dialectics.
Incidentally, the metaphysical fallacies of German classical philosophy and the Enlighteners' materialism have at least the justification that their speculativeness was partly a result of the immaturity of science and social relations ruling out the possibility of the profound, truly scientific understanding of the laws and tendencies of social development. But can there be any justification for positivism wallowing in metaphysics and idealism at our time when philosophy became a branch of science way back in the middle of the 19th century, when the problem of the relationship between philosophy and special __PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 sciences has been successfully solved and they have developed their own powerful means of theoretical investigation?
If Minerva's night-flying owl had ventured to make its appearance in broad daylight, it would have inevitably struck against various obstacles and could have hardly become the ancient symbol of wisdom. Positivism, unlike the mythological bird, has appeared too late to win the scientists' faith for long and become the foundation of scientific knowledge. It has never, even in the days of its so-called triumphs, been able to overcome the somewhat ironic attitude of the scientists to most of its claims.
Positivism combines in itself the belated faith in empirical science which was the foundation of the industrial power of capitalism in the 18th century with the youthful illusions of its ideologists that the prosperity of capitalist society was inseparable from scientific progress. Yet it is already infected with early scepticism in the anticipation of its inevitable decline and does not believe either in science, industry or in human values. The metaphysical principles making the foundation of positivist philosophy are similar to those metaphysical doctrines which were characteristic- of both the 19th-century's idealistic philosophy and mechanistic materialism. How can they tally with the latest versions of positivism, with its refined ``logic of scientific discovery'', ``semantic philosophy'', pseudo-scientific terms such as ``explication'', ``denotation'', ``verification'' and the like?
The rejection by positivism of such traditional philosophical problems as the relationship of consciousness to being, spirit to nature is by no means 52 tantamount to the rejection of idealistic and materialistic metaphysics. Just like in the case of Machism which claimed to rise above the antithesis between materialism and idealism with the help of ``neutral world elements'', ``introjection'', ``the principal of coordination'', ``economy of thought'', it simply means that the only object of scientific investigation is, according to positivism, the scientists' sensory experience, which allegedly does not represent any metaphysical, transcendental reality. The true significance of the empirical theory of verification advanced by neo-positivism consisted in that its adherents, despite all their anti-metaphysical declarations, were forced in the end to revert to the traditional, essentially metaphysical, problem of philosophy ---that of the basic, ultimate elements of knowledge. Instead of the objective reality the title ``absolute'' was conferred on sensations. According to the positivists, man's activity proceeds not in real space and time, but within the narrow confines of logical formulae binding the sensory experience. Man is incapable of breaking out of the jail built by positivist philosophers.
The mystification of the relation of knowledge to reality is characteristic of all idealistic philosophy which regards the world as the materialisation of an ideal form, as logic incarnate represented in language. Carnap, like Berkeley, Hume and any other subjective idealist, puts the true relation of knowledge to objective reality upside down. He starts his analysis not from objective reality, but from the logical structure of the language as it exists today, i.e. the language which has already taken a definite shape and is no longer a living organism, In other words, the 53 accumulated factual material represented in the modern language is the eternal truth---not relative, inaccurate, approximate, but Her Majesty Reality personified. To be intelligible, reality must have the same parameters as the logical structure of language. Man cannot go beyond the facts arranged in accordance with the logical structure of language. Such transcendence would call for a truly mystic ability to adandon the sphere of language and intellect.
According to Ayer, for instance, the world is a ``logical structure'' made up of sensations, which, in his modernised parlance, are called ``sensuous content''. Since the ``sensuous content'' is inseparable from the forms in which it is expressed, we are unable to pass beyond the bounds of even our statements of sensations. Ayer does not deny the existence of material objects, yet such existence, in his opinion, cannot be proved with the same certainty as the existence of sensuous images.
In the positivist picture of the world, like in a frequently staged play, the action always follows one and the same pattern set by the producer: subject to change are only the actors, i.e. concrete facts. Not only do the present logical schemes substitute for real relations between objects which are infinitely richer, more complex and contradictory than their logical counterparts; no less important is the fact that such schemes turn out to be even more speculative than the natural-philosophical doctrines of the 18th century, except that they take into account some results of the scientific progress during the past two centuries. In other words, the artificial positivist schemes ignore the crucial fact that the 54 logical links and relations are by no means identical with the real ones.
Positivism sees its main task in binding together the ultimate elements of scientific knowledge rather than in searching for them. Nevertheless, such elements do have to be defined, if only vaguely. The more resolute the opposition of positivism to objective reality as something that stands behind the ``elements'' and is different from them, the more it turns these elements into the ``absolute source'' of knowledge. By the ultimate elements of knowledge logical positivism understands ``facts''. For all the ambiguity of this term which can denote both the fragments of objective reality and events registered by language, the so-called facts are turned into an absolute similar to Mach's ``neutral world elements'' or Berkeley's sensations. The certitude of these original sources of knowledge does not need any further confirmation---it is self-evident. All other structures of knowledge rest on this solid foundation given directly in experience.
Wittgenstein's selected propositions such as ``the world is all that has place'', ``the world is an aggregate of facts, but not things'', the ``atom fact is the connection of objects (things)'', ``objects make the substance of the world and therefore cannot be composite'', are in fact nothing but vaguely defined ontology not much different from that of Hume or Berkeley: it is the ontology of ``atom events'' given in sensations. The only difference consists, perhaps, in that in the ontology of the classics the atoms are connected by association, through the agency of mental links, whereas in logical positivism the connection must be purely logical.
55Positivism takes for granted Hume's doctrine that the laws of science do not moan anything but habitual concomitance of events (conjunction of facts) and sets itself the task of showing the soundness of this. It has also borrowed the empiricist concept of ``observation'' as a simple self-evident act which only calls for distinguishing the observation of objects from the observation of their properties. Observation is not only the initial, but also the final point of cognition, since the only method of the verification of knowledge is also observation.
Hence, it would not be correct to regard the positivist doctrine as free from any ontology. Recognising that observation represents something that exists independent of man and his consciousness, positivism projects outside the result of observation. The positivist philosopher's world appears to be made up of separate, unconnected objects united only by some kind of affinity which, incidentally, is taken for granted and requires no explanation. These logically independent and empirically indifferent facts are joined with one another solely through the relation of similarity, just as distinctions are the only form of their separation.
Consequently, each object can change without affecting the properties of other objects or can remain immutable despite the existing alternatives. This, however, is not the premise, but rather the conclusion following from the logical independence of statements of facts. In Ayer's doctrine all facts are particular or represent conjunctions of separate events so that any generalisation of such facts can only be purely formal. Causality has no other empirical basis than 56 permanent conjunction since, according to Ayer, there can be no obvious links between them. Hence, relations between facts can only be external. Even if one speaks of ``internal relations'', the phrase can only mean a combination of simple elements as component parts of larger objects. Ayer avers that even if the process of identifying an element in the system carries some reference to other elements, there will be no two elements of which it can be said that they are necessarily related, and this is as much as Hume's argument requires.
Hence, the obvious paradox consists in that positivism, despite its own declarations about the need to overcome metaphysics and free philosophy from myths and Utopias remains itself metaphysical and even a mythological system substituting speculative logical schemes both for objective reality and for the real processes of cognition.
Advocating a strictly scientific approach to knowledge and demanding the elimination of all a priori propositions from scientific analysis, ' the positivists proceed from a very definite system of values which were established way back in the ideological battles with scholastic metaphysics. We shall yet have not one opportunity to see that positivism, even in its latest forms, has not been averse to the classical tradition in philosophy and in science in general. On the contrary, it has proved its strong affinity, remote in time but not in spirit, for this tradition, attempting to reconcile Locke's and Hume's views, incompatible in many respects as they are.
The inherent metaphysics of positivist philosophy, incapable of critical self-analysis, combines in itself some characteristic features of 57 18th-century natural philosophy and mechanistic materialism manifesting themselves in the irresistible urge of positivism towards formal simplicity, rigidity and completeness of scientific knowledge, with the principles of Hume's and Berkeley's subjective-idealistic philosophy underlying the positivist absolutisation of empirical facts regarded as the only source of self-evident certitude and the true foundation of scientific knowledge. Indeed, beware of metaphysics!
The widely advertised neutrality of positivist philosophy is in fact nothing but a philosophical eclecticism leading inevitably to idealism, just as the proclaimed freedom from metaphysics is nothing but a smokescreen for more subtle metaphysics. Lucien Seve has justly observed that ``positivism is a typical form of the decline of metaphysics which has not yet managed to find its way to scientific = materialism''.^^1^^ It stands to reason that the inner contradictions of positivism inherent in its basic dogmas, let alone the contradictions between the premises and conclusions, could not but lead positivism from one crisis to another and stimulated its attempts to find a way out with the help of one or another stopgap theory. The philosophy of science was bound in the end to reject the positivist programme of struggle against metaphysics and give up attempts to discard all general problems pertaining to being, nature, society and thinking. It is not surprising, therefore, that the tendency towards the revival of ``metaphysics'' has at last prevailed in the philosophy of science itself.
_-_-_^^1^^ L. S\`eve, La philosophie française contemporaine, Editions sociales, Paris, 1962, p. 294.
58 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. METAPHYSICSOne of the radical attempts to solve the problem of the relationship between science and metaphysics on a non-positivist basis has been undertaken by Karl Popper, a prominent English philosopher, who proposed a doctrine of the structure and development of scientific knowledge and gave it the name of ``critical rationalism''. It is noteworthy that the main principles of his doctrine, alternative in a way to logical positivism, were developed by Popper within the walls of its citadel---the Vienna Circle. The ideas of Popper who had been a member of this circle from its very foundation foreshadowed, as it were, the inevitable crisis and disintegration of the new school long before it reached the peak of its glory when nothing seemed to betoken the impending end.
From the very beginning Popper was a severe critic of the new trend in the philosophy of science which was budding within the Vienna Circle among the philosophers and natural scientists interested in the logic and methodology of science. However, Popper was no alien in this circle, though there is an obvious tendency now to leave this fact out of account in considering his relation to logical positivism. Popper's alliance with the new school was by no means accidental even if we put aside his formal membership of the Vienna Circle. One could evidently speak of a certain difference of opinions concerning the means, yet the aim as such was undoubtedly common. This is true at least of the early period of Popper's activity when he advocated 59 the restructuring of scientific knowledge on the basis of an empiricist interpretation of its laws and categories and underscored the need for complete elimination of metaphysics from scientific studies. Hence, not only did he identify himself with the tasks set by logical positivism in that early period of his research, but he strove wholeheartedly to solve them in a most consistent and effective manner.
True, the way which Popper considered to be the most expedient and logically sound fell off the tracks chosen by most of the other adherents of the Vienna Circle. Giving him credit for scientific intuition one ought to note that he sensed the inherent weakness of the verification theory when it was still in the cradle and discerned the seeds of contradictions bound to undermine this theory when it was to start revealing its philosophical content, particularly when the principles proclaimed by the Vienna Circle were to be applied to the problems of real scientific cognition.
In his polemics with logical positivism Popper stressed, not without reason, that modern physical theories were too abstract, even speculative, to meet in any degree the criterion of verification. This criterion, according to which the truth of any theoretical statement must be confirmed by direct experience, could not provide reliable guidelines even for a most general appraisal of their scientific value. All attempts to reduce them to experimental data and to show that such statements, if only in the field of classical mechanics, were based on direct observation have proved to be futile. Even the basic laws making the backbone of a theory were too remote from what was called the empirical 60 foundation of science. On the other hand, the treatises devoted to dreams and spiritualistic seances appeared at first sight much closer to everyday experience than theoretical propositions and even seemed to use something like the induction method which held undivided sway in empiricist natural science.
Popper also noted the fact that many scientific theories had originated from myths. It was yet another proof that there existed no sharp demarcation between science and metaphysics, particularly in terms of the verification theory. According to Popper, Copernicus's heliocentric theory of the Universe was inspired by the neo-Platonists' worship of the Sun which they placed in the centre of the Universe. Ancient atomistics was another example of a myth that played an extremely important role in the development of science. As opposed to logical positivism which reduced the difference between science and metaphysics to the difference between meaningful and senseless propositions, Popper underscored already in his first mature works that the problem of meaningfulness and senselessness was a pseudo-problem. Metaphysics, according to Popper, was neither a science nor a set of nonsensical assertions. Hence, already in the early period of his ideological evolution Popper held a different view of metaphysics than the founders of the Vienna school influenced to a considerable extent by Wittgenstein's and Schlick's ideas.
According to the ``verification version'' of logical positivism, the criterion of the scientific value of different forms of human knowledge is their confirmability by inductive methods: an assertion can only be regarded scientifically 61 (empirically) valid if it can be confirmed by inductive methods or an inductive = inference.^^1^^ As regards a theoretical proposition, it must permit logical reduction to a protocol statement confirmable by an experiment. The basic distinction of Popper's criterion of scientific knowledge from the verification principle consisted in that he regarded refutability (or ``falsifiability'') and not confirmability as the main characteristic feature of a scientific statement. Hence, Popper's solution of the problem of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific assertions is the direct logical opposite of the neopositivistic criterion. The immunity, even if only thinkable, of a proposed hypothesis against refutation is a sure sign of its metaphysical nature. A system of assertions can only be considered scientific if it is at least capable of being at variance with observation. From this it follows that the verifiability of a theory coincides not with its confirmability, but with its refutability, and this is just what makes the difference between science and ``nonscience''. For instance, the existence of God, according to Popper, is asserted in approximately _-_-_
^^1^^ The weakness of empiricism and inductivism as methodological concepts was noted long ago. The most exhaustive assessment of these trends was given by Engels who, in particular, wrote in his Dialectics of Nature: ``These people have got into such a dead-lock over the opposition between induction and deduction that they reduce all logical forms of conclusion to these two, and in so doing do not notice that they (1) unconsciously employ quite different forms of conclusion under those names, (2) deprive themselves of the whole wealth of forms of conclusion in so far as it cannot be forced under these two, and (3) thereby convert both forms, induction and deduction, into sheer nonsense'' (Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.~226).
62 this form: God is because he is. Since this statement is practically tautological, the degree of its confirmability is very high. Yet it is quite obvious that a statement, of this kind is completely immune from refutation and is, therefore, non-scientific.Popper's argument against the verification principle and in favour of his ``falsification'' criterion are serious enough, though not at all as original as he claims. Putting aside the author's pretence, let us take a more close look at his arguments against the ``verification version'' of anti-metaphysical philosophy.
First, Popper contends that observation is always preceded by certain theoretical assumptions and scientific knowledge, contrary to the positivist concept, does not start with sensory experience. Second, the traditional problem of empiricism, that of the substantiation of the inductive conclusion, derives, according to Popper, from Hume's error concerning the nature of the scientific method. In Popper's opinion, Hume indeed showed that a theory cannot be 'deduced logically from observation statements, yet he overlooked a very important circumstance: his arguments do not prove that a theory cannot be refuted by observation. Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the positivists, empirical generalizations are immaterial for scientific cognition. A scientist is usually not guided by generalised observations, but makes a resolute step and puts forward bold proposals which are subject to subsequent empirical verification. Popper maintains that scientists test new theories not in an attempt to deduce them from a certain imaginary basis, but by creating experimental 63 situations whereby they try to refute or falsify them.
One cannot but admit that Popper did pinpoint the vulnerable spot of empiricism. Yet the full significance of his criticism can only be assessed in the light of the programme which he proposes as an alternative. It may seem at first sight that his epistemological principles are radically different from those of positivism. Indeed, according to Popper, ``knowledge cannot start from nothing---from a tabula rasa---nor yet from observation. The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the modification of earlier knowledge. Although we may sometimes, for example in archaeology, advance through a chance observation, the significance of the discovery will usually depend upon its power to modify our earlier theories.''^^1^^
Refutation in science, according to Popper, is a motive force of progress---a refuted hypothesis gives place to another one intended to eliminate or avoid the error. Some conclusion ensuing from an adopted theory or from a hypothesis may be refuted---this will cause the scientists to improve and transform the theory or the hypothesis. It may also happen that the very premises of a theory will prove to be invalid---in that case the theory should be resolutely rejected. In any case, a scientist himself must always strive to subject his hypotheses to severe criticism as it stimulates continuous progress of science. ``Refute!'' _-_-_
^^1^^ K.~R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Harper and Row Publishers, New York and Evanston, 1963, p.~28; see also Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960.
64 ---calls Popper on scientists. A refutation, in his opinion, is a scientist's victory since any act of rejection represents the essence of sciencof elimination of errors and perpetual progress e: knowledge.According to Popper, the test of a theory amounts in fact to an attempt to refute it, and refutability is the fundamental property of scientific knowledge, whereas the critical spirit is one of the basic characteristics of scientific life, the ethical imperative, so to speak, of a scientist's behaviour. In assessing a hypothesis a scientist should first of all decide whether it lends itself to a critical examination and, if so, whether it is capable of withstanding a critical charge. Newton's theory, says Popper, predicted a deviation of the Sun's planets from Kepler's orbits owing to their interaction and thereby exposed itself to a possibility of being refuted by experience. Einstein's theories were tested in a similar manner as the conclusions they suggested did not follow from Newton's theory.
By contrast with the metaphysicians striving for an ever broader generalisation and confirmations of their ideas, the scientists do not seek a high degree of probability of their assertions or, to be more precise, it is not their main aim. The more a statement asserts, the less probable it is, says Popper. For instance, a theory giving exact quantitative predictions in relation to the splitting of lines in the atom emission spectrum under the influence of magnetic fields of different intensity is more vulnerable to experimental refutation than a theory predicting merely the effect of a magnetic field on such emission. In that respect, according to Popper, the __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5---1152 65 more definite and refutable a theory is the more verifiable it also is, as it lends itself to more accurate and exacting tests. In other words, contrary, for instance, to Carnap, Popper maintains that a high degree of verifiability cannot represent the aim of science. If that were so, the scientists would confine themselves to tautological statements alone. Actually, however, their task consists in developing science, i.e. in enriching its content, and that is bound to lower the probability of its propositions.
As we see, Popper presents rather a dramatic picture of the evolution of science which consists essentially in a continuous struggle of theories and in the survival of the fittest. Unlike Carnap who regarded the victory of a theory to be in no way damaging to the prestige of its rivals, Popper maintains that the triumph of one hypothesis inevitably spells the doom of all others. With Carnap, scientific theories move in a respectable and civilised society, whereas Popper sees them waging relentless struggle for existence in which the rise of a theory can only be achieved by ``murdering'' its opponent. Explaining his understanding of the difference between science and ``metaphysics'', Popper used to say that a believer perishes together with his false convictions, whereas a scientist sacrifices his creation, a theory, for the sake of the progress of science.
As regards each individual scientific theory, it begins, according to Popper, with a problem. Then follows a tentative solution, a conjecture, criticism and correction of errors. The tentative solution may prove partly or even completely erroneous. Yet this does not mean, says Popper, 66 that a scientist is entitled to a deliberate error. To avoid it, he must, first of all, look deeper into the problem and ``comprehend'' it. And how can he do this? Popper says: ``To understand a problem means to understand its difficulties, and to understand its difficulties means to understand why it is not easily soluble---why the more obvious solutions do not = work.''^^1^^ The step that follows a tentative solution consists in discussing and criticising the theory. At this stage everybody tries to find faults with it, to refute it or to correct the errors. Popper writes: ``The critical attitude may be described as the conscious attempt to make our theories, or conjectures, suffer in our stead in the struggle for the survival of the fittest. It gives us a chance to survive the elimination of an inadequate hypothesis---when a more dogmatic attitude would eliminate it by eliminating = us.''^^2^^
This attitude, according to Popper, is true of the animal, pre-scientific and scientific knowledge and, consequently, characterises the mechanism of its evolution in general. A specific feature of scientific knowledge consists in that the struggle for existence in human society becomes more difficult because of conscious and systematic criticism.
In Popper's opinion, one can only speak of any progress in science (as well as of the demarcation line between science and metaphysics) in connection with the possibility of falsification. _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p.~260.
^^2^^ Challenges to Empiricism, Ed. by Harold Morick, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Ltd., Belmont, California, 1972, p.~149.
__PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__ 5* 67 Popper's falsification concept is closely linked with his peculiar notions of the genealogical tree of knowledge. If we take a tree in its natural position, i.e. with its crown up, for a model of the evolutionary process, we shall have, according to Popper, the picture of the development of applied sciences, since they are characterised by the ever increasing diversification and specialisation. Yet to visualise the development of pure knowledge, of fundamental sciences, one should set the tree with the crown down, since the leading tendency in the sphere of pure knowledge consists in the growing integration and unification of theories.From the epistemological viewpoint, Popper's concept is different from the traditional empiricist stand only in that it dismisses the question of the source of knowledge, since the logic of a scientific discovery which is what Popper's epistemology boils down to, does not concern itself with questions of this kind. In point of fact, this question lies on the other side of the demarcation line which Popper draws between science and metaphysics. Yet even within the narrow limits of a purely logical model of the process of cognition Popper's concept gives rise to serious contradictions. Indeed, in investigating the relation between knowledge in general and a concrete discovery or theory one must answer at least two questions: (1) which element of knowledge and at which stage of its maturity is taken as the basic proposition; (2) which proposition in a given specific case can be confirmed or refuted with the help of an experiment. The second question remains, in fact, unanswered by Popper. As regards the first one, the answer is as follows: 68 the initial, basic propositions are a product of arbitrary convention among scientists. Popper does not deny the connection of basic propositions with experience. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery he writes that the decision to adopt a basic proposition stands in causal relation to our sense perceptions. Experience, according to Popper, can only go to the extent of motivating a decision which is needed for the adoption or rejection of a proposition. Yet any attempt to trace basic propositions to perceptions would be entirely fruitless.
As we see, despite the ostensible opposition to empiricism, Popper's concept reveals a curious similarity to logical positivism in at least two aspects: (1) in its tendency to limit the subject-matter of epistemology to purely logical problems and to reject some general problems (e.g. the problem of the source of knowledge); (2) Popper, like the leading theorists of the Vienna school, is forced to resort to conventionalism when it comes to explaining the origin of basic propositions, though he substitutes conventionalism ``from below'' for the traditional conventionalism ``from above'' used by logical positivism in its attempt to account for scientific laws and theories. Popper's conventionalism is a result of his far-reaching logicism, leading to the dismissal of philosophical and sociological problems of science as insoluble. The basic propositions introduced by Popper are intended to replace the protocol statements of the Vienna school and differ from them in that they reflect a system of conventional knowledge rather than the transient individual experience.
The rational kernel in Popper's criticism of the 69 verification theory consists in that Popper considers science as an endless chain of theories that replace one another. He effects a radical change in the traditional orientation of the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. Having started with the investigation into the rules of refutation of scientific theories, Popper made the progress of science the pivotal point of his concept. The problem of the criterion of scientificity now organically merges with the concept of the development of science: crises in science, i.e. the collapse of traditional theories are declared to be inherent in the main postulates of the logic of scientific development. The new logic of science is a logic of scientific discovery, of the radical transformation of the existing systems of knowledge. Popper has shifted the focus of attention from the formal logical analysis of systems and propositions to the problem of the logical reconstruction of historical events in scientific development.
In his person the logic of science has made a step towards the history of science in the hope of creating a new tradition in the analysis of scientific knowledge. New horizons have been opened up before logic both in terms of theory and heuristics. Popper's logical notions show a clear tendency towards historicism in the presentation of scientific progress. Historical analysis, of course, would have been highly helpful in the solution of such problems as the criterion of scientific theories, the role of philosophical knowledge in the development of science, and many others. But such analysis proved to be beyond Popper's possibilities. Logicism has got the better of his aspirations.
70Development, a traditional metaphysical problem, has also been treated with reference to scientific knowledge by Thomas S. Kuhn, who gave it even a more pronounced anti-positivist turn.
In opposition to Popper, Kuhn put forward a thesis that scientific development cannot be explained by means of rational logical notions in principle. The sharp controversy that was initiated by his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first published in 1972 is still unabated centering around Kuhn's polemics with Popper's school. This polemics is playing rather an important role in weakening the positions of ``critical rationalism''.
A crucial feature of scientific life which, according to Kuhn, was ignored by Popper, consists in the presence of some ``dogmatic'' elements in the scientists' work which bolster up their faith in the success of their investigations and help them to persist in their studies without arguing with their colleagues. As distinct from Popper who underscores the significance of criticism in science, Kuhn emphasises the function of dogma in scientific investigation. Contrary to Popper, who avers that bold refutations and tough competition of theories pave the way for scientific progress, Kuhn sees the starting point of progress in a transition from debates and competitive theories to a common viewpoint shared by all specialists.
According to Kuhn, the true creator of science is the scientific community, a group of professionals who decide to adopt a certain scientific achievement or theory as a model and make it a basis for their investigations. No scientific community can start investigating natural phenomena 71 without a definite system of generally recognised notions. Such a system of notions also includes certain metaphysical propositions or models of the type: ``heat is kinetic energy of particles making a body'' or ``all perceptible phenomena are essentially interaction of qualitatively homogeneous atoms in free space'', etc. Within the scientific community a model theory is a paradigm, whereas the study of nature within the framework of a paradigm is ``normal science''. If there is a paradigm, the solution of concrete scientific problems resembles the solution of puzzles: the scientist has a model of the solution (the paradigm), the rules to be followed, and knows that the problem is soluble. The conditions being set, his success depends on his personal ingenuity. The secret of scientific achievements lies largely in the self-organisation of the scientific community. No other professional group has succeeded to such an extent in fencing itself off from everyday life and laymen's questions as the scientific community. To be sure, such isolation can never be complete, yet it is very essential. A scientist always does his individual research with an eye to his colleagues in the first place, whereas a poet or a writer addresses a non-professional audience and depends to a great extent on its appreciation. ``Just because he is working only for an audience of colleagues, an audience that shares his own values and beliefs, the scientist can take a single set of standards for = granted,''^^1^^ writes Kuhn. He does not even have to select his problems--- they themselves are waiting for him.
_-_-_^^1^^ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p.~164.
72However, this is only the first stage of the scientific process. The next stage consists in a break-down of old paradigms, a crisis and a formation of a new paradigm. It is a period of extraordinary investigations and controversy leading to the development of the new principles of investigation and to the creation of a new picture of the world. The main task of this period is to select a theory that would play the role of a paradigm. This selection, according to Kuhn, is not a logical problem as it appears to logicians. The criterion for the selection lies in a socio-psychological sphere: the scientific community selects for a paradigm the theory which appears to be best suited to ensure the ``normal'' functioning of the scientific mechanism. Therefore each critical period gives way to a new upsurge of creative activity and another step forward in the onward march of natural science. To an individual scientist, however, a change of basic theories (paradigms) is tantamount to conversion to a new faith: he feels like entering a new world with entirely different objects, notions, problems and tasks.
Hence, a scientific revolution consists essentially in a change of paradigms. This change does not yield to rational explanation in terms of logic as it is rooted in the professional feeling of the scientific community: either the community possesses the necessary means for solving ``puzzles'', or, if such means are not available, the community has to create them.
The main turning points in the history of science are associated with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein. According to Kuhn, each of these turning points signified 73 that a group of professional scientists had to discard one age-old theory in favour of another incompatible with the former.
Paradoxical as it may seem, Popper's logical concept of scientific revolutions and of the downfall of famous theories has been constructed on the basis of the same historical material. In this connection Kuhn justly observed that Popper had no reason for characterising all scientific activity in the terms applicable to its rare revolutionary periods only.
The severity of the test criteria referred to by Popper is only one side of the medal, the other one being the tradition of ``normal'' science, the solution of ``puzzles''. Subject to testing is not the basic theory, but the scientist's conjecture, his ingenuity. An erroneous conjecture is a setback for the scientist, but not for his paradigm.
Popper's idea of the ``elimination of errors'' which accompanies a change of theories is yet another concept which meets Kuhn's resolute opposition. Popper regarded as erroneous Ptolemy's geocentric astronomy, the flogiston theory, Newton's mechanics. Kuhn refuses to accept this point of view: no ``error'' has been committed in the development of these theories and the notion of error in general is absolutely irrelevant in the assessment of an obsolete scientific theory. In his opinion, the most one can say in such cases is that a theory which had once been correct later became erroneous, or that a scientist made a mistake by adhering to a theory too long.
In the final analysis the basic distinction between Popper's and Kuhn's concepts lies in their different understanding of the nature of science and progress. Popper has repeatedly emphasised 74 the need to cast off ``psychologism'' in the solution of such problems. He was never tired of repeating that his concern was the logical rules of scientific progress rather than the scientists' psychological incentives; yet he could not but admit that the rules of logic followed by scientists in their investigations are something like their professional imperatives. In contrast to Popper, Kuhn contends that such imperatives alone can account for a scientist's selection of one solution instead of another and that his preference cannot be explained on purely logical or experimental grounds. In other words, it is only the analysis of socio-psychological factors in the development of science that provides a key to the correct understanding of the historical aspects of scientific progress. Popper's science is impersonal whereas Kuhn strives to introduce a ``human element'' into the logical problems of scientific cognition and highlights its sociological and psychological aspects. Both concepts, however, are completely divorced from the problem of the interaction between philosophy and particular sciences. Moreover, Kuhn even makes a special point of substantiating this indifference. A question, naturally, arises if such an abstraction in the investigation of the history of science is justifiable and if it is not likely to distort the true picture of scientific progress.
A serious attempt to save the logical tradition in the analysis of historical changes in science was made by Popper's disciple Imre Lakatos, a prominent representative of critical rationalism and a talented expounder of his school's principles.
Lakatos holds that it is necessary to discard 75 completely the tradition of logical positivism which focused on formal logical means in the analysis of scientific = knowledge.^^1^^ He shares Popper's opinion that the only way in the investigation of the logic of science is to turn to the real practice of scientific thinking. To substantiate this view he shows that even mathematics which has long been regarded as the main bastion of the adherents of formal logical analysis needs the substantive analysis of its history so as to get a basis for the development of the logical and methodological scheme of scientific discovery.
Each time the historical process of scientific cognition reveals a need for a change in the existing system of knowledge there appears a possibility for different strategies and for different ways of development. Being always faced with the necessity of ``casting lots'' in selecting one of the alternatives that would prove the most beneficial for further scientific progress, the scientists never stop seeking for a guideline. This guideline, according to Lakatos, must be provided by the modern logic of science. It is precisely for this reason that it should break off with the tradition of formalism. Formal logical analysis deals with deductive, formalised theories which represent science in the artificially ``frozen'' state, whereas the real object of logical analysis and explanation should be the methods and mechanisms of changes in the structure of knowledge. Criticism gives scientists a rich ``situation logic'', i.e. opens up a broad range of possible lines of behaviour in different situations.
_-_-_^^1^^ See I.~Lakatos, ``Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic'', in: The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 325--30.
76Lakatos points out that Popper's solution of the ``demarcation'' puzzle and his criterion of scientific knowledge have brought about a radical change in the very formulation of the problem. After Popper, the logical appraisal of a scientific theory turned in fact into the analysis of conditions under which a given theory or hypothesis can be adopted for scientific use. In other words, Popper's new approach to the traditional problems of the logic of science brought to the forefront the question of the acceptability of a scientific theory or a hypothesis. According to Popper, a theory can only be accepted as scientific if it is falsifiable. Lakatos, however, regards this criterion as only one of the requirements a theory must meet in order to become acceptable.
Kuhn's controversy with Popper about scientific revolutions raised the crucial question of the possibility of representing the endless change of fundamental scientific theories as a rational process interpretable in terms of logic. As for Lakatos, his main object was to give a logical explanation of the victory of a new paradigm. He is firmly convinced that logic is capable of giving the scientist a rational guideline for his behaviour during a ``critical'' period in the development of science. Proceeding from this aim, Lakatos develops his concept known as the ``methodology of research programmes''.
Lakatos sides with Kuhn in his criticism of Popper's rule: ``having falsified---reject!''. According to Lakatos, the comparison of a theory with the results of an experiment is a more complex procedure than Popper originally thought it to be. This comparison involves, as it were, three ``layers'' of knowledge: (1) the theory under test 77 itself; (2) the sensory data explained by the theory (for instance, the light images observed with the help of an optical instrument); (3) the so-called background knowledge embodied, for instance, in the instrument design. We cannot know what the experiment demonstrates and how it can pass a final judgement on the theory under test. Rather, says Lakatos, we subject to testing a tangle of our theories and the experiment's verdict is: ``incompatible''. Which of the theories must be rejected is still a big question. Generally speaking, there are no absolutely indisputable facts which would compel an ardent adherent of a theory to surrender immediately and unconditionally. On these grounds Lakatos comes to the conclusion that a theory cannot be invalidated by a single empirical counter-example. Its rejection can only come about in the process of adoption of a new, better theory.
Broadly speaking, it means that the true object of a logical evaluation is a series of theories in their succession rather than an individual theory. Several series cluster around propositions playing the role of something like a dogma---here, according to Lakatos, Kuhn was right. It can therefore be affirmed with good reason that the scientists in their investigations of nature translate into reality some more or less developed ``programmes''.
Lakatos understands science as activity aimed at solving concrete problems within the framework of a certain programme. Each programme can be viewed as consisting of two components: a rigid core and a safety zone of ``sacrificial'' theories. The rigid core consists of one or several propositions which are not subject to refutation. 78 Such are, for instance, the three laws of thermodynamics and the law of gravitation for the adherents of Newton's theory. These propositions must be preserved under any onslaught of falsifying data. The ``salvation'' of the core is achieved at the expense of auxiliary hypotheses which replace one another and are intended to neutralise counter-examples and preserve the core with the help of various amendments and modifications.
By way of illustration Lakatos refers to Newton's gradual elaboration of his theoretical models.^^1^^ Having first worked out his programme for a planetary system with a fixed point---like the Sun and one single point-like planet, Newton derived his inverse square law for Kepler's ellipse. But this model was forbidden by Newton's own third law of dynamics, therefore the model had to be replaced by one in which both the Sun and the planet revolved round their common centre of gravity. Later he introduced more planets as if there were only heliocentric but no interplanetary forces. However, the results obtained at this stage ran counter to observations, and later Newton worked out the case where the Sun and planets were not mass points but mass-balls and also introduced interplanetary forces. Such multistage elaboration, according to Lakatos, reveals the true course of the scientist's thought.
The history of science, according to Lakatos, is the history of the birth, life and death of research programmes. While a programme is being realised, science runs its normal course---it is Kuhn's ``normal science''. During a change of _-_-_
^^1^^ See Imre Lakatos, ``Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes'', in: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 143--59.
79 programmes, or a change of paradigms, science undergoes a revolution. As distinct from Kuhn, however, Lakatos believes that programmes are logically commensurable and can be compared to one another. Their comparative analysis can provide a scientist with a reasonably reliable guideline for selecting one programme and rejecting another.According to Lakatos, any theoretical concept of knowledge provides a framework for the rational restructuring of the history of scientific knowledge. Though not every detail in the history of science fits in with rational explanation, logico-methodological concepts should provide the closest possible approximation to real processes in order to permit their description. For instance, an inductivist who considers Newton's theory an ``error'', and its lasting prevalence a delusion would find no rational justification for it. Popper's type of logic would provide a rational explanation for a scientist's failure to recognize the collapse of his theory by referring to his metaphysical views. In Lakatos' opinion, preference should be given to a concept which permits the rational restructuring and interpretation of the largest possible number of facts in the history of science. Proceeding from this criterion, Lakatos considers his concepts to be the most expedient. However that may be, his ultimate conclusion is this: it is the history of science which is the touchstone of any logico-methodological concept, its strict and uncompromising judge.
The controversy between the ``critical rationalists'' and the adherents of Kuhn's-concept of the history of science had greatly affected the assessment of the very possibility of constructing a 80 purely logical concept of scientific knowledge and its development. The most sceptical views in relation to this problem were expressed by Paul Feyerabend. In one of his works, after expounding the basic principles of Popper's logic of scientific investigation, Feyerabend puts two questions which he considers to be of prime importance: (1) whether it is desirable to live up to the rules of ``critical rationalism'' and (2) whether science can be brought in accord with these = rules.^^1^^ Feyerabend gives negative answers to both questions.
According to Feyerabend, the highly specialised thinking characteristic of modern civilisation is accountable for a corresponding narrow approach to the study of man's cognitive activity and for a tendency to rationalise the process of cognition by simplifying its participants, strictly delimiting the field under investigation and by abstracting from historical context. Feyerabend contends that such abstraction from the external factors of scientific development becomes fatal for philosophy, since human inclinations, interests and ideological influences have a greater effect on the progress of knowledge than is generally believed. Despite his general opposition to Kuhn's understanding of the nature of scientific activity, Feyerabend, as he himself admitted, had wholeheartedly accepted his thesis of the incommensurability of basic scientific theories that succeed one another in history. Incommensurability was the point on which the views of both authors completely coincided when they were discussing the basic ideas of Kuhn's book. Kuhn was fond of _-_-_
^^1^^ See Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London, 1975.
__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6---1152 81 comparing the world as it appeared to Aristotle with the world depicted by the 17th-century science. Having taken the cue, Feyerabend carries out a detailed comparative analysis of classical celestial mechanics and the special theory of relativity and strives to show that even the concepts of length, mass and speed in these theories were entirely different. According to both Kuhn and Feyerabend, the meaning of observation terms is completely determined by the theoretical context in which they are used. From this it follows that theories replacing one another are mutually incompatible and even incommensurable. They belong to different w